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HISTORY OF FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY

HISTORY OF FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY (1870-1925)

BY

STEPHEN H. ROBERTS, M.A.

RESEARCH FELLOW, UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE

Author of "History of Australian Land Settlement, 1788-1920" (1925);
"Population Problems of the Pacific" (1927)

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CHAPTER X

MADAGASCAR

THE instance of Madagascar is especially instructive in the history of French colonization, because the French were dealing there with a very involved problem, and because the solution was astonishingly successful. Indeed, from the first, Madagascar vied with West Africa in being the most successful colonial venture of France, and, although the island has known nothing of the striking economic advance of Indo-China in recent years, it still remains in the forefront of French colonial annals, especially as concerns the natives. It would be difficult to imagine a native problem more acute and complicated than that of Madagascar in 1895, and equally difficult to envisage a more satisfactory solution. That is what makes Madagascar so important in the history of comparative colonization,—that France introduced there a model state of native policy at least twenty years before such ideas were freely accepted elsewhere. A native policy based on *association*—a “policy of races,” as Galliéni called it—was introduced almost at once; and to France is due much of the credit for working out this phase of indirect rule (even before England’s experiments in Nigeria), and in particular for perfecting those means which are now being emphasized as perhaps the leading props in any system of indirect rule,—viz., development on native lines, a “social taxation” for purposes of native improvement, and vocational education, both agricultural and industrial. Madagascar was thus a laboratory of research in native policy, the lesson being the more striking because it was so opposed to the conventional French theory of rule. It was this that made France successful in Madagascar and that has given the island an importance for the whole French Empire. For instance, the policy adopted in Morocco at a later date was clearly a derivative of that pursued a decade earlier in Madagascar, and the present general theory of “association” found its practical arguments there too. The island was thus, like Algeria, an experimental-station in policy: unlike its Mediterranean prototype, however, it was successful from the beginning, and has played a greater part in directly moulding France’s present native policy than any other French possession, perhaps even more than Tunisia.

I. Events leading to the Conquest

The position before the French conquest was singularly confused. On the central plateau, and largely inaccessible from all sides, was the kingdom of Emyrna or Merina, commonly but quite incorrectly called the Hova Kingdom. These so-called Hovas were Pacific Islanders slung thousands of miles from their proper habitat: at base, they are really Polynesians, diverted in this direction when their fellows in the great age of voyages 2,000 years ago left Malaya for the Pacific. The passing of the centuries involved much Melanesian and later African mixture, but the Hova blood and language and organization remained essentially Polynesian. These olive-coloured *métis* existed in their present form from the fifteenth century and easily exerted a dominance over the surrounding black tribes.

They retained the customary Polynesian organization, but in an accentuated form, because for centuries they were so isolated from outside influences. Accordingly, their social policy was one based on absolute kings and a feudal structure rigidly graduated from nobles to slaves. It was an essentially caste-organization, a curious feature being the absence of private property: the King was the only Malagasy land-owner, an ethnological fact that was most important when the French conquered the land. Gradually these Emyrna or Merina, of whom the Hovas properly speaking were only the second or *bourgeois* caste, merged their many kingdoms into one organization centring round Antananarivo, and, both because of their superior organizing ability and their impregnable position on the key-plateau of the island, spread their hegemony over most of the east. This expansion was accomplished in the eighty years before 1810, so that, when the French came, sufficient time had elapsed for a definite tradition of Hova leadership to grow up,—a fact which the French seized as the basis of their organization.¹

But the impassable nature of the country and the intrinsic weakness of the Hovas made a complete amalgamation of the island out of the question, especially in the inhospitable west and south. It was only in the east coast, where the gentle and idle Betsimisaraka dwelt, that Hova rule extended in detail: even the northern Sakalavas, "the men of the long valleys," consented only to a nominal Hova control and resisted any attempt to convert that control into a reality, for instance, by becoming French allies. In the west and south, the poorer and more mountainous parts of the country, where only a *transhumant* pasture was possible, the country was not worth Hova efforts, nor could

¹ A. and G. Grandidier, *Ethnographie de Madagascar*, 4 vols., 1901-1918; or, for short account, E. F. Gautier, *Madagascar* (1902), p. 335 *et seq.*

they have gone there had they wanted to. As the French found, the most recalcitrant natives of the land were there, hardened by a difficult environment something like that of South Algeria or the Boër steppes,—a land of dour natives and perpetual tribal wars. The Sakalavas, in the west proper, were idle warriors, but lacked stamina and, decimated by disease, were rapidly giving way. Beyond them, as one went south to the almost impenetrable strongholds of the Bara pillagers, a more primitive type of savagery became manifest: the westerners and southerners in the main were thus essentially unproductive brigands, knowing nothing of Hova rule, either actually or in name.²

In all, about a third of the land was under the Hovas, but it must be noted that this was the temperate region, the economic nerve-centre of the whole: they monopolized the economically desirable part, for, contrary to general opinions, Madagascar is not a land of teeming natives and luxurious tropical vegetation,—a magnified Ceylon. To the contrary, save for the central Hova plateau, it is a poor and scantily populated land, and, in the south at least, is positively forbidding. The Hova control, therefore, was more important than its area indicated, and explained why Madagascar, to all intents and purposes, meant Emyrna,—the Hova Kingdom.

For the rest, the so-called kingdom was a savage one, more reminiscent of the *opéra-bouffe* kingdoms of the Pacific than anything else. It was essentially barbaric, so much so that the quasi-modernization of the nineteenth century, by emphasizing the ludicrousness of the innovations, only served to throw the basic savagery into clearer relief. The introduction of the *bric-à-brac* of the civilization of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III (or rather of Victorian drawing-rooms, because it was England who brought the new atrocities to Madagascar!) could not remove the blood-base; and Madagascar was simply a larger Fiji, a lesser Morocco. As Prince Henry of Orleans summed up the position, the Hova kingdom resolved itself into

“a Government which exists only in name and which in reality is only a union of a few families come together to exploit the greatest number,—barbarous princes still capable of human sacrifices and of horrors which it is impossible to describe,—a Queen recognized mistress of an island of which she possesses scarcely half—a people working only enough to live, and certain that to save money is a way to be despoiled,—an administration sold by auction and paying itself from the administered,—and everywhere arbitrariness, anarchy, and, in their train, insecurity.”³

² *Annuaire Général de Madagascar*, 1920–1921, Vol. II, p. 9 *et seq.* See Map No. 17.

³ Henri d'Orleans, *À Madagascar* (1895), p. 77; Malzac, *Histoire du Royaume Hova depuis ses origines jusqu'à sa fin* (1912).

It was with this body, crumbling beneath the insurrections of the semi-subdued subject-races and the disintegration brought about by inconsiderate changes in a policy based on custom, that the French had to deal,—or rather, this body plus the English missionaries and the English mercenaries who, in the intervals between the Zulu wars, found a happy hunting-ground (and less arduous fighting) in the adjacent island.

Madagascar had been linked with French claims for a long time, in the same vague way as the Senegal or the Congo coast. France had claims that were partly legendary, partly historical, and in any case, of little practical importance, unless supported by force,—claims that might serve as the tinsel draperies to hide the mouth of the guns, but which would deceive no sensible person. Louis XIII had taken official possession of Madagascar: Richelieu had given it to the "*Compagnie d'Orient*": a Hungarian adventurer had set up a French kingdom in all of the north, and his success was supposed to be dear to Louis XVI, until he sold out to the Americans: and Napoleon sent two missions there. On this flimsy basis, France erected the structure of her claims over the island. Even the oldest of them was deemed to have been retained; and if, in the aggregate, their array was nothing formidable, they were given a fresh importance in the newer alignment of forces of the nineteenth century. They were rejuvenated, so to speak, and given an importance which their originators would scarcely have conceived.

Nothing could be done, however, until France knew something of this prize that was waiting for the taking. Accordingly, attempts were made to penetrate the interior,—a slow task, because until 1860 there were only a few coastal settlements, mostly on the east. It was Alfred Grandidier (1865–1870) who first made known the island, by his successive explorations of the south and west and then of the central plateau,—the Hova land proper. By this time, the Hovas, who, as has been said, had all of the political sagacity of the Polynesian races, could see the trend of events and had become inveterate enemies of the French. The forces were clearly arrayed: it was the Hovas and the English missionaries aligned against the on-coming French. Under Queen Ranavalona the Cruel, "the female Caligula" (1828 onwards), this policy was definitely shaped, and the Malagasian kingdom threw down its gages. A decree of 1845 submitted all foreigners to local law,—a euphemistic way of making them subject to intolerable *corvées*, slavery for debt, and confinement to the Hova province. A punitive expedition failed, and, since France was not fundamentally concerned with colonial expansion at this time, the country was locked up until the eighties, the withdrawal of the troops seeming to testify to the intrinsic power of the

Hovas and accordingly strengthening them in their definitely recalcitrant attitude.⁴

But this recalcitrance overreached itself, for the Hovas did not realize that their immunity from interference was only one of convenience, to be tolerated as long as they did nothing sufficiently aggravating to prevail against the dominant anti-colonialism in France. After 1881, therefore, when they committed the *faux pas* of going too far, events quickly moved to the protectorate of 1885. In March, 1881, a code was promulgated in Madagascar, and said in the famous "Law 85" that no foreigner was to own land in the country. This at once gave France a *casus belli*, for a treaty of 1868 had definitely conceded this right to Frenchmen. The aim was undoubted: the native rulers were openly embarking on an anti-French course.

As Consul Baudais reported at the close of 1881, "the Hovas have been slowly but cautiously pursuing the same end for several years,—the expulsion of every Frenchman from the country."⁵ Having attacked French private interests, they now turned to the State and denied the French protectorate which had been formed some years previously over the north-western tribes. These were the two outstanding grievances of France: to them was soon added an insensate *furor* against the *vazahas* or Frenchmen, gaining intensity as only an emotional tumult in an Oriental country can. It became unsafe for Frenchmen, and in 1883 the coasts were bombarded in various places and the French occupied Majunga and Tamatave.⁶ At this juncture, however, they were checkmated, and, hampered by the desultory policies of Paris and their own weakness and the fever of Madagascar, they stood still for a couple of years. They could do no more than hold the two coastal posts and maintain a nominal blockade over the north-west. And all the time the frenzy of the Malagasians was increasing against them. Even the school-children were mobilized, and the new Queen, Ranavalona III, cried that she "would not give them the smallest corner of land, not even as much as would cover a grain of rice!"



Meanwhile, in Paris, there had been the usual vacillations. The Ministry knew that the existing position was untenable and that they would either have to occupy the land or withdraw, but, liking neither of these alternatives, tried to stand still,—an impossible policy when the Hovas were mustering forces strong enough to push the fevered French garrisons into the sea and when the English Cabinet, through Lord Lyons, was supporting their attitude and hindering the French

⁴ Livre Jaune, *Affaires du Madagascar*, 1881-1883, p. 4



⁵ Baudais-Gambetta, 13/12/81, in *Affaires du Madagascar*, 1881-1883, p. 8.

⁶ *Affaires du Madagascar*, 1882-1883 (1884), p. 7 *et seq.*

NOTE THE CONCENTRATION ON THE PLAINS.





DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION



NOTE THE LIMIT IMPOSED BY THE MOUNTAINS.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

CONFIGURATION



LANGUAGES





FIG. ROBERTS

at every step. Ferry, as usual, was somewhat hazy and indistinct on the matter. He stopped short of conquest, saying that he was there only for the protection of the French allies, the Sakalavas, and to uphold French nationals and French secular rights; but he would not link up force with the assertion of these rights, save as a remote and unpalatable contingency. Ironically enough, the Right and the extreme Left, the notorious anti-colonials, attacked him for not being sufficiently energetic in asserting France's rights, although obviously they were concerned more with attacking Ferry than supporting a forward policy in Madagascar in itself. The sequence of events was altogether remarkable. With Ferry in power and hesitant about provocative action in Madagascar, the Deputies declared for force by 437 to 26 votes (July, 1884):⁷ with Ferry out of power, the same Deputies a few weeks later vigorously attacked the Malagasian venture, and Ferry as vigorously defended it, literally fighting through the credits as a forlorn hope, as he had done in the case of Tunisia and Tonkin (July, 1885).⁸ This curious juxtaposition obviously justifies a conclusion anent the relative importance of party-quarrels in Paris and the intrinsic issues of Madagascar, and explains why the Hovas were given time to form an army, under English instructors.

In the interim, despite the bombardment and the occupation of the north-west, the Malagasian position had been strengthened, because the discussion in the Deputies had made it clear that the French simply wanted a protectorate over the north-west and were not concerned with the Hova control of Antananarivo. Moreover, the invaders were realizing for their part that the task was more difficult than they had anticipated, so that, hampered by desertions and the ever-present fever, they eagerly adopted the compromise suggested by their consul Baudais,⁹—to recognize the Hova Queen as ruler of the whole land in return for a nominal French protectorate, also over the whole. This would save the face of both parties, and, since it changed the actual position of neither, was acceptable to both. It solved an awkward dilemma by ignoring it and by introducing paper schemes which had no relation to actuality, and thus hurt nobody. Accordingly, the treaty of December 17, 1885,¹⁰ instituted both a French protectorate and an all-Madagascar Queen, both of them purely nominal. France agreed not to interfere in internal matters, but, as a *quid pro quo*, received the control of foreign affairs, the entire

⁷ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 28/3/84, 22/7/84, 31/7/84; Senate, 15/8/84. See de Lanessan's report in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 8/7/84.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Deps., 22-29/7/85 (long debates), especially Ferry in 29/7/85.

⁹ In *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Madagascar*, 1884-1886 (1886), pp. 119, 131.—Baudais-Ferry, 25/10/84 and 25/6/85.

¹⁰ In *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Madagascar*, 1884-1886 (1886), p. 174.

cession of Diégo-Suarez (the seat of the north-western operations), and an indemnity. This was clearly a temporary compromise, however, and solved nothing. On the other hand, it gave both sides a breathing-space, and, in particular, time for the colonials in France to rally,—a much-needed move since the last Malagasian credit had been voted in the Deputies only by a majority of four,¹¹ and since Ferry's fall had implied a ban on colonial ventures. Madagascar thus comes very closely in the wake of Tonkin and Tunisia in the list of colonial experiments in which French action was hindered by the anti-colonial monomania of the mother-country: indeed, it is the unjustified Imperialism and the ridiculously inefficient methods of enforcing it that characterize the whole of these ventures of the Third Republic.

For this breathing-space France had to pay dearly in the years of thwarted effort, when the position became increasingly impossible. The Hovas construed the treaty of 1885 as a victory, and, with the impulsive tactlessness of unsophisticated native rulers, were not content to let well alone. Consequently, the next decade was "one long chafing" for the French. Individual Frenchmen were assassinated and the blame laid on "*Favahalos*" or brigands,—a procedure that grew on itself, as the operation was a pleasure and the attribution of blame a royal jest. More important, there was continual trouble with the subject-tribes, especially in the uncontrolled south and west. The Hova kingdom was quickly crumbling and had to rely on Betsileo conscripts, led to the front chained two by two: and the entire island was soon in a ferment.

Faced with this drift, France clearly had to move one way or the other. "We must sooner or later go to Antananarivo," Baudais reported in 1884 and on several later occasions¹²: a coastal policy was absurd, as it did not touch the fringe of the problem, for "the plateau of Imerina is Madagascar, and so long as the Hovas are there, they are the masters of the island." This was the goal: the existing position was at its last breath, because the treaty of 1885 had been broken in all its branches. It had not given France a protectorate but a right of protection,—quite a different thing: it had not defined the rights of each Power: it had not mentioned the vital matters of land-ownership and economic exploitation, and it was full of equivocations. Indeed, for all practical purposes it did not exist, as there was a difference between the Hova and French texts, and neither side would recognize the validity of the

¹¹ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 25/7/85. Compare dwindling majorities in *Journal Officiel*, Senate, 15/8/84 and 28/12/85, dissentients increasing from 1 to 59. See especially Clemenceau's attacks in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 31/7/85.

¹² Baudais-Ferry, 9/5/84, in *Affaires du Madagascar*, 1884-1886, p. 104.

other's translation. France always had a Grand-Guignol element in her colonial efforts, and nowhere was this more evident than in the Madagascar of 1890,—quarrelling over the verbiage of a treaty with a native government that had practically no existence. As a sign of the breakdown of the compromise, Le Myre de Vilers, the first Resident at Antananarivo (1886–1889), had withdrawn, although, an experienced soldier and administrator, he should have been able to stop there had anyone at all been able to do so, because his collaboration with Chanzy in Algeria and his reforms in Indo-China had elevated him to the front rank of French colonials, and he possessed the useful qualities of humour and *sang-froid* not always known to his fellows in that front rank. But even such a tactful negotiator as M. de Vilers could not avail against the machinations of the English and the limitations of his position, and he withdrew in 1889,¹³—the deciding step. From that moment, intervention was only a matter of time, depending on two factors,—the recognition of the French protectorate by England (achieved in 1890), and the winning-over of the French Parliament, which was not a difficult matter now that the anti-colonialism of the eighties had faded into the period of military expansion.


Gabriel Hanotaux, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, strongly appealed to the Deputies in November, 1894, for a solution of the *impasse*, and, urging both the collapse of the compromise of 1885 and the French need of the plantations and metals of Madagascar, demanded “a protectorate with all its consequences.”¹⁴ He thus provided a rallying slogan, and added a new element,—the economic *motif*. “The Hova Government has constantly made the work of colonization impossible,” he told the Senate¹⁵; and now the idea was not only to avenge the insults to France but to develop the land. Le Myre de Vilers, sent out again as a special plenipotentiary, reported that Hova excitement was so great as to admit only of forceful methods. The position he found was impossible. “To the calculated delays of a dictator were added the weaknesses of a divided oligarchy, which was more concerned with internal quarrels than the destiny of the country. Under these conditions,” he summed up, “the negotiations threatened to become eternal, as no one dared to take the least responsibility.”¹⁶ The French therefore left the capital: the English officers rallied the Hovas, as in 1885: the red flag, the signal of

¹³ G. Grandidier, *Le Myre de Vilers, Duchesne, Galliéri: Quarante Années de l'histoire de Madagascar* (1923), p. 29 *et seq.*

¹⁴ *Journal Officiel*, Depts., 16/11/94, 24/11/94, or G. Hanotaux, *L'Affaire de Madagascar* (1896), 3rd edition, pp. 84, 147 *et seq.*

¹⁵ *Journal Officiel*, Senate, 7/12/94. Compare Deputies, 23/1/94 (Brunet).

¹⁶ Le Myre de Vilers-Hanotaux, 4/11/94, in Hanotaux (1896), *op. cit.*, p. 71.



THE FRENCH CONQUEST OF MADAGASCAR.

muster, was hoisted on the twelve sacred mountains : and it was war. The degree of Hova disintegration, however, was at once made evident by the collapse of their resistance ; and little over four months after the French commander, Duchesne, landed, he was in Antananarivo, his chief enemies being the awkward *terrain* and the difficulties of food and communications. Only twenty of a total of 5,592 men were killed by the enemy : disease took the rest,—a significant commentary both on the way in which French abstention had conjured up a non-existent bogey in Madagascar, and on the manner in which colonial wars were conducted in this period of military expansion.¹⁷

In October, 1895, therefore, Ranavalona III accepted a real French protectorate, as distinct from the shadowy structure of 1885, and, in return, the French agreed to recognize Hova authority everywhere, thus clinging tenaciously to this *idée fixe* of native policy in Madagascar,—an idea which, based on a misconception, for long paralysed all efforts there. This, it will be remembered, was the idea evolved by Consul Baudais in 1885,¹⁸ and was supported by the over-large emphasis which the French always placed on the Hovas. They made the Hova kingdom and Madagascar synonymous conceptions, and, if the two did not coincide, the scores of outside kingdoms were viewed only as rebels who had seized the opportunity of the existing troubles to deny their allegiance. The French interpreted Madagascar in terms of their own centralized polity, whereas in reality the land was essentially one of local units, both by geography and race, and, as such, could the easier have been controlled by a strong outside Power.

But, instead of seizing this obvious solution of "rule by division," France decided not only for the maintenance, but even for an extension, of Hova rule, thus introducing a completely artificial conception, and, moreover, one which would be resisted to the utmost by the independent native kingdoms. France was at once attacking their independence and reviving their anti-Hova feeling. In short, the French had solved the Malagasian problem by arguing from premises which did not exist, and thus, as in their early days in Indo-China, encountered only difficulties. "Let us make her (the Hova Queen) a Queen of Madagascar and a Queen in all seriousness," urged Baudais in 1885, "uniting under her power the fifteen or twenty peoples of Madagascar, and reigning at Antananarivo (the importance and situation of which indicate it as the natural capital

¹⁷ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 27/1/94, for decision : 23-27/11/94 for debates : 9/12/94 for credits. The best secondary account is in Grandidier (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 62 *et seq.*, and for the operations, Chap. 4, or J. E. Duchesne, *Rapport sur l'Expédition de Madagascar* (1897).

¹⁸ *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Madagascar*, 1884-1886, p. 119.

of the island), but reigning under our direction and according to our advice." There was something glamorously imperial about this Queen-making process that appealed to the Frenchmen of the nineties, and, accordingly, the buttressing of Hova hegemony and the extension of that hegemony over the whole of the other island-races became the key-notes of French policy after the conquest of 1895, and until Galliéni went out. Naturally, since this policy was based on a complete misconception, it was not until Galliéni destroyed the Hova hegemony and utilized natives of *all* tribes that there was any success. French policy in the early days meant a Hova policy, whereas Galliéni's "policy of races," by stressing the numerous tribal units and by affording scope to all, alone met the situation.

But in 1895, as in 1885, policy was determined less by the facts of the particular problem which confronted France than by considerations of general theory in Paris. At this time, after the success of M. Cambon in Tunisia and the turmoils of Indo-China, the general question of colonial control was being discussed, especially the protectorate policy. Under these conditions, the concrete Malagasian issue was swept into the discussion of general theory, and the actual policy decided, not by the facts of the situation, but by the fluctuating opinions which were shaping general French colonial policy at this time when the new Empire, that conquered in Indo-China and Africa, was demanding organization. In this way, Madagascar became a kind of touchstone of colonial policy,—a determinant of policy in the stage after the positive success of Tonkin and the negative lessons of Indo-China. The position seemed to be that protectorates had succeeded and that the older idea of "annexation-plus-assimilation" had failed: at least, there was a tendency to generalize from the lessons of Tunisia and Indo-China, and it was on Madagascar that the percussions of these theoretical generalizations fell.

There were three main schools of opinion on the matter. First were the annexationists, who looked on assimilation as the keynote of French colonialism and who were inclined to explain away the notorious failure in Cochin-China by reawakening the old hostility towards the whole of the Indo-Chinese peninsula and saying that *any* policy would fail there! These found support from the military school, who believed in a charmingly succinct doctrine of force and destruction, and who pointed to the recent advances in South Algeria and the Niger and Tonkin as indisputable proofs of their contentions. At the opposite extreme was the newer idea of "protectorate," basing its claims on Cambon's rule in Tunisia and the ideas of Paul Bert and de Lanessan in Tonkin. This was the fashionable theory of the day with the non-military sections,

and it must be remembered that M. Etienne and the industrialists were perhaps the leading forces in colonial theory at this juncture. These theorists found a spokesman in Gabriel Hanotaux, the Minister of Foreign Affairs ; ¹⁹ and were supported by the Algerian reformers who were taking such a firm stand against *rattachements* and assimilation in general.

Elasticity and variation according to local needs and conditions were the demands of the protectorate-school, or, as Hanotaux said, "a supple and elastic organization capable of adapting itself to whatever difficulties may arise,—an organization which, while being prompt and energetic and *bon enfant*, would not be cumbersome or formal." He wanted an essentially resilient policy, taking into account the rudimentary organization of the Malagasians, and, while allowing as much development as might be warranted or demanded by the new conditions, pressing very lightly, almost imperceptibly, on the natives. This implied a rejection of all the minute details of French organization and all the paraphernalia of assimilation, and a corresponding regard for native institutions. The determining fact of the situation was to be the needs of the native : those institutions that had evolved must be to some extent based on native needs and conditions, it was argued, and, assuming that the anti-developmental aspects could be shorn away, should be the best basis for future organization. Duchesne's instructions, conceived in this light, had read, "it would be unwise to break their manners and interests and prejudices unnecessarily," ²⁰ and he was urged to conserve their organization as far as possible,—a direct contrast to the policy which the French were even then pursuing in West Africa and the Pacific of first shattering everything native, and only then considering the needs of the future. That was the argument of the new school,—assimilation was not proportioned to the needs of the occasion, and, moreover, had broken down in those colonies in which it had been adopted : on the other hand, in Tunisia, where native institutions and customs, even the illogical and needless ones, had been kept, there was obvious success. Could the deduction be clearer ?

But the position was not so simple. The protectorate-school had reacted in the opposite direction from the assimilators, and had gone from emphasizing French ideas to native ideas : but a third or intermediate school arose and wanted to know how the ideal of protectorate, however desirable it might be, could be immediately translated into practice under the specific conditions pertaining at that moment in Madagascar ? How, in a word, could the fine theory of protectorate be brought down to the hard earth of everyday fact ? Assimilation was

¹⁹ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 24/11/94.

²⁰ In Hanotaux (1896), *op. cit.*, pp. iii, xvi-xix.

obviously faulty—that nobody denied,—but it at least worked, even if not in the most satisfactory manner. But how far was this new theory of a protectorate only a theoretical reaction, incapable of realization in actual practice, save in the peculiar conditions of Tunisia where there was an old-established kingdom and, moreover, one cemented by a strong religious factor?

As soon as the protectorate was established in Madagascar,²¹ this compromising school pressed to the front, and attacked the treaty of October, 1895, as being based on an unworkable theory. Leroy-Beaulieu and Le Myre de Vilers led this attack and argued for a midway system which was neither protectorate nor annexation, but which was used by England, Holland, and Russia in their lands, especially by the English in Kashmir. This combined the maximum utilization of native chiefs with the most effective control, and allowed both an economy of effort and a consciously directed evolution. Leroy-Beaulieu reached this position by a process of elimination. Direct administration by Frenchmen, with its corollary of assimilation, was clearly uncalled for. "We have no desire to govern by prefects and sub-prefects," with all of the centralization and unification that this implied. On the other hand, a protectorate policy was negative, and, under the conditions of Madagascar, meant a virtual abdication of French sovereignty. "The protectorate pure and simple would be deplorable, an unpardonable *naïveté*, as our soldiers would then mount guard in Madagascar only for the protection of British influence and interests." The effective system, therefore, would be one which would amount to annexation in so far as foreign Powers were concerned (with a corresponding power over foreign nationals—an important matter in Madagascar), yet which would be a protectorate from the point of view of internal government,—but with the French hand clearly in evidence.²¹ France was not in the mood for a repetition of the disastrous experiment of 1885 and demanded a clear control, even if in an indirect manner. That is, there was to be an approach from an annexationist point of view, but with a more elastic system, and one more in touch with native interests than that usually employed by the French.

Whatever the merits of this midway theory *per se* (and it seemed almost as intangible as the theory of protectorate pure and simple), it at least swung the pendulum in favour of annexation and ranged the majority of theorists in the camp opposed to the idea of a protectorate. To the nebulous characteristics of a "protectorate" policy and the difficulty of immediately translating it into a practical code, was added the deep-seated desire of the Frenchmen for direct measures,—in a word,

²¹ *L'Economiste Français*, 24/8/95, 19/10/95.

for the old assimilative substratum. And already in 1896, the treaty, although it had stipulated for "the protectorate of France with all its consequences," was bitterly attacked, because it seemed to stop half-way and to be not even the midway theory elaborated by *L'Economiste Français*, but an abnegation of French rights. The difficulties and length of the conquest (which had but begun and not been ended by the spectacular march on the plateau and capital) had astonished and disgruntled France, so that, "under these conditions, the terms of the treaty of 1895 appeared disproportionate to the importance of the sacrifices that had been involved."²²

Opinion was fast tending towards a more complete and immediate form of control, and the Tunisian system, in so far as it was to be applied to Madagascar, was throttled at birth. This change was aided once more by the emergence of the anti-colonials, who, in the particularly exasperated frame of mind in which they found themselves during the numerous colonial wars of 1894-1895, resolved that, if France had to have this new colony, at least she should have it completely,—a policy of grasping the nettle. Even before the war was over, the Government, in pursuance of this trend, had telegraphed to Duchesne to impose the protectorate by a unilateral act and not to negotiate it by a mutual treaty; but they were too late, the result being that, after the ventilation of this matter in public, the Treaty of Antananarivo was replaced by a unilateral Act of the French Parliament, and then by an Act of August, 1896, which, after a long *exposé des motifs*, said in a single clause that Madagascar was directly annexed to France. The protectorate-idea was thus rejected, and colonial theory seemed to have swung back to the pre-Tunisian stage of annexation and assimilation.²³ The only result of the lengthy discussions was to confer an unjustified *imprimatur* on the old methods and correspondingly to retard the effective organization of the new Empire which was just then being conquered, and in particular, to establish anomalous positions in Madagascar and Indo-China, the two colonies most immediately affected by the decision.

To be logical, the triumph of the annexationist school in Madagascar, based as it was on the fall of the idea of a protectorate, should have been accompanied by those methods usually associated with annexation: but the trouble was that, if the French could set back the clock of theory, they could not mould the existing facts in an equally facile

²² Analysis in E. Mignard, *La Domination Française à Madagascar* (1920), p. 199 *et seq.*

²³ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 28/11/95 and 20/3/96 (Berthelot), 31/5/96 (Hano-taux), 21/7/96; Senate, 12/7/96. The law and *exposé des motifs* are in *Journal Officiel*, 8/8/96.

manner, and, whatever decisions Paris might come to, the methods of administration implied in a protectorate had to emerge. The only point was whether they should emerge naturally, as in Tunisia, or after a period of travail and suffering, as in Tonkin: and, fortunately for Madagascar, the facts of the situation allowed only the former solution.

The protectorate theory, interpreted primarily as meaning abstention, had broken down on the spot as well as in Paris. Though the conquest had not been completed, the French stood still, and, with a fanatical population desiring war above all things, this was tantamount to a premium on anarchy. Fanatical bands rose all over the south, because Duchesne had prematurely repatriated part of his forces: the northern religious extremists rose to defend the national talismans, the red *lambas*, but the French thought them only bands of cattle-thieves and did nothing: to dispel their doubts, the south rose too, and, for the sake of pillage, the west and even the slothful Sakalavas, hitherto the French allies, joined in the movement. All of Emyrna fell into rebel hands, and only the south-west remained quiet. Naturally, talk of a protectorate, with the freedom of native development which this was deemed to imply, was inapplicable under such conditions, and France, where a new Ministry was not averse to tossing overboard the protectorate theory introduced by Ribot's Cabinet, declared for Gallicization and strong measures,—for anything rather than an emphasis on native organizations.²⁴

To effect this, they decided to send out a man accustomed to native races, and at once a soldier and a *colonial de carrière*. The result was that, in August, 1896, with the position vitiated by the ten months of drift, they sent Joseph-Simon Galliéni, fresh from Tonkin,—the man who had said that organization was more than conquest, and whose concisely expressed code fitted in very well with the existing psychology of the French Ministry. "In everything down there," said Galliéni, "there must first be a maturely studied plan, then a decision, and then prompt and effective action." To ears wearied with reports of epidemic risings and tired of arm-chair theories of colonial organization, this terse statement seemed just what was wanted; and, exactly a year after the occupation of Antananarivo, Galliéni landed in Madagascar.

II. Galliéni

Galliéni, perhaps the greatest figure in French colonial history, really made Madagascar: more, he secured the acceptance of the native policies and administrative methods which he enforced there as the normal colonial methods of France; and it may safely be said that, if there is a turning-point in the history of French colonization, it was when he landed

²⁴ *Journal Officiel*, *Deps.*, 8/12/96 (Michelin).

in Madagascar. He had had a long colonial experience, and was the embodiment of that varied training which the French method gives. But, in addition, he was possessed of a suppleness and sympathetic tact which, not always a characteristic of French colonial administrators, when possessed, transmutes the experience gained in a variety of colonies into a wealth of human-material, and makes of this particular type of French officer perhaps the *beau-ideal* colonial administrator. Galliéni had fought in West Africa in the wars of expansion and had concluded the treaty of 1881 with Ahmadou, thus extending the Niger protectorate to Timbuktu. There, in reorganizing the land, and in managing such diverse peoples as the pastoral Peuhls, the agricultural Bambaras, and the industrial Mandingués, with a leaven of fanatical Toucouleurs, he had worked out that "policy of races" with which he was to transform Madagascar. In Tonkin, where he next went, he had gone further and had evolved his "*tache d'huile*" or oil-stain method, of a gradual percolation of influence through any conquered country, with stress on intelligence-officers rather than the military. In this manner he had subdued the hitherto impenetrable provinces of Upper-Tonkin (1891-1895), and, fresh from this success, and convinced that his African and Indo-Chinese experiences could dovetail together into a new policy that would transform colonial methods, he came to Madagascar,—with a theory tested and made harmonious by experience, and especially applicable to lands where, as in Madagascar, a number of vigorous and apparently irreconcilable tribes dwelt side by side.²⁵

His theory was "a policy of races," and, as the very name implies, meant a certain diversified development, a development attuned to the needs of each particular race, and varying with the position of each. When he landed, he was confronted by a record of failure on failure, and a disconcerting vagueness of methods and objectives. To commence with, he cleared the air by postulating certain general principles, and at once removed those fragmentary policies which were either mutually irreconcilable or in themselves unwise. Thus, he asserted in the first place that Madagascar was primarily a native-country and that, consequently, policy had to be determined by and for native ends. This was not a white-man's land; it was unsuitable for any extensive degree of small settlement; in 1895, there were only 845 Europeans in all, and only forty-five of these were planters. The only trade was in cloth, and this for native needs. Madagascar was entirely native, and, the productivity of the country being what it was, had to continue thus. The development of the land rested entirely with the natives, and, this once grasped, Galliéni was able to shear off those contradictory policies which had

²⁵ His life is summarized in appendix to Grandidier (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 241.

previously been attempted, and to make the regeneration of the Hovas and the inland tribesmen his primary care.²⁶

But, even so, the natives could not develop of themselves without some outside guidance;—Galliéni had had sufficient experience of backward races to know that : and it was in accord neither with their needs nor the interests of France to continue the previous negative policy of abstention. Therefore, the second part in his programme came to be a very real control. This at once implied the reversal of the traditional French policy of strengthening the Hovas,—of making their rule coterminous with the island, and then controlling island destinies through them. To the contrary, held Galliéni, the Hova power had to be sapped, both as a measure of general policy and as the most economical course of action under the circumstances. "My programme," he wrote, "is to make Madagascar French, to sap the English influence, and to lower the pride and power of the Hovas." France was no longer to buttress the power of any one kingdom or tribe against the others : rather was there to be a balance of power between the tribes and a development of each. Accordingly, emphasis was placed on winning over the lesser tribes, who were often, especially in the south, the more virile ones, and on abolishing Hova hegemony. The Queen was exiled to Réunion, and the Merina Kingdom entirely abolished (February, 1897). The new theory thus came to mean a direct control by the French and a ban on rule through any intermediary native kingdom.

But here Galliéni added his third note. Direct control in other lands meant assimilation, and it would appear that the reversal of the Ribot idea of a protectorate would involve this necessary concomitant of annexation. This was not so, the new Resident-General brusquely asserted : annexation and assimilation were *not* inevitable corollaries one of the other : assimilation was but one method, and a discredited method, of translating annexation into practice : protectorate methods, in so far as they meant development along native lines and as far as possible through native agencies, could be carried on quite as well in an annexed colony as in a protectorate. Thus, Madagascar was never made an experimental-ground for assimilation. "No assimilation" (except in justice), Galliéni asserted time and again, and this was perhaps the leading feature of his policy. This interpretation was not popular at the time. As has been seen, the trend of Parliament in 1896 was all to the contrary, and de Mahy, the Vice-President of the Deputies, had voiced current opinion in saying, "We must make of Madagascar a colony of French *peuplement*, a French land, and a market reserved to Frenchmen

²⁶ For conditions, see Galliéni's first "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar," 1899, in *Journal Officiel*, 7/5/99 *et seq.*

under our law." France, even after Galliéni was sent out, seemed to expect some such compound of extreme assimilation and small emigration.

Against this, Galliéni stood out in no uncertain way. With his usual forceful arguments and dogmatic certainty, he said :—

"In all that touched tradition and the customs bequeathed them by ancestors, I resolved only to make those reforms necessitated by their state of civilization, and to realize even those only progressively. The precept of one of our historians that *the power of tradition fructifies new institutions* is profoundly true in colonial administration. The road to follow could not be better explained, nor the Utopianism revealed of those people who, misunderstanding the nature of atavism and mental heredity, think that they can destroy the work of centuries in a few months and wish to attain the immediate assimilation of a new people by the application *en bloc* of the institutions of the metropolis." ²⁷

To this stage, he had been removing preliminary misconceptions rather than outlining a practical policy. Now, with irrelevancies swept aside, and with a clear realization that policy had to be for the natives, based on a real control, and with no vestige of assimilation, he could go further and outline his actual methods. These methods could be divided into two sections,—a general combination of "political-cum-military" agencies, and a utilization of each race in Madagascar.

The first of these was the key-note of the whole,—the famous "*tache d'huile*" method invented and utilized by him and later popularized (but in no sense invented) by Marshal Lyautey in Morocco.²⁸ Galliéni's method was to choose strategic centres and from these, by entering into the lives of the people at once and convincing them of the solidarity of interests between the two parties, extend French influence in a gradually widening and perfectly consolidated circle. An oil-stain spreads outwards on blotting-paper, so French influence, based on the firm foundation of native collaboration, could extend in Madagascar, even over the inhospitable brigands of the mountain-lands. This meant a limitation of military efforts and an emphasis on *liaison*-officers who would play a far more important part than soldiers in the work of reconstruction. Hitherto, the soldiers had been viewed as the necessary fore-runners of a subsequent organization: Galliéni made the point that they themselves were the organizers, and that conquest and organization, far from being successive stages, were to each increase *pari passu*. By June, 1897, he had organized the central plateau, "and this result," he wrote, "has been achieved by the constant application of the principle

²⁷ Galliéni, *Neuf Ans à Madagascar* (1908), p. 274. For the opposite argument, see Brunet, *La France à Madagascar* (1895), p. xxviii.

²⁸ Galliéni (1908), *op. cit.*, p. 47.

the efficiency of which I have described,—a combination of military and political action in taking possession of the country, and, at the same time, entering into an intimate contact with the natives, trying to learn their tendencies and their psychology, and, by satisfying their desires, to attach them of their own volition to the new institutions.”

However trite this may seem at present, it was an entirely new emphasis in the French colonial-world of 1895, for up to that time the army had been viewed as “the be-all and end-all” of colonial methods. The procedure had been to let the army do its utmost destruction of things native, and then decree an orderly structure of assimilation: whether the two linked together and met the situation was not considered; French colonies were either assimilated to a homeland *département* or remained under the iconoclastic rule of the army. But now, on the other hand, Galliéni was proposing to make the army in itself build up rather than destroy, and not only this, but to stabilize an organization which was to be permanent and to dispense with elaborate constitutions. The phrase, “organic statute,” had been the curse of French colonization: Galliéni was removing it. The ready-made constitutions which the Parisian *bureaux* could so readily produce either for Senegalese tribesmen or indolent Polynesians were no longer needed. Galliéni was revolting against such *a priori* methods as much as against the use of insensate force: he was staking the future on a changed concept of the army’s rôle and on a changed part left to the natives.

Political action and military action were to go on concurrently, with the former “by far the more important,” and the latter more as a safeguard in time of emergency than anything else. It was the races themselves that determined the methods both of the initial conquest and the subsequent organization; and the utilization of force was to depend on the recalcitrance or progressiveness of the tribe in question. It was, on the face of things, absurd to suppose that an equal amount of force was needed for each race, for that would be to postulate a uniform “savage” and an exact similarity of conditions in each case. To the contrary, methods were to be variable and elastic. “Political-cum-military action,” then, was to shape the political organization, the extent of each varying with the needs of the actual situation, but, wherever possible, with military means only as an ultimate resource. After that, the third factor, economic action, was to enter to make the tribesmen progressive and to make the original organization permanent and part of the normal lives of the natives.²⁹

The last factor stressed by Galliéni was one necessitated by the

²⁹ See his instructions of 22/5/98, in *Neuf Ans à Madagascar* (1908), p. 326.

presence of so many antagonistic races with whom he had to deal at once. Once Hova hegemony was destroyed, each of the native races had to be convinced of the need for progress on its own lines, otherwise all would slump into stagnation or into the former internecine warfare, both of which eventualities would vitiate the whole of Galliéni's carefully elaborated scheme. He therefore promulgated his "policy of races," which was to introduce each race to its position as a collaborator with the French, and to open to it a certain line of development. He realized that lack of outlets for racial pride and lack of scope for energy would both hasten racial decline and perhaps that scourge of Madagascar with which he was for ever confronted,—positive depopulation. To allay this, he had to introduce a tangible goal for each race, and means and incentive of reaching that goal. Instead of Hova hegemony, there was to be a confederacy of native units, each evolving in the light of its own *milieu*, each retaining its individuality and energy, and each associated with the French overlords.

Galliéni was quite specific about this point. In his instructions to his *Chefs de Provinces* in October, 1896, he clearly defined the objective,—“to dispossess the Hova authorities and to separate the people into their various racial groups, administered by their own chiefs under the advice of Residents, without forcing them to a uniform method of organization and administration for the whole island, for the manners, the customs, and the character of each people have to be considered.” The vassal-populations were thus called to *kabary* or council to choose chiefs for themselves, and the tribal structures of the free populations respected. After this, they were as far as possible to rule themselves,—the policy being what the French later called “association” or “the collaboration of races,” and the English “indirect rule.”

In this manner, Galliéni's theory consisted of five points, each logically dependent on its predecessor, and all dovetailing together to form a coherent plan,—“the policy of races.” But theory and practice were quite different worlds, and it remained for him to convert this theory to meet the troubled conditions of the Madagascar of 1896.

When he landed, even the road to Antananarivo was menaced, and France held only the three posts of Majunga and Diégo-Suarez (both isolated outposts in the far north) and the country round Tamatave, and fully 99 per cent. of the country was in armed revolt. A year later, he had subdued most of the east, with its gentler and more apathetic natives, and, with half of the land under his control and a solid line of posts on the Emyrna frontier, he was in a position to drive back the Sakalava raids from the west,—and all the time he was subordinating a cataclysmic military advance to his slower and less spectacular, but far more effective,

policy of "pacification and administration." But it was not until the end of 1898 that he effectively occupied most of the west, and not until January, 1902, that the always-anarchical south, the land of the marauding Baras and Mahafalys, was conquered: even in the centre, pacification was not sufficiently general to allow the substitution of civil for military authority until 1901, and the displacement of military officials was of necessity far slower in the outer regions which had never known any restraint.³⁰

Galliéni, too, was held back by the very strangeness of what were to the French obvious concepts, and he had to introduce rudimentary notions of government and social organization. The amount of preliminary spade-work was enormous, and France tended to become restive, because, by constant emphasis on "the Hova kingdom," the French mind had come to view Madagascar rather as a backward Tunisia than as, say, a savage Fiji. A uniform system of justice, the universal freedom of men, the idea of a Public Treasury, taxation without exemption, individual or group-ownership,—all of these were practically unknown concepts in the Madagascar of that time, and the various peoples had painfully to be set in the path of communal advance, before any general schemes of reconstruction could be entertained.

Thus, it was not until some years had elapsed that Galliéni could really attack his problem, for the Malagasians had first to be taught the nature of liberty, and, in particular, that the essence of liberty is restraint,—ideas especially difficult in the case of an Oriental people accustomed to, and thinking in terms of, absolute power, and viewing liberty either as unrestrained licence or as the freedom to exploit somebody else. A character-training or a social education had first to be instituted, and Galliéni could not introduce his final native organization until 1903. In the previous year he had made the first tentative efforts to use native-officials in the Hova plateau, which had naturally seen the bulk of French efforts, and had experimented with the peculiarly democratic council which the Hovas had obviously inherited from their Polynesian forefathers,—reminiscent as it is of the Samoan *fono*. This is "a kind of government in the public square," where the inhabitants of a given group meet to discuss public matters. Savages are nothing if not ceremonial, and Galliéni quickly perceived how important a psychological influence such a gathering could exert, firm-built on native traditions as it was and reviving the traditional past as it did. "*Tsy izany ve ry vahoaka?*"—"Is it not so, O people?" cry the orators; and the assembled council reply with a booming voice, "*Izany!*" ("It is so!")

³⁰ Galliéni (1908), *op. cit.*, p. 47.

and disperse with the consciousness that each member is immediately and personally a part of the body-politic.³¹

So successful was this revival of native institutions that Galliéni extended it in 1903, and, in addition to the above *foko'nolona*, set up the *ben'ny tany*, or council of notables in each district to act as *liaison-officers* between natives and European officials. They would at once bring the Government home to the people and allow the commoners to voice their grievances and propose reforms. Such bodies, justified by their success in central Emyrna, were extended to all Hova territories in 1904, and even to the Betsimisaraka country, although the recency of the conquest there necessitated a more direct and stringent form of control. At the same time (July, 1903) the individual native-officials were definitely given a leading part in organization: hitherto, they had been on trial and were only *agents de transmission*, or messengers, and it was not known whether Galliéni's hope of making them the basis of provincial administration could ever come to fruition. But, certain by 1903 that pacification was genuine, that the new social reforms had been assimilated, and that the individual chiefs were capable of progress under the changed conditions, he resolved to introduce the new *régime*,³² and to transform the native-officials from mere *agents de transmission* into *agents d'exécution*, that is, to give them definite powers. They were to have charge of various administrative and economic functions, and even financial power on a small local scale: they were, in fact, to be the local governors as well as mouthpieces of the central Government. Thus, powerful individual agents and assemblies were to give the natives a part in administration, the extension to the wilder Betsimisarakas showing that this was no mere gesture to the Hovas but a genuine "policy of association," to be extended to all tribes as soon as their situation warranted it, and to vary in scope with the needs of each tribal-unit.

Madagascar, therefore, was divided into three sections, differentiated according to the degree of native self-government in each. In the more advanced parts, as on the Emyrna plateau, the *régime* of delegated authority, or as the English would term it, "indirect rule," was in full operation. Each district had a European Chief or Resident who presided over the advisory Council of Native Notables and supervised native affairs in general. The lesser officials under him were all natives, both the governors and the tax-collectors; and the organization was similarly divided right down to the lowest unit,—the village chief and the *Foko'nolona* or Council. The European element in these regions was restricted to the general determination of policy and the supervision of the whole

³¹ *L'Afrique Française*, April 1902, p. 149; Galliéni (1908), *op. cit.*, pp. 206, 241.

³² In full in *Journal Officiel de Madagascar*, 8/7/03.

machine: under ordinary conditions, everything was in native hands, and there was thus a real indirect rule. But such an extensive devolution of authority presupposed a genuine desire to co-operate on the part of the natives, and moreover, both the capacity of societal advance and the means of converting this capacity into reality, both of them dependent on an adequate training. Most of Madagascar, therefore, remained under direct administration by French officials, as with the Betsimisaraka, but a small, and gradually widening, element of indirect rule was allowed as conditions warranted it. This was essentially a training stage, to fit natives for that ultimate degree of self-government which had been attained by the Hovas on the central plateau. Assemblies of Notables and native officials were introduced very slowly in these cases, and, for a long time, would be restricted to small functions within the villages, for the essential need in this stage was to develop a group frame of mind and to introduce the ideas of communal responsibility and contractual authority. But even this compromise, limited as it was, was too far advanced for the fighting tribes of the south, and so the third system in Madagascar was "the *régime* of interior protectorates,"³³ in which, as with the Ménabés and Baras, the natives were left alone as long as they kept the peace. There was little direct administration here, little intervention: all that the French officials did was to advise the native chiefs. These districts, in short, were rather fields of abstention than training-grounds for indirect rule.³⁴

Galliéni thus worked out methods of native rule varying from a protectorate in its widest form to pure indirect rule, and a system that allowed of variation within each province. Moreover, it combined efficiency for the moment with hope for the future, and rested almost entirely on native collaboration. In fact, it was the first occasion on which the French elaborated a policy of indirect rule on an extensive scale, and the first occasion on which a hope of ultimate self-government on palatable native lines was extended to a subject-population.

But this was only one phase of the problem. It was very promising to provide for an ultimate self-government and an immediate collaboration to some degree: but Galliéni had first to save the natives. He saw that, in his zeal for experimenting with possibilities of a remote future, he could not leave their bodies for immediate dissolution; and the condition of Madagascar in 1895 was such that, if he adopted such an idealistic *laissez-faire* policy, his problem would all be self-annulled,—by the depopulation of those for whose future welfare he was planning.³⁵

³³ *L'Afrique Française*, Sept. 1904, p. 284.

³⁴ See tables for these three systems in Galliéni (1908), p. 331.

³⁵ Galliéni's first *Rapport d'Ensemble*, 1899, pp. 206-210.

There were 2,260,000 natives in the island in 1897, and they were rapidly declining, owing to the enfeeblement of their physique and the psychology of despair which was the consequence of physical decay. It must be remembered that the Malagasians are basically a Polynesian people, and, as with all Polynesians, that power of mind over body, which is always so strong with native peoples, is positively abnormal. The 'will-to-die' is an immediately realizable possibility with the average Polynesian; ³⁶ and they are prone to a racial despair which, by its nature, is the gatekeeper of death, and knows no remedy, so long as the individuals concerned retain their lethargic and indifferent frame of mind. A dejected *insouciance*, if permanent, means death with such people, irrespective of bodily weakness, and naturally, if the body is already enfeebled, the efficacy of the death-spell, the web of destructive auto-suggestion with which the native surrounds himself, is increased. Such a race must progress and be convinced of the reality of progress according to its own lights, or it dies: its spark of vitality is dependent on the continuance of its traditions and the certainty of its own self-expression: hence the importance of Galliéni's revival of the *foko'nolona*. If it can see no avenue of expression, if its thwarted instincts fall inwards on themselves and find expression in a mortified despair, then the virility of the race is sapped, and the individual gives up the struggle. He sees a place for himself neither at the moment nor in the future, but only the hand of the foreigner over everything, and nothing, not even life itself, becomes worth while; and the places of rest in their mythology beckon to them, and gladly they die.

This was exactly the case with the Malagasians. The French found a natural *penchant* for this introspective disease aggravated by the evils of last century. "Decimated by the persecutions of the last reigns and ruined by an arbitrary system of taxes and *corvées*, the Malay of Emyrna had lost all energy and had fallen into that state of resigned misery and those habits of idleness and *insouciance* which are the sad fate of peoples oppressed by tyranny." ³⁷ And Galliéni might have added, the peculiar legacy of Polynesian peoples, with whom self-annihilation by mental processes makes change, and especially disruptive change, so important! Their minds were predisposed to death, and when their environment, through their diseased eyes, took on all the characteristics of a phantasm of gloom, death loomed very near. The *vazahy* was supreme in everything: his ways were not their ways: and they had but to go to their

³⁶ S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (1927), Part I, for these attributes of the Polynesians. A good study in the form of a novel is in C. Renel, *Le Décivilisé*.

³⁷ Galliéni (1908), *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 50.

own world, the world of their cultural forbears, the world whose spirits beckoned in the wooden tombs of their graveyards in the forest. There was a certain fatalism and a tinge of spectacular self-abnegation about this process that made it dear to the heart of the savage, and indeed something almost desirable,—a welcome release when particularly irksome tasks confronted him, or when the ultimate horror, of having to work permanently and consistently, loomed prominently in front of him. And, since the disease was psychological, its remedy was the more difficult, because nothing in the French surgeon's pharmacopœia could deal with such intangible complaints : indeed, with natives dying round him, his books would assure him that this particular form of racial *hàrikari* by self-suggestion was non-existent.

Even physically the task was sufficiently formidable, without the incubus of this general "will-to-die" which made the native the arbiter of his destinies and the despair of the French administrators, for the conditions of native life had enfeebled their bodies, and the new diseases engendered by contact with the Europeans, and the more terrible because the natives had no immunity, either innate or acquired, wrecked their constitutions entirely. Constant wars, the slave-trade with Zanzibar, and the prevalence of abortion and infanticide had kept down the population, and, even when the first two of these were removed, the latter increased as life became harder ; and families became smaller and smaller, owing to debauchery and alcoholism and the increased difficulties of even living. Life had become a problem, and the new vices were easier to absorb, and far more pleasant, than the peculiar virtues of the French civilization, such as work and tax-paying. Add to this formidable list tuberculosis and meningitis, influenza and measles, their grip increasing as the native body became more and more enfeebled : and the fact of depopulation may be easily understood.

Galliéni's main problem, therefore, and the main problem in Madagascar to-day, was to make the natives live.³⁸ He placed health in the forefront of his efforts, for depopulation was increasing in every part of the island, especially with the Sakalavas. Two months after his arrival he instituted a medical school to train native doctors, and gave orders to provide the natives with a free health-service, and, perhaps most important of all, commenced to combat the influence of the sorcerers who, especially in the wilder and more primitive south, were the most enervating and destructive force in native life.

But he quickly perceived that the real evil lay far deeper and that it was useless to try to cure disease : the problem was to check it, and to erase that peculiar psychology of despair which was the cause of

³⁸ Galliéni's second *Rapport d'Ensemble*, 1899-1905, p. 523.

everything. The issue was psychological rather than medical; so too Galliéni's cure, to be effective, had to be directed towards the natives' minds, and incidentally their bodies would improve. The disease was that hope had gone from them: to revive it, they had to have new interests, interests that would convince them that the past could be emulated and improved, and that the future held a real place for them and their children. Their participation in government and the safeguarding of as many of their customs as possible had convinced them of their cultural safeguards: now, the immediate problem was to provide the individual with a psychology of hope and fighting. Galliéni perceived that the key to this lay in economic self-advancement,—that, once stimulated to the development of his land and once accustomed to the increased facilities that this would make possible, the native could then save himself. But it would be useless to try to convince him of this by argument or persuasion: the ordinary Malagasian thought only of the present, and was not even convinced that that was worth troubling over: and the confirmed fatalism of the Polynesian knew nothing of the morrow, save as a day which must possibly be lived through. The natives, therefore, had to be introduced to the benefits of the new *régime* by force: beneficent tutelage is the only way of advance for a racial stock as enervated as the Malagasian. On the other hand, the tutelage clearly had to be free from any taint of exploitation, otherwise the native pessimism would be the firmer imbedded. To meet this need, and to force the natives to develop their land despite themselves, and incidentally to transform their mental outlook (and improve the State finances), Galliéni hit upon the device of "social taxation,"—that is, taxation so directed in its incidence as to induce the natives to work, and not for any European planters, but for themselves, the idea being that, once accustomed to the new groove, the natives, their *insouciance* being what it is, would continue in that groove, and thus change their minds and redeem their bodies.

That Galliéni had connected all of these arguments in a coherent theory and that his taxes were really "socially" directed is beyond dispute; and the matter is important, because this theory of natives being forced to work by "social taxes" is now part of the generally accepted native policy of colonizing Powers (e.g., in places as widely apart as Kenya and New Guinea), and because it was first worked out in a connected practical form by Galliéni in Madagascar. He saw that work was the key to the whole difficulty,—and the optimistic psychology engendered by the obvious results of work. As he said explicitly:—

"In Madagascar, as in all our new colonies, the experience of the first years of occupation has shown that the native-tax is the indispensable

stimulus of native energy. There is no doubt that the Malagasian, in all parts of his island, can almost always procure without appreciable efforts what he wants to nourish, lodge, and clothe him. Native indolence aiding, only a minority—and this minority is infinitesimal with the newly conquered peoples—conform to the health-giving law of work, without being directly incited to it. To leave the native in this state is to renounce for him all progress,—all improvement in his economic and social position. On the other hand, the employment of direct force, in such a case, is at once immoral, impolitic, and useless. The conclusion then is,—we must find, not a material means of coercion, but a stimulant, which pushes the natives to work and brings them little by little to understand its advantages. To do this, nothing is better than the tax, nothing can more efficiently fill such a useful and moralizing rôle.”³⁹

This was especially needed in certain parts of the country. The Hovas themselves did not want it in the main, save as a preventive of lethargic despair, because they were good working agriculturists: but the newly-freed slave-castes did, because they thought that liberty meant, with other pleasant things, the right of doing nothing, ignoring the individual and social disintegration that followed in the wake of such a procedure. In the south and the west, the natives, predatory robbers by nature, did not work at all. Compulsion, therefore, though an attack on individual liberties in theory, was the best social and individual safeguard under such conditions. To meet the case, Galliéni reformed the system of native-taxation in 1904, and made it entirely social, varying its incidence to take into account the greater need for it in some districts. In backward regions, it could be paid in kind, and in certain provinces where social organization needed to be strengthened, a collective tax was permitted, with the native chiefs allocating the amounts under European supervision. Everywhere alike, however, it was to induce the natives to work, and the revenue was kept for educational and social purposes.⁴⁰

The result was undoubted.* Exports doubled between 1902 and 1904 in those coastal districts in which the tax was first imposed, and statistics of native commerce in Emyrna showed that the tax caused an expansion even with the comparatively energetic Hovas: while with the untamed outer tribes, the immediate causal relationship of the tax to economic change was the more certain, because the tax represented no small amount of labour under stone-age conditions, and because the provision for payment in kind permitted of no evasion. It was a genuine measure of social transformation, of consciously directed social evolution; and, as such, became one of the mainstays of French policy in Madagascar.

³⁹ Galliéni (1908), *op. cit.*, p. 272.

⁴⁰ Lorin, *L'Empire Colonial de la France* (1906), pp. 261, 262, for a good analysis of the aims of the tax.

In 1922, it assumed its present form, and became far more direct in its incidence. Galliéni had been content to tax the native and thus indirectly to make him work. * But, by 1922, the administration felt that it could go further, and directly ordered the native to work in some way for at least 180 days a year or pay a tax, the proceeds to go towards the development of agriculture.⁴¹

With social taxation, Galliéni linked education in his scheme of things, because the two, in his mind, were kindred and connected steps towards the agricultural revolution which was to sweep over Madagascar. Before 1895 the natives had been self-sufficient and could largely live without working. They consumed little outside produce and lacked power to purchase much. The ground afforded rice, potatoes, and manioc; a desultory pasture gave meat for feasts; if luxurious, the individual could buy Manchester cloth; and what more was needed, unless he were æsthete enough to abandon native weapons and want one of the rifles the Indian traders peddled for taking potshots from the bush at Frenchmen? Galliéni saw that this position was incompatible with progress, and that the native had to become a producer and a member of a wider exchange-group. He had to be familiarized with the concept of growing for sale, and thus becoming a consumer of other people's produce; that is, the market had to be introduced as the nerve-centre of native life, instead of the self-sufficient family. But this needed the desire to work and the capability of working; and it was the tax that was to induce the former, vocational education the latter.

That is, Galliéni insisted on a strictly utilitarian education,—a stand the more remarkable because in practically every other French colony at the time, France was adhering to her traditional literary methods. Pépète in Algeria, Rarahu in Tahiti, and little Ahmadou in West Africa were all trained as Jean Blanc was on the Left Bank in Paris: but Galliéni saw that the differing native needs necessitated a vitally different mode of instruction, that his Lanalo and Rademari had to be a trained farmer and an artisan, and moreover, that, without this, his whole structure of native policy would lack stability. As early as 1897, therefore, he established a solely professional school at Antananarivo, and insisted on the need of "giving the native an education that was above all practical and utilitarian." His school on the central plateau had 800 pupils within six years and gave instructions in no fewer than seven distinct practical vocations.⁴² By 1903, Galliéni had set up 650 schools in the island, with 50,000 pupils, mostly, of course, in the more advanced central

⁴¹ *L'Afrique Française*, Jan. 1922, p. 46.

⁴² *Compte Rendu du Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale*, 1912, p. 40 et seq.; Galliéni (1908), *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53, 242-244.

plateau, but already spreading to the north and east. Though the development since that date had been more restrained (to 750 schools and 77,000 students by 1922), the professional aspect of education has retained its original emphasis, especially during the serious campaign to extend agricultural education in the years after 1916. Each elementary school has a garden, each main one an *atelier* to teach the rudiments of the various local industries, and each regional school has a distinct industrial section. As the official programme runs, they give "a primary manual education which the students may be able to utilize for themselves and which will increase their social value," and which, it might be added, is still very rare in French colonies in general.⁴³

Galliéni's native policy, as viewed backwards from to-day, may not seem so very unconventional, but, interpreted in the light of 1900, it formed a whole which was strikingly coherent and progressive. At that time, the custom was either to ignore the natives or make them labour for Europeans: even the progressive colonies did no more than provide embryonic health-facilities and a smattering of French literary education for a minority. But Galliéni not only reserved the land for the natives and placed their interests in the ascendant, but laid the basis for their ultimate self-government on native lines, provided for an economic revolution which was to spell for them both prosperity and a psychology of hope, and arranged comprehensive schemes of medical attention and vocational education. Practically every part of this scheme was in advance of the times: the whole policy, cemented by the device of "social taxation," is at present advocated as the ideal native policy for progressive colonial Powers; and nowhere is the theory so carefully developed, stage by stage, as in Galliéni's two *Rapports d'Ensemble* and his *Neuf Ans à Madagascar*.⁴⁴ His native policy was at least two decades in advance of its time as a general theory, and, more than that, in so far as French colonial policy was concerned. It is this fact, and the consequent freedom from native discontent, that has marked off Madagascar so clearly from every other French colony. Before the war of 1914, Tunisia might have vied with the island for this place, but even there, there was the *Jeune Tunisien* movement and the unsettled ebullience of the war-period; whereas, in Madagascar, the *rapprochement* between natives and French has been continually growing. A force of 5,863 Malagasians volunteered during the war, and the land claims to be "Oriental France," with the solidarity extending more and more with the passing of the years, even to the turbulent tribesmen of the inner

⁴³ *Annuaire Général de Madagascar*, 1920-1921, Vol. II, p. 249; A. Dondouau, *Géographie du Madagascar* (1922), pp. 176-178.

⁴⁴ In 1899, 1905 and 1908 respectively,—all quoted above.

mountains. Indeed, the French success with the Baras and Mahafalys is one of the mysteries of their colonial record, the only explanation being that something in the French temperament seems to promote an understanding with these peoples of Polynesian descent, just as in Tahiti. But, whatever the cause, there is no doubt that Galliéni's native policy has transformed Madagascar and has been in many ways the greatest colonial victory of France.

This point is best proved by a comparison of the land when Galliéni came in 1896 and when he left in May, 1905. When he landed, he found

"in the aggregate, a huge and impenetrable forest, where mutually hostile tribes lived in a brutish isolation: in the centre, a cultivated plateau, inhabited by two peoples, the Hovas and the Betsileos, who were half-awakening to civilization but who were a prey to the exactions of the Court and the nobles. On the coast, there were certain ports, extremely precarious posts through which a rare commerce filtered in and where the first roots of colonization were being implanted. From Majunga to Antananarivo, there was a road lined with the wreckages of our Lefevre gun-carriages, and seamed by the tombs of our soldiers. From Tamatave to the capital was a line of ditches, with gaps of 600 metres and more,—a collection of crevasses and ravines. Over all, as the presiding evil genius, were incessant raids,—raids of pirates, of rebels, of the *Fahavolos*, all caused by the inveterate anarchy, the miseries of warfare, and the constant intrigues of the Hova Court." ⁴⁵

It was a terrible forbidding land, a country of phantasm and gloom, knowing neither order nor safety. As Hanotaux said, "Galliéni received an insurgent forest, he made it a tranquil and prosperous colony." The most obvious change was peace and development,—aspects which had not characterized Madagascar in any previous era. All of the land was pacified, most of it was changing from military to civil control, part of it (the central plateau) was almost completely self-governing, and another section, the land of the Betsimisarakas, partly so. Native institutions had been revived, especially the *Foko'nolona*, and councils of notables instituted. The blight of the Hovas had been removed, and in their place the progressive lower orders of Hova society raised, and the outside tribes restored to their liberty and organizations. The central plateau and the east-coast regions were lands of progressive native-farmers, with medical and educational systems extending over their whole nation; and these characteristics and facilities were gradually extending to the south and west. The natives in general had traversed an economic revolution, and the enlargement of their economic world involved a corresponding mental revolution, and, incidentally, a grave blow to the pre-existing psychology of despair, which was so inimical to racial vigour.

⁴⁵ Galliéni (1908), *op. cit.*, p. viii.

Internal trade had really been created, and external commerce increased.⁴⁶ The total trade had increased from 2 million francs to 43 millions, and the central budget from 5½ million francs in 1899 to 24½ millions in 1905. The metropolitan grant-in-aid was no longer needed, and the colony already had reserves of almost 10 million francs.

In addition, it was in the intangible social changes that there had been an even greater transformation,—with the abolition of slavery and exploitation in all forms, and the provision for social progress, and the emergence of the individual thus made possible. In 1895, Madagascar resolved itself into one half ruled through the fear instilled by an alien noble-class, and another half subject to the slave-raids of outside brigands: there was no certainty of existence, or, in the exceptional cases in which there was security, no hope. On the other hand, by 1905, the land had become safe and democratized, and, from Diégo-Suarez in the north to Fort Dauphin in the south, there were individuals on a par,—some backward, it is true, but all equal before the law and with a possibility of advance, both of which were unimaginable contingencies in the Madagascar of the Hovas. The French had removed slavery and the uncertainty of existence: and, in addition, had introduced the notion of individualism and societal equality,—their greatest achievement.

In short, as Galliéni said, "the country was at peace and becoming organized and enriched," and, even if there had been a relapse of trade in his last two years, and even if he had somewhat neglected the economic development of the country, he had laid the firm foundations on which his successors could develop the land on the ordinary lines. He had performed the extraordinary task of winning over and organizing the natives, his followers could consolidate his achievements.

III. Madagascar since 1905

Since 1905, therefore, the history of Madagascar has been quiet, the absence of facts to record being perhaps the best testimony to the permanence of Galliéni's *rapprochement* with the natives and the best sign of the steady economic consolidation that has absorbed activities. It is the spectacularly abnormal things that make a lengthy record—that is why failures take up such a large place in French colonial history,—whereas the quiet economic development passes almost unnoticed.

In the years immediately following Galliéni's departure, the economic problem was still further clarified. Galliéni had emphasized the natives and tended to forget trade, and thus the essentials of the problem had become a trifle blurred. The decline of trade in 1904–1905 had shown

⁴⁶ Article by Xion in *Revue de Madagascar*, 10/6/1900, or by Galliéni in *L'Année Coloniale*, 1900.

that something was wrong, and that native policy could be successful without, or even at the cost of, economic development. Even the direction of development, despite Gallieni's insistence on native claims, had become confused, and the old obsession of *petite colonisation* by immigrants from France had crept to the fore. Before any permanent progress could take place, therefore, the relationship of this settlement to native efforts had to be determined, and the degree of emphasis to be placed on it in the future made clear.

Before the French conquest, the Hova Government owned all the land, and, owing to the feudal structure of society, the notion of individual land-ownership was either completely non-existent, or, in the trading-districts, barely nascent. The land naturally went to the French Government on conquest, but the question arose as to the claims of the natives and the European settlers. For the former, the issue was settled by making the natives peasant-proprietors: a law of 1896 thus said that "the natives shall continue to enjoy land on which they have built or which they are at present cultivating."⁴⁷ They were at a stroke introduced to the idea of individual property, and, under the conditions, this necessitated an economic revolution, for the idea of personal property meant competition and the resultant advance. It only remained for new methods and the provision of exchange-facilities to complete the revolution, and to allow a progressive yeomanry to take the place of the unenterprising serfs of the Hova *régime*.

But this guarantee of the natives' rights was clearly not very compatible with European settlement. In those parts of the land where the so-called "rich cultures," like cocoa and vanilla, were possible, such settlement was indispensable if new methods were to be adopted. But, if this were the aim, capitalistic instead of small settlement would seem to have been called for, and yet the French were filled with the idea of setting up a small emigrant-class in Madagascar, akin to the Creole class in the neighbouring Réunion. Therefore, the administration provided both for schemes of large and small settlement,⁴⁸ although the Congo *débâcle* prevented any very extensive handing-over of the island to large companies. In all, only eight large concessions were granted, all in the experimental stage before 1905, and the Deputies refused to sanction the principle of extensive alienations by a land-grant railway. This was held to be an undesirable mortgage on the country's future development, and France saw that it was prejudicial to the interests of all concerned to gamble with the colony's land.

⁴⁷ L. Truitard, *Madagascar et les Intérêts françaises* (1912), p. 54.


⁴⁸ For history see *Compte Rendu du Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale*, 1912, p. 370 *et seq.*

Small free efforts were in favour, Galliéni himself devoting much attention to military colonization on the lines Bugeaud had attempted in Algeria half a century earlier.⁴⁹ "Official colonization" on the east coast, again on the best Algerian model, was another of his obsessions. Creole families, already acclimatized to tropical conditions, were brought in from Réunion and given land and materials. But the result was to turn him away from the idea of State-aided "official colonization." The immigrants were accustomed to the nonchalant *dolce far niente* of life in a sugar-colony, and, counting on the administration, abstained from initiative and often from work, so that the scheme was entirely a failure. Galliéni therefore resolved to stand aside and let colonization be either spontaneous or non-existent. A law of 1896 set up a homestead plan, giving a hundred hectares to every French settler on condition that the land was improved: otherwise, land could be bought in any quantity for two or three francs a hectare. The whole scheme was somewhat nebulous and haphazard, because it was already realized that such settlement was a minor detail rather than a leading fact in Madagascar's development: the land was clearly an Indo-China rather than an Algeria, in so far as small settlement was concerned, and, even if there was a scope for "middle settlement" on the Tunisian model, no demand existed on the part of capitalistic immigrants. Accordingly, the results of all the schemes were mediocre in the extreme. Up to 1905, 2,385 grants were given for an area of 404,904 hectares, but only 43 per cent. had been finalized by the performance of the necessary conditions, easily satisfied though they were. There were still only 630 European planters in the group, and they cultivated 18,000 hectares as compared with the 760,000 hectares improved by the natives.⁵⁰

It was clear, therefore, that such development as there was had to be in native hands; but, when the Government services were organized to foster this development and to induce habits of industry in the natives, they were confronted by the great problem of Madagascar,—the automatic and increasingly stringent limit placed on development by the small and dwindling population. It was commonly thought that Madagascar was a land of teeming millions, whereas, in reality, with an area as large as France, there were only 2½ million natives, a great proportion of whom were feeble and decadent. The central plateau and the east were relatively densely peopled, but, even there, it is only in the immediate environs of Antananarivo that the population numbers twenty to the square kilometre: the south was far less peopled; the north still worse with less than two persons to the square kilometre; and the west was

⁴⁹ *L'Afrique Française*, April 1901, p. 121; Feb. 1903, p. 53.

⁵⁰ L. Truitard (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 49 *et seq.*; Galliéni (1908), p. 355.



practically empty. Indeed, right athwart the centre of the land is a long empty strip as big as several French *départements*.⁵¹ The total native population, it is true, went up to 3,459,403 by 1925, but the increase was due rather to improved methods of taking the Census than to the prosperity of the natives themselves. It is a moot point as to how far the population is still decreasing: certainly, the survival-rate is falling off, and the changed methods of existence, as has been seen, take a constant toll of the population. Some races are rapidly giving way: the Sakalavas, in particular, the first French allies and formerly the most important race in the north, have already dwindled to 141,000 and are clearly on the way to extinction. On the other hand, the Hovas and Betsileos and the southern mountaineers are increasing, and it is with them that the future of Madagascar lies. But these races number in all less than two million people, and what can such a tiny number do in a tropical land the size of France? ⁵² So that, if Madagascar reproduces the conditions of native agriculture that pertain in Indo-China, it lacks the essential element of the Indo-Chinese population position,—the millions of prolific natives.

Accordingly, French efforts have centred on increasing the future supply of labour and safeguarding the present in Madagascar. To secure the former is "the policy of *crèches*," but such works of social assistance are limited by the monetary aspect and by the attitude of the natives themselves. Birth-control on the one hand and the general disintegration of native life on the other nullify the French efforts: even salutary social reforms like the abolition of slavery and the *corvée* seem to aid the enemy, as they deprive the natives of the health-giving necessity for work, and, under such conditions, unrestricted freedom is as bad as a noxious drug in inducing racial decay. In the last resort, the natives must save themselves, and, as always with indolent native populations, Gallieni's schemes for their regeneration through work is brought up against the rock of native heedlessness and passive opposition. This is what militates against the success of the schemes to provide a peasant-proprietorship, and at present is an almost insoluble difficulty in Madagascar, because, the tax to the contrary, the native, after the original constraint, must come to the new stage—or, at least, maintain himself in that stage—of his own volition. Madagascar is at present in the halting stage between the two systems.

The French, however, have retained and even increased the element of restraint. An *arrêté* of November, 1919, increased the poll-tax to the considerable amount of from 15 to 25 francs a year, imposed a tax on all rice-fields, and a land-tax payable by all residents of Madagascar. In

⁵¹ See Map on page 409 for population density.

⁵² Dondouau (1922), *op. cit.*, pp. 116, 117.

addition, a decree of 1910 had instituted a special "assistance" tax of three francs a year, the proceeds to go to free medical treatment for the natives, and amounting in 1920 to 2½ million francs.⁵³ But these indirect measures, accumulated though they were, still proved inadequate, and in 1919 the administration had to decree directly that every native should work 180 days in each year. Any such policy of socially directed force, however, has its limits, and certainly Gallieni's dream of seeing a flourishing population made energetic by the spur of economic progress, has not been realized, despite the boom of rice-production during the war-years. The fibre of the race is the issue at stake, and, after thirty years of effort, the average native seems as nonchalant and unprogressive as ever.

Undeterred by this deadening enervation which seems to creep over Malagasian affairs with the dreadful inexorability of a tropical forest encroaching on cleared land, the Government maintains its efforts, although it would appear that the peculiar lassitude which characterizes Polynesian races would prevent results similar to those achieved by the English on the Gold Coast and Nigeria and by the French themselves in West Africa, where economic prosperity, coupled with a tactfully applied spur in the form of "social force," has removed the racial *malaise*. In 1922, for instance, Governor-General Garbit attacked the problem again, for, without success in this direction, Madagascar clearly had to remain stagnant. During the war-years, when rice and manioc were wanted by France in larger and larger quantities, an element of exploitation had for the first time entered Malagasian native policy, because the determined heedlessness of the natives could not be pandered to at such a moment of crisis,—when production was the essential need. To prevent a continuance of this, Garbit set up a "Department of Native Affairs" and an advisory council for native matters, with a majority of Malagasian members. In addition, he admitted four natives to the administrative council of the colony and increased the number of native functionaries, the idea being both to provide a scope for the natives and to give them means of expressing their grievances. The time was ripe for a new sign of their visible co-partnership with the Government,—an important matter for a people having the natural Polynesian *flair* for political matters. At the same time, he arranged for a closer local supervision of the economic life of the tribesmen. A strict *régime* of contracts was instituted to eradicate the exploitation that had previously crept in; and commissions of labour were set up in each province, prescribing minimum wages and in general safeguarding the natives.⁵⁴ As a general inducement to progress, agricultural loans to peasant-proprietors are being contemplated

⁵³ *Annuaire Général du Madagascar*, 1921-1922, Vol. II, p. 270.

⁵⁴ *L'Afrique Française*, April 1922, p. 189.

(although the French colonial scheme in general is notoriously backward in providing credit-facilities, and Madagascar is no exception to this rule). In fact, the whole of the newer native policy, while rejecting both the idealistic attitude of Gallieni's time and the exploitation of the war-years, provides a limited avenue of progress for the natives, and sets up a closer supervision of their economic life, with the element of social constraint or judicially exercised force more prominent than before.

Yet these are in some degree measures of desperation,—last-hour attempts to inculcate a progressive spirit in a backward native stock in which the majority of administrators have little faith. The root-evil of the island is still the population problem, and, to Gallieni's plaint that "what lacks in our new possession is a sufficiently numerous population" has to be added "and a sufficiently vigorous population." The problem is both one of numbers and stamina, and, because the latter affects the numbers of the future, it is the centre of French efforts.⁵⁵

As would be expected under these conditions, the actual development of Madagascar has been strictly limited. The land itself is not a unity, for its possibilities range from European crops on the central plateau to the sugar-cane and cotton of the western plains, and the rich humid crops like vanilla and cocoa and pepper in the east. But the unifying crops are rice and manioc and maize, which grow everywhere, except in the extreme south, and are the staples of the land. Madagascar is essentially a country of rice and manioc, and hence of small native growers, as the experience of Indo-China and elsewhere has eliminated all other methods of production in such cases. Conditions are such that the prosperity of the land must of necessity depend on these two native crops, and hence only a limited and very gradual development is possible.⁵⁶

To the French, however, with their idea of colonies as regions to be exploited, this restraint was anathema, and, because they retained the psychology of the Dutch in the wealthy East Indies, and detested the idea of a colony where the tedious farming methods of France had to be duplicated, a period of restricted development marked the first years in Madagascar. This was partly caused by the failure of the various settlement-schemes, but mainly by the emphasis placed on the country's varied possibilities. The Europeans turned first to gold, and, in the early years of the century, gold-seekers flocked in on every boat, and even the comparatively settled natives like the Betsimisirakas deserted their rice-fields for the allurements of placer-mining.

This gave way to a rubber boom, and, for a time, Madagascar was viewed as a potential Congo; but the unwise exploitation of wild rubber

⁵⁵ See Richard Report to *Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale*, 1912, p. 631.

⁵⁶ Jumelle Report on agriculture, in *ibid.*, p. 369.

by the natives soon razed the *massifs*, and by 1910, rubber exports had dwindled to insignificance. Not deterred by this, Europeans turned to the "rich tropical crops," the get-rich-quick-crops, and, by 1906, cocoa and vanilla and kindred cultures were the centre of attention. But these were clearly subsidiaries rather than the staples of the island, and, in a disgruntled kind of manner, France realized by the time of the crisis of 1905-1908 that the wealth of the land was in rice and meat—naturally a disappointment to those who had for years looked on Madagascar as a Java or Ceylon waiting for its wealth to be drawn from it. "The island must above all be a granary and a pastoral-station for South Africa and its own natives,"—that was its limited destiny, and the lesson of 1906 was as unpalatable as it was clear.⁵⁷

The result of the disillusion was the crisis towards the end of Gallieni's time. This was aided by his neglect of economic development, a neglect made almost inevitable by his emphasis on native regeneration, and one accentuated by the policy of tariff-assimilation. Madagascar had been "assimilated" in 1897, and, at once, despite the extensive imports for public-works, trade commenced to decline. France secured the Malagasian market for herself, that could not be denied; but at the cost of stagnation. With one hand she limited that increase of trade which Gallieni, with the other, was offering to the Malagasians as the primal incentive for his scheme of economic development on their part.⁵⁸

The final cause of the crisis was the sudden restriction of French efforts. In the ebullience of the early years, when Gallieni's "policy of races" seemed to have removed the native difficulty and opened this teeming tropical Eldorado for exploitation, France sanctioned a vigorous policy of public-works. Construction-materials poured in, trade received an artificial fillip, there was an increased demand for French goods, and the French manufacturers flooded the Malagasian markets. An economic structure altogether too large was erected, and Madagascar was clearly traversing a boom-period. The pricking of the bubble came when 15,000 men were suddenly taken from railway-construction, and the island swept back in a tide of pessimism as artificial and unjustified as the boom of 1896-1898 and the following years had been. Imports declined by 50 per cent. in 1904, and the crisis lasted for four years.⁵⁹ The result was that trade in 1906-1908 was less than it had been in 1900, and it

⁵⁷ Dondouau (1922), *op. cit.*, p. 206.

⁵⁸ July's Report, in *Compte Rendu des Travaux du Congrès Colonial de Marseille* (1906), Vol. II, p. 206; A. Artaud, *Introduction à la Révision du Régime Douanier des Colonies Françaises* (1925—report to Colonial Institute of Marseilles), p. 38; *Congrès du Régime Douanier Colonial*, Marseilles, 1925, p. 51 *et seq.*

⁵⁹ *Compte Rendu du Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale*, 1912, p. 245 *et seq.*; Messimy, *Notre Œuvre Coloniale* (1910), p. 239.

was not until 1916 that imports again approached the boom-level of 1901.

Madagascar thus received a salutary lesson on the subject of developing in unhealthy directions and at a forced rate, and, until the war-years, remained practically stagnant. The comparatively rapid development of 1909-1912 was followed by a marked depression in the next two years, and, on the whole, the country stood still, under the joint influence of an assimilated tariff and an unprogressive native population. To offset this, and to supplement the successful native policy by a developmental economic policy, Galliéni's successors, from Augagneur to Merlin (1905-1918), emphasized economic consolidation above all things. Augagneur in particular turned to the development of native agriculture and of railways, and attacked the problem of communications in earnest.

It was evident that, even given a desire to progress on the part of the natives, any such development depended on the extension of communications, especially in such a country of mountains and jungle. The economic life of Madagascar centred on the plateau of Antananarivo, the old Hova land, yet this was set far inland from the coast. Up to 1900 the only connection between the two was by man-back portage, with the "forest-fever,"—the *hazo-tazo* of native tradition,—keeping Emyrna in a practically isolated situation. Even Galliéni's carriage-road served only to reduce the cost of transport from Antananarivo to the coast from 1,300 francs a ton to 700 francs, and clearly a railway was called for. After considerable hesitation between the eastern and western projects, the French Parliament in April, 1900, sanctioned a loan of 60 million francs, 48 million of which were to go for the railway.⁶⁰ This was finally opened in 1913, and (termed "the rice-railway") was quite as important as the Dakar-St. Louis line ("the groundnut railway") had been in Senegal in changing the semi-desert of Cayor and revolutionizing the position and outlook of the natives. This development continued, and at present there are three railways with a mileage of 430; but the country still stands in need of communication.⁶¹ It has only 1,346 miles of metalled roads, and, although the scarcity is not as important as it would have been had economic development been more rapid and the transformation of native life more extensive, it still imposes an almost impassable barrier on development. At the very least, it sets a limit which cannot be passed.

The development of Madagascar thus remains restricted, as the

⁶⁰ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 24/3/1900; Senate, 15/4/1900. Report in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, 1900, p. 16, or *Journal Officiel*, Deps., docts. parl., sess. ext., 1899, p. 461.

⁶¹ *Compte Rendu du Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale*, 1912, p. 595 et seq.

following table shows, especially if account be taken of depreciation :—

	IMPORTS. (Millions of Francs.)	EXPORTS.
1896 . . .	—	3·605—Galliéni's arrival.
1900 . . .	40·469	10·623—beginning of public-works.
1905 • . .	31·196	22·850—Galliéni left : crisis.
1910 . . .	33·436	45·348—period of restricted prosperity.
1913 . . .	46·747	56·054—a bad year.
1915 . . .	43·766	66·066
1916 . . .	101·954	85·015—rise due to rice-exports.
1917 . . .	136·769	86·207
1918 . . .	102·268	91·782
1919 . . .	98·972	177·167—franc at 35 to £1
1920 . . .	279·694	285·942 „ „ 50 „ world crisis.
1921 . . .	225·921	108·308 „ „ 62·5 „ local crisis.
1922 . . .	173·831	132·472 „ „ 62·5 „ „ „
1923 . . .	209·818	191·840 „ „ 75 „ „ „
1924 . . .	259·033	387·571 „ „ 88 „ „

There is nothing remarkable about this table⁶² : on the contrary, with a country comparatively free from droughts and other natural obstacles, and with established staples, it implies restriction. It is true that the development had been consistent and firmly based, even if limited, and that, to obtain a fair perspective, the new position has to be compared with that pertaining under the Hovas. For instance, in 1901–1902, all of the northern Sakalavas, in an essentially rice-growing province, were living on rice imported from Indo-China ; a few years later, the region not only fed itself but had become a rice-exporting country : and this transformation, little sign of which appears in the trade-lists, was but typical of what was happening in some degree all over Madagascar, especially when the demand of the war-years gave a fillip to the export of rice and the much-needed manioc with its hard fibre. Madagascar's position thus remains one of compensations. The development, if limited, has been natural and guarantees the future stability of the country, although at the same time making unlikely any sudden or extensive increases. It also follows that Madagascar's financial position has always been sound and that the colony, when hit by the world-crisis of 1920 and the currency-depreciation, could not only withstand the four bad years but, by 1924, could recover its equilibrium and even obtain a favourable trade-balance. Like Indo-China and West Africa, and unlike Algeria, the country is in an essentially sound position, even if in a comparatively small way.

⁶² See graphs in Dondouau (1922), *op. cit.*, p. 232, or statistics in *Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale*, 1912, p. 233.

At present 35 per cent. of the country's exports are of rice and hides and 40 per cent. of the imports cotton-goods, the other items being subsidiary to these staples. The French have undoubtedly secured their end of monopolizing the country's trade, as they control 87 per cent. of the imports and 88 per cent. of the exports, these proportions being uniform over a number of years. But, in view of the proximity of the South African market and the natural attachment of this island to the mainland, such a restriction is obviously artificial, and, by attaching Madagascar to a market 7,000 miles away, imposes heavy financial burdens on her, and in addition, a handicap on her possible development, although it is impossible to estimate to what extent this is so.

As a distinct change from the relative stagnation of Malagasian production for two decades, the recent move west is one of the most important economic events that the island has known.⁶³ Hitherto, the central plateau absorbed most attention, although a lesser effort was made to develop the relatively peopled sections along the east coast. This was an attempt to bring the cultures to the people, despite the fact that the land in question is mediocre. But, with the advance of French knowledge of the island, it was realized that the future of Madagascar lay in the west, the less peopled half of the island, with fewer than two persons to the square kilometre, and with the huge Morondara province inhabited only by rapidly disappearing Sakalavas, who were making no attempt to orientate themselves towards the changing demands of existence, but were simply giving way. Once attention was diverted from the illusory "rich cultures" which were possible in certain regions of the east, and once it was realized that Madagascar was a land of rice and cattle, it became clear that, for purposes of future development, Madagascar meant the west. This was a vast region, a third the size of France, with three distinct belts of plain, separated by practically desert spaces. Two of them already had natural outlets at Majunga and Tolear, and a third, for the largest and most important plain, was starting near the Tsiribihina delta. This was "quite another world," distinct from the *hauts plateaux* of the east; and here, where a native could produce thrice as much as in the centre and where the easier conditions of life make a healthy race more prolific, was emptiness. The land waited for the taking. In times gone by, the warrior Sakalavas had kept the west a closed field of endless war, and thus shut off from the eastern Malagasians, but now the erstwhile pillagers were giving way with a frightful rapidity, —doomed, because the spark of vitality had gone from the race, and because it lacked the power of adapting itself to a quiet farming life.

The result was that the vigorous stocks of the south and north and

⁶³ Dondouau (1922), *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 234 *et seq.* See Map on p. 409 for migrations.

east have been concentrating on this land of promise for almost twenty years, and especially in the past decade.⁶⁴ The claims of an easier life attract the heedless masses, while the possibilities of advancement draw the energetic coastal-dwellers of the east and the mountaineers of the south. From six directions, therefore, a vast human migration has been taking place and is displacing the centre of gravity in Malagasian life. The Baras, twenty years ago all south of the Mangoky River, are already up to the Tsiribihina, that is, the centre of the island, and their onrush over the plains is unchecked. The Betsileos from the central plateau, traditionally quiet agriculturists, are coming down all over the west, and the Antaimorana, in whose east-coast home there are almost ten persons to the square kilometre, are crossing the roof of the island. In the north the Antandrona and Betsimisirakas have invaded all of Analalava province and most of Majunga, and penetrate south to effect a junction with the Baras coming north. Both the tribal and economic positions are being radically changed, and the important feature of the move is that the very migration and the energetic movement and competition do more to induce that progressive state of mind aimed at in Galliéni's native programme than all the measures of "social force" could do, when applied to a listless population remaining immobile and unprogressive in their traditional eastern homes. The migration means the spur of change and the removal in part of the hampering web of tradition; and, with natives as with everybody, the occupation of a virgin land and the carving-out of new provinces must mean a more energetic outlook, and, with a people like the Malagasians, a blow to their psychology of drift and despair. In this manner, Madagascar's displacement to the west means racial revival as well as economic health, and so island affairs in every way are coming more and more to centre on the *mise en valeur* of the west,—with the labour and irrigation and communication questions that of necessity are involved.

IV. Conclusion

Madagascar in these ways adds a distinctive element to the history of French colonization,—the transformation of a country in a few years and the permanent winning-over of what was formerly a bear-pit of some twenty quarrelling native races, to whom ideas of progress and co-operation were entirely foreign. Galliéni's "policy of races" produced this change and became the accepted colonial policy in this connection,—as Tonkin and South Algeria, West Africa and Morocco, especially the last-mentioned, were all to know. This island exerted a very real influence on the colonies and on colonial policy in general,

⁶⁴ *Compte Rendu du Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale*, 1912, p. 415, for motion favouring it.

especially by transforming the hitherto vague "protectorate" policy, which was becoming construed more and more as simply meaning abstention, into a definite policy of "the collaboration of races,"—the theory of "association" in its practical form.

It may be argued that this success was dearly bought and that France paid for it by the relative stagnation of Madagascar's economic development, but it must be remembered that the limitations of the country and the shackles imposed on development by the system of tariff-assimilation were certainly more immediate, and possibly far more important, causes of that stagnation. Even so, however, the question arises as to whether a spectacular but artificial economic advance, as in the case of Algeria, is preferable to the slow and secure growth of Madagascar: and the lessons of the crisis of 1920–1924 would seem to make the choice clear. Notwithstanding the firmness of Malagasian advance, however, and taking into account the physical nature of the country, it is clear that development has been unduly slow and limited; and it becomes a further moot point whether an advance, however firmly consolidated, may be called successful, if it does not represent the greatest possible exploitation that would have been warranted by the nature of the country's possibilities. On the other hand, the opening of the west, and the greater freedom which this implies for the natives remaining in the east, would seem to be a possible transforming factor, both as regards the native temperament and the colony's future, and it can certainly be said that, despite the unusual test of the post-war crisis, Madagascar is in a sound condition for such an experiment.

In all, then, Madagascar was perhaps the greatest native success of the French, although less successful in modernizing and rejuvenating the native temperament than in evolving a harmonious policy. Economically, development has been stable if limited, and, by a somewhat painful process of trial-and-error, has come to limit itself to those fields of development that afford future opportunity. Development has been limited to the natives, and to ordinary farming-pursuits in preference to the richer plantation-cultures; and the west has been called into being to destroy the unwonted emphasis hitherto placed on the central plateau. But, after all, the question of Madagascar's economic development is not the important issue in French colonial policy: it is the Galliéni tradition and the "policy of races" that made Madagascar so conspicuous a French success, and an interesting study, not only in French colonization, but in the wider history of comparative colonial methods. In this regard, Madagascar is one of the outstanding successes of European colonization in general,—a seminary for the inculcation of new views on native policy;—and therein lies its importance.

CHAPTER XI

INDO-CHINA

ONE of the greatest mysteries in French colonization is the present undoubted leadership of Indo-China. "From all points of view," summed up Sarraut, "this is the most important, the most developed, and the most prosperous of our colonies,"¹—a position that is the more remarkable in view of the dismal record of failures in the early years. Yet it could easily be understood why the early policies should have been inapplicable. The problem afforded by Indo-China was very complex and quite new,—indeed, it had nothing in common with France's African problems. Its complexity was undoubted. There was a large homogeneous population, linked by one civilization and singularly hostile to new cultural influences: yet they were so split up into rival native kingdoms that all the French could do was to lump five dissimilar States into a loose union. Organization under these conditions was practically out of the question, and, to make matters worse, there were certain complicating features from outside. Constant diplomatic issues arose with other Powers, and the rich deltas of Indo-China saw a continual infiltration of inimical elements from China and Siam. Local circumstances thus exerted a considerable influence on policy, and, when it is added that this colony was the particular playing-ground of French theorists, the difficulties of control will be obvious.

The policy occasioned by these conditions was in many ways remarkable,—not least in the radical difference between its two forms. In the first stage, everything was based on assimilation, and this involved the destruction of native cultures; but, in the second, the more liberal teaching of Paul Bert and de Lanessan bore fruit, and it was recognized that Indo-China had to evolve in the light of its own past. This change of emphasis came in 1897, and explains both the failure before that date and the success after it. It also explains the anomalous nature of Indo-Chinese organization to-day,—why Cochinchina, for instance, is a totally assimilated colony and why the northern States are only protectorates, with the natives still largely governing themselves and masters of their own cultural future. Cochinchina had the misfortune to be the first

¹ A. Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises* (1923), p. 463.

part of the peninsula to come under French influence, hence its organization dated from the eighties, and everything native was so completely uprooted that it could not, as in Tonkin, ultimately predominate over the extraneous French ideas. Tonkin's stand, however, swung the pendulum in the opposite direction, and, coupled with metropolitan indifference or hostility in the nineties, decided that the rest of the Indo-Chinese union should be organized loosely, with a considerable scope left for native development,—a trend reinforced at a later date by the rise of the *association* theory in France.

The turning-point of 1897 also explains the difference between French methods here and in Africa. Of course, it is impossible to generalize in this connection. As has been pointed out, the present organization of Indo-China is made anomalous by the position of Cochinchina as an assimilated colony, and the influence of the period before 1897 is continually cropping up: but, on the whole, Indo-China may be judged by the policy since Doumer's arrival in that year. So too with Africa. Tunisia and the more recent policy of *association*, as organized in West Africa and Morocco, may be put aside, and Algeria and the pre-war stage in general taken as expressing the conventional French policy there,—so far as there was one. If France's African and Asiatic policies are limited to essentials in this way, it is seen that they are completely different. Africa meant to France the triumph of annexationist ideas and the destruction of native kingdoms, whereas Indo-China, after the experiment of Cochinchina, came to stand for a Protectorate, with native institutions surviving as the means of government. The typical French form in Africa was thus a directly annexed colony; in Asia, rule through associated native powers. This in turn meant that the French policy was direct rule in the former, indirect rule in the latter; or, in other words, the destruction of native government in Africa, but in Asia rule on the old Annamite-Chinese model,—through a mandarin or *litrati* class, with all the un-French orientation that this implied. The one saw emphasis on the French point of view, the other on the native. That is to say, collaboration rather than assimilation was the aim in Indo-China, at least after 1897. As far as the natives were concerned, this different emphasis involved social disruption for the Africans, with all of the repercussions that this meant on temperament and modes of life and thought, but social continuation for the Asiatics,—or what this meant under the circumstances, a large degree of social immobility.

Following these fundamental differences between African and Asiatic policy were certain lesser ones, which were tendencies rather than facts, quite opposite in each case. Because of the emphasis on native destruction and assimilation, French efforts in Africa tended to become

primarily governmental, but, with these matters reduced to lesser importance in Asia, France turned in the first place to economic development. That is why the transformation of Indo-China has been so noticeable and continuous since 1897. As a corollary of this came the French attempt to obtain a monopoly in the commerce of her African colonies, but a recognition that her Asiatic possessions were destined by nature for local Oriental markets. In general, that is, the centripetal idea was triumphant in Africa, the centrifugal tendency in French Asia, with the differences that this implied in every department.

But it is easy to overdraw such a contrast in colonial methods, and it must be remembered that French Asia and French Africa formed one whole in the determination of the colonial policy of Paris. That means that Africa determined the early assimilation-experiments in Cochin-China and Tonkin, that Tunisia and the force of circumstances led to the later policy of a protectorate, and that, in turn, this *association* idea spread outwards from Indo-China through Madagascar to French North Africa; and thus African and Asiatic policies tend to-day to be united on an *association* basis.

Yet, despite this continual interaction and essential unity of French policy, and despite the turning-point of Indo-China in 1897 and the newer policies in Africa, the basic differences of emphasis remain as important factors in the situation. They account both for differences of organization and for the different position of each set of colonies at the present time. Indeed, it might be asserted that, had it not been for this difference of emphasis, there would have been no reason why Indo-China should have forced itself to the front so spectacularly: with it, on the other hand, the Indo-Chinese Union easily recovered from the inapplicable policies of the first years and built up a record that is unequalled in French colonization.

I. The Preliminary Stage (to 1885)

As with her other colonies, France successfully raked history for proofs of her interest in Indo-China,—a process that could be used to justify the annexation of Jerusalem or the Cannibal Islands, and the main point of which seemed to be that the claims in question were always concerned with declining native Powers! France undoubtedly had early claims in Indo-China. Her voyagers and missionaries had been there since 1625: her officers had built forts for the Annamese at the close of the eighteenth century: Guizot held that her trading rights there justified annexation, several Annamite ports were opened to her in 1841—and the peninsula lay athwart the main route to the Orient!

Napoleon III therefore sent a fleet in 1859 to take Saigon, the port at

the delta of the Mekong in Cochin-China, and, as in Algeria, the French, once there, could not withdraw. For a time, all of the customary procrastinations and *volte-faces* of French colonial policy came to bear on the situation,—what Jules Harmand termed “the most singular and astonishing ideas.” Everything was confusion in the first six years, the only plain fact being that France wanted to withdraw. But this was the one thing that she could not do under the circumstances, especially when the treaty of 1862 gave her the three lower provinces of Cochin-China in full ownership. Napoleon *did* almost withdraw in 1865, but, two years later, events forced him to accept three more provinces; and already in 1863, de Lagrée had set up a protectorate over Cambodia, which was a decadent fragment under Siam. In this desultory and confused manner, France obtained the colony of Cochin-China and the protectorate of Cambodia almost despite herself. Incidentally, although she did not know it, she secured the trade-outlet of all the interior, even up to the provinces of South China.²

By the late sixties, tendencies had become more unified and efficient by reason of the trading impetus. France wanted to tap the China trade and held that all of the southern provinces could be made economic dependencies of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, looking south rather than east to the China Sea. This corner of Asia would thus mean a number of economic influences coming from the interior and centring on Cochin-China, which, fortunately for the new theory, began to flourish. With a densely populated delta and a rice-staple, Cochin-China was naturally one of the rich regions of the world. As early as 1867, that is, before the conquest of the second three provinces, its budget already showed a profit of a million francs. Indeed, it was the only French colony sending money to the mother-land at this time, and so France looked kindly on this colonial prodigy. Moreover, it accorded well with the rather hazily adventurous outlook of the Second Empire to consider an awakening Cathay at the feet of the French throne: and, while this won over the Court and the people, the influence of the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce and the Ministry of the Marine secured the interest of the traders. By 1866, therefore, France was full of the idea of entering China by this back-door and diverting the channel of economic development so that it would become the main entrance.

The Ministry of the Marine sent naval officers to explore the Mekong, in a hope that trade could come directly south from Szechuan to Saigon. In 1866–1868 Doudart de Lagrée, the most romantic figure in the early

² Documents in J. Ferry, *Le Tonkin et la Mère-Patrie* (1890 edition), pp. 58–69; a fuller account in P. Cultru, *Histoire de la Cochinchine française des origines à 1883* (1910), or P. Vial, *Les Premières Années de la Cochinchine* (1874).

years in the peninsula, ascended the river for the first time. It is a significant commentary on the emphasis on China at the time that Murchison, the President of the Royal Geographical Society in London, said that this was the most important expedition of the nineteenth century! Yet all that Lagrée really did was to go from the mouth of the Mekong to Seou-Cheou on the Yangtse and incidentally to dash the French hopes that Cochin-China could be made an outlet of West China. He demonstrated that the river could not possibly be this artery and that it was impracticable to develop the point.³

France, undaunted by this rebuff, continued her explorations of Yunnan, for it must be remembered that the Orient was viewed at this time as Africa was a little later,—as the future pivot of the world's economics and as spelling world-power for the nations securing predominance there. The economic penetration of Yunnan was France's goal, and, even in an anti-colonial age, the wisdom of this move was scarcely questioned, as it was deemed to concern trade but not colonization.

Gradually, it was perceived that Tonkin and not Cochin-China might be Yunnan's link to the sea and the portal of South China. Interest therefore deserted the Mekong for the Red River, and left Saigon for Hanoi. There were the same extravagant hopes, the same imaginary advantages. "This river will one day turn most of the riches of Western China to a French port," wrote the Vicomte de Carné, one of the de Lagrée mission⁴: and Dupuis, a trader who had been in China since 1855 and who was obsessed by the idea of the southern outlet, commenced his series of explorations in 1871. He brought metals down from China to Hanoi in nine days, proving the practicability of the connection beyond the possibility of doubt. Thus he confirmed the deductions of the de Lagrée mission by actual experience, at the same time giving a fillip to the situation by revealing the mineral wealth of Yunnan.⁵

By this time everything was ready for French action. Tonkin was obviously more densely peopled and had a greater commerce than Cochin-China, and Dupuis's flat-bottomed boats had shown that it was the road to China. All in all, France's interest in Indo-China was shifting north. Then, too, England's activities dispelled any lingering doubts that France may have retained on the subject. The English papers published even more than the French about Dupuis's expeditions, and saw in the Red River the link from China through Burma to India. England was

³ Report of Doudart de Lagrée in *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (Paris), June, 1880.

⁴ Vicomte de Carné, *Voyage en Indo-Chine et dans l'Empire Chinoise* (1869), or de Kergaradec, *Rapport sur la première reconnaissance du fleuve du Tonkin* (1876-1877)—report by French Consul at Hanoi.

⁵ J. Dupuis, *Les Origines de la Question du Tonkin* (1896).

trying to secure the connection through Burma, and, between 1865 and 1889, made at least eleven important expeditions in the Burma-Chinese region, the idea being to attract the trade of West China to either Calcutta or Rangoon, instead of to Hanoi. England had hitherto been the arbiter of Chinese trade from the east, and London had been practically the sole intermediary between China and Europe: hereafter, wrote François Garnier, the second in command of the de Lagrée mission, Hanoi would give the French at least independence, and possibly more.⁶

Therefore, when the Annamite mandarins and the Yunnan Viceroy raised obstacles in Dupuis's path, France eagerly intervened. The Garnier mission was sent in 1873 to settle these disputes, study the general situation, negotiate a favourable tariff, and secure a right of exploiting the mines of Yunnan. It was a trade mission, but with the understanding that political action was not far behind. But the recalcitrance of the natives, real or supposed, led Garnier to take Hanoi and to occupy the Delta region himself. This, however, was overstepping the mark. The zealots on the spot were forgetting that this was 1873, that colonization was treason in Paris, and that France wanted from the Orient not obligations, but only riches that would strengthen her for her fight on the Rhine. They had blundered in converting a trade matter into a colonial one, and thus ruined their cause. France wanted to open four of the richest Chinese provinces, but the establishment of a new colony was not once contemplated. The Duc de Broglie, the head of the anti-colonials, therefore stopped the conquest of Tonkin, and the Treaty of Saigon, in March, 1874, was practically an evacuation. The independence of the land was recognized, and, although the river and certain ports remained open, France had to all intents and purposes given up. The steady work of economic penetration, spread consistently over twenty years though it had been, was abruptly stopped. Parisian anti-colonialism, aided by a meaningless distinction between commerce and colonization, had triumphed once more.⁷

Yet the matter could not be disposed of so simply, as the very logic of facts kept the French there. Events in the next decade moved steadily in the direction of annexation. French explorers worked in the back-country of Laos and Annam, there were reconnaissances for mining and railway purposes, the Chinese merchants in Yunnan worked for an outlet down to Tonkin, and the chief Chambers of Commerce in France

⁶ See important article of F. Garnier ("Des Nouvelles Routes de Commerce avec la Chine") in *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie* (Paris), Jan. 1872; or documents in Ferry (1890), *op. cit.*, pp. 97, 233.

⁷ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 2/8/1874, or Livre Jaune, *Affaires du Tonkin*, 1885. The treaties are in full in Du Clercq, Vol. XI, p. 144.

ordered a report on trade possibilities (1885).⁸ European commerce definitely started by this Red River route in 1883, and by 1885, there was a practical agreement of opinion in France on two points—that the Tonkin route might serve to break the hold of Canton and Hong-Kong and admit France directly to Chinese raw materials ; and that an immense wealth lay hidden in these regions and could be made available by using the dense population. Nor was there any doubt that all of these advantages would fall to France, for a ton of goods cost only 450 francs to go up the Red River to Yunnan, while the cheapest alternative route, that of the Yangtse, cost 880 !⁹ What could be clearer ?

Trading opportunities thus caused France to intervene once more, despite her hostility to new colonial ventures. A sufficient pretext was afforded by Tonkin's turn to China in the early eighties, although it is not clear what was the heinous offence implied in this turn. The truth was that the treaty of 1874, dubiously worded as it was, had caused endless trouble. France had purposely refrained from mentioning a protectorate in it, because her idea was to evacuate the land ; but, when later events made interference desirable, she claimed that the treaty *implicitly* set up a protectorate, even if it did not directly say so. The treaty was undoubtedly vague and obscure on the political side, and a protectorate could be read into it or denied at will. France had simply promised to protect Annam and had recognized the country's independence : and clearly this was not a protectorate.

Faced by French encroachments, the Emperor of Annam turned towards China, and the position became most involved. Annam owned Tonkin, China claimed to own Annam or at least be its suzerain, and France was reading new meanings into the treaty of 1874. To provide some tangible issue, the famous *Héris* or " Black Flags," the remnants of the Taiping rebels, occupied Upper Tonkin and, with local auxiliaries, became known as the so-called " pirates " who were the most formidable opponents of the French for twenty years. The diplomacy of Annam was remarkable. The Emperor deliberately revived the old Chinese rights over his country and appealed to Peking for protection, the result being the sending of Chinese regulars to the north. At the same time, to make the situation interesting, he appealed to France for reinforcements, under the terms of the treaty of 1874, and then left both sides to settle the issue. The French were soon hemmed in to Hanoi and Haiphong, and the Emperor kept on aiding both sides. Grand Guignol had again left the Rue Chaptal to assume its rôle in the French colonial sphere ! Perhaps the most delightful manifestation of all was the diplomacy of the Chinese Minister in Paris, Marquis Tseng, who effectively

⁸ In *Journal Officiel*, 12/2/85.

⁹ Ferry (1890), *op. cit.*, p. 234.

dallied with Gambetta and confused the situation so that nobody could understand it.¹⁰

The French, confronted by this maze, seized upon two factors and isolated them from the remainder. The Emperor Tu-Duc of Annam had deliberately connived at bringing the Chinese to Tonkin, and "Black Flags" and Chinese irregulars were in occupation of Upper Tonkin. "If France does not wish to renounce all influence in the Extreme Orient," reported Patenôtre, the French *chargé d'affaires* in China, in 1880, "it is absolutely necessary to bring a prompt remedy to this situation, which is daily becoming worse."¹¹ Therefore, Commandant Rivière was sent in January, 1882, to expel the intruders from the mountains of Tonkin.¹² Curiously enough, this did not involve war with China, but with Annam! The "Black Flags" were Chinese, but it was Annam who had enlisted them. The situation was most exasperating, and Gambetta had all his Meridional impetuosity set on end by Tseng's suave complications. Fortunately for the French politicians, the issue was solved by Rivière's death,—on the same Papier bridge on which Garnier had met his fate! This at once simplified matters. Was France for ever to be halted at this point? And when Rivière had been the idol of the masses after his conduct in the New Caledonian revolt of four years before? France, once aroused, cared little about anti-colonialism or facts or difficulties. She did not know whether she was fighting China or Annam, or both, but somebody had to be smashed on the Red River. Rivière and France had to be avenged, and no "Black Flag" savages could beard the tricolour any longer. Credits were instantly rushed through,¹³ and France went feverishly towards the conquest of Tonkin. The whole episode was especially instructive as to the motives determining French colonial policy, and, if coupled with the subsequent collapse, may be taken as a complete embodiment of the French colonial process.

There was no vagueness now. Jules Harmand was sent as Civil Commissioner, Hué was bombarded, and a treaty of August, 1883, gave "a full and complete recognition of the protectorate." Although four months had elapsed, Parliament was still overwhelmingly in support of the policy,¹⁴ and, even in December, Ferry received a majority of 210 in summing up French policy in Tonkin and showing that it was the best

¹⁰ For Chinese position, see Marquis Tseng-St. Hilaire, 27/12/80, and Gambetta-Tseng, 1/1/82, in *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Tonkin*, 1885, or Dubois et Terrier (1902), *op. cit.*, p. 849 *et seq.*

¹¹ Patenôtre, French *chargé d'affaires* in China, to de Freycinet, 5/5/80, in *Les Affaires du Tonkin*, 1885, or Dubois et Terrier (1902), *op. cit.*, p. 845.

¹² His instructions are in Dubois et Terrier (1902), p. 853.

¹³ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 25/1/83.

¹⁴ See interpellation in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 11/7/83. The voting was 362 to 78.

instance of colonial solidarity France had known.¹⁵ Parliament, for some incredible reason, stood firm; and so the Treaty of Tientsin in May, 1884, stipulated for a complete Chinese evacuation of Tonkin, while a Treaty of Hué in June finalized the pacification with Annam and set up a firmer protectorate over Cambodia.¹⁶ By 1884, France thus had one colony and three well-defined protectorates in Indo-China, and, wonderful to relate in the history of French colonization, there had been a consistent majority of over 200 for an aggressive colonial policy for fourteen whole months! Everything seemed finished; Ferry was still the master of the Houses, and had successfully steered France over the longest colonial crisis that had yet arisen. The French name had been absolved from its stain, Garnier and Rivière avenged, and Tonkin bade fair to go down the ages as one of the Republic's most spectacular triumphs,—when news came of an ambushade of French troops at Bac-Lé (June 23, 1884).

Quite illogically, France had reached the apex of her colonial ecstasy, now, equally as unjustifiably, she swept down to its nadir. This meant a war with China, and the Deputies, though thrice voting credits,¹⁷ were plainly irritated by the reopening of the question, and then by the length of the war and the constant reverses. The tedious events dragged on for nine months, Ferry's unpopularity increasing the while, and Clemenceau's constant attacks sapping the Ministry's resistance and tautening the nerves of the country. It was this protracted strain and feeling of frustration that alone explained the panic of March, 1885. As was inevitable, the French by this time were asserting their superiority in the Orient, and negotiations with the Chinese were proceeding favourably in the hands of Sir J. Duncan-Campbell. Once more, an ending seemed in sight, when there came to Paris a despatch of General Brière de l'Isle announcing a defeat at Lang-Son and containing the alarmist statement that "Whatever happens, I hope to be able to hold all the Delta,"—an attitude clearly uncalled for by the facts. Lang-Son was an unimportant skirmish in itself; the Delta was not threatened, nor yet the country beyond it; and the incident should have had no effect on the general situation. But the despatch exactly coincided with the mood of Paris at the moment. The Commune spirit was again in the air and the Parisians looked round for something tangible to rend,—they could not tear Tonkin to bits beneath their feet, but they had to do something. Filled with panic, they wanted to kill, but lacked a victim. Why, Ferry,—le *Tonkinois*, he who was as bad an enemy of France

¹⁵ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 31/10/83, 11/12/83; Senate, 21/12/83.

¹⁶ In Du Clercq, Vol. XIV, pp. 374, 382.

¹⁷ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 16/8/84, 22/10/84, 27/11/84.

as the "Black Flags," the murderer of Rivière, the man responsible for Bac-Lé and now Lang-Son! "*À mort Ferry*," "*Ferry le Traître*,"—the hoarse cries reverberated in the clammy air of a Paris June, and the crowds swarmed across the bridges and down from the Place de la Concorde to the Palais-Bourbon,—where within, the panic was just as pronounced and far more degrading than outside the iron railings, because the Deputies were at least sentient individuals and lacked the excuse of mob-psychology.

The hubbub beggared description, and culminated in Clemenceau's unjustified accusation of high treason against the Cabinet. Clemenceau was on many occasions forced to dubious practices and rewarded with popular plaudits, but he was never more popular, never more despicable, than at this moment.¹⁸ Ferry could not answer without betraying official secrets and could only appeal to his adversaries on the scores of his known integrity and the wisdom of delaying judgment on their part. But, as the mob was incapable of appreciating the first and was ignorant of judgment in any form, his appeals availed little. He fell, and it was clearly realized—and this afforded the spice of the situation to the cynics and the humorists in that bear-pit—that, while Lang-Son was a fitting fireworks to keep the mobs aroused outside, the voting within the Chamber, though nominally on a colonial issue, was determined almost entirely by Ferry's recent anti-clerical acts and severe measures against the Communist spirit.

On the 28th, Ferry's majority was down to fifty¹⁹: two days later, he was in a minority of 306 to 149: and, at any stage, he could have saved himself by telling of the peace which was even then being finalized.²⁰ His resignation was thus a conscious self-annihilation for the good of his country,—“the supreme honour of his life of pride and self-abnegation.” On the very day of his fall Sir Robert Hart sent the dispatch announcing the nearness of peace, and, four days after the Deputies had stigmatized him a traitor and the crowds had attacked his carriage, the peace for which he had been working for months was signed, and China recognized the French protectorate in Tonkin.

Tonkin was thus back to the stage of the first Treaty of Tientsin, but with every premise of the situation given a different value. Before, the country had been popular in France and viewed as one of the Republic's most obvious triumphs: now, its very name was an insult, and Ton-

¹⁸ His speech is in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 31/3/85. For opposition, see A. Rambaud, *Jules Ferry* (1903), pp. 363, 364.

¹⁹ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 29/3/85. Voting was 259 to 209.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Deps., 31/3/85. See 1/4/05 for vote of 50 instead of 200 million francs. The Treaty is in *Du Clercq*, Vol. XIV, p. 496.

kin sounded as bad as Sedan to French ears,—and the actual policy was determined by this feeling for at least twelve years. Tonkin was damned by the events of 1885, and France would have none of it. Ferry and Tonkin had revived the bitterness of 1870, and the psychology of defeat; and both were enemies of France. Accordingly the colony was detested by the great mass of the French and doubly detested by that minority which, realizing the mistake of March 30th, and ashamed of the degradation of Paris and Parliament, hated to be reminded of their degradation, and transferred their rancour to the cause of the whole situation.

By such curious means, the French came almost to gloat on Tonkin's failures in the next few years, their warped psychology seeing in these failures some measure of their own vindication. It is quite obvious how illogicality has been said to be the dominant *motif* in French colonization and how the apostles of emotion as against reason found a congenial soil in France. The Tonkin episode was in 1885: in 1889 Bergson published his first apologia for intuition, and the Naturalists were unreservedly plighting their literary troth to instinct. *Tonkinois!* The very word, with the biting contumely associated with it, tells the whole tale of French colonization and French temperament in these decades, and it was not until the Dreyfus case in 1894 that the passionate relegation of Tonkin to a special niche of bitterness was over. Even then, the aftermath was long felt, even as late as the attacks on Klobukowski's rule in Indo-China in 1910. *Revanche*, Tonkin, Boulanger, Panama, Dreyfus, *l'âme nègre*,—the French spirit has many sides, but withal a striking consistency, and it needs no elaboration to show how this directly influenced colonization and why French colonial efforts were always subject to influences that pertained in the case of no other Power.

After this emotional crisis and the long anti-climax that followed, the Indo-Chinese possessions, under a cloud though they were, slowly rounded themselves off, hindered at every stage by the passive or active opposition of France. In December, 1885, for instance, it was only after three days of discussion and recrimination that a credit of 50 million francs was voted, and even then only by a vote of 173 to 167, and to meet far larger contingencies! ²¹

Under these conditions the completion of the conquest was an unduly protracted process. For twelve years, continuous campaigns had to be directed against the "pirates" or pillagers, who, sheltered in their mountain-gorges, were supported by the sedentary populations in resisting the French. It was not until 1890, that even the Delta was pacified,

²¹ *Ibid.*, Deps., 25/12/85. "Procès-verbaux de la commission parlementaire des crédits du Tonkin" (Report and annexes), in *Journal Officiel*, 20/7/86.

and only then could the inland mountain-regions be attacked. The long struggle, however, at least provided a striking laboratory for the rising school of colonial administrators. It was here that Galliéni, for instance, evolved his "policy of races" in pacifying Cao-Bang province and organizing the land up to the Chinese border (1893-1894). Perhaps it was an outcome of the newer methods of collaboration thus emphasized that, when the last big rebel-chief was subdued in 1894, he was made a Resident,—probably on the score that precisely those attributes which had made him a successful bandit could, if diverted in other directions, be used equally as well for the pursuance of State purposes!

By 1897 France thus had Cochin-China as a colony and the rest of the peninsula as protectorates, and she was again looking outwards. Attention had turned to the south once more, especially after France had begun to sulk on the Tonkin question. Just as twenty years before, the Mekong River had been forced into the background before the claims of Tonkin and the Red River, so now, in the nineties, the progress of fluvial navigation combined with the unpopularity of the north to turn interest to Cochin-China and the Mekong, and thus to the rounding-off of the western frontier-lands. Here, since 1884, France had had rights over the Shan States and the Mekong valley, but, in the years after 1887, Siam had deliberately pushed eastwards and come to control Annam, menacing even Vinh on the coast. In 1893, Annam was thus reduced to a narrow strip between the mountains and the sea, Tonkin was menaced, and all the Mekong was abandoned to the Siamese. The French had to force the invaders back over the river, and, in 1893, despite England's obstruction, wrested from them all the rich territory between the Annamite mountains and the rivers. This permitted the organization of Laos two years later, and made Indo-China a connected block of land instead of what the natives called "a sack of rice at each end of a long stick,"—that is, Cochin-China and Tonkin separated by the thin Annamite coast.²²

With this rounding-off, France could once more turn to the question of the South Chinese market,—that issue which had hitherto given coherence to her Indo-Chinese policy and without which, it might safely be said, she would probably never have gone beyond Cochin-China. The capture of this trade was for the time being the main aim of French diplomacy in the Orient, and France seized various opportunities throughout the nineties to extend Tonkin's sphere of influence northwards.

²² Livre Jaune, *Affaires du Siam*, 1893-1901 (1901), or Seauve, *Les Relations de la France avec le Siam*, 1880-1907 (1908). The incident is best related in the debates in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 25/2/96, 28/2/96, especially the speeches of Deloncle and Dévellé.

After the defeat of China by Japan, she secured a more favourable frontier and special commercial rights in the three southern provinces of China: three years later, China agreed not to cede land in these provinces to any other Power and to lease Kwang-chow-wan to France as a naval depot. Concessions had also been obtained for the Peking-Hankow and Lang-Cheou-Si Kiang railways and France was building up a network of economic privileges. It was a period of diplomatic warfare for commercial rights, with French lives at a premium. The assassination of two naval officers, as the official historians of French colonization naïvely related, "obtained for us, instead of reparations and indemnities, a new series of privileges, a better delimitation of territory near the port, and a permit for a Franco-Chinese company to exploit certain mines."²³

But the trouble was that, after fifteen years of such struggle, France found that the English railway from Hankow to Canton and Kowloon dominated the situation and turned the bulk of traffic away from Tonkin. It was "a victory of Hong-Kong over Hanoi and Haiphong." This check in itself terminated the French policy of expanding Tonkin northwards by means of concessions wrested at the cannon's mouth, but it was given finality by the newer evaluation of South China's resources.

In the early nineties, the old exuberance of Dupuis's period was still in the air, and the Lyons "mission of commercial exploration" was studying Szechuan and stressing the potentialities of the Yangtse markets. They held anew that the Red River outlet was far more advantageously situated than the eastern outlets of China, and that Tonkin was the economic mistress of South China. Their report, in fact, might almost have been written by Dupuis or Garnier, and certainly kept alive the erroneous premises of the earlier years.²⁴

More to the point were Leroy-Beaulieu's statements in *L'Economiste Français*. He scouted the idea of French commercial hegemony over South China. Why, he claimed, the very transport trade itself was largely mythical! "The three frontier provinces are the poorest of the whole Empire,—very mountainous, inhabited for the great part by very primitive tribes, and devastated and depopulated by the Mohammedan risings of the middle of last century."²⁵ Kwang-si was poor and pirate-infested, Kweichow was not much better despite its silk-resources, and Szechuan, though richer and with more trade, turned east to the Yangtse

²³ For documents, see *Journal Officiel*, 22/10/96, or Dubois et Terrier (1902), *op. cit.*, pp. 824, 927-942.

²⁴ Chambre de Commerce de Lyon—*La Mission lyonnaise en Chine*, 1895-1897 (1898).

²⁵ *L'Economiste Français*, 1900, or British Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 324, 1901, p. 14.

and not south to Tonkin. Even for Yunnan, the Red River route was uncertain and dangerous, and could not compete with the English outlet *via* the West River.

On the whole, then, very little trade passed the Indo-Chinese frontier at Laokay, and, by the dawn of the century, France saw her Chinese expectations dwindle, and her interests turn from outside her own border to the development of Tonkin's internal wealth,—a significant change of emphasis. The wider but illusory advantages of the South Chinese trade were thus cast aside for the more restricted but practical development of Indo-China itself. French policy had left beliefs for facts. Such Chinese trade as there was was to come out by a railway through Tonkin instead of the treacherous Red River, but, after all, this was seen to be only a minor phase of Indo-Chinese life, and not, as had been thought for thirty years, the very *raison d'être* of the colony.²⁶

It was not until 1900, therefore, that the elements of the Indo-Chinese position were clearly discerned, and that policy was determined by the real nature of the situation. By that date, there was an Indo-Chinese Federation (1891), with the powers of the central organization being gradually developed under Doumer (1895–1905), and with the component parts well-defined. There were five distinct countries in the peninsula, one of which alone was a French colony. There, in Cochin-China, the Algerian policy was applied, and the colony had the usual paraphernalia of a deputy to the French Parliament and an official Financial Council in the colony itself. The other four provinces were protectorates, but with control exercised in a different fashion in each, and with actual policy largely determined by the pre-existing degree of native organization. All had Residents-General controlling the civil and judicial services, and all were directly ruled by native mandarins. But political and administrative organization in Annam and Tonkin was predominantly Chinese, whereas it was Indian in Cambodia and Laos, and less democratic than in the Chinese sections. Over and above this were other differences. Tonkin was legally a protectorate joined to Annam, but, after 1897, became to all intents and purposes a colony like Cochin-China, for the last Annamite viceroy was suppressed in that year, and organization approximated more and more to that of the southern colony. Annam itself tended to advance in quite an opposite direction. Possibly because it was the most archaic and poorest of the Chinese regions, the French neglected it. The protectorate over it remained only in name, and it became a native State under French protection, with a degree of change inversely proportionate to that of its neighbour, Tonkin.

²⁶ J. Chailley, *Paul Bert au Tonkin* (1887), pp. 185–196. A long report on Yunnanese trade is in *Journal Officiel*, 28/1/90.

Cambodia was even less changed. It had a sovereign under French protection, but, because it was a nation with a long civilization distinct from that of the other Indo-Chinese states, it remained a backward Oriental kingdom of the interior. Laos was practically untouched, and is still protected by its poverty and isolation. It takes fifty days to go from Saigon to its capital, and so Laos is further from Cochin-China than France. Accordingly it remained inert and undeveloped under its hereditary princes.

On the whole, therefore, the Indo-Chinese federation resolved itself into five utterly dissimilar states, with French policy differing in each. Effective attention was confined to Cochin-China and Tonkin, the two extremes, which were the richest and most populated states of the federation. One of these was completely assimilated, the other became increasingly so, and such was the position that the remaining three states existed only to give some degree of geographical continuity to these two provinces. Indo-China meant Tonkin and Cochin-China: the rest were only ballast. The federation was thus a *congeries* of unlike provinces, unequally developed and unequally desired, and with the points of difference outweighing the common features.

II. The People and their Civilization

One feature was early evident,—that Indo-China was predominantly a native country and that any scheme of development had to be determined by this basic feature. This realization was at once a limit and a possibility, but it at least kept policy in accord with facts.

The race of the various peoples was not as important in this case as their civilizations.²⁷ The aboriginal natives, for instance, the Moi of South Annam, the Khas of Laos and the various hillmen of Tonkin, are unimportant, however curious they may be from an ethnological point of view. On these, three other peoples had come. The Thais, now a million and a quarter strong, occupied the river-basins in Upper Tonkin and Laos, and the Cambodians, the ancient Khmers, settled in the upper delta of the Mekong, and now number a million and a half.

Far more important than either of these were the Annamites,²⁸ whose history largely determined the past and present of Indo-China. The various autochthones were either declining or backward throughout the centuries, and even the Cambodians, an entirely agricultural race, became more and more effaced. It was the Annamites who came to dominate the country and to make its civilization predominantly Chinese.

²⁷ A racial analysis is in *Bulletin de l'Office Coloniale*, Nov. 1911; the figures for 1921 are in Caillard, *L'Indo-Chine Française* (1922), p. 37.

²⁸ Frequently spelt "Annamese."

They occupied the Tonkinese delta in the third century of this era and radiated outwards until they absorbed the other kingdoms. They mastered Cambodia in 1658 and Cochin-China in 1768, and were pushing still west towards Siam when the French came. The French were thus brought up against a traditional expansionist tendency and a remarkable power of absorption in a quiet way. The Annamites at present number 15 millions and comprise the great majority of the population on the eastern side of the mountains,—that is, in the rich regions on which exploitation must centre. They are very compact in the Tonkin delta and in Cochin-China, and, though less dense in the south, occupy the Annamite lowlands. They are clearly the race of Indo-China: they are the hardest working, the most enterprising, the most prolific, and the most civilized. There has never been any question of the Annamites giving way by inanition as the Chams and Cambodians did, nor was the submergence of their traditional civilization ever a matter of serious politics. The Annamite knows no racial or cultural decadence, despite the French conquest. On the other hand, the record of the past twelve centuries and the persistence of their traditions impart those elements of vitality which decide the future of a race. They are, and always have been, peaceful absorbers and conquerors, spreading their influence in the way a tropical forest inexorably creeps over a tract of cleared land. Tenacity is the key-note of everything Annamite, as the French found when they attempted to introduce their theory of assimilation in the eighties.²⁹

Everything with them is fashioned on immobility. They are Chinese to the core. "The Annamite soul," it has been said, "is fashioned on Chinese Confucianism," and this determines their social and political laws.³⁰ Other religions, Taoism and Buddhism for instance, have been superimposed at various times, but with about as little influence on the basic structure as French ideas have had in the political world. The Annamites constitute a solid *bloc* of racial impermeability in the way of all change. Change to them is heresy and irreverence to the ancestors they worship, and custom has its support firmly founded on the familial nature of social organization.

The entire public and private life of the country is based on the family. It is "the centre round which all interests and all ideas pivot," wrote de Lanessan in 1887. The commune, a collection of families, is the basis of administration, as was pointed out by Luro, the official who

²⁹ A good survey is in the special Indo-Chinese number of *La Vie Technique et Industrielle* (Paris), 1922, p. 43 *et seq.*

³⁰ F. Bernard, *L'Indo-Chine* (1901), pp. 14-20; L. Vignon, *Un Programme de Politique Coloniale* (1919), p. 110 *et seq.*

first made known the secret of Indo-Chinese organization in his *Pays d'Annam* (1897), and whose work is still the *vade mecum* of French administrators there.³¹ The head of the family has absolute authority and bases his power on ancestor-worship and the sanctions this implied. The family is a little State resting on unquestioning obedience. So in turn, the commune is a larger family and the State a larger commune, all of them based on absolute authority. The Emperor has the same rights over his subjects as the father over the family, and the whole organization rested motionless on the tablets of Confucius.

Yet this was not all of the situation. So far, Annamite organization was absolute and theocratical. Paradoxically enough, a distinctly democratic tendency was joined to this. What made the Annamite organization unique was that the functionaries were chosen by competitive examination in this pre-eminently autocratic *régime*. The absolute authority of the "Son of the Heavens" was sapped in practice by the power of the *litrati*, the successful examinees. They were the governors, the *Tong-Doc* of provinces, prefectures and sub-prefectures,—persons who were really the moving force in administration. Side by side with them were the local officials of the communes and cantons. These were elected chiefs. The people of the villages chose a chief and council, and the delegates of the various villages met to elect a cantonal head, who was to be the *liaison*-officer between state and communes. Thus, State officers permeated down to the canton: local officers went up this far. Pre-French organization was based on a harmonious co-operation of two forces,—the sovereign and mandarins representing the theocratic and governmental aspects, and the elected notables in the communes representing the democratic phase of the situation. Between them was the connection of the examinations. The mandarins and the communes were clearly the institutions natural to the country, and the balance of power between them was quite unique. Illogical, perhaps absurd as the combination was, it worked well and was sanctioned by the success of centuries. The peculiar blend of autocracy and democracy fitted in with both sides of the Annamite character and afforded a real self-expression for the people.

Everything thus seemed ready-made for the French when they came. The natural thing to do—the only thing, it seemed—was to recognize the existing organization and thus solve the whole problem of administration. Call the village chief and council a Mayor and Council of Notables respectively, retain the elected mandarins, and control the more or less ornamental sovereign—and the needs of France would be satisfied

³¹ E. Luro, *Le Pays d'Annam* (2nd edition, 1897), p. 160 *et seq.*; Vignon (1919), *op. cit.*, p. 140 *et seq.*

and the peculiarities of native organization respected. Based on contradictions though the entire structure was, it was imbedded in custom and religion, and there was nothing in the whole that was incompatible with French aims, and indeed little that was not conducive to progress under the given conditions. The main thing to do was to control the mandarins, and the system, despite its idiosyncrasies, readily lent itself to such outside control. It seemed as if the basic immobility of Annamite life could be safeguarded, and yet the utmost efficiency obtained for the French with the minimum of effort.

Luro had made the situation clear, and France could not deny knowledge of the religious and traditionalist nature of Annamite organization. The remedy was made equally clear, and there seemed no reason why a colonizing Power should not have adopted the obvious policy. But France was drugged by the assimilation-idea, and, obsessed with this, tried to fly in the face of native organization and character, with results that were foregone. Hence the record of vacillation and procrastination that made the early stages in Indo-China a formidable rival of the corresponding stage in Algeria for the dubious privilege of being considered the nadir of French colonization.

III. The Early Struggles of Principle (1885-1895)

The essentials of the position were clear beyond any possibility of doubt. To progress at all, organization had to be based on a respect of native institutions, especially where they were of so vigorous and peculiar a nature. On the other hand, the Colonial Congress of 1889 had declared that the principle of assimilation was to be universally applied. To the French, the only method of progress was by assimilation: to the natives, progress meant immobility. The two were quite incompatible. The position called for a loose protectorate, but France set out to introduce a rigid assimilation. There was no attempt at compromise, no consideration of local needs and forces. To the assimilators of the eighties, Annamite organization was an obstacle in the way of progress and a relic of past barbarism. In fact, France reckoned her success in these first years in terms of the destruction of native life. As half-way measures were impossible under the conditions, there emerged a war of principles. France, it is true, had political and military force, but the natives possessed the kind of force that rendered these two powerless, and that alone could triumph in such a country. They had the age-old force of passive resistance and cultural expansion: so long as they lived, they could impose their culture on those with whom they came in contact, and maintain it. The French were fighting an intangible force—the soul and religion of a people; and, in the Far East, this makes

the combat unequal and the issue inevitable from the first, if racial annihilation is out of the question.

Not all of the French colonials, of course, were so enamoured of the assimilation idea that they could not see the logic of a situation which demanded other methods. Two sets of thinkers combined to demand a special *régime* for Indo-China,—those who, while convinced of the desirability of assimilation under certain conditions, looked on it only as one method of colonization, and those who thought that a protectorate was the only valid colonial method.

Strangely enough, it was Ferry who first emphasized this point. Imagination and adaptability to other circumstances were not attributes usually conceded to this stalwart Lorrainer, yet he expressed the protectorate-theory for Indo-China more clearly than was done for long after. Even in the earliest days of Conquest, he stood for this method of rule. Hermand wanted annexation and direct conquest, and, because of his influence, the treaty of 1883 was a mixture between annexation and protectorate. Ferry, however, insisted that either this compromise or a direct annexation was impossible under the conditions and that any development had to be based on a respect of the local civilization. As he said, "for the very success of our efforts there, Annam *must* not be a pure fiction. This part of the Empire must remain a distinct but subordinate State, and one capable of finding in its own territory those resources which will permit it to live without embarrassment and to administer itself under our advice."³² The second treaty, that of June, 1884, therefore set up a protectorate alone.

This organic law of Indo-China was merely a re-edition of the Tunisian system, and, had its principles been given a practical expression, would have meant indirect rule for the whole land. Ferry stood for a negation of direct intervention and yet for a clear realization of the subordination of native authorities. "Absorb yourself with the idea that there should be neither annexation nor assimilation," he wrote to Resident-General Lemaire of Annam,³³ "but at the same time, you must *use* the court of Annam, take it by the throat and bring it to make the mandarins progress in our sense. It is thus that the English proceed in India, and it is this that M. Cambon has done with success in Tunisia." With this understanding of relative importance once enforced, native authorities could be utilized to the fullest extent. Under a semblance of the traditional immobility, there could thus be a gradual social progress, and one suited to the needs of the occasion. French authority was to be stressed, but only when native officials failed to perform their functions

³² In *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 13/7/84.

³³ In full in A. Néton, *L'Indo-Chine et son avenir économique* (1904), pp. 55, 56.

in a satisfactory manner. Under ordinary conditions, the native rule was to remain as before; it was only where it was disruptive or unduly stagnant that there was to be change, and, even then, the change was to be so tactful as to be imperceptible to the mass of the people, however much it meant changing the higher officials. Taking them by the throat behind the curtains was at once an effective and a private process. Above all, wrote Ferry, "we want the Annamite kingdom to keep sufficient scope for its own existence and to limit our rôle to a supervising and controlling function, without interfering directly in the administration of the country." That was the main end, and emphasis was to be primarily on continuation, unless institutions were either directly anti-French or anti-social in the native sense,—even if this implied a slower rate of progress than was usual with the French.

With this theory clearly outlined, France had no doubt as to the needs of Indo-Chinese organization, and Ferry's statement of policy is still as true as it was in 1884. "As far as possible, you will seek to aid the existing powers and to direct their action for the most useful functioning of the country's social life, without prematurely seeking to substitute for them new organizations and systems borrowed from our civilization and our manners." The basic idea of a protectorate could not be more succinctly expressed. Ferry thus places himself in the list of France's native theorists. But, for the moment, it seemed as if the theory he outlined, despite the factors on the spot that worked for its acceptance, came to share some measure of his own unpopularity.

Why it was not accepted is a mystery, as everything at this stage seemed to be in its favour. De Lanessan, a leading colonial theorist, was sent out to investigate the position *in situ*, for there had been no coherent policy since 1883, and France had done nothing except pour armies of functionaries into the land. Yet the functionaries could not stir until it was decided whether there was to be annexation or a protectorate! As they were *bureau-trained* automata on the Algerian model, they naturally fought for annexation. They had no ready-made methods suitable for a protectorate, and, not adapted for the evolution of such methods in their own brains, even lacked the initiative and power of translating Cambon's experience in Tunisia to suit Indo-Chinese conditions. Despite this official opposition, de Lanessan fought for native traditions and customs.³⁴ It was abundantly clear that the tropical climate would never allow French *peuplement* and that hence all development had to be in native hands. To realize this, the natives had to be progressive, but progress was impossible without a political self-expression and a pride in their civilization—consummations which could be

³⁴ His report is in his *L'Indo-Chine* (1888).

achieved only by the maintenance of their old culture. De Lanessan ridiculed the idea of change in an age-old civilization which had balanced institutions and a regular hierarchy and a sufficient capacity for progress. Social immobility, he held, was desirable under these conditions,—and even a great degree of political immobility. Untoward change was the greatest enemy, and France, recognizing existing organizations, simply had to bring about enough change to allow the economic development of the country. De Lanessan's plea, like Ferry's, could not be misinterpreted. He stood for toleration on the part of the French and a recognition of the native polity, with all of its inevitable and perhaps desirable peculiarities. Certainly, the old institutions were as efficient as could be expected in that country, and to divert attention from the main question by speaking of the corruption of the mandarins was unjustified. This corruption might even be conducive to efficiency in the aggregate, it was held, and certainly its existence could not be as harmful as the disintegration that would follow any premature attempt to eradicate it. Even to stress it unduly showed that the critic still retained much of the assimilative frame of mind and was arguing from European to native conditions,—from like to unlike. De Lanessan's report thus stood for native development with a minimum of change, and supported Ferry's theory by showing how it accorded with the facts of the situation.

Ferry had thus made the theory, de Lanessan had shown that it met the actual situation, and now a man with imagination was sent to apply it. Paul Bert, the man so chosen, was an old collaborator of Ferry's in the latter's educational reforms in France and one of the oldest protagonists of the colonial cause. He was a scientist turned politician, and now a politician turned administrator. He was appointed Resident-General of Annam and Tonkin in January, 1886, and, in the few months before his death, early in November of the same year, he had demonstrated the practicability of the protectorate scheme and had carried out a policy which made him a tradition in colonial annals. Indo-China in these months of 1886 shares with Madagascar under Galliéni and Tunisia under Cambon the credit of being the most successful episode in French colonization: and Bert was directly the father of that scheme which went through Galliéni to Lyautey and through him to the present generation of colonial administrators. Paul Bert, in short, had an influence out of all proportion to the changes he introduced or to the actual events of his administration. He became a formative factor in the shaping of colonial policy, and his name a tradition,—and therein lies his real importance.

On his arrival in Indo-China, this middle-aged politician found

Tonkin little pacified, Annam in open revolt, and French influence in the outer regions entirely nominal. France held only the Delta in the north: beyond, the mountain lands of Upper Tonkin were almost entirely in rebel hands, and most of the north was not even explored. Annam was yet worse, for there the rising was open all over the country, and France held only certain isolated fortresses, with the troops virtually prisoners inside. "Not a province that did not occasion disquietudes, not a class of the people who could be treated as allies!" In particular the *litterati*, the governing class, were practically to a man against the French, because they saw in French rule the curtailment of their own privileges. They had flourished under the growing disintegration of the Annamite empire, as this had implied a practical hegemony for them in local matters: but now, with the inevitable French ideas of centralization, this would all go, and they would be either rudely dispossessed or converted into mere phantoms of authority. Autocrats to the core, they became either open or passive rebels, and it was in the last form, as nominal adherents but passive resistants of the French, that their influence was so deleterious. In their eyes, the Emperor at Hué, "the French Valet," was a traitor to his ancestors, and accordingly they stood aloof when his authority was confined to Hué and even his court menaced.³⁵

Paul Bert arrived in April, 1886, but was already cognizant of the actual situation. He had first to establish himself, because, as the representative of the civil authority, the military stood out against him and were supported by those civil officials who believed in assimilation *à outrance*. But Bert asserted himself by rallying the merchant-classes, and then turned to his next task,—the necessity of establishing the administration and commencing the work of civilization with a capital of six million francs. The France of 1886, he knew, would not vote another *sou* for Tonkin, so he had to trim his policy according to his resources.

With valuable time wasted by his skirmishes with the French at the capital, and annoyed by his restricted resources, he turned to the problem proper. Being a straightforward fighter of the Ferry type, he plunged into its midst,—Annam. "Annam is given over to blood and fire," he cried: the general insurrection had become anarchical, and there were little wars of extermination everywhere. Reinforcing this immediate reason for intervention, too, was his realization that Annam was the key of the whole situation. Though economically backward, it was the governmental and cultural centre, and Hué, third-rate native town though it was, was the centre of Indo-Chinese life. Everything native

³⁵ J. Chailley, *Paul Bert au Tonkin* (1887), p. 17 *et seq.*

in the peninsula reached its culmination there, and Annam in general was the connecting link of Indo-China. The land could therefore serve France, if it were once pacified and organized on the right lines.³⁶

But how could this be done? It was not a French colony, and clearly the way of advance was by winning over the native officials in some form or other. It was the *litterati* who governed Annam, however much the Emperor was the ceremonial and religious head of the land. Bert saw that his task was to turn the attention of the people towards the royal figurehead and win over the *litterati*. The people themselves afforded an easy task, because French intimidation and the constant uncertainty had by this time reduced them to a state of despairing apathy,—an ethnic melancholia. “We seek only rest. We are the old children of an old race. We ask only to die in peace,” they told the new Resident-General. But Bert answered this by turning their eyes to the cultural centre of their race, to Hué, and tried to revive the outer semblance of the Emperor’s authority. He utilized the ceremonial *flair* of the natives to give them a new interest in existence and to distract their attention from the realities of the situation. At the same time, he respected the local dignitaries and led them to support the new *régime* by leaving them largely unimpeded in their powers.

In Tonkin, to which he next turned, the problem was still more difficult, not only because the nature of the country made conquest more uncertain, but because Tonkin was ruled by Annamite mandarins who were foreigners in the native eyes. In Annam the native officials had at least belonged to the race of the people, but this position did not pertain in Tonkin. France’s enemies were the mandarins and the pirates, both of them unpopular with the mass of the people. Bert therefore perceived that, while the position in Annam had forced him to recognize the mandarins and hoodwink the people, in Tonkin the reverse policy of rallying the people and ousting the mandarins was called for.

He took the first steps by calling on the natives to help him against the pirates and the Chinese irregulars who swarmed over the province. These, he saw, were pillaging-bands who were not on the whole supported by the farming population. But the position was difficult, because the many reversals of French policy in the past had exposed their adherents to the terrible vengeance of the Court and the mandarins, and, besides, many natives were alienated by the disregard of their customs. It is not a good way to win over an essentially religious people by quartering troops and horses in their pagodas. Before he could start, Bert thus had to restore confidence in the French. Much in this direction

³⁶ J. Chailley (1887), *op. cit.*, pp. 39-44.

was done by a tactfully worded proclamation of April, 1886,²⁷ which assured the natives that the French wanted neither their lands nor to usurp their public functions, and which promised an absolute respect of their customs. This was something quite new in the history of French efforts in the land. Bert's predecessors had viewed the natives simply as heathen clods and none had thought of the idea of conciliating and reassuring them. Bert, to the contrary, made clear to them their position as co-partners in the development of the land, and gave them something tangible to cling to in the bewildering maze of change into which events had cast them.

Point was at once given to his proclamation by a series of reforms. *Corvées* were restricted, the abuses of tax-payment in kind removed, grants were given to impoverished provinces like Lang-Son, hospitals and charitable institutions founded, and other social reforms introduced to win over the suspicious natives. What decided them, however, was his war on the detested Annamite mandarins who had ground down the country for eighty years. This reform was at once salutary and popular, but it placed Bert in an immediate quandary. The abuses of mandarin-rule were obvious, their unpopularity equally so; but their abolition simply meant that there was no one to carry on the work of government. The basic principle of *litterati*-rule had been the denial of political education to the people and the consolidation of all authority in the hands of a body of officials selected at the Hué examinations. They bore the same relation to the Tonkinese that the English of the Indian Civil Service bear to the natives of India, save that each official was seeking his own preferment by corrupt methods. The problem of replacing them was thus a far more difficult one than destroying them, and Bert was perplexed. He was finding it difficult enough to explain why he was maintaining the mandarins in Annam and yet abolishing them in Tonkin, and now there was this problem of finding people to take their place. The obvious policy was to raise local Tonkinese functionaries, but the art of government cannot be acquired in a moment, and administration had been in the hands of a closed foreign caste for generations. And the point was that the people respected these professional administrators even while they hated them. With a remarkable optimism that he would be able to survive the interim, Bert therefore set up a Tonkin Academy, to choose from the middle class those *huyens* or cantonal chiefs who could pass examinations,—and thus obtain the *imprimatur* of culture which counted for everything in a Chinese country. In short, he provided the means to erect a new *litterati* class, but one well-disposed to France and, by its very origin, opposed to Annam.

²⁷ In full in J. Chailley (1887), Appendix A, p. 320.

In the same direction, and to govern the country as it then stood, he took the much-opposed step of instituting a Council of Notables (April, 1886).³⁸ This was far in advance of colonial theory at that time and was bitterly contested by the majority of experts. Representatives were to be elected from each province for a year and were to discuss national problems, returning to the provinces as the apostles of French rule. Arguing from the facts, the experts who opposed the scheme seemed to have the main arguments on their side, but by one of the twists of human nature that made Bert such a success, he was able to carry through a scheme which, by every theory, was impossible at that date. It certainly had the audacity of genius about it. Bert, immediately confronted with failure, was throwing a last dice with destiny, and staking all on his knowledge of human nature. There was something Quixotic about this policy, which was absurd in the light of every known canon of colonial theory and which seemed the last possible way out of the *impasse*. If facts meant anything, it was a position that called for Gatlings and not elections, yet Bert persisted, because the position was as intriguing to him as dubiously logical constitutional experiments were when the barricades were up in Paris in '71.

The device certainly brought him into touch with the people and finally aroused them from their apathetic indolence and veiled mistrust of his strange, and to them inexplicable, reforms. The result could not have been better. "The elected representatives belonged entirely to the class of people whom we were trying to reach. All of them except two were simple peasants, notables of their villages and generally poor. The most learned amongst them was a local schoolmaster whom they made their president." But these ignorant men had "a practical spirit and a stout heart," and were as easily won over as one of Balzac's village mayors would have been in going up to Paris. Bert rejoiced in experimenting with such simple types, and they in turn responded to the skilful way in which he blended ceremony and frank speaking. His sensible utterances appealed to them as self-made individuals, his solicitude touched the vanity of unimportant men raised suddenly to office, and his courtliness was in accord with the ceremonial spirit of China. He gave them specific points to discuss, knowing full well the tendency of all new-born legislatures to reform the world by platitudinous generalizations, and allowed them to deliberate away from functionaries and mandarins, knowing well, too, how easy was the transition backwards from the people's representative to the inferiority complex of the foreign-ruled serf. The upshot was that they discussed such matters as money-

³⁸ See Arrêté in Chailley (1887), Appendix I, p. 349. See *Le Régime des Protectorats* (Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale), Vol. I, 1899, p. 193.

taxes, the reconstruction of devastated areas, police, public-works, and the like, and concluded their report by the note that Bert had been quietly infusing into the whole of their deliberations,—“our works will not be approved by the mandarins but they will be entirely supported by the people.”³⁹ Bert had thus appealed in turn to their sincerity, their priggishness, their traditionalism, and their human hatreds, and had succeeded in securing forty-three friendly delegates to scatter French influence throughout the provinces : and it is amazing how such rumours spread in a crowded Oriental population which lacks newspapers. Bert knew whither he was tending, for he was using that *finauderie*, that untranslatable quality of the Normans, with which he was so fully endowed beneath his surface brusqueness.

He quickly realized that this happy experience could be manifolded by turning to the schools. He saw how an innate reverence for learning, especially on the part of those who had none, made examinations so important in Annamite existence, and how an extension of educational facilities would, by widening the sphere of opportunities open to ordinary Tonkinese, win over ever-increasing numbers of the people. The council-scheme had given him an *élite* of propagandists : he now invoked the aid of the schools to give him “an army of apostles.” But he was quite specific that *any* form of education would not do. Cochinchina, where there was assimilation in every field, had organized an educational system directly on the French model. “As a result,” it was said, “you find in Saigon young Annamites purely and gravely speaking the language of Louis XIV,” but these were simply a minority. The great mass of the population, outside of a few clerks and interpreters, knew no French, and it was difficult to secure enough interpreters to accompany the French expeditionary forces northwards. Bert wanted no duplication of this useless situation in Tonkin : he aimed at the spreading of serviceable French on a large scale, even if it were only a *patois*. Accordingly he set up 132 French schools by the end of the year. This was at the same time far simpler than teaching the extraordinarily difficult Annamite language and far more useful for the purposes of the government.⁴⁰

All these reforms, political and educational and social, Bert carried through in less than six months. He instituted a system in every branch which had only to be carried on to secure the pacification of the natives right up to the Chinese frontier and which allowed any degree of economic exploitation by the French. To-day, such a system would still be in advance of the times : in 1886 it was revolutionary, and, given Bert's limitations in men and money and time, almost impossible.

³⁹ Chailley (1887), p. 129 *et seq.*

⁴⁰ G. Dumoutier, *Les Débuts de l'Enseignement française au Tonkin*, 1887.

His final declaration of policy, in a long circular of August 30, to the Residents,⁴¹ carried even Ferry's theory a stage further, and remains his vindication. He explained why he had retained the mandarins in Annam yet abolished them in Tonkin; why the French Residents in Annam had to restrict themselves to purely political supervision, yet those in Tonkin had to control financial and administrative affairs as well; and why native officials had to be used everywhere and native institutions respected. "The natives will continue to exercise the functions conferred on them by the law of the land in general administration, justice, and tax-collection. Your rôle," he said to the Residents, "is not to administer in their place but to supervise and control their acts."

Then, for the natives, and to harmonize the conditions of their existence with the needs of development, he said, "they want laws specially made for them, laws modelled in a great measure on their own native laws, but amplified, when necessary, in accordance with the principles (but not the provisions) of our Western legal code." Laws were to be adapted to their requirements and based on existing native codes, but at the same time were not to neglect the needs of progress. Bert compromised on native lines, considering things as they appeared to native minds, and basing his justification on the correctness of his analysis of native psychology in each case. His policy was very much the expression of his own personality, but, once established, others could have continued it, had they so wished. Bert had more than justified Ferry's choice of an untrained man, and handed over a Tonkin and Annam pacified and organized as no other French colony was at that date. His successors could dissipate their heritage, they could not deny it.

The extent of his achievement made the complete collapse of the following decade the more reprehensible,—indeed, it may be termed the least justifiable of the many unjustified events in French colonization. Ferry, de Lanessan, and Paul Bert had all worked to achieve certain results: those results were achieved and needed only to be consolidated, when the new administrators turned entirely to a work of destruction. If Bert proved anything, it was the fundamental error of the earlier policy of assimilation and native destruction, and the astonishing success of his own policy: yet, because assimilation was the theory of the day and Paris was not enamoured of astonishingly successful policies in the colonies, his ideas were reversed and his work broken.

The five years after him were sad ones in every way.⁴² There were

⁴¹ In full in Chailley (1887), *op. cit.*, Appendix F, p. 329.

⁴² A good account is in M. de Pourvoirville, *Études Coloniales*, Parts I (*Le Tonkin actuel*, 1888-1889) and II (*Deux Années de Lutte*, 1890-1891), or a summary in A. Gaisman, *L'Œuvre de la France au Tonkin* (1906), p. 89 *et seq.*

no fewer than five governors in that time, each of them with a different *personnel* and a different policy. Affairs naturally drifted, because what the native demanded at this time was a fixed policy. Even a consistent policy of force would have been preferable to the continual changes, as change was the one thing unjustifiable in native eyes, while change on change was worse to them than the former oppression of Annamite mandarins. They turned to piracy in growing numbers, because, after all, with the civil administration disorganized and the military seeking campaigns and the pillaging-bands roaming over the country, the only way of securing safety was to become a pirate of the mountains. For its part, the French Government was convinced that events were merely justifying their attitude of 1885, that Bert's success had been melodramatic but unreal (and was he not a *protégé* of the now ostracized Ferry?), and that there was nothing good about Tonkin. They therefore refused credits and thus accelerated the drift. The fifth of the short-term governors, Piquet, refused to face this accumulated series of disasters and demanded his recall.

The position could scarcely have been worse in any way. The Chinese frontier had become "nothing more than a vast camp designed to organize pillaging-bands and to inundate us with pirates"⁴³: "the natives fled systematically or openly fraternized with the pirates"; and in 1891 there were risings to the very gate of Hanoi. The position was so bad that France had to do something or evacuate the peninsula. As Etienne, the Under-Secretary of the Colonies, told the Deputies in March, 1891, "it is absolutely necessary to have a new method of colonization inspired by the treaty of 1884 (that is, the establishment of a protectorate), and a new man to save the colony from the abyss into which it has fallen."⁴⁴

But Bert was dead and Ferry unavailable: therefore de Lanessan, the only survivor of the previous trio of reformers, was sent out by the de Freycinet Cabinet in 1891 as a special commissioner. He was to try to retrieve the country and to set the clock back to the time of Bert's death five years previously; but this was ages ago in so far as the temper of the people was concerned. He was given every power, as a too narrowly administrative rule was viewed as the cause of the existing failure, because it had banned originality and enterprise.⁴⁵ To effect this, a decree of April, 1891, enlarged the Governor-General's powers, so that Indo-China had a man with a positive theory and with adequate power to enforce his theory. Even Bert had been hampered throughout by the restrictions on his power: de Lanessan, on the contrary, had an

⁴³ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 29/2/89.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Deps., 20/3/91.

⁴⁵ J. L. de Lanessan, *La Colonisation française en Indo-Chine* (1895), pp. 355-357.

entirely free hand. No other colonial governor had ever had such extensive powers. He had control of all works, the disposal of all forces, and a summary right of dismissing officials. Indeed, he had absolute power without reference to Paris, so long as he did not call for more credits.

When he landed, he met a position similar to that which Bert had found, save for the increased bitterness and the mistrust of everything French due to the events of the preceding five years. Tonkin was in a state of collapse. The budget had a deficit of twelve million francs: there had been no public works for years: and the Deputies would not vote a franc. The natives had moved as a people against the French. "There was no longer piracy but rebellion," the acting governor had reported, even in the Delta, and only two provinces were quiet. The mountain-regions were practically independent, and Chinese pirates were absolute masters of all land west of the Red River. Annam was as badly off, with the mandarins either openly or covertly opposing France. Cambodia was quiet with the quietness of prostration, having weak budgets and not a single public-work since the declaration of the French protectorate. Cochinchina alone was relatively prosperous, because the growing rice-exports offset the deluge of French functionaries in the land. French Indo-China was thus restricted to the one southernmost State and two provinces in Tonkin, and the progress of the rebels made the latter only a "paper-asset."⁴⁶

De Lanessan clearly perceived this situation, and, what was still more to the point, he was convinced that he knew where policy had erred in the past. He contended that there had been three entirely false assumptions,—that the mandarins were a detested aristocracy, to reverse whom would win over the people; that the Emperor of Annam should be strengthened and would help against the mandarins; and that Tonkin preferred foreign rule to that of Annam. All of these, he held, were absurd on the face of things. The crux of the situation as he saw it was that the *litterati* were the only trained officials and the only ones having the support of the people. To destroy them was political suicide for any outside conquerors and an anarchical state of drift for the natives. The mandarins, chosen by examination as they were and without distinction of birth, represented the most intelligent and zealous of the natives. Moreover, "the entire people being the source from which the mandarinat emanated, it was quite natural that the people should have the greatest respect for them": and indeed, there was something almost religious about the respect of the people for them. Respect for

⁴⁶ De Pourvoirville, *Études Coloniales*, Part III (*La Politique Indo-Chinoise*, 1892-1893), or de Lanessan (1895), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-6.

them was a corollary of the respect of children for their parents,—a mandarin was “the father and mother” of his charges, and thus personified the basis on which Annamite society was built. Thus, quite apart from the impossibility of replacing them by anybody else, it was clear that they had to stay. To repress them meant to create an impossible situation, to shatter the basis of education, and perhaps of society, and certainly to break that curious balance which had been so typical of Annamite life in pre-French days. In outlining this situation, de Lanessan may conceivably have over-emphasized the popularity of the mandarins, but, even so, he was giving a policy in accord with some at least of the facts, and anything was better than the existing confusion.

To support this new attitude, the reformers adduced the experience of the past. In Cochinchina the abolition of the *litterati* had left the French face to face with the notables in the communes, and with no link between these local representatives and the central Government. The result was a paralysis of the whole, because the *litterati* were the *liaison*-officers who had kept the machine functioning. To fill the gap, therefore, the French had to reinstall the native officials in some form or other, but, because the original *litterati* had withdrawn to the Hué court, all kinds of substitutes had to be used. The only persons available were interpreters, militia-men, and servant “boys,” all viewed as renegades, and all ignorant and despised in a community where so much stress was laid on training and culture. The result was a complete fiasco, and Cochinchina merely limped on from year to year. Even Paul Bert had encountered this difficulty in Tonkin and had been compelled to leave the mandarins in Annam completely untouched.

De Lanessan resolved therefore to re-establish the mandarins in their former power. French rule, to mean anything in such a land, had to be indirect rule,—that is, rule through the channels to which the natives were accustomed and by officials who were endowed with traditional importance. He recognized them as governors of the local districts and restored the old connection between the Tonkinese mandarins and the Annamite court. For his part, the Emperor issued an ordinance insisting on their loyalty to France: de Lanessan, in return, recognized the old suzerainty of the Emperor over Tonkin and the mandarins. He even gave them command of the local militia, the result being that, since it was now to their interest to restore peace in the land, most of the Delta was tranquil by the end of 1891, and everywhere the mandarins “became one of the best agencies of pacification.”⁴⁷

With pacification thus accomplished (it was only a matter of time

⁴⁷ De Lanessan (1895), *op. cit.*, pp. 9-12. Compare his *L'Indo-Chine* (1889), p. 754; or Etienne in *Journal Officiel*, *Déps.*, 1/12/91, p. 2379.

to extend it to the mountain-regions), de Lanessan went on to introduce the rest of his native system. In the first place, he restored a uniform organization in Annam and Tonkin. Up to this time, the French parliament had been obsessed with the idea that Tonkin wanted liberty from Annam's yoke, and so had rejected General de Courcay's attempt to so modify the treaty of 1884 as to recognize the Emperor's authority over Tonkin as well as Annam. In his eyes, the country wanted method and uniformity above all else.

"Heretofore, each Resident-General has done what he liked, denying or enforcing the treaty of 1884 according to the caprice of circumstances or the theory ruling for the moment: the one would try to conquer this or that part of central Annam, the next would reverse his predecessor's policy in this direction: and none of them showed any respect for Annamite authorities, either in central Annam or in Tonkin, but left each Resident to direct the affairs of his province according to his own idiosyncrasies. Of order or rule, there was none, save that policy changed with each change of *personnel*." ⁴⁸

From 1883 to 1891, there were twenty Residents-General, and this implied administrative anarchy. In addition, there was the ever-present temptation to take advantage of the greater power given them in Tonkin by the treaty and to rule directly and forcibly. Against all of this, de Lanessan now declared for uniform protectorate measures,—by native agencies and for native welfare.

The third article of his creed was to retain native organizations. With an old changeless people like the Annamites, opposed both by religion and temperament to innovations in any form, it was impolitic to adopt a policy of needless change. He did not want to duplicate the turmoil caused in Cochin-China by the destruction of the Annamite communes and the supplanting of the native systems of law by the French *Code Civile*. Such extraneous codes merely introduced concepts foreign to the Annamites and served to reverse several of their basic ideas,—as, for instance, those of the family, inheritance, and the commune. De Lanessan, opposing such untoward changes, stated dogmatically that the three basic rules of modern colonization were to respect the native religion, to respect their social institutions, and to respect their functionaries.

In pursuance of these ideas, he took his stand against the traditional system of the French colonies,—what he called "the prefectorial régime." This he defined as "administrative *paperasserie*, an infinite multiplicity of governmental machinery, and a cumbrous and costly French *personnel*," the whole combination considering neither varying races nor

⁴⁸ De Lanessan (1895), *op. cit.*, p. 23.

local conditions. All of the customary French theories—conquest, administrative assimilation, commercial monopoly—were out of date, he held: all of them spelt failure in a place situated as Indo-China was.

He pacified and organized the land on these lines, doing much to remove the gap of mistrust that had emerged since Bert's time. But, this consolidation achieved, he had to face the more difficult problems of development, because he knew that, unless he made the colony self-sufficient and economically progressive, his entire work would be reversed when he left the scene, as that of Paul Bert had been. He had either to admit failure or make Indo-China pay. Further, he had to do this with his own resources, and without coupling in the native minds the ideas of his reforms and economic exploitation. Face to face with this problem, the earlier task of restoring protectorate-principles seemed almost simple. But there was no alternative, and, though not fitted for the task, de Lanessan plunged himself whole-heartedly into the work of economic development. A strategic railway to Lang-Son was started: ports were made: encouragements given to traders and settlers: 350 kilometres of roads built in the Delta in two years (1891-1892): taxation made more efficient, and money raised. Money, indeed, was his bugbear. When he went to Indo-China, no financier would have lent him a million francs: when he left, he had constructed fifty million francs' worth of public-works, and French financiers, without a guarantee from the Government, had lent enough money for 1,500 kilometres of railway. All of this was attacked both in the colony and at home as mortgaging the budgets of the future, but more to the point was the fact that results were secured at the desired moment and the country's position transformed in consequence.

But Paris had become uneasy about this interpretation of the powers they had conferred on de Lanessan and he was abruptly recalled in 1894 in the very midst of his work. In four years, he had increased tax-receipts from 3,760,000 to 6,600,000 piastres, and customs-revenue from 820,000 piastres to 2,040,000: but now, without any cause, the economic consolidation of the country was interrupted and even the railways delayed for two years. How needless the recall was was evident to all concerned. Even the president of the Council of Ministers which was responsible termed the act an *enfantillage*, and Jaurès pointed out in the Deputies in March, 1895, that, while de Lanessan had been recalled for carrying out a certain policy, his successor was advised by the same government to continue that policy! ⁴⁰

Paris, however, was not to be thwarted in its desire to extirpate this growing decentralization. To prevent a recurrence of such activities

⁴⁰ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 3/3/95.

as de Lanessan's, a decree was issued in March, 1896, limiting the public-works of Indo-China to the *annual* resources of the country. Even these were taken from the control of the Governor-General and placed under an agent corresponding directly with the Minister of Finance in Paris. As with the corresponding *rattachements* in Algeria, all initiative was taken from the Governor-General and the colony placed under the Parisian *bureaux*. The effect was at once to stamp out any initiative, and the new Governor-General, Rousseau, simply had to mark time in his two years of office. He was as much a *fainéant* as were the Governors-General of Algeria in the eighties, and Paris seemed to be striving to reduce Indo-China to the position it was in when Paul Bert died. De Lanessan's native policy still remained, it is true, because nobody could think of an alternative one; but his economic policy was nullified. This position lasted until the Méline Cabinet sent out Paul Doumer in 1897.

Once more an effective policy had been evolved in Indo-China, and once more, seemingly, allowed to die by administrative opposition. The country threatened to duplicate in 1897 the conditions of a decade earlier and to be the grave of colonial reputations. It was going from bad to worse, and even improvements had to be brought about in the face of official opposition. No other colony had had a history so chequered; and Tonkin came to pall in this decade, when the colonial craze was for military conquest on the African model. France wanted to hear of victories in the field, not of difficulties of organization. Indo-China therefore simply limped on, with the officials discouraged or acquiescent, and the natives once more reverting to their favourite pastime of piracy. The colony's affairs were again coming under the influence of that psychology of despair which was the bane of the situation: there was an obvious drift.

IV. Paul Doumer (1897-1902)

Paul Doumer was an advanced radical deputy with experience on the financial side of public administration. He had been Minister of Finance in the Bourgeois Cabinet and, as the colonial budget-reporter, had made a study of Tonkin's finances in 1895, when the colony's position had become so bad that something had to be done.⁵⁰ He was also a thorn in the side of the Government, which sent him to Indo-China to get rid of him and possibly in the hope that the difficulty of restoring order there would tarnish his reputation. He thus came to Indo-China with very marked predilections and ideas, both on the subjects of finance and Parisian control. To these he added an undoubted belief in his own powers and a determination to start everything in Indo-China

⁵⁰ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 29/3/95, 30/6/95.

afresh. If anything, he under-estimated the importance of Paul Bert and de Lanessan, and seeing in Indo-China largely the chaos of 1894, he wanted to transform the whole situation, first by organizing the government, then (and here was the crux of his work) by developing the finances and public works of the country. "Organize!" was his cry: he was to introduce method and uniformity where there had previously been none. Thus his work, if forceful and salutary, was stamped with a somewhat artificial character before he started. But this was not an unmixed evil in the Indo-China of 1897. The country demanded force and continuity and precision. It did not matter very much what the policy was as long as it was a policy: and Doumer's greatest service was in lasting five years and in adhering to a consistent line of action. He set out to eradicate what he termed "the policy of effacement" and stood for "a policy of action." He gathered up the various trends in the colony's life, re-vitalized them, and made them coherent by the impress of his vigorous, perhaps too vigorous, personality.

When he landed, energy was an unknown quantity. Each of the colonies was in an unsound financial position and had increasing deficits. "Indo-China" was simply an administrative expression that bore no relation to facts. Cochinchina, rich as it was, was ruined by an over-rigid policy of assimilation and the consequent control by an army of French officials. This oligarchy controlled the imposition of taxes and the spending of public funds, so that it was not unnatural that the natives were always paying. Doumer found here an intrinsically rich colony paralysed by the sectional administration of officials, who were deliberately swelling their own numbers and the numbers of the Indian labourers to get votes. Frenchmen and Indians from the five towns in India alone enjoyed the franchise. Cochinchina therefore had become a synonym for corruption on a large scale. Cambodia, the next colony, was entirely outside the French sphere and maintained its picturesque Indian ceremonies entirely to the neglect of efficiency or modernization. Annam was in the hands of the mandarins who controlled the Emperor, and was a hotbed of disaffection: and Tonkin, as usual, was the very centre of unrest. Despite Paul Bert and de Lanessan, the French had reverted to direct methods of administration there, with the alienation from the people that this entailed in such a country. The natives, separated from the government by an impassable gap, were given over to poverty and insecurity. "The Annamite of Tonkin," reported Doumer, "regarded us with fear,—like a poor beaten animal which is always apprehensive of its master's brutality." The requisition of coolies for military columns, in particular, produced the impression that the State sanctioned a modified slavery, and the constant uncertainty demoralized

this essentially peaceful race of cultivators. All of these States were under the Government-General which had nominally been introduced in 1891, but in practice the position meant a Governor-General without a Government-General. There was little co-ordination of efforts and no similarity of policies. Over everything was the insidious blight of the mandarins. Some were retained, others dispossessed, but all were suspicious of the French and disillusioned by the increasing amount of direct rule by French officials in the previous few years. France had irretrievably alienated these native officials, who retaliated by telling the natives that their own exactions were imposed by the French Government. In all, the Indo-China of 1897 was a striking object-lesson on how *not* to colonize in an Oriental country.⁵¹

Doumer at once arrayed these various weaknesses so that he could estimate the situation in its entirety. That precision which he had gained in his early days as a Parisian compositor always made his mental processes rather deceptively mechanical. Then, knowing the faults, he formulated his general policy of redress. In a few words, he summed up the situation. "It was the lack of governmental and financial organization that caused the weakness of the country: and it was the absence of economic machinery that prevented the development of its resources. It was necessary, therefore, to *organize* Indo-China and to create economic machinery,—a general plan which would be executed as possibilities presented themselves."⁵² That is, he wanted to regularize administration as a starting-point and then commence his real work,—of ensuring the *mise en valeur* or economic development of the country. "The economic work, the main end of colonization, has scarcely commenced in Indo-China."

His course of action was therefore so clear as to admit of no doubt. He had first to organize the Government-General and make it a real co-ordinating and directing feature. It had to be the centre of Indo-Chinese affairs, and the various local administrations had to be altered so that they would fit in with the general structure. This entailed the definition of a real protectorate over Annam and Cambodia, and the modernization of each place. The rule of the dominating clique of officials in Cochin-China had to go, and some ruling given as to the method of governing Tonkin,—and this included the vexatious question of the *litrati*. Political organization achieved, he had to attack the still more important financial side. The various Governments, especially the federal Government, had to obtain stable budgets, or their very

⁵¹ P. Doumer, *Rapport d'ensemble sur les affaires de l'Indo-Chine*, 22/3/97, or his *Situation de L'Indo-Chine, 1897-1901* (1902).

⁵² Doumer, *L'Indo-Chine Française* (1905), pp. 286, 287.

existence would be a matter of doubt. In particular, taxes had to be so manipulated that the federal and not the local administrations would be the main recipients. This reform of taxation naturally led to an overhaul of the whole world of finance,—in fact, a search for “a régime suitable to the country, to its social state, and to the customs of the natives as well as to the needs of the budget.”

If these two preliminary reforms, governmental and financial, could be secured, Doumer knew that he could easily go on to his third and most important problem,—that of general economic development. He saw that development in Indo-China meant economic modernization, and that without this the land would for ever be as unstable as it had been up to 1897. His main work, therefore, was to give the land its economic machinery, and all other reforms were but preliminaries to this. Railways, canals, roads, ports, all had to be constructed : hence, his rule centred on the 1898 scheme of railways and public-works. This once carried out, production and commerce would be increased, and both French colonization and native proprietorship develop. In a word, the economic development that would follow his governmental organization would complete the transformation of the country and allow an unlimited development in the future. Doumer thus proposed an entire policy of colonization, differing from Bert's in being economic, and from de Lanessan's in being primarily and not secondarily economic.

All of this scheme seems obvious to present observers, as it simply epitomizes the ruling theory of “industrial colonization” : but it must be remembered that it was unknown in the French colonial system of 1897, and that Doumer's essential service was in formulating a comprehensive policy. This at once placed him in the ranks of the great colonials, and it is a moot point whether the clarification thus brought about was not as important as the execution of the policy. To carry out such a policy may be the work of many men : it was its promulgation that was the essential expression of Paul Doumer,—the work that he alone could have done. Doumer industrialized French colonial policy, for, apart from Ferry's generalizations, there was nothing approaching this in French colonial theory until Albert Sarraut's theory of a *mise en valeur* in 1920. Doumer had gone much further than the purely native concepts of Paul Bert, and, though he was indebted to de Lanessan's concept of economic policy as a necessary complement of native policy, the resultant *ensemble* was clearly his own.

In carrying out his theory, he had first to create the various Governments. Each State within the union was proceeding on different methods, and it could almost be said that Indo-China was not organized at all, except in Cochin-China. In this southernmost colony, Doumer's task

was simple. He had merely to restore the traditional French colonial system and to clear away the abuses that had swept over it. It was too late to regret the replacement of the mandarins by low-grade French officials: the assimilation-*régime* had definitely been chosen, and all that Doumer could do was to make it as efficient as possible. It is true that nobody could entirely eradicate the faults of direct administration and assimilation in an Asiatic country, but a reformer could at least render them fairly innocuous. Doumer therefore lessened the abuses of the official hierarchy, reformed the Colonial Council, and prevented the framing of a budget solely in the interest of the French officials. Despite this, the basic evils remained. The army of officials continued as before. There were 290 civil officials in 1900 where there had been fifty mandarins before annexation, and, in proportion to the population, Cochin-China had ten times as many officials as Java. Yet even these had to be aided by native auxiliaries! ⁵³

With the cultured and trained mandarins, went all of the codes suitable to the country. French laws and customs came in, even for purely civil matters. No deference was paid to native tradition, and Cochin-China had none of the mixed courts of Java or Tunisia. Everything native was swept aside, and the disgruntled Cochin-Chinese remained passively hostile to the French. To these faults of officialdom and native neglect was added economic stagnation, and it was only because Cochin-China was an intensely rich land that it could prosper at all. Public works, save in the towns, were practically non-existent. There were no agricultural or irrigation improvements: the port of Saigon was almost as it had been in 1860: the same old river-junks provided the means of transport, and there were only seventy kilometres of railway. Cochin-China remained in the same economic state of primitive rice-cultivation that it had known for centuries, and there was neither development nor efficiency. Yet the French thought that they were model colonizers here, because they had proven themselves the best town-planners in the Orient. A town like Saigon had pretentious palaces, a cathedral, the best theatre east of Suez, and all of the amenities of Parisian life! With this splendour before the people's eyes, it mattered little that every drink of water was a gamble with disease and that the word "sanitary system" was almost forgotten! "In the capital as in the colony," it was said, "nothing was wanting—except necessities." The spectacular ineffectiveness of the assimilation-*régime* could not have been better demonstrated than in the Indo-China of 1900. Yet Doumer, with all his zeal, could do little. Assimilation could not be eradicated, and, with it, little could be done in the way of change.

⁵³ F. Bernard, *L'Indo-Chine* (1901), pp. 43-45.

He therefore turned with added determination to the virgin field of Cambodia, which had hitherto remained a picturesquely useless relic of Oriental mediævalism. The problem here was quite different from that in the coastal provinces. The latter were fundamentally Chinese and stiffened by generations of Annamite rule: the inland kingdom was entirely Indian and was never effectively a part of the Annamite Empire. The sovereign of Cambodia was nominally a tributary of the Emperor of Hué, but the Annamites had never invaded the land. This in turn meant that the energy found in the coastal populations was unknown here: in its place was a nerveless apathy, a tendency to find a shelter from modern problems by enwrapping their very thoughts with the atmosphere of Anghkor-Wat and their mythical past. The Cambodians, docile and unprogressive, sought the last refuge of a decadent race in refusing to face facts. They had no energy or faith in their race, and none of that force of expansion which characterized the Annamites. They were essentially Indians; as Doumer said, "they carry their certificate of origin on their face and in their character." But their history had ended with the overthrow of their Khmer ancestors, and, since then, they had been a race of living dead.

None the less, they were a distinct body, both racially and culturally, and so could be organized on different lines from the coastal populations. Doumer saw this, and saw too that the progress of the race could be assured, if he could in some way connect the present with the past. The land was still an old Asiatic kingdom, untouched by Europe, save for the *rococo* palace of King Norodom and the presence of a French Resident-Superior, who changed nothing so long as the game of the country afforded him sufficient hunting. Doumer therefore resolved to continue but to revitalize the past.⁵⁴ He insisted that the native kingdom should be maintained in all its splendour and power, and deprecated the usurpations of the Residents. The "protected States" of India were his model, and he simply reproduced in Cambodia the system of the English, say, in Kashmir. That is, he allowed the king and the native officials to govern as before and limited the French Residents to purely advisory functions. But, to prevent such a complete stultification as there had been in the past, he spread Residents throughout the provinces and arranged for certain necessary reforms. For instance, barbarous institutions were repressed. Debt-slavery and torture were abolished, and elements of equity introduced into the political system. The reception of these various reforms best explains the situation. When foreigners were taken from the anomalous native code and placed under French

⁵⁴ Documents in *Le Régime des Protectorats*, Vol. I, 1899, *op. cit.*, p. 415. Doumer (1905), *op. cit.*, p. 221 *et seq.*

justice, the King protested, because this deprived him of one of his main sources of revenue,—the profits of “judging” the rich Chinese merchants! When the demoralizing public-games were abolished, he again protested that demoralization was nothing compared with his revenue, and needed a promenade of gunboats before he could see the logic of the French contention.

At the same time, “a gate was opened to French settlement in Cambodia,” because it was realized that the natives would prosper most by a development of their country’s resources. An ordinance of 1897 therefore recognized French titles to land. Up till then, the only French colonists had been half a dozen traders at the capital, but this new edict would allow a steady infiltration of French influence. When concluded by his scheme of water-transport, Doumer’s reorganization opened a new phase in Cambodian history. It converted French control from name to reality, and opened the land. Native interests were safeguarded and yet a considerable degree of modernization allowed. If the scheme worked out (and this was the essential qualification), the dictates of equity and progress were both provided for: but it remained to be seen whether Doumer was over-estimating the importance of organization in such a land, where it was the spirit of the people that provided the difficulty.

After all, the Cambodian problem was relatively simple, because Doumer was working with untouched material. When he turned to Annam, however, he was confronted by the demoralization and bitterness caused by the mistaken policies of the past. He had to eradicate both the errors and the frame of mind induced by them before he could secure any progress. He had to change the very psychology of a people and convince them that the earlier policies had been mistakes,—and it must be remembered that, with a people like the Annamites, such a confession of past failure was tantamount to damning the new policy before ever it was elaborated.

Annam in 1897 was nominally a French protectorate. Really, affairs went on much as before, save that a bitter hostility was felt towards the French. The Emperor was a boy: the three Regents and the mandarins all made administration and justice a source of profit for themselves. “The Annamite government thus functions almost as it did before the French conquest. All of the mandarin hierarchy is conserved in the provinces, and the administrative practices are the same.”⁵⁵ This meant that the French rule was not a real protectorate. It involved an emphasis on the vices of the old system and an eradication of its virtues, for why should a mandarin exert himself for the benefit of the

⁵⁵ Doumer (1905), *op. cit.*, p. 163.

foreigners at Hué? The Residents, therefore, overlooked matters but had no effective checks. "We limited ourselves to a rudimentary protectorate which was not interested in the welfare or economic development of the country," reported Doumer, and thus the drift continued. The trouble was largely that the French treaty-rights were restricted, and it was virtually impossible to interfere in native policy or internal administration, and, without such interference, economic advance was out of the question in a country where prosperity meant additional mulcting by the mandarins.

Doumer therefore arranged for a more direct and immediate form of control. He kept the royal power, because he saw the inadvisability of breaking the old tradition of Imperial rule and leaving the religion of the whole Annamite race without a tangible head. At the same time, he made it clear that this was not equivalent to a recognition of stultification. The monarchy had to become efficient and progressive. This end he secured by his reorganization of September, 1897, which increased the number of Residents and conferred on them real powers of direction. The old secret council, the *Comat*, which had been such a centre of reactionary intrigue, was totally abolished, and was replaced by a Council of Ministers, under the Resident-Superior. Doumer thus sought to centralize Annamite administration and to make it efficient by reducing the apathy and abuses of the mandarins whom he was compelled to leave as before in the provinces. In 1898, he completed the change by giving France a direct control of Annam's finances,—a step which left no doubt as to the mastery of the situation. Annam was thus hastily dragooned into the path of advance, and Doumer looked to his Residents at Hué and in the provinces to keep her there.

This effected, he could turn to Tonkin, the last and the most difficult of the peninsular-States, and that in which the past record was a greater obstacle than in any other.⁵⁶ Tonkin was nominally a protectorate with a little more control than in Annam, but in reality was very much of a directly ruled colony. It was more of a Cochin-China than an Annam. Mandarins were retained in the provinces, but only because the French *personnel* was insufficient to manage the details of administration there, and they were rather shackled native auxiliaries than mandarins in the old sense. The real power lay with the Residents, every instinct of whose training was to administer on the Algerian model. Keeping administration in their own hands, they left justice to the mandarins, because they could not do this themselves. The only variant from the norm of a directly ruled colony was that the French did not understand enough Annamite to judge the natives. This is what the vaunted

⁵⁶ Doumer (1905), *op. cit.*, pp. 140, 295 *et seq.*

protectorate-theory meant by 1897. Doumer even found that the French were doing their best to destroy the particularly virile system of local government,—that system of communes which was perhaps the dominant note in Annamite organization. Each village had been a tiny republic, each Council of Notables had secured order and progress: and there seemed not the slightest need of interfering with this structure, save that it possessed the cardinal vice of being native! Yet the Residents were trying to obliterate the village communes in Tonkin, as they had already done in Cochin-China.

Doumer took decisive steps to change this position. He suppressed the *Kinh-Luoc* or Viceroy, that phantom ruler whom his predecessors had set up in Tonkin and who had neither traditional authority nor moral value nor practical interest. Then, he told the Residents that their functions were to guide and direct, and not to throttle, the mandarins. So long as the latter were administering to the welfare of their charges, no interference was necessary. He restored to them administrative as well as judicial functions and really made them the provincial rulers. In Cambodia and Annam, it had been necessary to give the Residents a more conspicuous place: here, Doumer had to push them back and assert the mandarins against them. At the same time, he recognized afresh the power of the local communes, thus reverting to Paul Bert's basic principle. Each village was again given charge of communal affairs, and Tonkinese organization reverted to its original form of a loose confederacy of self-governing local units. Doumer not only restored the communes, but actually enlarged their powers, as he could see no reason why their local rights should be in any wise fettered. Thus, they collected taxes, managed schools, controlled charities, decided local policy, kept order in the municipality, and corresponded with the Government through the mandarin. By thus retaining mandarins and communes, Doumer again made the administration of Tonkin self-working, limiting the French part to intervention wherever the machinery broke down.

This organization of the various States was completed by the end of 1897. Cochin-China was recognized as a directly administered French colony: Cambodia was a loose protectorate: Annam, though also a protectorate, had more direct and immediate control: and Tonkin was a self-governing country with organization centring on the communes and the *litterati*, and Residents supervising the whole. After this, Doumer had the necessary data for his federal scheme, and could go on to evolve a system which could at once take cognizance of these local variations and yet allow the federal body to be the directing force in Indo-Chinese affairs.

He had no hesitation in deciding for the central government: When he came, a federal administration was practically non-existent. The only Government-General was himself and an archivist without archives! The Governor-General had hitherto been only the administrator of Tonkin, with a wider title than his colleagues: but Doumer resolved "to govern everywhere and administer nowhere." He was to decide policy all over the Union, and the States were all to be subsidiary to him. This meant a complete reversal of the existing situation, and was perhaps the boldest step that Doumer took, because it at once raised against him the various localist forces, especially in Cochin-China.

First, by setting up a separate Resident-Superior in Tonkin, he withdrew himself from a particular association with any one province. Then, in September, 1897, he instituted a *Conseil Supérieur* for the whole of Indo-China, as the existing body was purely a nominal one. But, before he could secure his Council, he had to manufacture the electorate. At this early date, individual representation was unheard of in colonies of the Indo-Chinese type, and only the representation of bodies was allowed. But even the bodies were non-existent. Therefore, he had to inaugurate mixed Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce in Annam and Cambodia and arrange for the representation of the separate Chambers in the older States. The delegates of these Chambers, when met in Council, were to discuss general economic matters and, in particular, vote on the Federal Budget. French colonial theory in 1897 did not recognize the need of having any discussion of political matters: hence the predominantly economic nature of the Council. Doumer went on to complete the federal structure by setting up the various services, instituting the Customs on the changed basis, and providing for the Budget. He reserved to the Federal Budget customs, communications, public works, judicial matters, and "civil affairs" in general, the range of these functions making it very clear that the provinces were no longer to be independent. Cochin-China perceived this immediately. Its Colonial Council refused outright to accept the Federal reforms, and it was not until Doumer secured the assent of the Council of Ministers in Paris (July, 1898) that the matter was decided. The decision meant that federalism, in its most rigid form, was to triumph over provincial development. By the end of 1898, therefore, Doumer had evolved his Federal organization and had his various Ministries functioning. Indo-China was no longer a mere geographical expression but a governmental entity, and Doumer hoped to make it an economic entity as well.⁵⁷

After 1898, interest thus came to centre on the Government-General,

⁵⁷ Doumer (1905), *op. cit.*, p. 287 *et seq.*

which decided the policy of the peninsula and controlled all economic matters. The Governor-General himself had the power of *all* the Ministers in Paris, and his only aid was from the *Conseil Supérieur*, which, beyond passing the budget, was a purely advisory body. Of the provinces, Cochinchina was directly administered on the African model by a Lieutenant-Governor and a Colonial Council elected by French citizens. The other three States, being protectorates and not colonies, were controlled by a Resident-Superior and local Residents. The only outside body was the *Conseil du Protectorat*, which consisted of officials and delegates of the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture, and which passed the local budgets. But it was the federal body that counted. The Governor-General and the federal services were the centre of affairs, and even Cochinchina's obsession with its special rights as an assimilated colony could not avail in the changed state of things. Doumer had called a State into being in Indo-China, and the land had become an effectively organized unity.

ECONOMIC REFORMS

The bulk of the governmental reconstruction was over by the end of 1898 and needed only the passage of time for its consolidation. Doumer could then turn to grapple with the economic problems in which he was mainly interested and on which he had such positive ideas. Indeed, his governmental changes he viewed solely as preliminaries for the economic development of the country. * They were his communications and his base for the real attack: acting from them, he was to transform the land's economic position, and until he attacked this, was only on the threshold.

When he arrived, the financial position of each of the States without exception was deplorable. Even Cochinchina, with its huge resources, had a deficit of a million piastres in 1896, and, although this was entirely unwarranted, it had detrimentally affected the credit of the country. The northern protectorates, Annam and Tonkin, had had a joint autonomous budget since 1887, the result being that by 1890 there was an accumulated deficit of 13 million francs. France had made the colony a present of this amount, but had to advance another twelve millions to remove the deficit of the next year. A third time, in 1895, 15 million francs had to be given, this time because of de Lanessan's huge programme of public-works.⁵⁸ Despite this, 1895 and 1896 again saw a deficit of over two million piastres, and the colony's finances were so low that, of

⁵⁸ See Doumer's explanation in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 30/6/95, or the Krantz Report in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., docts. parl., sess. ext., 1895, p. 1608.

a loan of 80 million francs which was authorized in 1896, no less than 43 millions had to go to pay off past obligations.⁵⁹ It was decidedly not a promising record that Doumer had to face, for the northern deficits seemed to be ingrained.

He at once attacked the problem. By making tax-collection more efficient and by instituting indirect taxes, he balanced the Tonkinese budget for 1897, paid off the previous year's deficit, and for the first time created a reserve. Yet, in addition to securing a credit-balance of four million piastres by 1898, he carried out public works on a more ambitious scale even than in de Lanessan's time. For instance, he commenced the first irrigation works, made a survey for the railways, and started the gigantic Hanoi bridge which was to open the way for direct communication from the Delta to the Chinese frontier. Successful in the local sphere, he went on to the Federal budget, but was at once faced by the problem of disposing of the tax-receipts. He finally decided that direct taxes were to go to local services, while indirect taxes should be retained for Federal purposes (July, 1898). From 1899 onwards, therefore, there was one general and six local budgets in Indo-China, and Doumer made them all flourish before he left. In less than five years, he had converted a dangerous financial position into five credit-balances, had secured a loan of 200 million francs for railways, had built canals and ports, had paid 14 million francs a year towards the colony's military expenses, and had a cash-reserve of 30 million francs. The peninsula had never been so well off.⁶⁰

The only questionable part of his procedure was his inordinate stress on indirect taxes. He viewed these as "the most considerable resources on which we can count" and laid great emphasis on the State monopolies of opium, alcohol, and salt, from which he derived most of his revenue. The trouble was that, once these indirect taxes commenced, it was very difficult to change them. With opium, for instance, the State obtained almost nine million piastres by 1911, and the maintenance of the impost was determined, not by its social effects, but only by the fact that its suppression would involve "an enormous loss" for the Federal budget. So too with the alcohol monopoly. The State had a monopoly of manufacture after 1898 and of sale after 1911, and received an average return of 1½ million piastres (1903-1911). But the financial position was more than counterbalanced by the economic and political disturbances occasioned among the natives: indeed, much of the opposition to the

⁵⁹ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 28/12/95, 11/2/96.

⁶⁰ G. Demorgny, *Les principales Réformes financières en Indo-chine de 1897 à 1900* (1900). Doumer's own account is in *L'Indo-Chine Française* (1905), p. 300. A good report is in *Le Régime des Protectorats*, 1899, Vol. I, p. 193.

Government rallied round this specific issue of alcohol, with the irritating right-of-search used in enforcing it. The State monopoly of selling salt was even worse, because it meant the practical disappearance of the salt-industry. With each of these three monopolies, the financial success had to be considered in conjunction with the effect on the natives politically and socially as well as economically.⁶¹ Each article directly touched the native: hence, as the Annamite was prone to interpret the whole of French policy in terms of those parts with which he came intimately into contact, the taxes led to much anti-French feeling,—a feeling which almost faded into revolt under Doumer's successors.

But Doumer, aware as he was of these murmurings, tended rather to emphasize the old French adage about trying to make an omelette without breaking eggs; and, counting his financial position assured, went on to the railway-project of 1898. Looking far into the future, he planned a whole network of railways running through the peninsula, and strenuously contended that development from the first had to be in accord with a general plan. "We must know what we are going to do and where we are going," he argued, and drew up a scheme for no less than 3,000 kilometres of line (December, 1897).⁶² Deterred a little by the misgivings of his *Conseil Supérieur*, he finally compromised on 1,700 kilometres at a cost of 200 million francs,—an unheard-of sum in the French colonies of last century. It is perhaps the best commentary on his forcefulness simply to record that he obtained a law sanctioning a loan for this amount in 1898—at the hour of the Fashoda reverse and a new phase of the Dreyfus crisis, and when the word "loan" sounded ill in Parliamentary ears.⁶³ Three years later he again fought through a Bill in the face of lively opposition, this time for the extension of the Tonkin Railway into Yunnan.⁶⁴ By 1901, that is, he had planned and provided for a railway programme that would take at least a decade to execute,—and all in a time when French opinion viewed colonial railways as a costly phantasy.

Doumer's real work ended with this achievement. The realization of his financial and railway schemes was to come under his successors: he had simply prepared the way. It is easy to see, however, how his five years marked the turning-point in the history of the colony. He had replaced vacillation by a decided policy, he had enforced a consistent scheme of reform for five uninterrupted years, he had implanted

⁶¹ The monopoly question is examined in A. Métin, *L'Indo-Chine et l'Opinion* (1916), pp. 166-189; or Fréssensé's interpellation in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 3/4/09; or L. Vignon (1919), *op. cit.*, p. 451 *et seq.*

⁶² Doumer (1905), *op. cit.*, p. 325 *et seq.* See Map No. 20, p. 453.

⁶³ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., sess. ext., 1898, docts. parl., pp. 341, 423 *et seq.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Deps., 19/3/01.

his reforms so firmly that not even incompetent successors could prevent their operation. He had saved Indo-China despite itself and in the face of opposition both at home and in the colony. In short, he had made the youngest and most attacked of French colonies the most successful. He had created a federal government and organized the local administrations. He had made six budgets so that it would be difficult to obtain deficits, and he had created a taxation-system that was a most efficient source of revenue, whatever its other results were. He had laid the basis of the railway-system and provided money for his successors to complete the scheme. He had increased commerce from 170 to 363 million francs, and had trebled the French share in this,—a formidable record.

It was but natural that such a comprehensive policy should have many drawbacks. Doumer, by his very nature, over-emphasized the need of organizing matters afresh from top to bottom, and he was wont to neglect certain phases of development. His genius was essentially for the direction of finance and public-works, and this came to mean that he neglected agriculture in a country which was, after all, primarily agricultural. He went even further than this with local industries and held that any industry competing with the mother-country should be positively banned.⁶⁵ The result was that such enterprises as the Hongay coal-mining and the cement-works at Haiphong had to emerge in the face of his opposition; and the colony, though suitable for industrialization, was for many years held back by this attitude.

Similarly, he neglected land-settlement. Though the area granted to Europeans increased from 80,861 hectares in 1896 to 357,481 in 1901, there was little increase in *peuplement*. Free-grant was the rule, and some colonists obtained more than 20,000 hectares. The grantee simply installed natives on the land and drew part of the profits. There was no intensive cultivation by modern methods, but simply a continuation of the old, with the insertion of European *entrepreneurs* in an already over-populated land. Only twelve per cent. of the area ceded was cultivated by 1901, and nothing had been done towards the introduction of new crops.⁶⁶

Doumer thus failed to promote industry and agriculture, and, at times, what was termed "his suspicious and excessively meticulous administration" neglected the needs of commerce. He subordinated all of these things to the necessity of obtaining revenue for the Government, and it can with justice be asserted that his policy was unduly fiscal, even to the point at which it became anti-developmental. On the

⁶⁵ Doumer (1905), *op. cit.*, p. 361.

⁶⁶ F. Bernard (1901), *op. cit.*, pp. 132-141.

other hand, he had reformed finance and provided reserves for those who came after him, and they could, by taking advantage of the reforms he had brought about, extend development along the lines he neglected. He had created the country's credit and an atmosphere of optimism,—both of which were non-existent features when he came : and it is directly to his work in promoting unity, in developing the budgets, and in carrying out his railway-scheme that the self-sufficiency of Indo-China since his day has been due. He made the land as we know it to-day, and his name is as much associated with Indo-China as Cambon's is with Tunisia or Galliéni's with Madagascar. The Radical exile had justified himself and had given France the best of her colonies.⁶⁷

V. Native Policy after Doumer

After Doumer left, interest centred once more on native problems, because the very prosperity of the natives made them more assertive and they had so far shed their complex of unreasoning obedience to authority that they went too far in the opposite direction of claiming privileges.

The obvious feature in these years was a general *malaise* which is the nearest a Chinese population gets to that reckless abandon which suddenly flares up in a massacre. It was a general simmering of discontent, the more disquietening because it was under the surface and with all the intensity of a repressed tendency. Its nature was best summed up by a Francophile Annamite official, who said to de Lanessan in 1905 that,—

“There is no piracy as formerly, but discontent reigns in every class of the Annamite population. The King has no longer any authority : the mandarins, deprived of moral direction, are dissatisfied at not having powers which would permit them to aid the Residents in native administration : while the people are impoverished by taxes which mount ceaselessly and very rapidly. This dull discontent of the people, moreover, has been excited by the recent victory of the Japanese. In my opinion, the actual situation is much more difficult than it was formerly. Then there were only a few bandits who ravaged the country, the rest of the population favouring France : but now, the discontent is general. *I fear for the future.*”

“Dull discontent” is exactly the phrase for this widening gap between French and natives. There was a clear drifting-apart. The natives could not understand the whims and changing policies of the French : and, for their part, the French did not understand the Annamite soul, and, arguing from the analogy of “boys” and prostitutes, came once more to despise the natives. Both sides steadily hated and despised the other, and the gap grew.

⁶⁷ See Etienne's summary of his work in preface to Néton (1904), *op. cit.*, p. viii.

The position of the mandarins at once reflected this cleavage. They had not been properly reinstated in Tonkin, and the whole gist of Doumer's fiscal policy had been in favour of a more direct control of native affairs, however much its author believed in a powerful mandarinat. Tonkin was again becoming closer to Cochinchina, and such native officials as there were were more and more ostracized.⁶⁸ Perhaps no other policy was possible in Tonkin, because of the differences from Annam. In Annam there was not the same immediate incentive for direct intervention, but in Tonkin the absence of a local class of trained officials could not be counteracted, and, if untrained officials were employed, there naturally had to be constant supervision. This became more noticeable when Doumer's fiscal policy emphasized efficiency above everything else, and when French colonists increased in the Delta, and piracy once more gathered strength in the mountains. The mandarins found themselves a declining force, and, even if nominally retained, divested of their functions as they had been after de Lanessan had left the country. The Residents were substituted for the native officials instead of working with them. As Gervais, the Budget Reporter, told the Senate in May, 1913, the result was that, instead of an organized people connected with the Government through the intermediary of the *littérati*, there had come to be only an amorphous mass of twenty million human beings, disillusioned and at least passively hostile.⁶⁹

Aiding this tendency was the influence of the indirect taxes. Doumer had based his calculations on the unusually good harvests of his earlier years and had not reckoned on the abnormal degree of corruption that was to arise. In consequence, the burden became increasingly intolerable, especially because it irritated the people. The household searches in preventing evasions of the alcohol-monopoly became the most voiced grievance of the Annamites, and this in itself, whether justified or not, took away any justification the tax may have had. As a matter of fact, the native complaint that they were over-taxed had little real support. The aggregate yield was huge, it is true (36 million francs a year), but it must be remembered that this was spread over an unusually dense population. The individual Annamite paid less than any other French native, except the Indian and the Malagasian; and their 7.93 francs compared well with the 7.50 francs taken by the English in India, or the 11.22 francs of Burma or the 48.25 francs of British Borneo.⁷⁰ The grievance was thus more psychological than financial, but it was none the less real.

⁶⁸ For Beau's stand against this, see important article in *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 10/2/06, p. 73.

⁶⁹ *Journal Officiel*, Senate, 27/5/13; compare Gaisman, *L'Œuvre Française au Tonkin* (1906), p. 130, or Métin (1916), *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁷⁰ A. de Pourvoirville, *L'Asie Française* (1911), pp. 178-180.

Then came the influence of the Russo-Japanese War and the organization of Siam, both of them leading to an "Asia for the Asiatics" movement. The Annamites had given European ideas a fair trial, they considered. They had not arrogantly disdained the new customs, but had been curious and attentive. They had an unmistakable power of assimilation and a desire to learn and imitate. But they were extremely sensitive and, gentle though they were, were particularly attached to their traditions and civilization. Their racial pride once touched, they became intractably impervious to Occidental influences and filled with a bitterly ferocious, if repressed, hatred. They would borrow from another civilization, they admitted, but it was a gentleman's part to respect his friend's culture, even while admitting its differences: and France failed to do this, with a people who were nothing if not courtly. Moreover, when it came to actual competition, had not Mukden demonstrated that "a yellow skin is worth something," they wanted to know? The boasted superiority of European civilization which the French had insisted on viewing as the basis of their action in Indo-China was thus placed in jeopardy; and, as Fabre showed in his play, *Les Sauterelles*, the conduct of the average representative of this great civilization was not such as to make the Annamite forsake the culture of his gods and his fathers. As a result of these tendencies, a curious inversion had emerged by about 1910. The Annamites were holding themselves apart and disdainful, convinced that their civilization and their ways were preferable to those of the French, and, in general, comporting themselves with that air of ineffable aloofness so readily implanted by a belief in racial superiority.

The tendency was aided at this specific juncture by the social changes brought about in Annamite life by economic development. An Asiatic civilization, immobile and based on the submergence of the individual, had been suddenly brought into contact with European ideas of individualization. Aloofness in this connection was out of the question. The Delta, the key of the land, was transformed, and methods of production tended to change everywhere. The rate of cultural evolution, or rather destruction, was thus forced. It became almost a truism that a native's iconoclasm was in direct proportion to his economic advancement, and unfortunately, such iconoclasm came to be identified with the desirable quality of adaptability. A native who turned his back on his past was deemed to be progressing. This meant that the younger generations became sneeringly sceptical of their past, but, finding that isolation from their own world by no means implied entrance to the new Occidental world, they became potential rebels. Hence the rise of the "Young Annamites." Hence, too, the connection between industrializa-

tion and individualism and an assertive national patriotism.⁷¹ As long as social life was bounded by the village, as long as a young man measured success in terms of the approbation of his elders in the Council of Notables, then so long was the concept of a nation out of the question. The land was really a *congeries* of tiny republics. But the economic life of the Occident, especially in Cochin-China and Tonkin, changed all this, and, by enfranchising, or really creating, the individual, incidentally gave rise to a wider political perception. This was naturally more noticeable in the urban areas where native life became more quickly disintegrated, and where the hopelessness of the masses made them ready material for seditious purposes. But, even in the uplands, the economic changes spelt disintegration, and this went hand in hand with anti-French agitation.

Hitherto, the French had added to their despal of the natives a feeling that, even if they *did* misgovern, no retribution could touch them. "There is nothing in common between the various peoples, or their ideas or methods. There is no native public opinion, there probably never will be one. Thus a general rising is not possible."⁷² That was the prevalent French attitude: but it quite neglected the artificial nationality that was emerging, the community of grievances that was giving rise to a community of political interests, and the way in which the Annamites were invoking their cultural past for propaganda purposes. In 1908, for instance, there was an ominous spirit of unrest throughout the land. The pirates became a nuisance again in Upper Tonkin: all of Quang-nan province in Annam was in passive revolt against the rice- and head-taxes, and the French Residency at Faifou was invaded: there was a conspiracy down south in Cochin-China and the people construed the failure to convict as a sign of weakness. Still more important, the malcontents plotted to burn Hanoi, the capital. The towns in general were restive, and the French gave way to a panic.⁷³ An executive "Criminal Commission" was set up to ensure summary justice and to prevent such fiascos as the failure to punish the Cochin-Chinese plotters. But, as events turned out, it only aided the natives, because they knew that it was a panic-measure. Had it been set up permanently in a dignified manner, it would have been a salutary social measure: introduced in a panic and without that decorum which is so essential in a Chinese community, it was the reverse of politic.

⁷¹ *L'Asie Française*, Nov. 1920, p. 363.

⁷² de Pourvoirville (1911), *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁷³ Details of these events are in *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 1908, pp. 291, 426, 528, 1072, and the last outbreak in *L'Asie Française*, Sept. 1913. Messimy's colonial-budget reports for 1909-1910 (in his *Notre Œuvre Coloniale*, p. 70) analyse the discontent.

Over against these discontented natives were the unsympathetic French officials. Officialdom was the bane of the land.⁷⁴ They were steadily increasing in number (from 2,860 in 1897 to 5,683 in 1911), and as steadily weakening in type. They cost 35 million piastres a year,—that is, a quarter of the total budget-receipts, and it was estimated that at least two-thirds of them could have been dispensed with, especially the European proletariat who received about £120 a year. No other colonial Power used European officials for lowly work of this nature, and it was absurd to argue that natives were not available for it. All of these officials, great and small alike, were hopelessly alienated from a real understanding of native affairs. In 1911, for instance, the Annamite language of Tonkin was purely spoken by only three French administrators, and France had stationed one of these in Cambodia, where the language is utterly different. Only nine per cent. knew a smattering sufficient for everyday needs, and 91 per cent. knew none at all! Herein was largely the explanation of the gap between French and natives.⁷⁵ Clémentel had issued instructions in 1905, insisting that the higher officials at least should be able to understand native dialects, but only with the result seen above.⁷⁶ There was adequate provision for such training,—on the statute-book, a field in which France left scarcely any gaps!

It was plain by about 1910, therefore, that some change had to come, and that Doumer's policy of reform on fiscal lines had been accompanied by, if it was not indeed one of the leading causes of, native discontent.⁷⁷ It was seen that French rule had been based on the exclusion of the natives, whereas the only progressive method was to secure the collaboration of each race, even of the backward Laos-men. Development to be effective had to be mutual. Hence arose the policy of association, which, somewhat tardily, was so much stressed in Indo-China after this date. "We must associate the Annamite people in our civilizing work," de Lanessan had written in 1905, and there had to be "association of interests, of intelligences, and of races." Develop the natives in the light of their own civilization,—argued the theorists: and there was a low but very significant murmur by the financial experts that such development and association would produce positive economies. It would be a good stroke of business. But it was the clear failure of the existing policy that actually decided the change, because *laissez-faire* or mere continuance was out of the question.

⁷⁴ Messimy's report, p. 147 *et seq.*; Métin (1916), *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁷⁵ de Pourvoirville (1911), *op. cit.*, p. 143; Chailley's attacks in *Journal Officiel*, Depa., 17/11/08.

⁷⁶ *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 22/11/08, p. 1018.

⁷⁷ Messimy Report, *op. cit.*, p. 196 *et seq.*

A start had been made in the new direction in Tonkin in 1907, when an Advisory Council of native notables had been instituted to aid the ordinary financial Council. This was the first recognition that the Government needed any aid from outside in determining its policy, especially as concerned the natives. In addition, the provinces of Tonkin had elected commissions of regional notables, but this concession was unique, and the other States had nothing like it. Annam and Cambodia remained as they were after Doumer's reorganization of 1897, and Cochin-China was as inertly official as ever. It had a Mixed Council, in which 8,000 Frenchmen had twice as many representatives as three million natives. The obvious solution of two Chambers on the Tunisian model, one for Frenchmen and the other for foreigners, was not entertained, nor was there any effort to extend even the limited representation of Tonkin to Cochin-China. The gap between foreigners and natives still remained, and it was useless to speak of association when the Government would not bridge this gap or utilize the mandarins or native communes in any effective manner.

The country seemed at its nadir under Governor-General Klobukowsky (1908-1911), but the attacks of Messimy and Viollette in the Deputies secured the appointment of Albert Sarraut, who went out pledged to allay the native drift, and to start a native policy on the principles of de Lanessan and the bases of Beau. The position of the natives was unquestionably deplorable: as a mass, they were either apathetic or covertly hostile to France: but Sarraut, a leader of the new *association* school, was viewed as another Paul Bert or de Lanessan. He at once emphasized the native view-point and cleared away as many as possible of those obstacles which had hitherto stopped reform. He purged the Civil Service of what was called "the French administrative proletariat," throwing open the posts thus vacated to the natives. This not only secured cheapness and efficiency: it at once brought home to the natives the reality of their co-operation in the work of government, and placed them on something of a par with the Indians and Javanese.⁷⁸ After this, Sarraut enforced Clémentel's neglected decree on the teaching of native languages, insisting that the officials could not understand their charges, and still less secure their sympathy, unless they could dispense with interpreters.

But this was only the fringe of the problem, for Sarraut soon saw that, however much the natives emphasized their political wrongs and groaned about Doumer's indirect taxes, these were not the root of the

⁷⁸ See Lebrun on Sarraut's work in *Journal Officiel*, Depa., 20/12/12, or *Colonies et Marine*, 1922, p. 567.

matter. Indeed, the phenomenal economic advance of all classes since Doumer's time disproved these grumbings. Where the most immediate problem lay was in the world of justice. Here, the keynote was that struck in Pierre Mille's horrible tale, *Justice*, which showed to how great an extent flesh and blood were openly sacrificed to the letter of a Parisian code. Even the principles were not uniform. Some parts saw assimilation, others had myriads of fluctuating policies, everywhere the text and the application of the law were different; and, in all, Indo-China was a veritable legal quagmire.⁷⁹ The position was absurd. Indo-China was a country that called for decisions in accord with the tangled traditions and religion of the people. Everything was deep-rooted in the cultural past and meaningless apart from the maze of custom. Yet France had done nothing to meet the situation, or even to secure a uniformity in her policies that did *not* meet the situation. In Cochin-China, both the French civil and criminal codes had been introduced in 1881 and were still in force. A land-matter involving centuries of Chinese traditions would therefore be settled by a French magistrate with the same manuals of law employed in the suburbs of Paris. Local conditions were surmounted by being ignored. Since the natives dwelt in a colony assimilated to France, it was held that they should either endeavour to understand French law, or, if they could not do so, appreciate the honour and accept the result! In Tonkin the position was not as bad. Here, there was a compromise between old and new. The mandarins were supposed to administer local law, but, as a result of the innumerable changes in policy, the degree of European interference varied with the personality of every Resident. On the whole, however, the French magistrates exercised less judicial authority than in Cochin-China, although the uncertainty of the position was detrimental to justice. In Annam, native justice was entirely in the hands of the mandarins, and the Code Gui-Long, the basis of Annamite law, had been codified by a special commission. As regards the whole of Indo-China, the position thus meant that each province had a different solution for precisely the same issue, and obviously all could not be correct.⁸⁰

The conflict was between the Cochin-Chinese and Tonkinese systems,—that is, between the ideas of assimilation and a protectorate. Sarraut naturally adopted the latter, but was faced by considerable opposition. The French belief in the universality of the *Code Civile* dies hard, and it was not until a Royal ordinance of July, 1917, that Tonkinese

⁷⁹ Girault (1923), 2.1.557, for a good account.

⁸⁰ A summary of the different solutions is in Girault, 2.1.561. The position is attacked in L. Vignon (1919), *op. cit.*, p. 345 *et seq.*

justice could be reorganized.⁸¹ The result was a compromise as before, but one more favourable to the natives. It was admitted that French law could not meet the situation, and that in itself was an advance: on the other hand, the French were adamant that the illogicalities and imperfections of Annamite law could not be tolerated. There were certain basic differences that had to be settled. Annamite law confused law and morality, as was natural in a community where religion impinged on civil life. It was social rather than individual, transactional rather than absolute. It took into account attenuating factors and social conditions, and mixed up administrative and legal phases. The French, for their part, insisted that law was utterly distinct from morality, and that the prelude to any reform had to be a recognition of the principle of the separation of powers,—a decision hotly contested by the natives as inequitable and even irreligious.

Moreover, the French said that the mandarins could not at the one time be judges and administrators,—but this again was in direct conflict with native ideas, for was not the mandarin the head of his family and the decider of all things? Despite this plaint, the French instituted a hierarchy of “judicial mandarins,” in nine grades, as distinct from the administrative mandarins.⁸² Yet they recognized the danger of forcing the rate of change, especially in view of the native attitude, so that these reforms were not completed until 1923, and at every stage, mandarins and magistrates and administrators worked in a Joint Commission.

The upshot is that the law of Tonkin is now administered by specialized native officers, and the law itself, while fully taking into account local conditions and native codes, is yet compatible in its essentials with French law. The French have seen that it is the spirit, and not the letter, of their law that counts. There is thus no attempt to introduce French laws themselves, as in Cochin-China; it is only the basic principles, the ideas indispensable for justice, that have been fused into the general Annamite structure. The resultant law is an advance on anything the French Empire has hitherto known,—clearly an advance on the French Civil Law enforced in Algeria and Cochin-China, and even on the compromise of French criminal and native civil law so favoured in the African colonies. The Tonkinese system is more conducive to efficiency and equity, while it in no wise sacrifices the peculiarities of native custom.

Some experts, the jurist Fournier-Vally for instance, consider that the new Code had unduly forced the rate of evolution. They hold that

⁸¹ *L'Asie Française*, Dec. 1920, pp. 404, 410. The result for the civil law is in Daresté, *Recueil Colonial*, 1919, p. 110, and, for the criminal, in *Journal Officiel de l'Indo-Chine*, 16/11/21.

⁸² For classes of mandarins, see *Journal Officiel de l'Indo-Chine*, 22/3/19, 22/9/20.

it has too strictly separated law and morality, and that such a separation tends to accentuate the social drift which is such a problem in Indo-China and to complicate the problems of the individual who is asserting himself. In a community which is changing from a system based on the family-unit to one on an individual basis, as is the Annamite, general social conditions—what might be called the changing group-morality of the moment—have to be taken into account. As a case in point, the new Code bases its punishment for adultery and filial disobedience on the French model, quite neglecting the fact that the entire basis of Annamite social life depends on the principle of family-authority. It is clear that the old arrangements in this connection could no longer meet the situation, because of the changes during the last twenty years: but, on the other hand, the freeing of every young Annamite from the parental authority, when he reaches the age of twenty-one, is inept and revolutionary.⁶³ It considers the goal of the social evolution that is taking place in connection with individualism, instead of the stage that has been reached at present, and thus places a premium on anti-social change. Obviously, the old Annamite penalty of strangulation could not hold in a community impregnated by French ideas for forty years, but, to the Annamite, the new provision of a short-term imprisonment seems to mean the conferring of a State *imprimatur* on social disintegration. In the main, however, the Code is based on a workable compromise, although it is perhaps less elastic than the old. But, where the fundamental need is to prevent abuse, elasticity is only a minor consideration, and it must be admitted that, in general, the Tonkinese Code is far in advance of the customary French ideas.⁶⁴

By the time this reform was secured, Sarraut's term had expired, and Maurice Long, the deputy of la Drome, was carrying on his work (1919-1923). The problem that had confronted Sarraut was judicial: that with which Long had to deal was political, because the war had once more forced political discontent into a state of prominence. Sarraut had rightly postponed the issue; now his successor had to face it.⁶⁵ He prepared the ground for this by his fight for the recovery of the piastre and the acceptance of a local loan by the natives, thus approaching the more intangible political issues by emphasizing the undoubted prosperity of the people.⁶⁶ There was no doubt that the Annamites were the most prosperous of all the French natives, but this fact seemed only to make their political demands more vociferous. They demanded a

⁶³ *L'Asie Française*, Nov. 1920, p. 365.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 1924, pp. 29, 30.

⁶⁵ For Long's work, see *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 19/1/23, or Angoulvant in *Colonies et Marine*, Aug. 1922, pp. 566-579.

⁶⁶ *Colonies et Marine*, 1922, pp. 539, 573-576.

political status compatible with their changed economic position, claiming that they had either had too great political privileges in the past or too few at present. And, as the former suggestion was a mockery, the reformers insisted that logic (and *intelligentsia*-trained natives are nothing if not superficially logical) necessitated a change.

The demands could be divided into three categories. The first and most justified were the small concessions sought in the local regions. The old system of communes was changing. New economic and social forces had emerged to make it anomalous. Organization fitted for a society based on the family-group was unsuited for an aggressively individualistic society; and naturally the Councils of Notables came to be centres of reactionary forces, vainly trying to eradicate the social disruption and stigmatizing any change from the good old days as disintegration. They were archaic, oligarchical, and no longer represented the interests of the villagers.⁸⁷ Long therefore set up "communal administrative councils," elected on a fairer basis, and provided with communal budgets so that they would be the effective forces in each local district (1921-1922). The only opposition came from those who profited by the anarchy of village finances and the old "diehards" who lived in a world that had gone. The reform was in general popular, and now practically all Annamite villages have elected administrative councils, and there are over 2,000 communal budgets. Paul Bert's theory of local self-government has thus been re-vitalized and brought up to date, and the genius of the Annamite for group-democracy once more vindicated.

More difficult were the wider claims for a general representation of all natives in the government of the country. The educated "Young Annamites" were not very interested in the communal reforms, because local politics were rather outside their ken. They were statesmen, not councillors! They were concerned with the national stage, and concentrated on an extension of native representation in Tonkin and its introduction in an effective form in the other states. After 1920 they were joined by the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture; and even the French Press argued that the existing Councils, however much they may have met the requirements of Doumer's time, were clearly anomalous after the economic changes in the interim. In 1922, therefore, Long promised Cochinchina a body like the *Délégations Financières* of Algeria,—that is, a dual body, representing French and native interests in separate sections. By the decree of June, 1922, which reformed the Colonial Council along these lines, the French still retained a majority of members, but the significant feature about the new body was that it

⁸⁷ *L'Asie Française*, May 1922, p. 218.

was elected on the basis of individual representation,—quite a new political principle in so far as the natives of Indo-China were concerned.⁸⁸ Previously, representatives had been chosen from a college consisting of a delegate from each Council of Notables: there was thus an indirect representation of the village communes. Now, however, taxpayers were to vote directly, and this meant the enfranchisement of 20,822 electors. The functions of the Council did not change: the important features of the reform were rather structural,—in the increase of the native representatives from six to ten, and the recognition of the principle of individual voting.⁸⁹

Clearly, the reform movement was proceeding by leaps and bounds, but, when it entered the still wider national field and demanded something approaching a national autonomy, French policy halted. The French were prepared to give complete self-government in the communes and a gradually developing representation in the provinces, but they insisted that the Government-General had to remain responsible for federal policy. It was admitted by all that the existing *Conseil du Gouvernement* was inadequate. It was practically an official body, and, even so, only a registering chamber; and obviously the need was for a real elected assembly that could speak for the people. Long, before his death, had promised such an assembly, and Merlin, his successor, admitted that the Government Council, as constituted in 1911, no longer corresponded to the needs of the country or to the facts brought about by the war, or to the progress of Indo-China. But the difficulty was to know what to do, as French colonial theory had not yet advanced to the stage of countenancing any degree of responsible government in the colonies. Long, for his part, had fought for autonomy. While taking a clear stand against any form of independence, he claimed that "the moment has come for Indo-China to live its own life," "that Indo-China is a State and no longer a colony," and that it had to have its own policy in every direction, its own money and loans and navy. No questioning of French sovereignty was implied in this attitude, which was simply a demand for something like the Dominion-status of the British colonies. It was clearly laid down, even by Maurice Long, that France was in no sense to abdicate her authority.⁹⁰ The natives were not to be supreme.

Long asserted time and again that naturalization had to be the exception rather than the rule and that most of the natives had to remain in their present position. The balance of power within Indo-China

⁸⁸ Angoulvant in *Colonies et Marine*, Aug. 1922, pp. 568-570.

⁸⁹ *L'Asie Française*, Sept.-Oct. 1922, p. 347.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Feb. 1922, p. 58; Feb. 1924, p. 75.

was to remain much the same as before: a little more scope was to be given to the educated natives, and much more to the Government-General, which represented Indo-China as a whole. That was all. As Sarraut said:—

“The local organ of government which presides over Indo-China’s development must clearly remain under the control of the motherland, but the true power of decision must rest on the spot in Indo-China. At present, it is not there, despite the solemn affirmations of a logical decentralization of the Government-General. This Government has only a precarious authority, delegated by texts which allow the mother-country to withhold with one hand the power it gives with the other. Theory says one thing, practice sees quite the contrary.”⁹¹

The colony thus demands responsible government such as the British colonies obtained in 1853.⁹² It has had it for some time on the financial side, at least to the extent of discussing its budget: now, it demands a real self-government both here and in the political field. But it must be noted that this movement, though given its original impetus by the native demand for self-expression, has become more than a native question, and indeed, in so far as the natives themselves are concerned, it has been decided that their participation in whatever change may come about in the federal organization is, while gradually extending, to be limited to the part they play in the provincial Governments,—that is, scope to express their opinions and needs, but, in general, no power of coming to decisions on questions of policy.

With these issues settled for the time being, the centre of interest in native matters has once more changed. Just as it moved from the vague unrest of 1901–1910 to the specific judicial question under Sarraut, and then to the political issue under Long, so now it has oscillated once more,—this time in the direction of providing increased economic opportunity by means of industrial education. Questions of status and representation are not as immediately important to the mass of the natives as is economic advancement, and it must be emphasized that this new turn is certainly healthier than the somewhat defiant demands of the earlier stages were. It represents a conscious striving instead of a disgruntled recklessness, and is at least constructive.

The outstanding facts in the colony’s life at present are that agricultural methods are becoming transformed and that industry is more important here than in any other French colony. For both of these reasons, therefore, vocational education is of more than academic interest. Capital is superabundant (hence proposals to export some of it to

⁹¹ *L’Asie Française*, Jan. 1921, p. 25.

⁹² Gourdon’s article in *Colonies et Marine*, Feb. 1921, p. 106.

aid French Oceania), and the future of the colony depends on one thing, —improving the quality of the labour-supply. Under the conditions, now that the general development has taught the native new needs and desires, this rests entirely with education. Professional education will complete the change, as was seen by Bouinas and Paulis as long ago as 1885, when they wrote: "let us raise them to us by a gradual apprenticeship, by the establishment of model agricultural and industrial schools."

Sarraut had commenced a practical turn in this direction by his decree of December, 1917, which systematized native education on the basis that instruction had to be in French, and, by implication, modernized. The Chinese character-schools had proven intractable: these new ones, therefore, were to be directly under the State. This reform, which spread so that by 1920 only Cambodia retained its old pagoda-schools, paved the way for the industrialization of education. "The question of professional education is more than ever the order of the day in Indo-China," reported the Governor-General to the *Conseil du Gouvernement* in 1923.⁹³ Up to that time, there had only been one industrial school at Hanoi, yet two States of the union at least were semi-industrialized. The provision was hopelessly inadequate, and even by the end of 1923, there were only eleven such schools with 1,091 students, —for a population of twenty millions. The natives, seeing how they are directly affected, are remarkably unified in their stand on this matter, and indeed have brought to it all the passion that formerly found expression in political agitation. Accepting the professional schools, they demanded the reversal of Sarraut's policy of instruction in French, and made it a matter of national pride, especially in Tonkin.⁹⁴

There the matter rests. On the whole, it may be said that the native problem in Indo-China is not really serious. There is little of the open secession that is so obvious in Tunisia or of the passive hate that characterizes Algeria. In Indo-China the general *réveil* movement of Asiatic Powers naturally finds an echo, but it is difficult to make rebels of a prosperous peasantry. This might have been done in the years immediately after 1902, when they felt themselves ground down by the weight of Doumer's taxes and by the attack on their own mandarins and institutions. But now, with the mandarins restored and local self-government conceded, the position has changed. The ordinary Annamite, despite the ebullience of the foreign-educated minority, cares little about an adequate share in national government: so long as they have a vague participation which appeals to the spectacular side of their nature,

⁹³ *L'Asie Française*, April 1924, p. 171.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, May 1922, p. 216; July 1923, p. 324.

they are content, and probably do not understand even this (it was very difficult, for instance, to make the peasants grasp the nature of the village-reforms of 1923). The promise to make the existing representation more effective fully meets their desires, as there is no real national movement to control the government. It is the economic world that claims most attention. The peasant-proprietor, immobile for centuries, finds himself in the midst of an industrial revolution, and, now that the war-years have shown him that the changes are to his own immediate benefit, he devotes his whole attention to them, because, as has been seen, the Annamite can be attentive to change if convinced that that change is desirable. Hence the stress on education in the last few years, and on such matters as improved rice-methods, new crops, communications, credit-facilities, and the like. Economic transformation has been a distinct solvent of native grievances, and the new demands are not so much the result of oppression as of the self-consciousness of prosperity. The old claims were bitter demands from the depths of pessimism, the new ones simply a statement of the native's newly-felt importance. Complaints about deracialization and the plight of the mandarins, those bugbears of the past, no longer pertain to the position of to-day. Indeed, it may be said that native policy, as well as colonization in general, has become industrialized: and the native, finding his desires whetted, instead of, as formerly, thwarted, by the change, throws himself whole-heartedly into the work of bridging the chasm between patriarchal existence and industrialization, and in dealing with the myriads of questions that this raises in a society hitherto based on the rule of custom. The native problem, by being thrown largely on to the natives, and by reason of the economic changes and the increasing degree of individualism, has quite changed since 1910. Now, in the main, the emphasis is on co-operation, each side pursuing its own ends with the aid of the other; and the noisy but frothy independence movement finds itself isolated from the mass of the natives.

VI. Economic Development

Up to Doumer's time, Indo-China had been little developed, save for the rice-industry in Cochinchina and, to a lesser degree, the exploitation of the Tonkin delta. Trade had been set back by the "assimilation" of the colony to France in 1892,—an especially heavy blow in a country which depended on a local Oriental market and which could under no conditions be made a commercial dependency of France. Rice was practically the only crop: industry was non-existent; commerce was not progressing. There were only 800 European civilians in the land, and these had failed to settle down to agricultural pursuits: over against

them were twenty million natives, sullen and unprogressive, living as their ancestors did and seeing no reason why they should change their methods of production. Their minds wallowed in inertness just as their bodies did in the rice-swamps. Even Doumer's five years of reorganization left this position little changed in its essentials. He created credit, it is true, and thus cleared the way for a doubling of commerce, but, to counteract this, he discouraged industry and neglected agriculture. He failed to make alienation of land mean settlement, in so far as the Europeans were concerned, and worst of all, left the native body, by reason of his taxes and political changes, more disaffected than when he came.

Under these conditions, it was his successors who had to bear the brunt of the situation. When Beau followed him in 1901, for instance, he had a sound financial position, a growing trade, and a progressive policy of communications; but all of these had adversely affected the native and passed over the country's primary production. Public works had gone on at the cost of agriculture instead of concurrently with it: hence, Beau had not only to carry on Doumer's ambitious programme of railways, but also to revive agriculture and industry to keep pace with the general progress of the country. Doumer had tended to make the economic state of the country unduly artificial and to divorce his public-works from the facts of the situation. Beau, for his part, had to perform the graceless task of bringing all these sets of facts into line again.⁹⁵

By 1901, therefore, if the railway-issue had been decided, that of agriculture was just beginning. Emphasis was on new crops, fresh methods, irrigation, agricultural schools, and a turn to the experience of India and Java,—and point was given to this position by the bad harvests that followed Doumer's five good years and by the disquieting fall of the piastre. Indo-China was slipping back,—back from Doumer's forced progress to the position of agriculture which, at that time, was the direct gauge of the country's welfare. The federal budget had deficits from 1902 to 1906, and, at the same time as the agricultural quiescence that this presupposed, the era of unproductive expenses was at hand.

After Doumer left, the metropolitan Government stepped in once more, and each increase of direct interference meant a larger *personnel*. Expenses thus went up at the very moment when the country's productivity was declining. This was the period when France had no definite colonial policy, and emphasized only interference. Despite the return to budgetary prosperity after 1907, the drift went on until the attacks

⁹⁵ A full account of his work is in *Situation de l'Indo-Chine de 1902 à 1907*, 2 vols., 1908; or Gaisman (1906), *op. cit.*, p. 108.

of Messimy and especially of Viollette in the French Parliament.⁸⁶ In 1911, the latter showed the contrast between the richness of Indo-China and the detrimental *tracasserie* of the administration. The young attorney was astonished by what he found and, though unduly emphasizing the weaknesses of the situation, forced the apathetic Parliament to do something. His staccato explosions could not be lightly passed over. Each native paid a quarter of his revenue in taxes! Cochin-China's Lieutenant-Governor cost 720,000 francs, while the Minister of Colonies in Paris absorbed only 830,000 in all! Indo-China had a debt of 474,000,000 francs! Annam voted 85 per cent. of its budget for officials, ten per cent. for public works, and yet was supposed to be only indirectly administered! And all of the States were "in the grip of that frightful vampire that officialdom is out there!" This attack, probably because French colonial policy had never before been turned upside-down by the vehemence of a young man, led to the loan of 80 million francs in 1912, and to the appointment of Sarraut to reorganize the administration from top to bottom.⁸⁷ The drift from 1902 to 1912 was thus ended, and economic progress was once more possible.

PRODUCTS

Indo-China is obviously not a geographical unity. It divides into three dissimilar regions, each demanding a different policy. All of the south, the region centring on Saigon, is entirely agricultural and practically limited to rice-production, and to 1901 was the only developed region. All of the north, the area round Haiphong, is far more varied, but with a future resting on industry and mining rather than agriculture. Between these two extremities is the Annamite region proper, radiating from the port of Tourane. This is also almost entirely an agricultural zone, but varies from Cochin-China in not depending primarily on rice. Both of these regions are still mainly agricultural, and so too was the third, until the development of Tonkinese industries in recent years. Indo-China is thus a country of rural industries,—one might almost say, of rice. Rice and its derivatives formed 72 per cent. of the exports in 1900, 62 per cent. in 1924; and nine-tenths of the cultivated area is still devoted to this plant. The economic life of the country rests on rice, with all of the uncertainty that a monoculture land must be subjected to by its dependence on one staple, as was evident in the bad years after 1902. If the abnormal development of one crop simplifies economic problems in ordinary years, it complicates them to a corresponding degree in times of crisis.

⁸⁶ *Journal Officiel*, Deps. 4-7/4/11; Senate, 1/7/11-2/7/11, for debate.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Deps., 4-6/7/12.

Nevertheless, there is something attractively simple about Indo-China's dependence on rice. All of the natives live on it. All of the peasant-proprietors, save in Central Annam, grow it. All reckon in terms of it. It is the be-all and end-all of existence, and there would even seem to be a certain quaint connection between rice and the monotonously docile temperament of the native! In Cochin-China in particular, there is nothing else in native life and thought except rice. Fifteen of its twenty-two provinces know no other culture; Saigon is the great rice-emporium of the Far East; and Indo-China itself the second rice-producing country of the world. It is symbolical of the changes coming over the land to note, however, that the north is breaking away from this absolute rule of the rice-king, and that, already by 1921, only 180,000 tons out of a total production of 1,720,000 originated in Northern Annam and Tonkin.⁸⁸

Cultivation is still practically limited to the deltas of Cochin-China and Tonkin, with a little by primitive means round the Cambodian lake and the coastal districts of Annam. This is due partly to the wonderful richness of the delta-lands, partly to a regional egotism which keeps the Annamite from the highlands of the interior unless he is actually forced there. How important these deltas are is readily evident. It might appear on the surface that the French stress on the deltas was due to their inability to penetrate to the mountains, but this was not so. The truth is that, from an agricultural point of view, the peninsula narrows itself down to the two deltas. That of the Red River in Tonkin, for instance, includes a fifth of the area and four-fifths of the population. The land really resolves itself into two deltas separated by a huge mountain ballast. The alluvial matter brought down by the rivers carries the mountain to the sea, the interior in this way being the raw material of the deltas. Hongyen, for example, a port much frequented by the Dutch in the seventeenth century, is now 35 miles inland!⁸⁹

These facts seem obvious, but it was not until about 1910 that they were satisfactorily realized by the French. Up till then, there had not been sufficient progress. With such a rich country and a culture like rice, it is not the aggregate production that counts, so much as the relation this amount bears to what might reasonably have been expected from the country. Up to 1910, to the contrary, the French reckoned in terms of what they were getting, not what they should have been getting, and were thus not facing the real problem.

This was chiefly due to certain erroneous emphases on their part.

⁸⁸ *L'Indo-Chine*,—special number of *La Vie Technique et Industrielle* (Paris), 1922, p. 46.

⁸⁹ British Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 324, 1901, pp. 12-13.

As usual, they had tried to set up a European farming-population, although this was clearly opposed to their general colonial theory. When it comes to *peuplement*, here as elsewhere, the French forgot their theory and sought the unattainable. They neglected the fact that Indo-China was destined by nature for native colonization, not European, and tried to reverse the normal order of things. Free grants were thus readily given to Europeans, and, to 1902, included 192,000 hectares in Tonkin alone.¹⁰⁰

But the results were uniformly disappointing. Most of the new-comers thought that they could rival the tea-planters of Java or Ceylon, and, ignoring the relatively small yield from rice, turned to the so-called "rich" cultures. When disappointed in this direction, they either abandoned their holdings or simply installed natives on them on a share-basis, thus changing the position not at all for the better, and taking a part of the natives' livelihood. European colonization in the peninsula came to mean failure for the settlers and a burden for the natives. By 1905, therefore, the colonists were uniformly discouraged. Indeed, the Lieutenant-Governor of Cochin-China told his Colonial Council in that year that, even in his rich province, he did not know of one free-grant that had been successful! By this time, too, the element of dispossession involved in the scheme had become obvious. The population of Indo-China is concentrated on the Deltas, where the density is as great as that of Brabant; yet it was only here that the new-comers would settle.¹⁰¹

As this fact gradually became evident, French settlement was confined to the richer settlers, who were investors of capital rather than direct farmers. The result was some improvement. Up to 1905, only 27,000 hectares of land were cultivated by Europeans: by 1914, 169,150 hectares of a total granted area of 490,000 were improved, mostly in Cochin-China, with rice in the west and rubber in the east. After the original *métayer* experiments, therefore, it was in the direction of introducing rubber to Cochin-China and coffee to Tonkin that the French settlers were of service.¹⁰²

But this was only a by-product of French settlement, and the basic fact remains that Indo-China is a native-land and rice is a native-culture. The native alone can live directly from the soil, he alone can carry on the garden-culture of the rice-fields. If the European provides capital

¹⁰⁰ Brenier, *Essai d'Atlas Statistique de l'Indo-Chine Française* (1914), p. 193 *et seq.*, for details. For early position, see *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 1900, p. 472.

¹⁰¹ For causes of failure, see Gaisman in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, 10/6/05, or his *L'Œuvre Française au Tonkin* (1906), pp. 136-138.

¹⁰² Brenier in supplement to *L'Asie Française*, Dec. 1923, pp. 4-5; Néton (1904), *op. cit.*, p. 101 *et seq.*

on the *métayer*-basis, that would be better done by agricultural banks in Government hands : if he directly produces rice with native labour, he is performing no service and is merely retarding the development of peasant-proprietorship. It is only in introducing the newer cultures that there is any scope for him, and the predominance of rice prevents Indo-China rivalling Java or Ceylon in this regard. It is not European settlement, but native, that counts in such a land : so that the emphasis has come to be on the improvement of native culture in the delta-regions already occupied, and, since 1910, on the extension of settlement to the hill-country of the interior.

Peasant-proprietorship is thus the order of the new era. France had to build on the basis of what was already there, in this land of small native settlers, instead of trying to change the entire structure. The natives would not work for Europeans, and, even if they did so, the most stringent punishments the Government could devise did not prevent breaches of contract. Gentleness and force alike made no appeal to them, and they refused to leave their communes or even to work continuously in their home-regions. A perfect insouciance was their most marked characteristic. They had always grown rice and lived on rice : so why should they labour for foreigners or dabble with new crops ? They *might* be desirable, but the native felt himself well off as he was : and, besides, who was he to desert the ways of his revered ancestors, and, by change, imply that *their* methods had been inadequate ? This heedlessness and conservatism for long remained the greatest obstacles of the French in the land, and it was not until the increased prosperity after 1912 that the change came of its own volition.¹⁰³

Once the French had determined to institute peasant-proprietorship as the basis of the economic life of the peninsula, the temperamental difficulty was reinforced by the land question,—always an acute problem in densely populated native lands. How could holdings be defined and divided in such a country of confused traditions ? Yet how could the Government know where it stood without such a definition ? The problem was attacked haphazardly, the result being that certain rules emerged for the French, others for the Annamites, yet none for the land as a whole. The Torrens system, which had been adopted in Tunisia, was viewed charily in such a land, because the native, an inveterate gambler and heedless of the morrow, might too easily lose his lands altogether. Immatriculation on the Torrens model was therefore limited to two provinces, and the difficulties encountered there prevented its

¹⁰³ Néton (1904), *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73 ; J. Devallé, *La main d'œuvre en Indo-Chine* (1905).

extension elsewhere.¹⁰⁴ Experience here, as well as in Tunisia and West Africa, clearly showed that making land easily transferable might lead to all manner of social evils and dispossession. As a result of this lesson, the French adhered to the older compromise in Indo-China. That is, they retained native customs for the natives and introduced the *Code Civile* to regulate land matters for the Europeans: but this dualism led to confusion. If it prevented the disruption that might have accompanied the Torrens Act (though surely the increasing sophistication of the natives after 1910 would have largely prevented that), it certainly involved an economic evil. The confusion of land-titles prevented the offering of ready securities for loans and mortgages, and thus did much to keep native methods backward. Boudillon, who has investigated this problem in detail, holds that the present confusion can be brought to an end without placing the native at the mercy of speculators, and that local usages and French law can be combined to produce a system that is at once uniform and suited to the needs of the country. This can be obtained by means of a public register which simply clarifies the native tenure without bringing about the changes the Torrens system would involve. Native ideas are retained, yet made orderly; and thus the French system can be brought into play where Frenchmen are concerned, without confusion and without upsetting the natives. This compromise, somewhat reminiscent of the Algerian system, has been adopted as the basis of reform by de Lanessan's "Commission of Indo-Chinese Legislation," and, though limited to Cochin-China, where the need is greatest and the obstacles fewer, is clearly the system of the future and a distinct aid to peasant-proprietorship.¹⁰⁵

The next prop necessary for any such scheme is an adequate system of rural credit. In this field, practically nothing has been done, although it has for long been recognized that the land depends on small native cultivators. A law of 1894 provided for local agricultural banks on a co-operative basis, but, by 1922, the eleven syndicates so set up numbered only 3,045 adherents out of an agricultural population of three millions, and were not easily accessible to small or even average proprietors! Governor-General Merlin promised in 1923 to redeem this situation, as it was clear that progress on native lines was automatically stopped unless credit was provided for extension. "It is undeniable," said Merlin, "that provincial banks must be created for the provision of agricultural credit." The Administration therefore resolved to institute a Central Bank which would be the nerve-centre of credit for the whole country and which

¹⁰⁴ *L'Asie Française*, Jan. 1924; Nov. 1920, p. 369.

¹⁰⁵ This matter is examined in Boudillon, *Le Régime de la Propriété Foncière en Indo-Chine* (1915), or his article in Daresté, *Recueil Colonial*, 1914.

would operate through advances to district and provincial banks. But all of this remains theory, and the methods of the native proprietors remain very much as they have been through the centuries.¹⁰⁶

This explains the tardiness in introducing new crops. Old methods do not hinder the production of rice, but, once the new cultures are attempted, both capital and new methods are indispensable. Much agricultural land is awaiting development all over the country, but there are signs that a change is coming. There has been a significant breach in the defences of that aggressive localism which has hitherto characterized the natives. The coming of a greater degree of individualism at once weakened the old social life of the village and tended to force the enterprising individual out to new lands where he could find a wider scope. The railways started this tendency. Annamite labourers settled where the railways took them, and others made the railways arteries for penetrating the hill-country hitherto closed to them, both by their own regionalism and by the lack of communications. Then, the increasing pressure of population in the deltas forced them out to a larger and larger degree, and, in particular, an exodus started from Annam and Tonkin towards the south, where Cochin-China had an inadequate labour-supply.

This movement coincided with a vigorous attempt to introduce new crops. Up to 1910, save for maize and a little coffee and wild rubber, rice absorbed all attention, but after that, the future of rubber and coffee began to attract notice. Plantation-rubber in Cochin-China absorbed twenty million francs of capital by 1920, and other crops followed,—sugar-cane all over the south, cotton in Cambodia, coffee in Tonkin. Agriculture was becoming capitalized, over and above the basic rice-culture. The result is that to-day Cochin-China is becoming a land of varied cultures, and each of the other provinces is becoming associated with a distinct agricultural staple other than rice. Methods, too, are keeping pace with this expansion, and motor-culture is more and more replacing the water-buffalo. Hence too, the emphasis on irrigation since 1910. Canals were necessary to regulate the waters of Cochin-China, conservation-schemes to offset the irregular rains of Cambodia, irrigation-works to cultivate the innumerable little deltas along the Annamite coast, and dams to minimize the vagaries of the Red River and to prevent famine in Tonkin. Indeed, these schemes are said to be as important for the era after 1912 as railways were after 1898. At present, 236,000 acres are irrigated, but these works are limited to the two northern pro-

¹⁰⁶ *L'Asie Française*, Feb. 1924, p. 77.

vinces, and, despite the proposed expenditure of 76½ million piastres, irrigation-works still remain in the world of theory.¹⁰⁷

Nevertheless, the main agricultural battle has been fought, with the realization that Indo-China must in the main be left in native hands and that progress means an improvement of native methods. This is the main point. The European part is confined to direction and education, with that capitalistic experimentation which is needed for the introduction of new cultures which are costlier and more technical than rice-production. With this limitation of objective, such facilities as an adequate land-*régime* and credit, irrigation and communications become only incidentals to be realized as opportunities offer. The basic point is that the agricultural policy since 1910 has been brought once more into harmony with the needs of the situation.

INDUSTRY

Side by side with this, the north of the peninsula has been literally transformed by the growth of industry, the result being that Tonkin is to-day the most industrialized possession the French have. Up to 1902 a development along these lines was not even thought of. Only the Hongay coal-mines were in operation (1885 on), and the distinctive local industries of the natives were despised by the French. The cotton of Tonkin went to China to be spun and came back to be woven; rice was so treated by hand-turned machines that it could not be sold even in the Oriental markets; cane lost much of its sugar-content in being crushed; and naturally any suggestion that the raw materials of Tonkin might be manufactured to compete on the European market was crushed by a France that was convinced that colonies existed only to turn against the mother-country on the slightest pretext. Doumer, though he did more for the land than perhaps any other man, only reflected current opinion in saying that the industrialization of Tonkin was a form of treason and that it would be a dereliction of his duty not to suppress industrial concerns at the outset.

Against this attitude stood the undoubted facilities for industry in the country. The presence of iron and coal in large quantities made metallurgical industries possible, and with these went the textile trades. As has been seen in the case of West Africa and Madagascar, it is the trade in cheap cotton-goods that is the main element in the commerce of a native country: so too it was in Indo-China, but here the colonists endeavoured to solve the problem by manufacturing the cloth themselves. A cotton-mill was established at an early date at Hanoi, and two more added in the industrial revival between 1898 and 1901: but the difficulties

¹⁰⁷ *L'Indo-Chine*, 1922, *op. cit.*, pp. 51, 63 *et seq.*

encountered were typical of those met by industries in French colonies. France was either openly or passively antagonistic: British cottons continued to enter through Hong-Kong, despite the tariff: the dependence on American raw material meant continued uncertainty (in 1904, for example, the American crisis halved the value of cotton and ruined distant markets like Indo-China, that had bought in advance): general manufacturing costs were high: and labour, though plentiful, was undependable. But these difficulties were all surmounted, and gradually Haiphong became the industrial centre of Indo-China, and Tonkin became more and more industrialized. The water-communications, the coal, and the abundant labour-supplies combined to effect this; and cement-works and distilleries, silk-mills and electrical undertakings began on a large scale.

Further south, where the natural advantages were not so marked and labour not so plentiful, there was no kindred development, save for the rice-mills of Cholon, in Cochin-China, which to-day turn out 18,000 tons of husked rice a week. Industrialization in Indo-China is really limited to Tonkin, save for the secondary industries connected with rice in the south. Perhaps this rapid modernization of Tonkin after 1903 did much to explain the growth of the port of Haiphong and the moving of the federal capital north to Hanoi, implying as this did that the nerve-centre of Indo-Chinese affairs had left the agricultural south, and gone to the industrial north, because, after all, agriculture was stationary, while industry had unlimited possibilities in a land so richly endowed with minerals and labour. Whatever the cause, there is now no doubt that Indo-Chinese affairs centre on Hanoi.

COMMUNICATIONS

Such a transformation in a French colony naturally involved many difficult questions. The most obvious of these was communications. Indo-China was a scattered land of nearly six million hectares, with difficult mountain-barriers separating the centres of population. Therefore, when the question arose of colonizing the hill-lands, or of bringing labour and raw materials together, or of transporting manufactured goods to the port, it was the difficulty of effective communications that threatened to be the limiting factor. The development of the land from every point of view necessitated cheap and rapid transport. The isolation of the deltas had to be overcome; hence the emphasis on railways, even at that early epoch in French colonization when railways were viewed by Paris as needless luxuries. The groundnut railway in the Senegal had shown, however, that a railway could create new provinces

out of desert country, and this was the standpoint from which the French administrators approached the question in Indo-China.

The first railways were either short local lines in Cochin-China (1880) or military lines in Tonkin (1890), but effort in general was spasmodic until the loan of 80 million francs which was obtained by the law of December, 1896.¹⁰⁸ This loan, indeed, had a significance for Indo-China far wider than economic. It was subscribed twenty-eight times over, and was the first indication of the credit of Tonkin on the home market. As a result of the optimism thus engendered, the Lang-Son railway to the Chinese frontier was pushed ahead and completed by 1902.

At that moment, and largely as a result of the birth of the country's credit, came Doumer's programme of 1898. This was a vast project to connect Tonkin and Cochin-China by a trunk line, with numerous arteries for the intensive development of the two boundary States. A loan of 200 million francs was secured by the law of December, 1898, and the execution of the scheme commenced.¹⁰⁹ The Hanoi line was run down the coast to Vinh in Annam by 1905, and, at the same time, a start was made to work north from Tourane and effect a junction. But the actual work of construction was slow, because, after it had reached Hué (and thus linked Annam's capital with a port), it was a hopeless economic proposition and was only of strategic importance as forming part of the main trunk-line. Hindered by typhoons and floods, and at an exorbitant cost, it came only to Kwang-tri by 1908, and lingered there. It was clearly uncalled for, and due to the French passion for constructing symmetrical schemes on a map. It was not the relatively poor Annam but the rice-lands of Cochin-China and especially the industrial regions of Tonkin that needed the railways. The same objections applied to the railway eastward from Saigon in Cochin-China. The original project was too ambitious, and the railway never reached the terminus of Lang-Biang, but stopped in 1913 at Khan-hoa—nor was there the slightest reason why it should go on, save that Doumer had linked the two places on his vacant map in 1898!

It was the northern line that was far and away the most important,—that from Haiphong up the Red River to Lao-kai on the frontier and beyond to the capital of Yunnan. This was to realize the old dream of Garnier and Dupuis and Ferry, and was to link Tonkin and South China by a dependable communication. Here, as in Annam, economic and political reasons blended. The railway was certain of heavy traffic in the Delta, but beyond that it was comparatively useless in the mountain-regions, and, if the expected Chinese trade from beyond Lao-kai did not

¹⁰⁸ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., sess. ext., 1895, docts. parl., p. 1608 (Krantz).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, Deps., docts. parl., sess. ext., 1898, p. 341 *et seq.*

develop, would be another white elephant, as was the coastal-line in Annam. Through the Delta by 1903, it was then held up by its costliness in the unhealthy desert region, and it was not opened till 1906, and did not reach Yunnan's capital till four years later. Even then, it was rendered uncertain by continual landslides in the rainy season, and cost 165 million francs as against the original estimate of 94 millions! ¹¹⁰

By 1911, the vital sections of Doumer's programme were thus completed, although it required a new loan of 80 million francs in 1912 to round off the work.¹¹¹ Part of this was to go to the coast-line which still remained an obsession with the administration. A line connecting Hanoi and Saigon is a dream of the French, although for what reason, except for running a pretty red ribbon across the map, is not clear. This is one of those cases where the French cannot help following a general plan, despite the fact that it is the extremities, and not the centre, of Indo-China that are important. But they see only the fragment in the north, the fragment in the south, and the fragment in the centre, and yearn to connect them. Governor-General Long, for instance, said that this is a main line to tap the colony and to give an economic unity to the federation; but it is clear that Annam does not offer very much for the tapping and that the federation has no economic unity! And the other arguments that it would bring the needed labour to Cochinchina and rice to Annam are surely based on a myopia that refuses to see other means of achieving those ends! Nevertheless, Long raised a local loan of 6,180,000 piastres to complete the Vinh-Dong Ha section and thus at least connect Hanoi and Hué,—a project which continues to attract attention in Indo-China.

As a result of this emphasis on railways since 1898, the peninsula now has 1,288 miles of line; and, what is unusual in a French colony, they followed a preconceived scheme from the first. In view of this achievement, it would appear that railway development is somewhat over-emphasized at present, and that a corresponding expenditure on the waterways of the land would produce a more than commensurate return. Despite this, however, Indo-China is perhaps the most favourably situated of all the French colonies as regards communications, although it might be suggested that future needs should be determined rather by a study of the distribution of the population and its concentration in the delta regions than by a perusal of the sprawling map of Indo-China.

THE CURRENCY PROBLEM

Indo-China's next difficulty was perhaps even more pressing,—the intricate currency question, which also was more urgent here than in

¹¹⁰ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., docts. parl., sess. ext., 1898, p. 25 *et seq.*—a good survey.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 4-6/7/12.

any other French colony. It has been seen that labour, except in Cochinchina, did not present a vital problem, that communications were adequate, that all the necessary raw materials were to be found in the land, and that, since 1903 at least, there was no shortage of capital. Where the difficulty came from was in Indo-China's dependence on an essentially Oriental market,—in other words, her well-being came to be determined more by the vagaries of the silver currencies of the Orient than by any other single factor. This problem did not arise in so acute a form in the other French colonies, and certainly in none of them was it the determining factor of the country's prosperity.

The whole question is very confused, but the gist of the matter is that the silver piastre (normally about 2s.) is the currency-unit and that notes of the Bank of Indo-China are legal tender. But, owing to the fact that silver may not be exported or imported, the country suffers when it has a credit-balance, because then, unless it can keep its exchange normal by opening foreign-credits, the rate of exchange of its paper-money tends to rise. That at once places an exporting country at a disadvantage, and, since Indo-China has generally had a credit-balance since the early years of the century, and since her exports are mainly to countries with depreciated silver-currencies, the rate of exchange is usually at a premium,—indeed, so much so at times that a crisis comes. That is, any undue degree of prosperity, owing to the peculiar currency-system, walks hand-in-hand with a crisis. There is a continual exchange-crisis in the land.¹¹²

To this is joined a monetary crisis due to the silver position. Everything went well as long as silver remained constant, but, when Germany de-monetized its silver thalers in 1873, the Mexican piastres which were the coinage of the Far East began to depreciate. By November, 1902, therefore, their worth had fallen from 5.43 francs to 1.925, and this inevitably meant a rise in prices and a blow to the import-trade from France. On the other hand, the colony enjoyed all of the temporary advantages of depreciation in fostering its export-trade towards the gold-countries of Europe, although, since her main trade was with the Chinese market, this offset was more theoretical than real. Stabilization was out of the question so long as the Mexican piastre was in use, so these were de-monetized from the beginning of 1906, and French piastres alone used. But to keep out the changing Mexican piastre from surrounding countries meant that Indo-China became an artificially isolated economic unit, with the constant exchange-crises referred to above.

¹¹² A good account of this question is in *L'Indo-Chine*, 1922, *op. cit.*, p. 5 et seq. The successive stages of the controversy may be followed in *L'Asie Française*, Jan. 1920–Feb. 1922, or J. H. Adam, *L'Argent-métail et la Question Monétaire indo-chinoise* (1922).

Indo-China, in a word, became too prosperous, and was exactly situated towards its Chinese market as the United States were towards the world-market after 1918. The worst crisis was in 1919-1920, when the fever of buying caused by the world rise of prices combined with a poor rice-harvest to swell Indo-China's credit, without any opposite commercial balance. The position became absurd. The value of the piastre rose from 2.40 francs in 1914 to 6.50 in 1920,—that is, the value of silver had appreciated more than 100 per cent. in relation to gold, and, even so, paper was at an actual premium of 15 per cent. over this! ¹¹³ This meant that Indo-China was indulging in a very debauch of currency-prosperity,—a prosperity which was, of course, immediately weakening. In December, 1919, therefore, the Government not only removed the restriction on the imports of precious metal, but positively enforced such imports to the value of a fifth of the rice-crop. There was not enough silver to correspond to the country's prosperity, hence its value rose. To prevent a panic-rush by the natives, the Government also set up a " Forced Currency " in 1920, fixing the value of the piastre by decree, and relieving the Bank of the necessity of converting notes. By January, 1922, this drastic regulation had removed the premium that paper had over metal, and so limited the variation of the currency's value to the fluctuations in the price of silver. ¹¹⁴

But the real problem remained, and Berru  s Commission of Monetary Reform in 1920 recommended stabilization on a *gold* basis. ¹¹⁵ Yet this was rendered impossible by reason of the continued fall in the price of silver and the depreciation of the franc: and, moreover, it is by no means certain that this is not unduly arguing from European conditions. The silver standard, whatever its theoretical disabilities, is the medium of exchange in the Orient, and it is in the Oriental market that Indo-China's destinies are determined. Then again, the prosperity of Indo-China to-day is in no small measure due to this silver standard. It *did* secure a stability of prices in the land after the war, and, save for a rise in prices for a few months, had left the natives scarcely affected by the post-war crisis. Wages in piastres in Tonkin were only ten or twenty per cent. higher in 1922 than they had been in 1914, and prices were relatively stable in the home market. That accounts for the absence of a post-war collapse such as every other French colony had to face: it also explains why Indo-China, too prosperous within in comparison with

¹¹³ J. H. Adam (1922), *op. cit.*, p. 240 *et seq.*

¹¹⁴ *L'Asie Fran  aise*, March 1922, p. 100; *Colonies et Marine*, 1922, pp. 573-576.

¹¹⁵ The report is in full in *Bulletin Economique de l'Indo-Chine*, Sept.-Oct. 1921, or *L'Economiste Fran  ais*, 19/11/21. A summary is in *L'Asie Fran  aise*, Sept.-Oct. 1920, p. 320.

her neighbours, had to suffer, in so far as her export-trade was concerned. It is not to any colony's interest to have an exceptional monetary standard. It cannot be exceptionally good both inside and outside of Indo-China: hence, there is again a pronounced move towards a gold-basis. "We cannot get away from the fact that in a world of gold-standards, payments in silver take on something of the nature of barter, and are not very practical, as the limitations of the silver-standard render stable exchange very difficult in this metal."¹¹⁶ Indo-China has still not reached a settlement of this difficult issue, which, by reason of its very paradoxes, enabled her safely to pass the various crises since 1914. Had it not been for the local nature of her market, however, the tale would have been very different: and the country has learnt that even prosperity is relative to the world in which it lives.

TRADE

All of these influences were alike reflected from time to time in the trade of the country.¹¹⁷ The tariff of 1892, the rice-question, the industrialization of Tonkin, the changing demands of the natives, the growth of communications, and especially the currency issue, all blended to affect trade. How important the last-mentioned is in particular may be seen from the fact that trade has to be reckoned in "arbitrated" francs,—that is, as converted by a permanent customs commission to coincide with the real position of the piastre. But, over and above this, when both the franc and the piastre commenced to vary, and not in unison, a comparative study, even within Indo-China itself, became out of the question. For instance, the values of 1919 showed a difference over those of 1911 of 253 per cent. for the imports and 252 per cent. for the exports, whereas it was clear that, in reality, commerce had not increased to this abnormal extent. Yet to calculate in gold-values would only make the position still more confused, because this ignores both the changing value of gold in Europe and the unreality of such a conversion in Indo-China. All that can be said is that it is impossible to compare trade at different dates since 1911, for even the tonnage does not give a real view of the situation, because much, especially with such variations both in Europe and Indo-China, depended on the return as well as the actual output.

Even a computation in gold-values, however, shows a rise of 67.6 per cent. in the general trade of the country between 1911 and 1920, so that there was a real increase over and above that due to the monetary

¹¹⁶ *L'Indo-Chine*, 1922, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹¹⁷ The sources for this section are the annual trade-reports of Indo-China and the reports on the "special commerce" of France every year.

position. The solidity of growth can also be implied (though not actually reckoned) from the following table :—

	IMPORTS.	EXPORTS.
	(Millions of France.)	
1900 . . .	185.8	155.5
1902 . . .	215	185 —Doumer left after good years.
1903 . . .	204.1	120.4—crop failures, drought.
1907 . . .	294.9	253.3—exceptional rice-harvest.
1912 . . .	273.0	260.7
1919 . . .	532.0	846.2
1920 . . .	848.1	982.0
1921 . . .	807.7	1284.0
1922 . . .	839.3	1112.0
1923 . . .	1093.5	1154.8
1924 . . .	1388.5	1771.5

The only permissible deductions from this table are that trade has undoubtedly increased, and that the favourable balance of exports over imports has been more and more accentuated since 1912. To that date, indeed, imports outweighed exports, but exports so increased from then onwards that, as has been seen, they became almost a menace in giving the country unduly large credit-balances.

The other striking feature of the country's trade-position is how unsuccessful France has been in the competition. Such a rich colony was naturally assimilated to the mother-land in 1887, for, however much the productivity of the colony was affected, France simply had to reserve this rich import-trade for herself.¹¹⁸ As Prince Henry of Orléans wrote :

" We had not been masters of Tonkin for two years before we surrounded it with a thick wall of customs-duties, and, in order to gratify a few French traders, we arrested the commercial development of the country, not reflecting that a budding colony needs a maximum of liberty and free action, and that the greater the trade, the greater the profits."

Not content with this, France even placed export-duties on certain goods going from Indo-China to foreign countries, and Doumer went still further in making customs-receipts one of his fundamental sources of revenue. Despite this ultra-protection, however, the French share in the colony's trade was only 22.5 per cent. in 1900, 20 per cent. in 1913, and 18.1 per cent. in 1922 as regarded exports, and, for imports, 40 per cent. in 1900, 46 per cent. in 1913, and 42.4 per cent. in 1922. France had not increased her share in Indo-China's exports in the slightest, and, during the war, had even lost her imports to Hong-Kong.

At present, therefore, it is realized that French control must be

¹¹⁸ See debate in *Journal Officiel*, Dets., 12, 19/2/87; or *Recueil des Délibérations du Congrès Colonial National*, 1889-1890, Vol. II, p. 345.

limited to the import side; and, even there, the local industrialists are vigorously protesting that the *régime* of 1892 is "illogical and inequitable," especially for a colony that has developed as much as Indo-China has. Indo-China is a nation, it is argued, and hence should decide her own tariff-system: moreover, it is largely an industrial nation, and an industrial nation, to survive, must manipulate its tariffs with this end alone in view, and not the consideration of rival manufacturers on the other side of the world: and lastly, they argue, even if their patriotism makes them accept the existing system, equity demands that they should obtain a reciprocity. French goods enter the colony free, yet some colonial goods are taxed on entering France. The Indo-Chinese argue that their geographical position and the threatened economic invasion of neighbouring Powers, especially Japan, necessitate a special *régime*: but so little do their arguments avail that decrees of March and June, 1921, made the Indo-Chinese tariff prohibitive to foreigners.¹¹⁹ The old ideas of 1892, disguised as they were in Sarraut's scheme, were once more in the ascendant, and this handicap was placed on the colony, even in the difficult post-war years, in order to exclude the English. It is true that the French share in imports recovered from 29.6 per cent. in 1920 to 42.4 per cent. two years later, but this was only at the cost of draining away from the colony capital needed for its industries and railways. It is significant, however, as showing the reactionary nature of French colonial policy since the war, and as denying, not only tariff-autonomy, but even an adequate tariff-reciprocity. The colony has to be subordinated to France: that is all. The position, therefore, is that Indo-China continues to send its goods to other than the French markets, but is forced to buy half its imports from France, and thus to submit to a perfectly uncompensated Imperial taxation.¹²⁰

Despite this burden, the general prosperity of the colony remains undoubted. Just as before, Indo-China met tariff-assimilation by paying the added tax and going on as usual, so now it continues in the same way. It is far and away the most flourishing French colony. It is the second colony from the point of view of trade: it has cost France little since the early days in Tonkin: it has a consistently favourable trade-balance: its trade is increasing, both from the agricultural and industrial stand-points: it has had no post-war crisis in the sense that the other colonies had: it has 200 million francs in its reserve banks: its currency was at times more valuable than the French franc: it is, alone of the French

¹¹⁹ *L'Asie Française*, Jan. 1922, p. 25.

¹²⁰ Protest of Saigon Chamber of Commerce in *L'Asie Française*, Feb. 1924, p. 69; *Congrès du Régime Douanier Colonial. Compte Rendu et Rapports* (1925), p. 133, or the Sambuc Report on pp. 470, 485 *et seq.*

colonies, raising internal loans for purposes of development: it gave almost 200 million francs for war-loans: it had an average budget-balance of thirteen million piastres in the crucial years of 1920-1922: it gets twelve million piastres a year from customs and 44½ million from the State monopolies (1922), and it is developing in every direction. It has the land, the labour, and the capital for an indefinite expansion, and, since 1911, no legacies of past failures to militate against future advance.

VII. Conclusion

On the whole, then, Indo-China is the most conspicuous triumph of French colonization, just as it was the most obvious failure in the years before 1897. Up to 1910, with the exception of Doumer's period, it could almost be said that Indo-China saw the emergence of a rich country, despite everything that the French could do to hinder it. Even their colonial theories and their officials and the vagaries of Paris could not prevent such a triumph, and it is idle to argue how much greater the progress would have been had not Tonkin been a synonym for colonial despair until 1897, and had not the Paris *bureaux* consistently reversed such developmental policies as those of Paul Bert and de Lanessan, and even much of Doumer's.

As it is, however, Indo-China from the time of Sarraut (1912) stands for success in practically every direction, and at a time when the French colonies, without exception, were traversing acute crises. It is an example of successful organization, despite the variations between Cochin-China and the rest of the peninsula, and the different conditions in each of the component States. Its system of a powerful Government-General, with local variations for each State, has worked well, and without the rigid demarcation and quarrels that have typified, say, the federal organizations in Australia and Canada.

Economically, the colony also stands out. It is unrivalled anywhere in the French Empire in this connection, although it must be admitted that the railway-policy and the industrialization of Tonkin emerged directly in the face of metropolitan opposition, and the colony's development is still hindered by tariff levies imposed for France's benefit. Despite these limitations, however, Indo-China shows what can be effected by an ambitious but co-ordinated programme of public works,—if there is a rich colony and a large labour-supply to secure an immediate return on the expenditure involved.

As far as the natives are concerned, the record has also been good, although here again it is a moot point how far this is due to the curious urbanity of the Annamite temperament and how far to the applicability of French policy in itself. Certainly, France made as many mistakes

as possible in the early years, both in disregarding native traditions and in breaking up the age-old social structures and in thwarting the ambitions of the mandarins. But the toleration after 1911, and in particular the transformation of native existence by the economic improvement of the individual Annamite, more than counteracted this. Economic advancement in some way or other transmutes racial issues and makes the points of friction, in such a country as Indo-China, far less emphasized: that is why a summary of the turmoils of 1905-1910, for instance, seems so anomalous to-day. Yet it must not be inferred from this that there is no native problem in Indo-China. Where there are twenty million natives, bound together by a consistent and aggressive civilization, there is certain to be a problem: and the dangerous point is that, once economic advancement passes a certain stage, and once the natives have overcome their initial thankfulness for the change and take it as something for granted, they turn with renewed dogmatism and self-assertion to the pursuance of their national claims. So that Indo-China, if it does not present a native problem as acute as that of Algeria or Tunisia, has at least a nascent one, and it is complicated by the difficulty of evaluating the importance of Pan-Asiatic movements and of gauging how real is the slumbrous and passive hostility of the people. On the other hand, it may be said that France has secured greater native quietness in Indo-China since 1911 than in most of her African colonies; and the present policy of association, with its agreement to recognize each other's differences and to evolve on parallel lines, does much to continue this harmony.

In general, then, France has retrieved a dangerous position in Indo-China,—and the curious feature is that most of this success was won by radical politicians, who were often virtually exiled here to get rid of them. De Lanessan, Doumer, Sarraut, Maurice Long all fall within this category, yet it is precisely these men who have made Indo-China for France. As a result, the peninsula has become an "Oriental France," not only self-sufficient in itself, not only prosperous after the long world-crisis, but actually a centre for disseminating more French influences. Its founders thought that perhaps it might have a good effect on French activities in South China: instead of doing only this, it has become a proselytizing centre for French activities throughout the Eastern hemisphere. It is the centre of that policy of *entr'aide* which Sarraut has invoked to revive the French belt of dominion across the South Pacific: and it is on Indo-China's prosperity that the programme of linking New Caledonia to Panama directly depends. The peninsula has thus become a second homeland for French Imperialism, and nothing in French colonization is as significant as the contrast between this position and the drift and pessimism of the period before Sarraut went out in 1912.

Indo-China has forced a way into the forefront of the French colonies, and is the only French colony that in any way resembles the prosperous position of England's dominions of Canada and Australia, although it must be remembered that there is no French *peuplement* there. Once dominion-status or responsible government is mentioned, it has to be remembered that there are only 16,600 Frenchmen to nineteen million natives. Apart from this emigration aspect, however, there is much in common between Indo-China and a British Dominion; and certainly it is only to this French colony, and to Algeria, that arguments drawn from the British Dominions can in any sense apply. Yet, after all, despite the emphasis on the colony's prosperity, the final word must be a query. Is it correct to say that France has succeeded in Indo-China, or simply that Indo-China has succeeded? And therein, especially in the years before 1911, lay the whole question.

CHAPTER XII

THE ANCIENNES COLONIES

THESE colonies, which are so familiar to the student of French colonization, in no sense belie their name. As soon as one enters their affairs, the curtains of time seem swept aside. Theirs is a world that has gone, their significance is mainly historical. They are like a living memory,—a somewhat painful anachronism. In the past, after the great dismemberment of France's overseas lands, they meant the French Empire: they *were* the Empire.¹ As such, they determined policy up to, and even for long after, the accession of Algeria, because it was not until 1870 that Algeria ceased to be a conquest and became a colony, in so far as French policy was concerned. It was in them that the council-schemes were worked out, in them that experiments were made in the direction of tariff-autonomy, in them that universal franchise was tried, in them that the system of judicial and administrative assimilation received its strongest expression,—in them, in short, that France tried her various liberal and repressive policies in turn. That is their significance in the history of French colonization,—that they were an experimental-ground and that these experiments of a day that has gone still linger on. Hence, even as their practical importance dwindled, their interest remained,—and will remain, as long as the negroes there retain their privileges, for these islands are the scene of an experiment in the creation of a people, or rather, the attempted creation of a modern State out of untrained negro materials.

As their name implies, the history of the various island-groups goes back to the earliest days of the old French Empire,—the Empire of Richelieu and Colbert, of the *Grand-Maître* and the *Intendants*. Theirs is an epitome of the history of Anglo-French rivalries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for they changed ownership with practically every outbreak of hostilities and as regularly reverted to their former condition with the conclusion of peace. France first went to St. Christo-

¹ With them was always coupled Réunion, which had an exactly similar development, and by a curious coincidence, the same economic conditions and population problems. With the Antilles, it constituted the sugar-lands of the Empire. See H. Fouque, etc., *L'Isle de la Réunion* (1923), p. 133 *et seq.*

pher in 1625,—the settlement of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the islands which became the mainstay of her Antilles possessions, dating from a decade later. The islands were all handed over to Companies during most of the first century of their existence, and, despite the constant colonial wars, prospered during most of the time until the close of the eighteenth century. The toll of diplomacy, however, gradually reduced the far wider French estate in the Antilles until only Martinique and Guadeloupe were left to her after the Napoleonic Wars. France thus had two very rich islands in the West Indies, both eminently suitable for sugar-cultivation, but, since the middle of the seventeenth century, entirely dependent on slave-labour.²

Since the Napoleonic Wars, their history has been mainly catastrophic, the chain of disasters starting with the abolition of slavery and the competition of beet-sugar in Europe. The slaves had already been freed by the Constituent Assembly in 1794 and then enslaved again under Napoleon, but more than half of them were gradually emancipated during the early years of the nineteenth century. None the less, the brusque and inconsiderate introduction of a general emancipation in 1848 precipitated a crisis. A legislative act suddenly interfered with the operation of economic forces and turned a gradual movement which was beneficial to all concerned into a disaster. Considerations of the time-factor, of economic facts, of training the freed men, and of keeping a balance in island society were none of them taken into account. All that mattered was the doctrine of the Parisian demagogues who had set up the Republic. They freed the slaves, enfranchised the negroes of Africa and the coolies of the Indian towns, and thought to regulate grave problems of colonial practice by reference to a theory! With the history of 1794 before them, it seems scarcely credible that such events should have repeated themselves. But the evil was easily accomplished. The Schoelcher decree of April 17, 1848, was one of the first acts of the provisional Government, and its content was even incorporated in the constitution (Section 6) of the same year. In 1849 the National Assembly, since they could not overlook the fact that what they called liberalism meant expropriation for the colonies, gave 126 million francs in compensation, mostly in *rentes*; but, as the bulk of the money was not paid directly and as the average amount vouchsafed (500 francs) was admittedly far below the value of a slave, this did little to allay the crisis.³

It was a crisis affecting every class, and, it must be admitted, for the

² P. Chemin-Dupontès, *Les Petites Antilles : Étude sur leur Évolution Économique* (1907), p. 143 *et seq.*—a basic source.

³ Girault, 1923, 2.2.209.

worse. The 160,000 slaves, bred for generations in an atmosphere of slavery and saturated with a psychology of subordination and dependence on others, were suddenly given their freedom: and it was not unnatural that the majority, remembering the terrors of the *Code Noir* which had been in force since 1685, should construe that freedom as liberty to harass their former masters. No step involving a social or economic reform of this magnitude could hope to be successful without a long preparation: yet none was given. The ex-slaves did not realize the nature of responsibility, and had a practically undeveloped moral sense. So that it could be truthfully said that "the Republic of 1848, in bringing about this work of high morality and social justice, also committed the humanitarian blunder of making citizens of men who were still children."⁴ As a class, therefore, the negroes refused to co-operate in helping the State, and would not work. The emancipation of 1848 thus involved a crisis that was at the one time social and economic and political.

But the planters had to have labour. An industry of the magnitude of the cane-sugar of the West Indies could not be destroyed at a blow. Production, under the first confusion, fell from 33 million kilos. in 1848 to twelve million in 1851, and this decline threatened to be permanent unless immigrants—and immigrants already acclimatized to manual labour in the Tropics—came in in large numbers. France therefore scoured the over-populated regions of the globe to obtain labour for the Antilles and the similarly situated Réunion. Heedless of the social and political problems she was thus laying up for the future, or rather, perhaps neglecting them because she could not afford to contemplate them, she made the islands a dumping-ground for unassimilable Africans and Asiatics. At first there was a turn to a so-called free immigration from the continent of Africa, and 50,000 blacks came to the *Anciennes Colonies* (12,800 of them to the Antilles) in the seven years after 1852. But the method of recruiting and conditions on arrival showed clearly that this was only the old slavery under a new name, and the system ended in January, 1865. Such a scanty change of names was too obvious, and the position became untenable when French labour vessels were stopped by gunboats of other Powers as slavers. Unabashed by this failure, France turned to China and then to India. Conventions with the English in 1860–1861 allowed labour-recruiting in those parts of India under British influence, and, until the system was forbidden by them in 1888, 200,000 Indians emigrated to France's lands in the Tropics. Of these 64,700 had gone to the Antilles, and were directly responsible for the striking prosperity of those islands in the twenty years after 1860.⁵ By about 1884,

⁴ Chemin-Dupontès (1907), *op. cit.*, p. 192.

⁵ Chemin-Dupontès (1907), *op. cit.*, p. 203 *et seq.*

however, the needs of the position had again changed. Asiatic immigrants pouring in in such large numbers meant all manner of problems for the State: the changing conditions, too, had forced the natives to work, and, noisily insistent on their rights in the political world they dominated, they refused to have Indian competitors. The truth of the matter was that the two islands had won a new life with the 86,000 immigrant labourers they had received from Africa and India, and, thus strengthened, could face the newer crisis,—the crisis that was more formidable than any of its predecessors, because it meant the threatened extinction of their staple.

The competition of beet-sugar with the cane of the islands literally ruined the French Antilles and Réunion. The facts may be stated quite baldly. In 1850 the world produced only 200,000 tons of beet-sugar to 1,200,000 tons of cane: by 1880 there were two million tons of each; and by 1900 seven million tons of beet to four millions of cane-sugar. In those few facts lies one side of the tragedy of the Antilles. The islands, under the circumstances, had made a wonderful recovery from the emancipation crisis. Martinique had re-attained the position of 1847 in 1860, Guadeloupe twelve years later; and by the early eighties both were enjoying an unprecedented prosperity. In 1882, the *apogée* of their prosperity, they bought 55 million francs' worth of produce and sold over 80 million francs' worth. In the previous fifteen years, matching the good seasons against the bad, the accumulated trade-balance in their favour had been over 100 million francs, and this meant, under the simple economic conditions pertaining in the islands, a corresponding enrichment of industry.*

Two years later the crisis burst like the central vortex of a cyclone, and, since then, neither of the islands has really recovered from the wreckage. More and more beet-sugar was being produced, and, to make the over-production doubly bad, the world output of cane-sugar kept on increasing. Porto Rico, Cuba, Java, Hawaii, all entered the field, relying on their cheap labour-supplies to enable them to survive and eliminate their less favoured competitors. It was inevitable that prices should fall under these conditions, but, when they suddenly collapsed 31 per cent. in the two years after 1882, the magnitude and rapidity of the fall paralysed the Antilles. They could do nothing except passively submit: they produced only a hundredth of the world's supply and so could not influence markets or prices. They simply had to stop producing and suffer. Thus, sugar-exports fell from 60·9 million francs in 1882 to 22·8 million in 1886, 16 million in 1896, and to round about 20 million in the early years of this century. The history of the islands

* Analysis in Chemin-Dupontès (1907), *op. cit.*, p. 218.

had by now become a mere catalogue of disasters. Sugar kept on falling, and the price of living going up.⁷ When there was no over-production, droughts and floods and cyclones visited the islands. The eruption of Mount Pelé in 1902 lost Martinique a third of its commerce and destroyed the richest parts of the island. And, to this decalogue of horrors, the class-struggles and the political drift formed an appropriate background. Unrestrained social passions meant "race-riots"⁸; and an undeveloped electorate and an irresponsible government involved an almost unbelievable state of political corruption. It seemed as if the persons suffering from the economic crisis were trying to excoriate their wounds and indulge in a debauchery of self-induced suffering.

Since 1895, therefore, the islands have been in a protracted state of crisis, both political and economic. Even the optimists who have formulated grandiose schemes for a *mise en valeur* of the rest of the French Empire, even for the sands of the Sahara, have not thought it worth while troubling over these sugar-islands. Their day is admittedly over, and they now give to France only an unwanted competition for her beet-sugar industry at home, a troublesome crop of problems,—and remarkably cheap rum.

Perhaps the gravest of the problems remains the psychological "dry-rot" which is at the basis of the political and social troubles. The real cause of the evil admittedly goes back to the days of slavery. The slave-system denied opportunity or hope to those it throttled, the result being that, when individuals were thrown away free, they did not know what to do. They had never been made even efficient economic instruments. Indeed, that was the sphere in which slavery most obviously failed. It had proven a very costly and most inefficient means of production: hence the great increase of individual emancipation before 1857. The system taught the negroes nothing, and left them backward and unprogressive labourers, developed in only one direction,—hatred, but over-developed in that regard almost to the point of emotional insanity. The old *Code Noir* had distinguished thirty different kinds of negroes, the differences between them being minutely defined by law and involving a different treatment for each class. However much the Code might contain provisions that seemed fair enough on a cursory perusal, it had come to mean the conscious debasement of the negroes and mulattoes. "Negroes and food for negroes . . . that is all there is to colonial policy," Dubuc, an island-Governor, had written to Raynal. Carried as it was to its logical implication under the French, this viewpoint was that slavery meant the existence of *living* implements of pro-

⁷ *Compte Rendu du Congrès des Anciennes Colonies*, 1909, pp. 582, 608 et seq.

⁸ *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 10/6/99, p. 338; 25/9/99, p. 573.

duction whose only other purpose in the world was to afford sensual gratification for their owners. Hence the degradations of the *Code Noir*: hence the large mulatto class: hence the bitter racial antipathies in the islands: hence the several slave-revolts between 1816 and 1830, and the regular civil-war of 1831: and hence the determination of the freed slaves to exact a lasting revenge from the French for the wrongs they and their parents had suffered. The moral values of the ex-slaves, deformed as they were, anti-social as they became after 1870, could at least be understood.⁹ Thus, the history of the groups after emancipation was predetermined by the legacies of the past,—a point that is clinched beyond the possibility of doubt by the experience of Réunion. There, away in the Indian Ocean, although the economic conditions of the Antilles were exactly reproduced, the slave-system had not been accompanied by the same oppression and hatred; and the slaves, when freed, settled down amicably by the side of their former masters to maintain development. They had been decently treated in the days of slavery, and the social legacy of the group was thus as different as possible from that of the Antilles.

The ferocious battle of classes in the West Indies received a new, almost a sardonical, interpretation after 1870. A decree of December 3 of that year introduced universal suffrage to the Old Colonies and made their *Conseils-généraux* veritable local Parliaments, with powers far more extensive than their counterparts in France itself.¹⁰ This meant that the blacks had an overwhelming majority at the electoral urn (not one man in forty was a Frenchman by race!), and, what was equally important, power to make their wishes effective. At one stroke, they were given supremacy over their fellow-voters, the French planters, and power to hinder the permanent French officials. They had all the rights and none of the responsibility, and the island became a tragico-comical field of unleashed and unrestrained racial hatreds. The Europeans, realizing their impotence, usually refrained from voting, and even the pure-blooded negroes are content to let power fall to the mulattoes, who form what Girault calls "the democratic element in the Antilles."¹¹ The blacks, by not taking the trouble to vote, add a new element to the farce: they will trouble only to that degree which is necessary to give them predominance. At the elections of 1919, for instance, only 32 per cent. of the number of enfranchised persons voted in Martinique and 37 per

⁹ Chemin-Dupontès (1907), *op. cit.*, p. 188 *et seq.*—a very able analysis.

¹⁰ *Recueil des Délibérations du Congrès Colonial National, 1889-1890*, Vol. II, p. 21 *et seq.*; P. Dislère, *Traité de Législation Coloniale*, Vol. I, p. 371, or Vol. II, Chap. 8; François, *Le Budget Local des Colonies* (1908), p. 94.

¹¹ Messimy, *Notre Œuvre Coloniale* (1910), p. 368; Girault, 1922, 2.1.617.

cent. in Guadeloupe. As a periodical diversion, however, the negroes protest against the supremacy of the half-caste mulattoes—not by overwhelming them in the elections, be it noted, but, as in 1899–1900, by a series of fires and strikes and riots !

Bigoted class-interests,—it might almost be said, unintelligent class-interests,—thus dominate the politics of the Antilles. Each class is against the other, and none considers the general interests of the State. In particular, the *gaspillage* of State finances¹² for the benefit of particular sections has become a byword in French colonial history,—“a veritable pillage,” as even a colonial organ admitted.¹³ In the decade of full prosperity after 1872, for instance, when the colonies were never more favourably situated, improvidence reached absurd levels, and there were never less reserves or public works !¹⁴ Idle political quarrels absorbed all attention, the State and communal interests none. The Governors were without complete authority (and it seemed a singular stroke of irony that, in the only French colony where local liberties were allowed, they should have been offered to irresponsible negroes !) : the local assemblies were either incompetent or deliberately transformed themselves into instruments of class-bitterness : public opinion was uneducated and simply emotional : the financial system was ludicrous : and the general administrative organization was unduly costly and complicated.¹⁵ As a result, the crucial economic questions of the day were not considered, although the very existence of the island communities depended on a solution of these problems : it was only the political canker that was fed. Expert observers therefore insist that the root of the trouble is not economic but political, and, going still further back to the root of things, psychological. The decadence of the islands is due as much to the social errors of the past and the character-defects of the Antilleans as to the State's improvidence. The latter is the result and not the cause of the former. It is little wonder that, when France considers the results of her few limited efforts to emancipate the colonies from a political point of view, and sees the conditions of the negroes of the Antilles and of the Senegalese communes, or of the Indians of the five towns, she is distinctly averse to repeating or extending the experiment.

As time went on, the French came to consider this political drift as irremediable, and to concentrate on the economic problem which was, at least for the most part, freed from emotional and racial complications,

¹² G. François, *Le Budget Local des Colonies* (1908), p. 105 *et seq.*

¹³ *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 1900, p. 290.

¹⁴ Chemin-Dupontès (1907), *op. cit.*, p. 215.

¹⁵ It was extreme assimilation. See paper in *Compte Rendu des Travaux du Congrès des Anciennes Colonies*, 1909, p. 203. For general faults, see *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 10/3/06, p. 157.

The problem in this connection was twofold,—internal and external. It was as much concerned with the revolutionizing of methods within the colonies as with striving to counteract the effects of the fall in sugar-prices. The first change was greatly hastened by the results of emancipation, but it had been slowly emerging as the result of economic pressure even before that date. Before about 1860, industry and agriculture were confused in the Antilles. Most planters both grew the cane and extracted the crude sugar from it. But emancipation meant the rise of far smaller properties, and the new negro owners could not afford to have crushing-mills on each tiny plot of land. There had to be centralization: each group of adjacent properties had to have one mill between all of its members, and gradually, especially after 1862, it was seen that the most efficient method was to centralize and industrialize the refining process. Even the larger estates saw that they could obtain an easier and greater yield by handing over the refining part of production to industrialists. The 1,520 windmill-refineries of 1860 thus gave way to a smaller number of large and efficient industrial concerns,—a transformation that was aided by the extensive investment of French capital just at this juncture.¹⁶

To aid the colonies over the crisis, and indeed to compensate them in some measure for what they deemed the overweening morality of the mother-land, France had instituted a special form of bank in the islands in 1851. These banks existed only to aid the colonies over times of crisis, like that of emancipation or that due to the competition of beet. It was such specialized banks that have allowed the sugar-islands to survive, because it is no exaggeration to say that, without their aid, the island-communities could not have existed. They allowed the large proprietors to carry on in the troublesome fifties: they assisted the smaller owners after the transformation of 1848: and they hastened the industrialization of production by guaranteeing the early mills. They were safety-valves for times of explosion, so that their State-guaranteed advances have time and again saved the islands. Combined with the *Crédit Foncier Colonial*, which was founded in 1863 to aid industry and embarrassed planters on ordinary occasions, they have proven the greatest credit-aid France has ever given to any colony, although it was too much to expect any banking institution to survive a crisis of such a duration.¹⁷

The length of the crisis in the long run triumphed over everything,—

¹⁶ Chemin-Dupontès (1907), *op. cit.*, p. 215.

¹⁷ Documents relating to their origin are in J. L. de Lanessan, *L'Expansion Coloniale de la France* (1886), p. 972 *et seq.* For need of reorganization, see *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 10/9/07, pp. 710-716.

the newer industrialization as well as the Government's credit-facilities. For twenty-four years after 1882 the lowest price of sugar was not high enough to allow production to continue. The Government tried bounties on sugar-exports (1886), but, although this device temporarily increased the amount of sugar sent to England and the United States, it in no sense influenced the more general question of world-production. Even this revival was offset, too, by the French tariff-law of 1892. The extreme assimilation thus brought in was the last blow. The colonies lost the power of fixing their own tariff, and, though receiving no compensation, had to submit to the exclusionist policy of the mother-land. American products, having to pay the same duties as on entering France, were thus kept out, and the Antilles were artificially wrenched away from that market for which nature had so obviously devised them, and forcibly attached to France. This came just at the moment when the continued over-production was making the sugar-bounties of less and less avail, and meant a new crisis.¹⁸ In 1895 commerce was down to 60 million francs, —a level not reached since 1848. In other words, the new crisis was just as bad as the one due to emancipation had been. This, the Mount Pelé eruption, and the fall of prices again in 1900–1904, completed the tale of disaster, the commerce of 1904 being the lowest on record. The abolition of sugar-bounties at the Brussels Conference in 1904 produced a temporary improvement by the rise in prices, but this could not change the basic weakness of the Antilles,¹⁹ and the islands simply dragged on, with a commerce in the vicinity of 60 million francs a year. Guadeloupe in particular, where there is less capital and far smaller estates, has gone down and down, so much so that there seems little hope of a permanent recovery as long as the island conditions remain unaltered.

It is comparatively easy in this connection to blame the world-parity and do nothing, or to prosper by the temporary eclipse of beet-sugar during the war-years. But neither of these attitudes touches the real problem, which is that Guadeloupe and Martinique have wilfully scattered their resources and refused to develop their lands in other directions than that of the ubiquitous sugar-planting. The colonies have largely themselves to blame, both for their economic and political weaknesses. They are monoculture countries, and saw other monoculture lands, like the West African possessions, suffer from their dependence on one commodity. In addition, the events of 1850–1852, and especially the crises after 1884, had been perfectly clear in their warning,—a warning which

¹⁸ *Compte Rendu du Congrès du Régime Douanier Colonial* (Marseilles, 1925), p. 428 et seq.

¹⁹ *Compte Rendu du Congrès des Anciennes Colonies*, 1909, p. 608; *Chemin-Dupontès* (1907), *op. cit.*, p. 251 et seq.

the Government and planters of the *English* Antilles took to heart and profited by. The French, on the contrary, have simply drifted. Trinidad and Dominica replied to the sugar-crisis by turning to other crops, especially cocoa, which has transformed their position.²⁰ Yet Martinique and Guadeloupe, despite the suitability of their soil for these other crops, and despite the presence of adequate labour-supplies, have practically no exports except sugar and its derivative, rum. They have not even made any moves to *try* to alter this position for the better. It is easy to complain that island-affairs made history like a dirge, and idle to point to the racial frictions and make them an excuse for evading the real issue. The truth of the matter is that, the world-crisis notwithstanding, France has refused to look realities in the face in the Antilles, and has adopted the easier policy of a protesting drift. Practically every recommendation of the English Commission of 1896 on the Antilles applies to the French islands to-day,—and it is a sufficient commentary on the sterile nature of the interim period that this should be so. The French brought their troubles on themselves by their conduct in the period of slavery: they stereotyped that trouble by their inapplicable reforms and their *laissez-faire* attitude to the financial *gaspillage* and the political scandals: and they shut the door on progress by accepting the verdict of the sugar-crisis as final. The second French Republic met the crisis by energetic credit-schemes and Governmental intervention: but the Third Republic did nothing except extract a Tartarin-like kind of joy from the absurdities of island-politics, and lament the world crisis in sugar-affairs.

The reforms needed are obvious.²¹ The entire governmental and financial machine needs overhauling. The *Conseil-général* and the system of parliamentary representation are absurd as applied to the negro population of the Antilles in their present stage. The labour-supply needs training and disciplining, and the whole industrial process to be brought up to date, as it is admittedly inferior to that of Hawaii,—indeed, only one-half as efficient.²² The credit-system is backward and no longer meets the required needs: it, too, needs modernization, with one comprehensive central bank. The tariff of 1892 is ruinous as applied to a part of America, as Congresses from the time of that of 1906 have never wearied of pointing out. Then, if the islands are to live, the spread

²⁰ See, for example, the minute report in C. 5369,—Report of Royal Commission on the West Indies (London, 1897–8), 5 parts.

²¹ The needs are summarized in Chemin-Dupontès (1907), p. 329, or A. Blancon, *La Crise de la Guadeloupe. Les Réformes* (1920), or *Congrès du Régime Douanier Colonial* (Marseilles, 1925), p. 428.

²² A. Sarraut, *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises* (1923), p. 262.

of the new crops—cotton and coffee ²³ and cocoa—is absolutely inevitable. But the list might be indefinitely extended, for every part of island life, if a mere formulation of schemes availed anything. It is the attitude of France that counts, and France seems to be in a slough of despond in this connection, and to think that the islands are not worth troubling over, and that the evils, racial and political and economic alike, are so much legacies of the past that they are ineradicable. Even Albert Sarraut, optimist as he was in every other colonial field, could not escape this prevalent despair. And naturally, so long as this pessimism holds the field, then so long is any reform impossible, because, under the negro-ridden conditions of Martinique and Guadeloupe, any reform depends primarily on the activities of the French Government through its executive officers on the spot. The comparative prosperity of the war-years, and especially of 1919–1920, temporary though this was, afforded an excellent opportunity for starting reforms: yet nothing was done, and, although conditions are not as intrinsically bad as they were before 1904, the islands limp on from year to year—self-confessed failures, with a positively declining production.²⁴

²³ Guadeloupe already has 6,000 hectares of land under coffee to 10,000 under sugar-cane, but only 6 per cent. of the exports (1922) are of coffee and cocoa.

²⁴ E.g. the number of metric-quintals of sugar exported by the two islands declined from 667,740 in 1913–14 to 558,250 in 1920–21 and 527,200 in 1921–22.

CHAPTER XIII

FRANCE IN THE PACIFIC (TRANSPORTATION)

IN the early years of last century, when the affairs of the native kingdoms in the Pacific were in a state of chaos, France earned the reputation of having a distinct, although severely materialistic, policy there. The position was peculiar in many ways. The Polynesian kingdoms were avowedly drifting to destruction. Most of them were monarchies, or confederations of monarchies, based on the rule of custom—an elaborate system extending to every sphere of life and depending on the unquestioned rule of *tabu*. This meant that, if an individual infringed in any way against the rules of his society, he would be visited by the vengeance of the gods. Society was on a basis of supernatural sanctions; its maintenance depended on the continued dread of the people,—on the continuance of the fear-*motif*. Once they questioned, once they endeavoured to turn the light of reason on to the social and political organization, the whole structure collapsed. Yet that is just what had happened in the last years of the eighteenth century. The European navigators had come, had defied the *tabus*, and, marvellous to relate, had survived. At once, an unreasoning iconoclasm arose. The natives emulated the voyagers and also survived. Then the Pacific Islanders, bereft of their past and seeing nothing in the future, were whirled down a path of destructive change. Their religion, their social organization, their economic laws, their political structure all decayed: and their lives knew neither order nor stability. Their rulers were hard pressed to preserve their authority: the whole organization was shattered: and everywhere there was a drift.¹

At this particularly auspicious moment, the new forces of the Occident entered to complicate the change. Economic life left the barter-stage when goods were produced for foreign markets, and European Powers came to covet the islands, or at least, to want them so disorganized that they could drain them of as much wealth as possible. Annexation would have necessitated organization, and seemed needless when the Europeans could so easily profit by the disintegration of native existence: and this

¹ S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (1927), Chap. 2.

trend was unwittingly fostered when England, under the influence of the Exeter Hall philanthropists and the anti-colonial movement, resolved to recognize the native kingdoms as independent in international law. She persisted in this policy until at least 1880, not seeing how it was a *laissez-faire* abandonment of responsibilities and a refusal to look facts in the face. The result was that a clear field was left for France, whose gunboats were not so conscience-ridden. The French therefore terrorized Tahiti, browbeat Hawaii, and interfered in the life of practically every group, even in far-off New Zealand. Her corvettes and a missionary system which was avowedly Imperialistic made her the most aggressive force in the life of the Pacific in the first half of the century,—and an added burden to the natives.²

France, especially under Louis Philippe, was definitely making a bid for supremacy in the Pacific. To make her control more immediate, a protectorate was instituted over Tahiti in 1843, while New Caledonia, on the other side of the ocean, was annexed in 1853. This was the nucleus of her Pacific possessions, which, with subsidiaries seized at later dates, came to form two groups. In Polynesia, under the group-name of the Society Islands, the Marquesas and the Leeward Islands were added to Tahiti; and, across in the Melanesian world, France obtained equal rights with Great Britain in a Condominium over the New Hebrides. The islands thus secured were not important as far as trade or population was concerned, but they had a definite strategic value, and New Caledonia, in particular, became important as the scene of France's main experiment in penal colonization.

I. Tahiti

Tahiti was the earliest French settlement in the Pacific. When the French went there, it was a well-organized native kingdom, having been forced into the path of progress by agents of the London Missionary Society in the years after 1815. The missionaries had issued codes of law and had inaugurated a Parliamentary constitution on the most orthodox lines of British liberalism (1819). Economic life was similarly organized, and although the vagaries of the native rulers, the Pomarès, could not be entirely controlled, Tahiti was at least as well managed as any other native kingdom of that date. But France took no account of this and forcibly occupied the group in 1844. Strange to relate, the French Parliament, looking ahead and seeing how the opening of the Panama Canal might make the group the trade *entrepôt* for all the Central American coast, enthusiastically supported the scheme, unimaginatively *bourgeois* though their attitude usually was under the Monarchy of July. They

² G. Scholefield, *The Pacific: Its Past and Future* (1920), p. 12 *et seq.*

even stood firm when British diplomacy took up the cause of its aggrieved nationals and seemed not averse to forcing a breach.³

The natives, who were not then as demoralized and supinely lifeless as they afterwards became, resisted the French advance for four years, but their camps on the volcanic crests of Fatahua could not hold out for ever, and by 1847 the islands were at the mercy of the French. Until 1880, they were under a protectorate administration which even French writers join in condemning.⁴ As Deschanel wrote, "we were the masters of the situation, and had no enemies except ourselves." The administration was such that it kept the group stagnant, destroyed native life almost entirely, and introduced the word *tracasserie* as a synonym for French colonial efforts. Fifteen Governors were sent out in thirty-six years, wits saying that the principle governing their selection was that Paris had no further place to which to send them! Of the fifteen, only two, de la Richerie (1860-1863) and de la Roncière (1863-1869), tried to do anything at all. The former introduced a set of reforms, the latter annulled them!

Everything was either grotesquely official, or, when it shed its grotesqueness, either tragic or corrupt. Thus, in the early years, one Governor, Casset, made himself the subject of ridicule by sending a file of men in the dead of night to arrest the joyfully irresponsible native ruler,—a newer Flight from Varennes. His successor, de la Richerie, "ended as he began,—by extracting from the Tahitians everything they possessed"; and after him, de la Roncière had to be brought away by a specially dispatched Government frigate because he had so shamefully corrupted justice.⁵ With these exceptions, as has been seen, every other Governor did nothing, although under the circumstances such toleration might almost be construed as a virtue.

The colony was given over to minor officials. Young ensigns made every description of *arrêté*, so that "it was next to impossible for the natives to know what they might, or might not, do, so variable were all the regulations relating to them." There were officials for every conceivable purpose, even a Minister of the Interior, although the island was so mountainous and inaccessible that only pigs dwelt in his domain. An official report of this time naïvely admitted that "the colonists have recently raised a certain amount of outcry against the number of officials,"

³ For documents relating to annexation, see Dubois et Terrier, *Un Siècle d'Expansion Coloniale* (1902), pp. 232, 1026 *et seq.*; or *Le Régime des Protectorats*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 899, p. 396.

⁴ F. Soulier-Valbert, *L'Expansion Française dans le Pacifique Sud* (1911), Chap. 5 *et seq.*

⁵ For this period see D. Hort, *Tahiti* (1891), Chap. 14, or L. Joccolliot, *La Vérité sur Tahiti* (1869).

but nothing was done to stop the evil. Even after the protectorate-rule gave way in 1880, thirty-one Governors were sent out in forty years,—a rapidity of recall that naturally prevented any continuity of policy and still more any schemes of reform.⁶

By 1920 it was little wonder that a deadlock had been reached under these conditions. The Government services without exception had acting-staffs: there was no *juge de carrière*: there was no Secretary-General, because he was the acting Governor: there was no educational chief: the Customs were so disorganized that there had been no statistics for two years: and the survey Chief had to leave his own functions and become in turn leader of the Mines Department, Chief of Public Works, and the Governor's chief of Cabinet!⁷ Yet the colony was overridden with officials. In a population of 10,000, the budget provided for 510 permanent officials, and every tiniest community lived under the surveillance of the ever-present *gendarme*. As contrasted with this, the neighbouring Cook Island, under New Zealand, had three officials for 30,000 inhabitants! In Papeete the officials lived in palaces and maintained viceregal pomp on the approved model of the Pomarès: "they are many in number and produce no visible result." But in the neighbouring British colony of Rarotonga, the Government offices were a little shed by the wharves, and it was jocularly remarked that one could buy postage stamps and postcards from the Permanent Head of the Treasury!⁸ Behind this raillery, there was a considerable difference: the French colony was governed by an arid official-class but with all the frills of tropical romance—Loti up-to-date; whereas the English, confining its romance to the ramshackle dwellings that served as offices, gave punctuality and efficiency. Tahiti remained the Paradise of the Pacific, Papeete a merry little Paris in an environment of flame-trees and bougainvilleas and honey-coloured Polynesians, but as a well-organized colony simply did not exist.

Attempts to give the settlers a share in the Government were equally futile. A Council-General was set up on the usual French model in 1885, but from the first confined its duties to quarrelling with the executive. Elections were tumultuous, and, one might say, at times ultra-efficient, as when 450 votes were recorded for 200 people! The Council's violently antagonistic attitude commenced as early as 1895, when the Governor for the time being was so insulted in the Chamber that he had to leave. However, the dozen representatives—bakers and wine-merchants and

⁶ *L'Océanie Française*, Dec. 1922. Resulted in "le règne de l'intérimat, règne néfaste qui exclut toute initiative."

⁷ *Ibid.*, Jan.-March, 1920.

⁸ G. Calderon, *Tahiti* (1921), p. 32.

butchers—continued to meet in their petrol-fumed room and to harass the administration,—to the vast enjoyment of the general public, who were admitted and added to the general interest by familiarly chatting with their delegates in conference assembled. Such quarrels have continued up to the present. In 1924, for instance, a new tax on bread was bitterly contested, because the councillors were themselves, in other capacities, connected with the bakers. As an observer summed up the situation, the Council came to mean irresponsible criticism of an irresponsible administration. "More solicitous of their rights than their duties, and as careless of the one as of the other, most of the members of these assemblies, either by calculation or vanity, exaggerated the extent of their powers, and soon made the successive Governors regret this over-liberal measure of assimilation,—I could say, of premature emancipation of a people not yet ready for the exercise of liberty, and still less for a share in power." ⁹ Apart from hindering the administration, the main result of the council scheme was to introduce political discords which led to what was known as "Coral Fever,"—an unreasoning spirit of social cleavage. The scheme was a farce, its results tragic in a small isolated community.

But it was in the native field that the tragic element emerged most clearly. The Tahitians, and especially the Marquesans, had been amongst the finest of the Polynesian types,—fine examples of a fine race. Their political organization, their adaptability to the new economic system of the missionaries, and their voyaging prowess had all shown this in various fields; but the French simply, and of set purpose, hastened the disintegration of native life. They destroyed the chiefly system of Tahiti and sapped the *morale* of the ruling Pomarès. They made no attempt to keep up the missionaries' endeavours to instil ideas of regular work into native minds. To the contrary, they either passively watched, or deliberately hastened the new anti-social agencies, especially in the sixties. The old order was going, and the French welcomed this rather than be troubled with a strong native element. To the *dolce far niente* of the indolent tropical life was joined their openly disruptive influence: and the result was racial decay for a stock that was already enfeebled and that could not distinguish between liberty and licence. The Tahitians declined; the Marquesans, though outwardly still more physically fit, were practically annihilated. The population-movements of the Tahitians during the last century are still uncertain, though it is clear that the coming of the Europeans entailed the disappearance of the Marquesans. From 20,000 in 1848 they have dwindled to about a thousand to-day,

⁹ J. Agostini, *Tahiti* (1905), pp. 17-19; Montchoisy, *La Nouvelle Cythère* (1888), p. 108.

and not a sound physical specimen survives. The vitality seems to have gone from the race, and, lacking the will to live, they wither and give way, just as the fragrant *frangipani* of their islands wilts and fades.¹⁰ Adaptation to changing circumstances now seems beyond their power, and, in all of French Oceania, only one group, the Leeward Islands, with its hardy pearl-fishers, has an increasing population. The result has been that, even if France desired the economic modernization of these islands, this would be prevented by the lack of population and by the chronic indolence of those who survive. Island problems always come back to this phase of the situation, which is naturally an inexorable limit placed on advance.

As a result of the French attitude and the position of the natives, the Tahitian group remained, and still remains, undeveloped. The land is rich and permits other crops than the ubiquitous coco-nut of the Pacific: yet copra was for long the only product and even that to the extent of only 8,000 tons a year. Even in the nineties, the total exports were no more than £110,000, although the concentration on cotton and vanilla since that time has added hopeful features to the situation. By 1912, for instance, the exports of vanilla amounted to £240,000, as compared with £200,000 of copra; but vanilla demands a painstaking labour-supply, and the Polynesians of Tahiti cannot continuously be relied upon for the work of fertilizing the vanilla blooms,—“marrying the vanilla,” as the natives facetiously remark. The economic history of the group has thus been spasmodic. The opening of the Panama Canal, with the unfounded hopes that it engendered, led to a feverish activity before 1914, but the reaction was worse than the disease. Then again, after the inanition of the war-period, the commencement of Indo-Chinese immigration to New Caledonia, and after 1925 to Tahiti itself, once more provoked inordinate hopes, but of necessity leads to a similar disillusion. Tahiti offers limited and slow possibilities in the direction of developing several staples, but cannot expect to think of achievement unless capital and, more essential, labour-supplies are available in adequate and suitable quantities. Until then, the atmosphere of romantic indolence, the inconsequential side of life so aptly caught by Loti and Calderon, must remain the forces—and distinctly enervating forces—at the back of island life. Romance—and what romance there is—is disease-lined—must give way to balance-sheets, but the French are loath to make the change, and are satisfied to let the tropical languor creep in over their thoughts. They allow the Chinese immigrants to capture all of the retail and most of the wholesale trade of the group. The land, while nominally French, is rapidly becoming an economic dependency of the Chinese,

¹⁰ S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (1927), p. 91 *et seq.*

—so much so that the *Revue du Pacifique* already describes it as “unquestionably Chinese.”

The French establishments in Oceania thus remain picturesquely undeveloped.¹¹ Their isolation allows this, the temperament of the natives makes anything else difficult, and the sterile nature of French officialdom there clinches the result. The future of the islands therefore rests with outside immigrants, either, as up to the present, the Chinese, or, as the French hope since the Sarraut revival, with the indentured Indo-Chinese. But, however this may be, the group so far, with the exception of the prosperous Leeward Islands, has contributed little towards France, save a haven for the least efficient of her minor officials. On the other hand, it has provided a crop of problems out of all relation to its own size and importance,—native problems, Chinese problems, and problems of government and economics. Beyond this, the islands are in the same position as they were fifty years ago, especially as fulfilling the economic and strategic hopes of their founders. They are survivals of an age that has gone, and represent even that age in a *rococo* and ludicrous form. The obvious remedies of efficiency and modernization exist as yet only on paper. The islands are 10,000 miles from Paris, and everybody is happy there, even in their quarrels: therefore, why change things, runs the customary French attitude? The lantana spreads and the hibiscus grows: the natives decline, but those who remain are luscious tawny morsels for the French: the evil comes and goes for the good: and, after all, is not the island-world ruled by “*ari'ana*,”—“there is to-morrow”? The islanders’ drowsily insidious code has enwrapped French mentality there, and, if more is needed, then the cafés under the flame-trees afford all the pleasures of Paris. Tahiti represents the spirit of colonization drugged and confused by the gentle, and ever so desirable, lasciviousness of those tropical lands where existence is easy and the natives complaisant. “*Ari'ana*”—“there is to-morrow”: but so far, not for Tahiti.

II. New Caledonia

TRANSPORTATION

On the other side of the ocean, the French purpose was radically different. France went there for a brutally material purpose,—to find a gaol for the *gamins* of Paris and the *nervis* of Marseilles, and consciously subordinated every detail of the island’s life to that fact.

¹¹ *Annuaire de Tahiti*, 1914, pp. 100–103; *L’Océanie Française*, May 1923 (Guineuse), for Marquesas.

New Caledonia has nothing in common with Tahiti. It belongs to the continental type of Pacific Islands and is rather a tiny continent than a group like Tahiti. It has no picturesque or lazy pearl-lagoons. Rather is it a forbidding harsh land,—a mountain of minerals whose outcrops gash the sides of the hills and remind the observer of the quarry-walls of the Pyrenees. The natives, too, are poles apart from the merry Polynesians. They are the lowest of the black Melanesians, infinitely more archaic and repulsive, and more like the negritos than the gentle tawny Polynesians, who are almost Caucasians.

At first, until 1864, New Caledonia drifted along the usual lines of French effort. The natives were pushed back; expeditionary corps were overland to Ourail by 1859: elaborate towns, like Napoléonville, were planned in the wilderness: and a few free settlers spread to the basins of Dumbéa and Paita. One energetic Governor, Guillaïn (1862–1870), fostered this and tried group settlement, incidentally attempting to vitalize colonial existence by organizing justice and making roads and commencing native education. But, before he left, the deciding force in New Caledonian existence had entered,—the first grey-clad convicts had landed at Ile Nou.¹²

France very elaborately experimented with transportation as a means of colonization in last century. Much attention was devoted to the question, and there was little of that haphazard empiricism which was so characteristic of colonial policy in other directions. France knew what she wanted and scientifically worked out the solution, taking care to correlate her theory and practice. The actual scheme was another result of Louis Napoléon's inventiveness, although it was of a more practical nature than most of his innovations in colonial matters. Pointing to the 6,000 convicts who idled or died in the hulks and prisons, he said that "it appears to me possible to make forced labour more efficacious and moralizing, less costly and more humane, by utilizing the convicts to further French colonization." After several attempts, a scheme was worked out in 1852 and finalized in May, 1854. Henceforth, a person sentenced to forced labour was to work it out in the public-works of some colony other than Algeria. Those convicted for less than eight years were to remain in the colony for an equal period after their release, while those serving longer terms were to stay there for ever. This *doublage*, as it was called, was one of the main features of the plan: it was the sequel, so to speak, of the period of training. To brighten the outlook to some degree, however, convicts who distinguished themselves

¹² P. Cordeil, *Origines et Progrès de la Nouvelle Calédonie* (1885), pp. 48, 49. This period is fully covered in C. Savole, *Histoire de la Nouvelle Calédonie* (1922), p. 19 *et seq.*

by good conduct were to be allowed to work for themselves and receive grants of land.¹³

This *régime* was in due course established by a decree of May 27, 1854: but the problem was, where to send the convicts? Guiana had been tried two years before, but the authorities deemed the guillotine a more satisfactory method of execution than either malaria or the poisoned darts of jungle natives, so they looked elsewhere. West Africa and Tahiti were considered, but, when too many difficulties rose in connection with them, New Caledonia was chosen (1863). The first convicts arrived in the next year, and, between 1867 and 1887, the island was the only place of transportation for white convicts. Obock, Gabun, and Guiana were tried at intervals, but it was in New Caledonia that the experiment of transportation centred and assumed its largest form. By 1908 21,841 convicts were sent out, although the number in the island at any one time was never greatly in excess of 7,000, and, of these, it was estimated that only an average of 5,000 were fit to be employed. The percentage of wastage was as high as it always is in any convict system of this kind.

The system was very much akin to that which had pertained at an earlier date in the Australian colonies. Though there was a more elaborate definition under the French scheme, both systems had the same basic idea of making convict labour productive in the colonies, and after a period of probation, assigning individual convicts to farmers or allowing them to establish themselves on the land. On landing, all alike went to the centre on Ile Nou, when they were drafted to road-camps of from fifteen to thirty convicts apiece. The incorrigibles, who were not a negligible proportion of the whole, were sent to the dreaded disciplinary-camp, and, chained two by two like oxen, were a familiar sight labouring on the roads or hauling the mountain railway-trucks. If, on the other hand, they were adjudged meritorious, they received four to five hectares of land in the administration reserve, or were allowed, as *engagés*, to labour for free colonists.

In addition to the convicts pure and simple, two other classes of persons were transported. Political offenders (*déportés*) had been sent to the Marquesas since 1850, but the insurrection of 1871 necessitated a larger receptacle for the unwanted politicians of the metropolis. Hence, a law of March, 1872, concentrated all convicts, political and otherwise, on New Caledonia. Such political offenders, it is true, did not have to work on the roads and were allowed to bring out their families. On

¹³ J. B. Alberti, *Étude sur la Colonisation à la Nouvelle Calédonie* (1909), p. 57 et seq.; d'Haussonville, *Les Établissements pénitentiaires en France et aux colonies*, Chap. 17; or A. Bernard, *L'Archipel de la Nouvelle Calédonie* (1894), Chap. 9.

the whole, they were an especially privileged class, being forced colonists more than anything else. Starting in September, 1872, more than 3,924 were sent from France in all, and, to add variety, a few Arab rebels and recalcitrant Camoriens from the Indian Ocean joined the throng.¹⁴

Far more important were the "exiles" or *rélégés*. A law of May 27, 1885, sentenced to transportation all persons who had amassed a certain number of convictions in the preceding ten years. It instituted a mechanical purge of undesirables. "It has for its principal object the placing at a distance from the metropolis of those persons who constitute a menace to public security." The earlier law had failed to reach those vagabonds or incorrigibles who did not commit crimes sufficiently serious to receive a long-term sentence. These were the *récidivistes* proper,—the men who, without sinning greatly, left their country for their country's good. As amended by a law of 1885, relegation came to mean perpetual internment in a colony, either in groups or as individuals. The exiles, so long as they wore the distinctive blue uniform (not the despised grey of the convicts proper), could become labourers or farmers or contractors as they pleased. No restriction was placed on their individual activities: they had only to stay away from France.¹⁵

It is curious how this part of the experiment failed from first to last. When it was first mooted, the Press and the colonial governors bitterly attacked it. "Colonization cannot take place with idlers, any more than a locomotive can run without coal," asserted Lévillé in the Deputies, and the *Temps* emphatically supported this attitude.¹⁶ As a result, the original project was considerably modified. The decree of 1885 had specifically arranged that such men should construct public works in the colonies, but the free colonies resisted so strenuously that not a single one was ever sent to any of them. Only Guiana and New Caledonia were compelled to take them, and then only in comparatively small numbers.

They went to New Caledonia only between 1887 and 1897, and, even there, never exceeded 2,800 in number. Most of them worked as "collectives" in gangs. Some built roads, others worked in the forests, but the majority provided the labour-supply for the mines that were opening up at that time. But, despite the relative success in the last-mentioned sphere, they were not a desirable element in the colony. Habits of idleness were too deeply ingrained for them to face the rude life of pioneering;

¹⁴ Alberti (1909), *op. cit.*, pp. 27-29.

¹⁵ E. Petit, *Organisation des Colonies Françaises*, Vol. II (1895), p. 32; Dislère, *Traité de Législation Coloniale*, Vol. I, p. 1018; Alberti (1909), *op. cit.*, p. 32 *et seq.*

¹⁶ Report in *Recueil des Délibérations du Congrès Colonial National*, 1889-1890, p. 97; *Temps* (Paris), 18/6/84; or the Lanessan interpellation in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 30/6/89.

indeed, so much was this so, that an official statement of 1887 said that not 5 per cent. of them were useful in the colony. In the island itself they were most unpopular. The other convicts treated them as pariahs and dubbed them *pièces du Chili*, the reference being to the highly ornate but frequently bad coins so prevalent at that date in the Pacific. The real convicts were said to have energy on occasion and character of a kind,—certainly they were enterprising criminals. But the “exiles” were half-way men, petty persons who knew “*ni ressort ni courage*.” Apart from working in the mines, therefore, their only contribution to the colony, according to Alberti, the student of New Caledonian colonization, was the purely negative one of providing a slightly wider market for commerce!

By the time this experiment failed, attention was turned once more to the convicts proper. In the eighties in particular, an attempt had been made to systematize the whole scheme and make New Caledonia a model of penal colonization. This took the form of providing a continual avenue of progress for each convict from the hulk to a farm of his own. A decree of August, 1884, set aside 110,000 hectares as a minimum for convict settlement and definitely commenced the policy of converting the native reserves into areas for such settlement as the demand should increase. But this ambitious project had to halt before two factors,—the unsuitable nature of the raw material with which it had to deal, and the opposition of the free colonists. The latter was the more immediate of the two. The colonists asserted that the convict-reserves absorbed nearly all of the agricultural land and that the farming revival of the nineties would be cut short unless the Government’s policy was restrained. In view of this opposition, decrees from 1897 onwards reduced the area of the reserves and, by implication, admitted the failure of the attempt to make New Caledonia a huge convict-farm. Moreover, such convict-settlement as had been tried could only be described as farcical in its results,—and inevitably so. “As soon as a man is liberated, he is thrown on the New Caledonian soil, with a little money in his pocket, great desires for independence in his mind, and all of his hitherto repressed passions to satisfy.”¹⁷ The result was naturally defiance of the authorities and a repletion of the said passions in orgies impossible to describe.

A similar failure characterized convict-settlement in other directions. Assigned to settlers, they made their greater liberty a cloak for licence: assigned to domestic service, they repeated the Australian experience by serving as aids to immorality. On the land, only 868 convict-concessions were given in forty years, and this included all, unsuccessful with the successful. In the mines, owners preferred to pay Dalmatian

¹⁷ P. Cordeil, *Origines et Progrès de la Nouvelle Calédonie* (1885), p. 111.

emigrants seven francs a day to giving *forçats* one! As road workers, it was estimated that convicts took two million working days to construct 66 kilometres of road,—a method of construction that worked out at 20,000 francs a kilometre!¹⁸ In every field, labour on a slave-basis had either completely broken down or had proved woefully uneconomical.

These unfavourable elements of the situation came more and more to the fore as the years progressed, especially in the nineties, when more convicts were poured into the unfortunate island than at any previous time. The system, thus intensively developed, was in the first place seen to be the reverse of economical. Up to 1907, for instance, it cost nearly 147 million francs in all, the largest amount for any single year being 6½ million francs in 1883.¹⁹ Over against this expense were the roads and other public-works the convicts constructed, the labour given to free settlers at a ridiculously low nominal price, and the profit drawn from the Government-farms in the mid-eighties. But these were all of the advantages, and against them were the failures recorded above, and many other difficulties, even up to diplomatic quarrels with Great Britain owing to the escape of *récidivistes* to the Australian mainland.

One other major failure must be recorded,—the failure to reform the convicts themselves, but a curious feature of the whole scheme was how little the French took this factor into account at any time. The experiment was in providing a new and cheaper material for colonizing purposes: that was how it appealed to the average Frenchman interested in the work of the colonies. In so far as the moral factor was considered at all, it was admitted that the failure was practically complete,—far more so than had been the case in Australia, probably because the material on which to work was far more degraded in the French instance. Commissions in New Caledonia left no doubt on this point. They showed how the original promiscuity and the subsequent loneliness would each fail to reform the average individual. The man went in, perverse and dangerous and criminal, it was said: he came out an unrestrained brute. At the least, the result was “a forged atrophy, both physical and moral.”²⁰

As a result of this breakdown in so many fields, transportation came to an end, in so far as New Caledonia was concerned, in February, 1897, when, as the leading French periodical of the Pacific summed the matter up, “the tap of dirty water was shut off.” Since then, the island has been plagued by the remains of the system. The decision of 1897 only meant that no *new* convicts were to come out: Those already there remained and had to serve their sentences and stay in the island after

¹⁸ *L'Océanie Française*, April 1913.

¹⁹ Alberti (1909), *op. cit.*, p. 75.

²⁰ *L'Océanie Française*, July 1913.

that. However much transportation might cease, convictism had to remain in New Caledonia. Indeed, it still remains. Up to 1897, 21,630 convicts had been sent, 10,695 in the preceding ten years, so that the great majority of them remained to be dealt with when the system was discontinued. Of these, 7,222 had died and 4,684 had been freed or escaped, so that only 9,724 remained to be disposed of. At this stage, disease came to the aid of the administration, and the number dwindled to about 3,855 by 1919. The size of the problem may be gauged, however, by the fact that there were 682 full-time officials to deal with the convicts in 1895, and 229 even as late as 1913!²¹

Yet, failure though the system was, it is curious how a belief in penal colonization lingered, and still lingers, in French colonization. This was shown by the zeal displayed in the nineties, when as many convicts were dispatched to New Caledonia as in all the preceding decades, and by the decision of the International Colonial Congress (really a French body) in 1900 that convicts should be sent to *all* colonies that were confronted by a shortage of labour.²² Then, too, Alberti, after his detailed study of the convict system in New Caledonia, followed the earlier writer Cordeil in pronouncing it a success.

"It has given satisfying results," he sums up. "The prison administration has been able to make farming experiments that would have been beyond the scope of individuals, it has constructed roads and made general public-works, it has placed much labour at the disposal of Government departments and individuals, and it has aided the transformation of the convicts into property-owners and heads of families."²³

But, as has been seen, these purely general advantages cannot bear analysis, and, in summing up thus, Alberti abandons his studiously objective point of view by quoting general advantages without placing opposite them the equivalent defects.

A balance has to be arrived at, and certainly the experience of New Caledonia would rather seem to justify the conclusion of Jules Harmand, —that "economically, penal colonization is an absurdity; from the colonial point of view, it is a scandal; and morally, it is a crime."²⁴ Neither the State nor the convicts benefited in proportion to the outlay

²¹ *L'Océanie Française*, Jan. 1913, May-Aug. 1918. For the abolition, see articles in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, Jan.-March 1898 (Beauchet), or the Girault Report to *Compte Rendu des Travaux du Congrès Colonial International*, 1900, p. 139.

²² *L'Année Coloniale*, 1900, p. 77. For this attitude, compare *Recueil des Délibérations du Congrès Colonial National*, 1889-1890, Vol. II, p. 289 *et seq.*, or Gallieni's *Rapports d'ensemble* on Madagascar, —1st, 1899, p. 211; 2nd, 1905, p. 517.

²³ Alberti (1909), *op. cit.*, p. 199; Cordeil (1885), *op. cit.*, p. 125.

²⁴ J. Harmand, *Domination et Colonisation* (1910), p. 148.

involved, and, in particular, the stigma attached to any colony by being made a gaol imposes a burden on its development for decades. Transportation fails to meet the need of any section concerned with it. The only thing it does is to offer a theoretical opportunity to the individual convict,—and the reality of even this is problematical, and, if it does exist, it is a moot point if such reclamation is to be paid for by the stagnation of the colony and the suffering of the free settlers. The balance of advantages is not there, especially from the colonial point of view. Settlement and convictism are mutually exclusive terms under modern conditions, and, when the two conflict, one has to go : there can be no compromise between them. Thus, the discovery of nickel in New Caledonia in 1875 and the subsequent awakening to the fact that the island was the richest mining country in the world in proportion to its surface really condemned the convict system. This discovery hastened the conversion of New Caledonia into a colony of settlement and into a society,—ends which were incompatible with a convict *régime*, however much the supplies of cheap labour thus afforded might aid the early exploitation of the mining areas. In the long run, the first ugly gash in the mountain-side for nickel meant that the island had become a colony instead of a gaol : transportation was doomed.

THE NATIVES

In the meantime, the French had dealt with the native problem in an equally concise manner,—and, it might be added, in a manner equally neglectful of human values. In 1853 it was estimated that there were 100,000 Melanesians in the islands,—a number which declined to 45,000 by 1863 and 27,100 by 1921. The natives, abjectly debased Melanesians though they were, resisted the French domination for years and were aided by the mountainous nature of the country. They were most truculent and not at all amenable to civilizing influences, being in this connection quite different from the gentle imitative Polynesians of the French Oceanic groups. The New Caledonians were more of a negroid strain, sullen in appearance and nature, and with debased institutions.

At the commencement, France saw the natives as virile but repulsive and unapproachable. But, in accordance with the ultra-liberalism of the time, a code of benefits (on strictly European models) was extended to them. That this code of 1854 took the form of reversing every native institution mattered little. It was more progressive, from the viewpoint of Paris. It set up a miniature *Code Civil*. "Assassination and cannibalism" were forbidden : imprisonment was ordained for those hardy native spirits who danced in the night : theft and adultery were likewise to be atoned for in the white man's strong-house : and edicts

were issued against such social menaces as wandering dogs and dishonest bathers ! It certainly could not be said that the administration had not thought of every conceivable and a lot of quite inconceivable contingencies. Police agents, "having for a distinctive mark tricolour stripes on the left arm," were also instituted. In short, everything was arranged for,—except an analysis of the problems provided by a native Melanesian race coming into its first contact with European ideas. No attempt was made to stem the destruction in native life that was inevitable under these conditions, and no attempt to modify French practices so that they would suit the new environment.²⁵ It was Algeria and Cochinchina over again.

So far, the French policy had been merely grotesque : at this stage, it became a tragedy, because the French were imbued with the definite idea of destroying the chiefly system. The original system of the natives was founded on strong family units, grouped together into larger tribes. But France attacked these localist units and strove to break up the families by depriving them of their land.²⁶ A tenth of the whole island was set apart for native use in 1855, and this was deemed to be sufficient for all of their needs,—and, it must be remembered, the native population at that time was thought to be rapidly increasing. Even over this, however, the Melanesians were to have only rights of sufferance, a dispatch of 1855 categorically stating that "the chiefs and natives of New Caledonia and its dependencies have never had, nor can they ever have, the right of disposing of the land occupied by them either in whole or in part."²⁷ Even this scant arrangement was opposed by most sections in the colony, where there was an ever-present temptation on the part of the administration to cut down the area of the native-reserves, under pretence of "defining" them. This helped to cause the great revolt of 1878 and gave rise to that general racial *malaise* which found expression in armed revolt as late as 1917. The present position is that the tribal lands were defined in 1897, but that arrangement is in no sense proportionate to the numerical strength of the tribes to-day.²⁸ Indeed, the whole situation is dominated by the fact that New Caledonia is the only land in the French Empire, outside of Northern Algeria, in which small French colonists may settle. In 1921, the natives numbered only 28,000 in a population of 50,600, and the French, never prone at any time to attach overmuch importance to the Melanesians, regulated native affairs with this fact always before their eyes. They have thus driven back the

²⁵ S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (1927), pp. 149, 150.

²⁶ *L'Océanie Française*, March 1924.

²⁷ *Bulletin Officiel de la Nouvelle Calédonie* (Nouméa), 1871, p. 26.

²⁸ *Ibid.* (Nouméa), 1897, pp. 563, 564.

natives to the inner mountain-country where the reserves are situated, and emphasis is much more on the opening of land to settlers than on conserving it in native hands.²⁹ The classic Algerian policy of *refoulement* finds full expression in this Melanesian country.

In recent years, however, traces of a newer native policy have been evident. Some kind of stability in numbers—perhaps the stability of exhaustion—was attained after 1885, and it became obvious that the earlier French hope that the Kanakas would soon become mere ethnological curiosities was not to be satisfied. But by this time the French had demoralized their group-life and had not trained them for the new economic conditions: hence, they had to start afresh and endeavour to rehabilitate their native charges, delivering them from the inroads of the two destructive forces,—the settlers and the sorcerers. To do this, they offered opportunity to the somewhat bewildered savages, because, as they naïvely related, “the experiences of forced assimilation have not been happy.” Attempts were therefore made to strengthen native society, first by reviving their customs in courts of the West African type, and then by strengthening tribal organizations. This was Governor Brunet’s policy (1914), and, as far as the first part was concerned, worked admirably. But, when it came to rebuilding the tribes, two difficulties emerged. The French tried to solve the problem by creating powerful chiefs and emphasizing the wider units of the tribe and sub-tribe; but the difficulty was that the original native system was based far more on the family than on the tribe. Still, the gap was there, and the French in part filled it; and, so long as they named energetic and capable chiefs, at least improved on the previous state of drift. The “hierarchy of stripes,” as the new system was called, was certainly less democratic than the old, but, since the old organization had irretrievably gone, it seems a trifle anomalous to argue from its conditions. The new chiefs have vindicated themselves, even with the larger tribes like that of the Houailou valley, and have made the native organization uniform and virile,—and that, after all, is the chief desideratum.³⁰

On the whole, the native policy of the French in New Caledonia has not been particularly happy. Until 1914 at least, the old *refoulement*-motive was openly adopted, and any change of direction since then is but a tardy and quite incommensurate compensation. Tribal organization has gone, and the new Government-officials chosen among the natives are quite artificial: and the French have done little in the way of medical reform and nothing at all for the education or the economic

²⁹ E.g. in *Congrès Colonial National*, 1889-1890, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 416.

³⁰ *L'Océanie Française*, Feb. 1914, March 1924; F. Sarasin, *La Nouvelle Calédonie* (1917), pp. 36, 37.

improvement of the natives. They seem satisfied that the New Caledonians are more or less confined to the wild regions of the West and so divided by language-differences and so weakened by leprosy and tuberculosis that they cannot effectively combine against the Government: beyond that, there is practically no constructive policy. The native remains the *Canaque*, a person held in a grinning contempt that is unusual in the French colonies, and the *réserves indigènes* are viewed as land shut off from settlement by a passing whim of the administration. The new emphasis of the associationist school does not seem to have reached New Caledonia, Brunet notwithstanding. The island is 14,000 miles away from Paris, and France wants from it, not problems, but nickel and chrome.

AGRICULTURE

New Caledonia assumes a peculiar place in French colonization, because, except for the Algerian Tell, it is the only province they have suitable for permanent European settlement. Apart from its minerals, it is a farming and grazing country,—very much on a par, though dryer and more arid, than the corresponding latitudes of the Australian continent. Its agricultural policy has therefore played a large part in its history, and has been at times, as in the eighties and nineties of last century, the deciding factor.

At first, the position was not clear. France knew that the island was, in part at least, a land of settlement and that if the most was to be made of the opportunities that were offering there, she had to employ different rules from those she used in her tropical "*colonies d'exploitation*." Various experiments were therefore made. At the very outset, negotiations were entered upon with a view to introducing 600 Irish families, but this fell through when transportation was finally adopted. But isolated settlers crept up the valleys on the west coast, and Australians came across to spread over the basins of Dumbéa and Paita (1858), and then Creoles of the over-populated Réunion. By 1870, 1,562 European settlers were firmly established, and the movement received a big impetus when de la Richerie introduced something like the Australian squatting-system in 1871. By this, people could settle anywhere and could either lease or buy their land when it came to be surveyed at a later date: in a word, they could settle down anywhere they liked with no formality. The idea was to secure a class of large cattle-men, and, since the proposals meant the benefits without the limitations of the Australian system, it was naturally very popular. In a few months, 150,000 hectares were thus taken up in a comparatively restricted land. The result was a boom, and, as with every boom, a collapse. The rate of development had been

forced. Little land was left for the smaller settlers, and so the farmers became discouraged. The new herds, too, stamped out the cultivated plots of the natives, incidentally providing one of the causes of the revolt in 1878. Moreover, the cattle-market was over-supplied, the result being that herds were sold for 40 and even 30 francs a head. The cattle-men thus dwindled, and the smaller families, their enemies though they were, followed them: they could not survive in the face of the droughts, the inadequate lands, and the exorbitant interest-rates. As a result of these accumulated misfortunes, there were fewer settlers than officials in the New Caledonia of 1876,—3,032 functionaries to 2,753 colonists!³¹

As the drift continued, the Government turned, both by force and inclination, to convict-settlement on a large scale. A Commission of 1883 found that free families cost £115 each to install, and, since the first cost of convicts was far less than this, the latter were favoured. A decree of the next year therefore reserved all of the best land for convict settlers. This was the last step: it made New Caledonia "a colony without colonists," and the number of real farmers in 1891 was below a thousand. But, as has been seen, the convicts failed to become settlers, and, by the close of the century, the administration was confronted with a growing bill for its penal system and a dwindling primary production. The confusion was accentuated by the fluctuating policies of Paris at this time. "Ministerial dispatches followed in rapid succession, contradicting each other, and generally adding to the colony's troubles." The position was intrinsically bad. Paris was making it worse, the culmination coming in 1892, when the alienation of land was practically stopped, the result not unnaturally being to precipitate the colony into a crisis.

At this stage, Governor Feillet (1894–1902) formulated his policy,—a policy which enabled New Caledonia to survive the decade following the abolition of transportation.³² Feillet urged that colonization, to be worthy of the name, had to be the spontaneous settlement of free men,— "a solid and vigorous rural democracy," to use his own phrase. Supported at home by the powerful "French Colonial Union" and its organ, *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, he proposed to bring out a nucleus of 500 families of settlers, much on the Algerian model. This time, there were to be no haphazard methods. The settlers were to be methodically chosen (surely, if so many thousands a year went to La Plata, 500 could go to New Caledonia): once there, they were not to be dumped down on unsuitable land

³¹ Alberti (1909), *op. cit.*, p. 207; H. Russier, *Le Partage de l'Océanie* (1905), pp. 224, 225; Délignon, *Les Aliénations des Terres et la Colonisation Libre en Nouvelle Calédonie* (1898), pp. 29, 109.

³² Délignon (1898), *op. cit.*, pp. 110, 147; Dubois et Terrier (1902), *op. cit.*, p. 1020.

and abandoned, as they had been in the past. The administration, far from leaving them to their own devices, was to aid them, without falling into the Algerian error of pampering them and depriving them of a healthy initiative: it was to smooth away the insurmountable difficulties, and the colonists were to reciprocate by providing the necessary vigour.³³

Within seven years, 525 families were settled as a result of this policy, but, this much achieved, the scheme was "brutally interrupted" by the quite unjustified recall of its initiator. It is true that the struggle was long and pronounced, that labour and communications were lacking, that the long commercial crisis after 1902 precipitated many failures, and that a large number of the colonists became grog-sellers to the convicts and natives.³⁴ But Feillet claimed that worse than any of these obstacles was the lack of supervision on the part of the Parisian authorities. The majority of the settlers were woefully incapable of surviving the trials of a pioneer's existence. At Houailou, for instance, their numbers included painter-decorators and consumptives! He might have added, too, the insufficient support afforded by the Parisian authorities financially.

After much hesitation in previous years, the Ministry, impressed, it is said, by a growing sense of the feebleness of the whole Feillet project, finally suppressed the annual grant of 70,000 francs in 1908. This ended the scheme and, at the time, coinciding as it did with a mining crisis, was thought to be the death-blow of New Caledonia. The convicts had stopped, the mines were not paying, and now free settlement was to end! How needless it all was, and how those who introduce legitimate reforms in the French world have to pay for their audacity, may be seen from the fact that, of Feillet's 525 settlers, no fewer than 300 remained on the land in 1912!³⁵ The episode reminds one of the earlier Governor Olry, who was so reprimanded by the Minister for the time being for his praiseworthy aid to sufferers from cyclones that he forwarded a cheque on his private account for the whole amount he had disbursed! Such a relief was denied Feillet, who simply had to submit to recall: he was the author of one of the most promising settlement-schemes the French Empire ever had,—his only reward was disgrace and oblivion.

Since the Feillet scheme, agricultural efforts in New Caledonia, despite the suitability of the land, have been limited. A decree of July, 1913, which remains the basis of land-legislation, allowed free grants

³³ M. le Goupils, *Une Type de Colonisation Administrative: la crise coloniale en Nouvelle Calédonie* (1905), pp. 7-11. Compare Feillet in *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 25/8/99, p. 513. For the Bazin Report on the loan, see 10/4/99.

³⁴ *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 25/1/06.

³⁵ *L'Océanie Française*, April 1913; Albert (1909), *op. cit.*, pp. 217-219.

up to 200 hectares to all immigrants, and even officials, on condition that they resided on their blocks for five years and improved them: but the result has been mediocre.³⁶ The emphasis on mining, the gravity of the long chain of commercial crises, and the insufficient public-works combined to bring about this result, and settlement clearly languished. The good land in the island is very scattered and, under the conditions, is practically useless unless sufficient communications are provided and unless the produce may be easily evacuated to a market. Yet, after over sixty years, the colony has only 200 kilometres of road, and it is estimated that 750 kilometres, costing half a million pounds, are at once needed. A railway from Nouméa to Bourail was needed to drain the produce of the scattered west-coast settlements to the capital, yet it was not finished until 1914, and then only after interminable disputes and the raising of three loans.³⁷ Add to these obstacles the official vacillations, the isolation of the land, the uncertain nature of the climate, and the scarcity of capital; and the backwardness of settlement there may be explained, even if it cannot so easily be justified.³⁸

The retarded development of agriculture was in no small measure due to the emphasis on mining. The island is undoubtedly immensely rich in minerals. Gold, copper, and especially nickel were produced in the seventies, but most attention focused on the last after 1875. Nickel is found practically everywhere in the island, and, up to the commencement of Canadian competition, New Caledonia controlled the world-market for this metal. Its discovery saved the colony and enabled it to have whatever prosperity was realized, even after the uneven competition made the Canadian output four times that of New Caledonia. More than half the colony's exports are still of nickel and chrome-ore, and present development centres almost entirely on the hydro-electric works and blast-furnaces built around this metal production.³⁹ As a result of the basic mining and the correlated industrial activities, the export trade of the island has increased from an average of 9½ million francs in the period between 1905 and 1910 to over 33 million francs since 1920,—an improvement not entirely due to currency depreciation and one which seems to be permanent.

The colony is hampered, on the other hand, by many restrictions. Its isolation from France in particular, as the experience of the War demonstrated, makes its economic life one continued uncertainty. During

³⁶ *Journal Officiel de la Nouvelle Calédonie*, 1/5/13.

³⁷ Guieysse in *La Grande Revue*, 10/12/08, for opposition.

³⁸ For the position from an economic point of view see M. Lang, *La Nouvelle Calédonie* (1925), p. 47 et seq.

³⁹ *L'Océanie Française*, May 1924.

and after the War-years, the breakdown of French shipping forced New Caledonia to trade with foreigners, despite the exchange difficulty. At the same time, the War paralysed the chrome and nickel markets, reducing prices by a third and a half respectively. As a result, the budget-reserves dwindled, the credit-balances disappeared altogether, and, especially after 1920, the island finances were threatened with crisis. France had to advance over ten million francs in the ensuing four years, still without reaching equilibrium. An additional loan of five millions was therefore proposed to pay off the deficit and to allow the island to make a fresh start with its public-works. In consequence of this outside aid, the group's finances began to retrieve themselves, especially from 1923 onwards, when the metal outlook improved.⁴⁰

There New Caledonia rests at present,—a rich land with the problem of the natives solved by driving them back, agriculture possible but very retarded, and a flourishing mineral industry that is the colony's backbone. The convicts linger on as a testimony to the failures of the past, and the debased natives passively demand a more liberal policy: but the eyes of the French are on the nickel-seams in the hills and the blast-furnaces that appear so out of place in a land of coconut-palms; and beside these, other problems, other duties, have to assume second place. Though hindered by its acute labour-problem and by its isolation from the rest of the French world, New Caledonia is at present successful, possibly because, like Indo-China, it is in certain ways an intrinsically rich land. Certainly, it has a far larger proportion of European residents than any other French colony, and, despite the gravity and duration of the post-war crisis, a sounder outlook than most, especially now that Indo-Chinese labour is coming in in such great quantities. But, however this may be, and however optimistic the present view-point, the history of New Caledonia, like that of the majority of French colonies, is mainly one of failures,—of unsuccessful experiments. In particular, the shrinking, backward natives cry aloud the breakdown of French civilizing efforts there: French politicians and theorists may speak of the sacred duties of a colonizing Power, but conditions in the native reserves of this South Sea group give the lie to their statements and pretensions. And that fact, after all, is more significant than the nickel-gashes in the hill-sides or the belching blast-furnaces. Yet New Caledonia is indisputably one of the *successful* French colonies,—a good commentary on the general nature of French colonial efforts.

⁴⁰ For the successive stages of the crisis, see *L'Océanie Française*, March 1920; March-April 1921, and Jan. 1924.

III. The New Hebrides

The most interesting of the French spheres of influence in the Pacific is undoubtedly the group of the New Hebrides,—a rich scattered line of islands lying to the north of New Caledonia and at present jointly administered by France and Great Britain under a Condominium. This group has always been the centre of Anglo-French rivalries in the Pacific and provided a problem that was interesting from many points of view.

The story goes back to an early stage in Melanesian history. Early in the period of non-annexation, agents of the London Missionary Society went to the group (1839), soon to be followed by the sandalwood-traders. Certain freelances, like Paddon, the Scotsman who was the moving spirit of the economic life of New Caledonia, and even the Godefroys, the great German combine that dominated Pacific commerce from the Line Islands to Tongatabu, traded there in the fifties: but the effort remained spasmodic until the beginning of what is known in local annals as "the Higginson cycle." John Higginson, a Bedfordshireman who had become a naturalized Frenchman and a partner of the Rothschilds, formed the "Caledonian Company, of the New Hebrides" (1882) and planned to settle the group with *répatriés* from New Caledonia.⁴¹ The merchants of Nouméa, foreseeing the economic attachment of the new group to theirs, subscribed half a million francs of capital in twenty-four hours, and, by the close of 1882, the Company had bought 150,000 acres of land from the natives, with a pre-emptive right over an additional 200,000 acres. Three years later, the area so acquired had swollen to 700,000 acres, and the Company was the only energetic force in the life of the group.

At this stage, the question was suddenly flung into wider diplomatic channels. The Australian colonies, alarmed by the forward economic policy of New Caledonia and by the menace of a new convict colony, and not a little vexed because Higginson's astuteness had forestalled an Anglo-Australian Company in Malekula, protested to Great Britain. Higginson had placed the chiefs of Malekula "under the protection of the French," and the New Caledonian administration, while disavowing any intention of a forward policy, had constructed a line of military posts there in 1886. The Australians saw in these moves an exact duplicate of the methods the English had themselves pursued in Fiji a decade earlier, and thought to counter the French triumph by invoking the aid of diplomacy. "Beaten on the field of the commercial and patriotic war," quite rightly summed

⁴¹ H. Russier, *Le Partage de l'Océanie* (1905), pp. 192-193; P. Deschanel, *Les Intérêts Français dans l'Océan Pacifique* (1888), p. 245.

up a French authority, "the Australians then turned all their efforts to the diplomatic struggle."⁴¹

This opened a new stage. At that time, with Samoa in the world's spotlight for the moment, Pacific matters were always embryonic causes of world-crises, and there was no mistaking the gravity with which both France and England regarded the problem. The issue was really postponed by a Convention of October 24, 1887, which established a Joint Commission of Naval Officers in the New Hebrides. Their duties were to maintain order, but, beyond asserting that neither side was to act independently of the other, the Convention made no attempt to solve the many troublesome questions that were bound to emerge under so vague a system of control. As a matter of fact, the Naval Commission was never useful, and, amounting to a sanction of *laissez-faire* as it did, became increasingly out of touch with the realities of the situation as the century came to a close.

In the interim, the English had been consolidating their position, largely because the Australian colonies, inspired by the somewhat noisy and certainly secular agitation of the Presbyterian missionaries, and not at all reluctant to have a cause which would justify them in keeping the Colonial Office up to the mark, would not let the matter drop. A Consul was installed at Port Vila in 1880, but, owing to French protests, was withdrawn two years later, though the English clearly had international law on their side in this particular case. Then the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 and the Pacific Order-in-Council of 1893 increased England's powers in such groups as the New Hebrides, and meant that the English nationals there received effective protection and a national court, whereas the French were neglected by their Government. Every French colonial effort in this decade centred on Africa, and at this stage, just before the Marchand episode, France desired no trouble, such as had occurred in 1883-1886. The Government even annulled a municipality which the French settlers formed in the group, as contrary to the agreement of 1887, and in general comported themselves with studious fairness, or, as the irate colonists declared, abandoned their interests there for larger ones elsewhere.

Not until 1900—that is, until the African horizon had cleared—did the French move, but then they acted decisively. In February, 1901, they organized administrative and judicial structures in the group, and set up a Resident-Commissioner under the Governor of New Caledonia. Though decisive in practice, this action was still moderate in law. The French were now turning the English juridical argument against them-

⁴¹ Politis in *Revue générale de droit international public* (1901), pp. 121, 230 et seq. Compare his 1908 monograph.

selves, because, while the Order-in-Council of 1893 applied to foreigners as well as to Englishmen, the French pointed out that their actions of 1901 applied *only* to their own nationals and therefore could not be opposed. But, to all intents and purposes, the move meant that the French had obtained governmental supremacy in the group, and it has to be remembered that they already had economic predominance there.

Perceiving this, the English suddenly evoked the position of the natives and the impossibility of deciding land-claims as pretexts for a revision of the situation. Using the *Entente Cordiale* as their lever, they secured the Convention of October, 1906, but only after months of involved and tedious negotiations. In its final form,⁴³ the Convention set up a "region of joint influence" in the New Hebrides, with each country controlling its own subjects. Each was to have a High Commissioner, a Resident-Commissioner, and a body of police; but certain services, such as public-works and finance, were to be administered in common. At the same time, the old Joint Naval Commission was to remain in existence to help keep order. A Joint Court was instituted, with a Spanish judge, to deal with cases concerning more than one State.⁴⁴ In short, the system, ill rounded-off as it was, tried to combine joint administration with the control by each country of its own subjects. A number of elaborate, but not very practical, articles dealt with the natives,—ostensibly to solve those problems that the diplomats thought *should* arise in a native country. No native was allowed to become a French or British subject, lest either of the two parties might unduly strengthen itself by extensive naturalization. The High Commissioners were jointly to make regulations for them, but were to respect their customs. The sale of arms and the liquor-traffic were both forbidden, and general provisions made for settling labour-disputes and land-troubles. But the practical touch was lacking in each instance. The whole agreement reeked of arm-chair theory, the questions that practical administrators would have asked were nowhere considered. No one stopped to ask, how will it work? No one considered the everyday control of the native populations. An equipoise on paper was what the diplomats needed,—a footnote to the *Entente Cordiale*; and then a relegation of the matter to obscurity. Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon thought to introduce a completely new system of government in an agreement of some sixty-eight short

⁴³ Politis in *Revue générale de droit international public*, 1904, p. 755, or British Parliamentary Papers, C. 5256 (1887) and Cd. 3300 (1906), for the respective agreements. An analysis is in Brunet, *Le Régime international des Nouvelles Hébrides* (1907), p. 101.

⁴⁴ For the Joint Court arrangements, see British Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 3876 (1907), or A. Mérygnac, *Traité de Droit Public International*, Vol. II (1907), p. 365 *et seq.*

articles, and wherever difficulties arose, as in connection with the disposal of the natives, appeared to think that the introduction of the words "joint control" fully met the case!

Closer to realities, however, the Australian colonies and New Zealand once more raised an outcry against what they considered a sacrifice of their interests. No representative of either of these colonies had taken part in the Conference; hence the atmosphere of unreality around the whole Condominium arrangement. The Australians therefore deprecated the manner of its passing, were infuriated with its content, and scorned its proposals for future administration. But the Convention was ratified, despite their protests, as probably Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had read the report of High Commissioner im Thurn stating baldly that there were 401 French settlers to 228 British and that, under the circumstances, the British were receiving an adequate share of control!

Since then, the Condominium has only once been amended, otherwise remaining intact. A protocol of August, 1914, provided for representatives of *both* Powers in all islands. Previously, certain districts, like Port Sandwich, had been under the French alone, and others, like Tanna and Santo, under the British: but hereafter, such places were to be administered in common by two officials. This protocol, which was not ratified until March, 1922, did not touch the main machinery of the Condominium, but confined itself to an unimportant detail of administration. Its only other provisions were in arranging for the settlement of native disputes by special native-tribunals and in placing more stringent limits on recruiting,—limits which, since they could not be enforced, affected nobody and thus were readily accepted by all.

In this way, the farce of the Condominium was set up with all the pomp of international diplomacy, and, as was expected, proved impracticable from the commencement. Any dyarchy of this kind demands a careful study of all details in advance, and cannot be introduced by a general Convention dealing only with principles. It is an intricate problem in applied administration, and, however perfect the arrangement may be from a technical point of view, depends, for the slightest measure of success, on the human factors of the situation. In this case, the issue was decided in advance. The arrangement itself was far from perfect and any possibility of its harmonious enforcement was rejected by the attitude of both parties. Such a haphazard compromise would probably not have worked under any conditions: with the tension that was always present in the New Hebrides, it never had an opportunity.

Wherever one approached the problem, the weaknesses of the situation became obvious. Take justice, which, in view of the land disputes, was perhaps the most pressing aspect of all. There, the position resembled

nothing as much as the artificial and impossible dilemmas found in law examination-papers. There was a French tribunal, a British tribunal, a mixed tribunal, a Joint Naval Tribunal, and nobody could say what were the exact functions of each of these. All kept themselves busy, and all judged: whether they overlapped was a different matter, and whether they covered the whole range of litigation was not considered at all. An Australian Inter-State Commission on Pacific Trade (1918), composed of men with long practical experience of island problems, reported that this complexity involved "an endless series of complaints as to the uncertainty of the law, the inertness of the administration, and the tardy dispensation of justice, more especially in the determination of disputed titles."⁴⁵

The absurdity reaches its height in the Joint Court. This tribunal has a Spanish judge, Dutch officials, and proceedings in either English or French or both. It is as efficient as could be imagined under the circumstances. The French belittle it and deride its judicial dignity,⁴⁶ and the administrators on the French side do not collect most of the fines imposed. But even were this local feeling and administrative weakness absent, the position would still be impossible. No provision at all is made to bridge the gap between English and French legal conceptions. The basic ideas are in many cases as different as the poles. What happens, for example, when the French insist on the inquisitorial form of trial, or their attitude towards written evidence, or their *droit administratif*? Or, as often happens, how is the dilemma solved when they introduce certain of their land-laws that have no parallel in the English system? The process of *surenchère* (higher bidding) is a case in point, which arose in March, 1913. Again, to take the general concept, "land-suit," the French equivalent of this, *procès foncier*, includes many things not applicable to the English term.⁴⁷ Nor are these exaggerated instances. The very basic principles of jurisdiction remain unsettled, and so chimerical is the whole proceeding that the Court appears either to be in vacation or to confine itself to certain insignificant details, a safe way of avoiding troublesome issues. After three years of absence, for instance, the Judge reopened the Mixed Court in June, 1923, and in its first session dealt with such heinous offences as a colonist selling wine to the natives, and one native boy giving wine to his comrades.⁴⁸ In addition, it is only fair to state, one major point was settled. Etiquette

⁴⁵ Report of Australian Inter-State Commission on Pacific Trade (1918).—For the general drift, see Australian Commonwealth Papers 180 and 213 of 1914–1915 (report of Royal Commission).

⁴⁶ *L'Océanie Française*, Feb. 1914, March 1922.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, July 1914.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Sept.–Oct. 1923.

demanding the presence of police, so a force was organized, national rivalries being carefully considered. The force finally took the form of two Loyalty Islanders for the French, two New Hebrides boys for the English! The Court costs £5,000 a year and does nothing. Its chief duties were to have been in registering land-titles and settling disputes concerning holdings: yet, up to 1922, it had not issued a single judgment consolidating properties in the archipelago! It remains a legal curiosity, —a reflection on the rule of reason in colonial matters.

A more serious phase of the situation is concerned with those questions for which there is no court available; and it is a striking commentary on the situation to note that, with such a superabundance of tribunals, there are still obvious gaps. Until 1917, for instance, there was no effective court in which the natives could settle their disputes! Law-suits between natives, other than those involving real-estate, could only be referred to the mixed tribunal if all the parties agreed, and if the agreement declared that the tribunal would judge according to native custom. But, since Melanesian society is based on a localism and *amorcellement* perhaps unequalled in history, native customs vary beyond the possibility of compromise; and, if no agreement can be reached on this point, then no court is competent. In the interim, the native has probably settled the issue by his own rapid and effective law,—that of the *toma-hawk*!

A similar gap existed for many cases of land and commercial law. It was doubtful which court could decide questions relating to the forced dissolution of an Anglo-French Company, or could judge foreign criminals (and the population of the group is most varied) before they opted for either French or British nationality.⁴⁹ Added to this was the laxity of French justice in the case of serious crimes. A French colonist was murdered in 1913, for instance: two of the murderers received sentences of imprisonment for a few months! The judicial arrangements as a whole were far too cumbrous and elaborate, and yet not sufficient in everyday cases. Rarely has there been such a stupid and artificial legal position where a European Government is concerned. It has not a single redeeming feature, as both sides admit. It is ineffective where it should be efficient, is grimly opposed by the English settlers, and quite ignored by the French. Yet it goes on unaltered: and at least, it should be added, its members very tactfully avoid the raising of difficult issues.

A similar position pertains in every other sphere of administration. Government offices are few and underpaid, and the French avowedly refuse to co-operate in any way. The police service is bad, other Government departments practically non-existent. For 80,000 natives, for

⁴⁹ Article by Viollette in *L'Océanie Française*, July, 1914.

example, nothing at all had been done before 1911 to prevent depopulation or to diminish disease. In 1916, there were no public-works, except a wireless post at Port Vila. Roads, wharves, and sea-beacons were unknown: and, of a budget of 400,000 francs, the only work provided for was an expenditure of 10,000 francs on the Vaté roads! Economic matters were untouched, and those planters who desired to abuse the labour-regulations could, at least in so far as the French were concerned, do so with impunity.

In short, the Anglo-French Condominium has broken down in every part. It either did nothing and thus allowed drift, or introduced inapplicable measures based on conditions elsewhere. In neither case did the settlers or the natives benefit, and in neither did the Government advance. Both sides admitted the failure. "The administration of the Condominium," wrote Lippmann in an important article in *Colonies et Marine*, "has clearly shown that it can neither assure the economic development of the lands placed under its authority nor guarantee the security of goods and persons without a very long delay."⁵⁰ The British went further and said that it satisfied nobody, except perhaps the responsible diplomats.⁵¹ Several colonial bodies, notably Australian Commissions in 1916 and 1918, attacked it root-and-branch, and Massey, the Premier of New Zealand, strongly objected to it at the Imperial Conference of 1921. The trouble was not in finding fault with it, but with settling it in diplomacy. Rightly or wrongly, this specific question was one of the tag-end issues of Anglo-French diplomacy, and the moment it was raised, was obscured by an utterly redundant appeal to national pride. Missionary interests in Australia and colonial "diehards" in France refused to consider any compromise or admit the possibility of quite obvious arguments against their side: and any solution was thus put out of court before it could be postulated or considered.

The facts are abundantly clear, and, if they were not obscured by emotional vapourings or considerations of national pride, would not present an intrinsically difficult problem. Briefly, the position is that the French are in an undisputed and growing preponderance, both economic and numerical, in a group which is obviously a geographical and economic outlier of New Caledonia. In 1924 they had 750 nationals in the group to 274 British, and controlled £278,218 of a total external commerce of £353,219,—a position that is becoming clearer owing to Australia's

⁵⁰ Lippmann in *Colonies et Marine*, 1919, p. 356.

⁵¹ To quote instances at random, Fiddes, *The Colonial Office* (1926), p. 208; E. Jacomb, *England and France in the New Hebrides* (1919), Chap. 5 *et seq.*; protests of Australia and New Hebrides in British Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 3288, 1907; Massey's protest at Imperial Conference of 1921.

refusal to aid her colonists there and owing to the successful introduction of Indo-Chinese and Javanese labourers to the French plantations in the last few years. England's claims thus resolve themselves into a 20 per cent. economic interest (and a dwindling one), a geographical argument that is refuted by a glance at the map, and an assertive missionary control.

Yet each of the possible alternatives is opposed. The most obvious one, of giving the group to France and seeking compensation elsewhere, presumably in Africa, is opposed tooth-and-nail by the Australian colonies, for what reason other than the hold of its missionaries there is not clear. The alternative solution of France ceding the group is equally out of the question, quite apart from the overwhelming nature of her interests there. "The souls of our colonists are not in the market for sale," declare the French, and facts count for little before such an argument. Moreover, they declare, with rather more rhetoric than reason, but with at least a fair foundation of fact, a division from New Caledonia is impossible. The two are complements,—the one agricultural, the other mining—"To separate them would be nothing more nor less than cutting one of its limbs from a living being!" The third way out of the dilemma, that of geographical partition of the archipelago, is obviously impossible. The French are in the middle, the British at either end: and, under the conditions, even if a division could be effected, questions of administration and justice and native policy would raise impassable obstacles.

Of these three alternatives, logic clearly points to one only, because, if annexation is to be determined by missionary interests alone, then it would be equally justifiable for the British to demand parts of Korea or, in the Pacific zone, the Loyalties, where a precisely similar position pertains. A step, or at least a tendency, towards the desired direction appeared in 1921 when the Hughes Government in Australia refused to accept the offer of the 750,000 acres held by the Company which had acquired Higginson's interests. As the price involved was only half a million pounds, the estimate placed on New Hebridean affairs by governmental interests in Australia was rather clearly indicated.

The position, therefore, remains unaltered. The French retain and increase their numerical, trading, and social superiority, and are more and more monopolizing the plantations. On the other hand, the Australians have the commercial organization and the more active shipping lines. Over and above this cleavage of interests, the Condominium retards the economic development of the group, neglects native interests, and is an irritant to Anglo-French relations in the Pacific. This child of diplomacy, though perhaps an amusing experiment in international relationships, is an administrative absurdity. It is a completely un-

justifiable arrangement, and, to make the problem more serious, becomes worse with the passage of the years. It may safely be asserted that no other solution would be as bad for any interest (save perhaps that of the missionaries), and that no more inept system of control could be devised : but such strictures have been so often reiterated by even conservative critics on both sides that they have lost their novelty. The Condominium surpasses everything elsewhere in French colonization,—and therein is its ultimate condemnation.

IV. The General Policy of France in the Pacific

France's scattered possessions in the Pacific, while not large, were potentially important, especially in an ocean where strategical considerations play so large a part. France had the elements with which to build up a belt of influence across the Pacific, just as Germany had done from the centre of Samoa in Weber's time, fifty years ago. Indo-China, New Caledonia, Tahiti, Panama,—the map beckoned with an irresistible appeal, especially when the Pacific assumed its new-found importance in world-affairs in the twentieth century.

But, whenever any scheme of this kind was mooted, the most obvious facts were the weaknesses of the French position. When the dreamer turned from linking up scattered groups on the map to considering realities, the position was very different. The various French possessions were isolated and, without exception, practically paralysed by internal problems. All of them were weak financially, even New Caledonia with its mineral resources : all had labour-supplies inadequate to maintain even the existing situation : none of them possessed, or could attract, large supplies of capital : all were practically undeveloped, except for New Caledonia's nickel and chrome : and none had an energetic or even consistent policy. As providing the raw materials for a vague imperialistic venture, they were certainly not promising.

During the war-years, however, the very obviousness of these unpalatable facts was a service, for France realized that the revival of her policy in the Pacific was the only alternative to the disappearance of her interests there. The crisis had become so acute that France had to do something because of the very intensity of her despair. Certainly, things could scarcely have been worse, as all of the perennial weaknesses of island-life had become accentuated by the events of the War. The groups were cut off from the outside world, and, from an economic and governmental point of view, simply languished. They had to pay exorbitant prices for the goods they needed and could not dispose of their own products. Copra, vanilla, and pearl-shell—the island staples—all fell in 1914, then for a time boomed, but finally collapsed, the uncertainty

in each case being far worse than the diminished returns. After 1920 in particular, all of the island products fell to a half or a third of their value within two years, the result being the final collapse of State finances everywhere.⁵² The isolation of the War and the dislocation of trade had gravely affected the respective Treasuries, the small credit-balances of 1914 had been absorbed, and when the franc began to depreciate, all, even New Caledonia, were faced with the prospect of immediate bankruptcy. That economic prosperity which had been slowly emerging before the War thus received a rude shock, and the islands drifted in a despairing lethargy.⁵³

The collapse of the unduly optimistic outlook towards the Panama Canal also worked in the same direction. In 1912 the French had hailed the opening of the Canal as an event that was to galvanize their Pacific colonies into a new existence, that was to give their policy in the ocean a new meaning, and that was, in a word, to make them the arbiters in the life of the South Pacific. Papeete harbour in Tahiti, according to a Commission of 1913, was to become the trade cross-roads of the Pacific, and arrangements were made to spend seven million francs in modernizing it.⁵⁴ The French anticipated at least an annual tonnage of 600,000 there, and hoped that New Caledonia, across the ocean, would also be retrieved from its isolation. Accordingly, the law to carry out this scheme was passed in April, 1914, absolutely without discussion.⁵⁵ But the War came, nothing happened to Papeete (beyond a very thorough German bombardment), and the Panama anticipations were far from being realized.

Equally pessimistic was the governmental outlook. The islands appeared to be veritable administrative graveyards. Tahiti, with its thirty-one Governors in forty years, was a monument of inefficiency and retarded development: the Marquesas was a charnel-house of a few thousand despairing natives: New Caledonia, confronted by the financial crisis after the end of transportation and the failure to support Feillet's policy of free settlement, was wavering: and the New Hebrides, despite the virility of French economic interests there, was hampered by the Condominium form of administration. The great colonial house-cleaning of the years after the War therefore found very dirty corners in the French domain in the Pacific. A few isolated lifeless colonies seemed to sum up the position, and, if there were large possibilities, these remained only in theory. On the other hand, France had the nucleus of a strong position

⁵² *L'Océanie Française*, Jan. 1924.

⁵³ For position, see Regelsperger et Pelleray, *L'Océanie Française*, 1922, for each group.

⁵⁴ *Journal Officiel des Établissements françaises de l'Océanie*, 19/5/13—two official reports.

⁵⁵ *Journal Officiel* (Paris), 4/3/14.

there : the Tahitian group, despite its administrative anæmia, had been slowly prospering before the War ; New Caledonia had its minerals and its large European population ; and the French position in New Hebridean settlement was improving. The elements for advance were clearly there, however abused they may have been in the past, and however hidden they were at the moment by the veil of pessimism that had cast itself over island affairs.

But these elements were useless unless France could make them productive by bringing in labour and capital in sufficient quantities. This was easier said than done, however, because where was a country faced by the post-war economic crisis, by the depreciation of the franc, and by the growing demands of the African Empire to find men or money for her fragmentary possessions at the Antipodes ? At the best, the investment would be but a hazard, judging by past experiences ; and the country was naturally averse to wasting its resources. But here a new element entered. France itself could clearly not sponsor Pacific development, even if she so wished ; but there was a newer France, " France in Asia," that might perchance fill this rôle.

That Indo-China was in a position to do this, if she wished to, was undoubted. The federation was in such an advantageous position that it could easily become the centre of a new French Imperialism in the Eastern hemisphere. It had made wonderful progress since 1905 and was developing in all directions. It was the richest of all the French colonies except North Africa, had a population of 18 millions concentrated in a small area, and an external commerce of 2,300 million francs (1920). Its Treasury reserves were 200 million francs, and there was so much money idle in the country that a local loan was many times over-subscribed. Moreover, in parts, especially the Tonkinese delta, Indo-China was over-populated, so much so that one authority asserted that 40,000 trained men were at the moment available for labour in other colonies. That is, Indo-China had both the men and the money of which the Pacific colonies stood in so great a need.⁵⁶

Why not, therefore, urged the reformers of the Sarraut and Hubert schools, join these two sets of factors for the improvement of both ? What was to prevent the surplus in the one going to fill the gap in the other ? In the Pacific, France had only 80,000 lazy New Hebrideans, most of whom were unaccustomed to the shackles of settled life ; 28,000 New Caledonians who sullenly refused to work ; 1,500 Marquesans who were merely living dead ; and 20,000 Tahitians who had the name of being regular Cythereans, artists of laziness. True, there were the Chinese immigrants, but France wished to keep development in her

⁵⁶ Froidevaux in *L'Asie Française*, April 1923.

own hands, although she obviously could not do so without labour. Without this, New Caledonia's nickel and cobalt, and the plantations of Tahiti and the New Hebrides would be mere paper-assets. Capital was a difficult problem, but labour a matter of life or death.

To remedy this fault, and to connect Indo-China's strength with the Pacific's weakness, the reformers formulated their scheme for "*une entr'aide coloniale*," which was to transform France's position in the ocean. The scheme was first mooted by the *Comité de l'Océanie Française* in 1921, adopted by the budget-reporter, Léon Archimbaud, in the same year, and, a little later, officially supported by Albert Sarraut, the Minister for the Colonies.⁵⁷ As a symbol of the new connection, M. Rivet, the head of the Civil Service in Indo-China, was appointed Governor of Tahiti, with the special understanding that he was to further the policy. Then, the plan was submitted to the Deputies, and, after a long delay due to local truculence, approved by the Government-Council of Indo-China in December, 1923. After that date, the plan to revive the French groups in the Pacific by unlimited Asiatic immigration and Indo-Chinese capital was accepted as an integral part of French colonial policy. As Archimbaud summed up the position, the aims were—

"To give the Governor-General of Indo-China the necessary powers for establishing and maintaining a French policy in the Pacific that would safeguard our interests and rights, and in addition, to give Indo-China a right of moral, and in certain cases, material tutelage over our Oceanic possessions in order to put a close to the almost complete neglect which distance from the metropolis has meant for them."⁵⁸

In practice, the policy of an *entr'aide* meant Asiatic immigration. This, however, was far from being an entirely new feature in island-life. France had already tried Javanese and Indo-Chinese and Indian coolies in the early years of the century in New Caledonia; but the difficulties of selection and the undue expense of the system had led to its abandonment. Moreover, there was no central power of direction to keep it going, and, after the financial crisis of 1903-1906, the experiment simply died of inanition. The newer venture, however, was on a far different plane: it had Governmental direction, and scope, and continuity, and in every way, a fundamental place in island-life.

The first Tonkinese under its ægis went to New Caledonia in August, 1920, to the New Hebrides early in 1923, and to Tahiti two years later. So successful were they that 5,300 Asiatics, including Javanese, had been

⁵⁷ See *Dépêche Coloniale et Maritime*, 10/8/22, or *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises* (1923), p. 73 *et seq.*

⁵⁸ *L'Océanie Française*, Dec. 1922; Nov.-Dec. 1923; and June-July 1924. An account is in S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (1927), p. 287.

landed in the western groups by the end of 1924, and the demand for them was constantly increasing.⁶⁹ They have provided labour for the mineral revival in New Caledonia and have allowed the French planters in the New Hebrides to forge ahead of their English rivals. Commissions of inquiry from Indo-China have professed themselves satisfied with the conditions under which the immigrants find themselves, and Indo-China has largely overcome its initial aversion to the scheme. In short, the predictions of the reformers have fully justified themselves, and the French are rapidly aiding that Orientalization which is taking place in all Pacific lands.

At the same time, new steamship lines have connected Saigon and New Caledonia, and even Tahiti, thus linking the island groups together and effecting what was termed "a veritable economic revolution." Indo-China also financed immigration schemes from Java and advanced loans to Tahiti to carry out the old Papeete port project, as a forerunner of her duties of economic guardianship. To cement the structure, a "High Commissioner-ship of the Pacific," a concentration of local units on the lines advocated by de Lanessan forty years ago, was mooted. Hanoi was then to gather together all of the strands of French policy in the Orient and the Pacific, and thus secure that uniformity and continuity that had been impossible under the old localist *régimes*.

Against the success of the new policy, however, certain forces are operating. The projected unity is largely artificial, because Saigon and Nouméa are 4,700 miles apart, and Nouméa is still 2,500 miles from Tahiti. Moreover, each falls within a different economic world. Indo-China is an appendage of China, while New Caledonia naturally turns to Australia, tariff difficulties notwithstanding, and Tahiti to America. That was why the movement for a single Government-General of the Pacific failed before the War, and why any uniform Pacific policy has hitherto proved impossible. Add to these factors the still scantily veiled reluctance of the Indo-Chinese Government to further the scheme—in fact, any scheme ready-made for them by the metropolis,—and the difficulties of the situation will be readily manifest. Whether these factors will triumph in the end, or whether the French will continue to introduce 5,000 Asiatics to their island-groups every year and thus metamorphose their economic position there, remains to be seen.

Up to the present, while the economic side of the project has been successful, it cannot be said that the Governmental aspects of the plan to secure a uniform French policy in the Pacific have had much effect. The scheme as a whole may mean much and may indissolubly link Indo-

⁶⁹ *L'Océanie Française*, Jan.-Feb. 1925, for results. The rules are in *Journal Officiel des Etablissements françaises de l'Océanie*, 1/4/24.

China and all of France's interests in the Pacific zone : it will probably dwindle to a more or less spasmodic introduction of Indo-Chinese labourers, —a trend that is foreshadowed already by the turn to Javanese, with the implication that, after all, the contents of the Indo-Chinese reservoirs are not proving as amenable as could be desired. "*Entr'aide*" remains a fine theory and to date a success : its future is another matter. But it cannot be doubted that the French are making a very active fight to maintain and extend their interests in the Pacific. France realizes that world-affairs are coming to concentrate more and more on the Pacific basin and its fringe-lands, and, her interests in Indo-China, at the very portal of the ocean, being what they are, sees that she cannot over-emphasize the importance of a consistent and aggressive policy there. In Africa, the main part of her task consisted in the formulation of an energetic and, above all, uniform plan for the whole of her interests : precisely the same considerations apply to the regions of French ambitions between Siam and Panama. A spirit of energy and a consistent determination to fight an economic struggle over a long period of time,—both hitherto somewhat rare attributes of French colonization,—have without doubt differentiated this new "*entr'aide*" policy from its predecessors, —and that is the characteristic that makes its possibilities so large.

CHAPTER XIV



MOROCCO

I. The Struggle to 1912



IT was inevitable that Morocco, the *Maghreb*, Islam's westernmost outpost, should come within the orbit of French colonization. While it did not follow that this was necessitated by the occupation of Algiers in 1830, as certain French imperialists would have us believe, the move west in Oran and the march on the Figig oases placed the question in an entirely new light. It was only after this natural expansion that the issue of the three Mauretanas, as the Tunisia-Morocco scheme was called, became a practical one. Up to that time, the French claim was rather beside the point. A claim for the realization of natural geographical frontiers, unsupported by any effective occupation, was not a very valid one. Moreover, if geography were the deciding factor, as the French implied, then the Atlas should have been the western limit of French North Africa, and what geographical foundation was there for the boundary between Tunisia and Tripolitania? The law of geographical unity was invoked by the French only after the event and as an extra weapon in their armoury: and it was as relevant to the actual conditions as was the argument of the unity of the Mauretanas under the Romans. It is to other explanations that one must look for the source of French policy in Morocco. The move to a natural frontier would perchance explain the onrush as far as the Muluya: but, for the occupation of the west of Morocco (and it was there that the French turned first), quite distinct economic issues and the general rivalries of diplomacy have to be looked to.

This means to say that, apart from the Ujda-Figig sector, which is really a natural prolongation of Algeria, the Moroccan problem was an entity in itself. The elements of that problem could be simply stated. Morocco was the most favoured part of North Africa by nature: it was the richest agriculturally, it had the most forest resources, and it was the least densely peopled. Even in 1921, there were only 5½ million natives. It had an area almost equal to that of France, and was divided into geographical zones so varied as to allow the crops and pastures of Europe as well as tropical products like cotton. Its Tell, or coastal

NOTE THE CONCENTRATION ON THE PLAINS.



DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION



NOTE THE LIMIT IMPOSED BY THE MOUNTAINS.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

PH ROBERTS

plain, was larger than that of Algeria, and seemed an inexhaustible reservoir of agricultural supplies. It was a land of well-developed towns, especially in the middle steppes going up to the Atlas, and, to make the prospect still more inviting to the outsider, there was perpetual local rivalry between the various towns,—between Fez and Marrakeah, and between Casablanca and Rabat and Mazagan. But all alike, rival towns and rival country districts, wanted European goods and offered a virgin market. Trade, industry, agriculture, and even the alluring will-o'-the-wisp of subsoil riches,—all were there for the taking, a rich prize at any time, but doubly so at the end of the nineteenth century, when the partition of Africa had proceeded so far that only desert lands remained. The trade and agriculture of Morocco were very piquant attractions to a Europe confronted by a growing problem of markets in the new protectionist era, and by an increasing difficulty of securing cereals. Morocco was a safety-valve of considerable importance to the industrialists of whatever European country might secure predominance there: and it was equally a source of food-supplies. The economic *motif* for the Moroccan scramble was thus clear, and it was the more attractive because of its somewhat nebulous and uncertain nature.

Nor were actual pretexts for intervention difficult to find. The land was in a chaos politically,—an anomaly in the Mediterranean. It was a sixteenth-century Moslem State, isolated from the world of Islam, vegetating in its isolation, and unmoved by modern progress. Observers like Pierre Loti might rhapsodize about its immobility and romantic charm, but beneath the surface there was very little romance, less efficiency, and no adaptability. Indeed, there was no "Morocco": this was simply a generic term, chosen for its convenience to designate a multitude of contradictions, a confused medley which knew neither organization nor spontaneity. Just as the term "Morocco" was only a geographical expression, so was it only a diplomatic fiction. The land was not a State, so much as an incoherent jumble of constantly shifting peoples, bound only by a nominal spiritual submission to one man. "It was a mosaic of Moslem peoples and tribes, of Arab and Berber languages, of whom some obeyed a central power, and thus presented a certain cohesion, while the rest were more or less completely free from this power."¹ Theoretically, the Alaouite Sultans were at once the spiritual and temporal heads of the Empire, but in practice they exercised sovereignty over only a quarter of Morocco,—that part of the west known as the *Blad el Makhzen*, which included the ports and the big towns of the plain. Beyond that was the *Blad Siba*, the so-called rebel portion,

¹ Lyautey, *Rapport Général sur la Situation du Protectorat du Maroc au 31 juillet, 1914* (1916), p. 49,—the fundamental source.

most of which never submitted. True, there was a certain frontier area which temporarily gave in to a strong Sultan, but even here there was a continual flux, while, beyond this, the rebel tribes exercised an undisputed hegemony. Everything was chronically instable. Even in the coastal plain, the Sultans kept their power only by fomenting rivalries between the tribes. As a result of this weakness, Casablanca and Fez, and sometime Marrakesh, limited the average Sultan's authority,—a position which was clearly intolerable to any outside Power having relations with Morocco. How could France, for instance, demand redress from the Sultan if the Ujda tribes despoiled the desert caravans when the Sultan had as little control over those tribesmen as he had over the nomads of Onomotopa?

Even within the nominally organized zone, there was still uncertainty. Some part of the country was invariably given over to anarchy or rebellion: travellers going from Fez to Marrakesh always had to go *via* Rabat, and it was never possible to travel more than 30 miles a day. Life was of little value, especially a foreigner's; and trade and commerce were almost impossible in the interior. Even in the eight treaty-ports opened to commerce, life was sufficiently uncertain to prevent monotony. Anarchy, corruption, and impotence were the key-notes of this pre-French Morocco, and the entire structure, rotten to the core, was a disgrace to civilization. As the British Minister, Sir John Drummond Hay, described it, Morocco was "a kingdom of fishes of prey: one wherein the biggest of all lives by devouring the next biggest, those in turn the smaller, and so on down to the minnows feeding on the almost inanimate larvæ."² The land was a fœtid marsh rather than the mystic outpost of mediæval Islam that Loti imagined.³

The drift had been accentuated since 1894. Up to then, Moulay Hassan had kept order. He was the last strong ruler, and had even conquered the Atlas and part of the desert. But his military prowess and organizing ability served only to emphasize the collapse after his death. His son, Moulay Abdul Aziz, was an easily amused weakling, absorbed in the outward frills of civilization, but letting power slip from his hands: and the next Sultan, Moulay Hafid, was a neurasthenic who was a prey of cupidity and xenophobia. Under him (1908-1912) the land lost its last vestige of orderly government and sloughed into anarchy pure and simple.⁴ These last two rulers rendered foreign control inevit-

² Quoted by McLeod in *Geographical Journal* (London), 1918, p. 85.

³ A good account of pre-French organization is in Tardieu's report, *Compte Rendu des Travaux du Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord*, 1909, Vol. II, p. 651, or E. Aubin, *Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui* (1904).

⁴ *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. I, 1901-1905 (1905), *passim*.

able, and the question now was not so much whether Morocco should be independent, as what Power should assume control? Or, even more important, what economic compensations were the rival Powers to receive?

Here, France asserted her claims. Her trading rights were supposed to go back to the Middle Ages, but for all practical purposes they arose in the east from the Treaty of Isly (1845) and in the west from the Convention of Madrid (1880). But to minimize them, was the consideration that the former were only border rights and the latter were shared equally by several other Powers: so that, in 1900, France seemed to have no especial claim to Morocco, beyond a right of police intervention amongst the Ujda tribes of the east. Indeed, England had a far greater commercial interest in the land, for, in 1901, her maritime commerce with Morocco amounted to 31 million francs as against France's 24 million.

Seeing this, France introduced a new factor, and insisted that the territorial contiguity of Algeria and Morocco gave France "a special interest" in the land.⁵ This explained, or perhaps was explained by, the French move in the early years of this century to the economic penetration of the Ujda Tell and the Figig oases. Once accomplished, this gave rise to the claim that Morocco, at least in the east, was but a geographical and economic prolongation of Oran. The claim was first placed on a diplomatic footing by M. Delcassé, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet, in an important speech in the Senate in July, 1901.⁶ This may be taken as the beginning of the French move to Morocco. Delcassé literally claimed that the geographical situation made Eastern Morocco "an *enclave* of our African possessions" and that, in consequence, Morocco had to be modernized. The urgent needs of industrial expansion made this necessary, and, while Delcassé disclaimed any intention of indiscreetly hastening such a development, he made it clear that, once the transformation was decided upon, France expected that it was her aid and experience that would be enlisted. This frank declaration of July, 1901, was doubly important. It cleared the air and definitely demanded for France a priority in Morocco: but it also coupled the two reasons of an economic penetration from the Algerian side and a wider industrial expansion from France. It was a regular *exposé des motifs*. Taking advantage of the border-forays of 1901, Delcassé had thus set the stage: under him, France had commenced a policy of peaceful, but decided, penetration and had become the economic sponsor of an awakening Morocco.

The new relationship soon found expression in the arrangements

⁵ Delcassé in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 10/12/01, 24/11/03.

⁶ *Id.*, *ib.*, Senate, 6/7/01.

regarding the Algerian frontier. A protocol of July, 1901, provided for the establishment of order in the Figig oases, which were thus opened to France and incidentally gave her a closer control on all of the caravan routes which came from the desert, even as far as Lake Chad. The same protocol sanctioned a railway to Beni-Ounif to tap this desert trade at the head. The effect in general was to remove the sixty-years' deadlock in this region and to allow a forward economic policy over the oases and up to the Muluya. An accord of the next year went further, and set up "a mixed zone," so that French and Moroccan authorities could co-operate in the maintenance of peace in this region.⁷

But this joint action was not successful, and, by July, 1903, Delcassé had come to realize the limitations of the eastern approach to Morocco. Therefore, he eagerly grasped the financial straits of the Sultan as a pretext for intervening more and more on the western side of the Atlas. Morocco was rapidly drifting: foreign loans were becoming more and more difficult: the new silver money was depreciating in value: and the tribes refused to obey the fiscal reforms. Hence France changed the direction of her efforts, going, so to speak, from the periphery to the centre, especially when the Anglo-French declaration of April, 1904, gave her a free hand in Morocco in return for a like privilege to England in Egypt.⁸ She at once became more insistent on the need for reform in Morocco,—“wishing its prosperity, because our own, and that of our Algeria, depend on it.”

The first move in this direction was in June of the same year, when French banks funded the Moroccan debt by a loan of 62½ million francs. This was guaranteed by the Customs revenue, which was to be collected by French agents. The Moroccan customs thus fell to France, and already, Taillandier, the French Minister at Fez, was speaking of the inevitability of a new police force and a State Bank.⁹ Economic penetration was clearly gathering pace, and the general trend in 1904 was unmistakable. In November the Deputies passed an appropriation for humanitarian works in Morocco,¹⁰ and the question was no longer whether the French should go there, but what means they would employ. Despite the exuberance of the colonial party, Delcassé still stood firm for a purely economic penetration, and, in a policy-speech of November 10, 1904, defined the aim as an economic aid to Morocco, and, in return, a utiliza-

⁷ *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. I, 1901-1905, pp. 27, 49 *et seq.*

⁸ At the same time as the published Lansdowne-Cambon Agreement of 8/4/04 was a *secret* one (not published till 1911), partitioning Morocco between France and Spain. See *Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. I, 1901-1905, p. 134 *et seq.*; article in *Revue Générale du Droit International Public*, 1904, p. 701.

⁹ *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. I, 1901-1905, pp. 141 *et seq.*, 179.

¹⁰ *Journal Officiel*, *Déps.*, 27/11/04.

tion of the country's resources. Customs control had already been obtained: for the near future, he envisaged a new police, a French State-Bank, roads from Algeria, and a vigorous port policy. Railways and ports and financial stability,—these were to be the methods of France's economic protectorate over Morocco.¹¹ Taillandier rapidly carried out his instructions on this topic and, in March, 1905, demanded reforms along these lines.

At this stage, however, a new force entered the situation, rudely shattering France's peaceful penetration. Germany changed her passive hostility to active opposition and demanded the internationalization of Morocco's resources,—a claim that was incompatible with French policy. "It is held that our peaceful penetration cannot be reconciled with respect of the Sultan's full sovereignty," reported Bihaud, the French Ambassador in Berlin, in March, 1905. Both sides stood firm, and in rapid succession came the visit of the German Emperor to Tangier, the consequent refusal of the Sultan to accept the French reforms, the resignation of Delcassé and the implied reversal of his economic policy. Germany insisted on an international conference to settle the matter, and the Conference of Algceiras met in the first four months of 1906.¹²

To guard against a breakdown, certain basic principles were agreed on beforehand and were placed outside the realm of discussion. It was recognized that Morocco had to be independent and that all nations had to have economic equality there. But, at the same time, it was conceded that police and financial reforms were necessary and that, in considering these, France's "particular relations" and "special interest" were to be taken into account.¹³

It is interesting to note how the basis of France's special claims had widened by this time. Rouvier, Delcassé's successor, in an important policy-pronouncement of December, 1905, explained these claims as starting from the fact of the Algerian frontier, as being extended by the French position in Western Morocco, but as being, above all, based on considerations of wider policy.

"The special situation that we occupy in Morocco does not arise from the contiguity of our frontiers: our right has a more general source. It

¹¹ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 11/11/04. See long statement by Taillandier in *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. I, 1901-1905, p. 179.

¹² For details of these events, see French *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. I, 1901-1905, p. 196 *et seq.*, or German *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, 1871-1914, Vol. XX, Part 1, p. 197 *et seq.* The German point of view is best summed up in Radolin-Rouvier, 24/6/05, in *Livre Jaune*, p. 242, the French in Rouvier's speech in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 11/7/05.

¹³ *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XX, Part 2, pp. 591-592; *Livre Jaune, op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 306-307.

consists of the fact that France is the great Moslem Power of Northern Africa, that we have to maintain and preserve our authority there over a population of six million natives in contact with 700,000 European colonists, and that the community of languages and religion and race which draws this population to that of Morocco makes it susceptible to all the excitements that may develop in the neighbouring State, either from the absence of a regular government or from the institution of a hostile government."

Therefore, while ceding economic equality to other Powers, and while recognizing the Sultan's independence and integrity, France could not, would not, relinquish her special position in Morocco.¹⁴

After an especially troubled Conference, the General Act of Algieras (April 7, 1906) stereotyped these principles and laid down the direction of future reforms. In each of the crucial issues there had to be a compromise. A joint Franco-Spanish harbour-police was to be set up in the eight ports open to European commerce: the State Bank was to be subscribed to by each of the signatory Powers, and, while having its seat in Paris, was not to be an exclusively French institution: and no public works were to go to the profit of particular interests.¹⁵ In a word, while France retained an economic predominance, she was not given a monopoly, for the limitations imposed on her action by the new international régime were very real. If she had maintained her contention of "special interest," it was only by placing shackles on the future development of those interests.

This Act was the climax of the first period of French policy in Morocco. Delcassé's policy of a steady economic penetration was hereafter discredited, and still more was the strident demand of certain French papers "to make Morocco a second Tunisia." The check of 1906 was so real as to cause a drift for six years. The forward policy was definitely in the discard. France had to intervene, it is true, but, in every field, her action was curtailed. Economically, the forward policy was paralysed: politically, there was an aversion to Morocco: and militarily, there was as little aggression as possible. It was a period of thwarted action and half-hearted policy. Lacking the optimistic aggressiveness of a Delcassé and with the vitalizing spark of keenness gone from her economic policy, France drifted in Morocco, uncertain of her ends and suspicious of her methods. The State Bank was set up in 1907, a French engineer was placed at the head of the public works, and the port-police

¹⁴ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 17/12/05.

¹⁵ For proceedings in full, see *Livre Jaune, Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. II (1906), p. 5 et seq., or *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XX, Part 2 (preludes), and Vol. XXI, Part 1 (the Conference itself). The General Act is in *Livre Jaune*, Vol. II, p. 260. For French estimate of results, see *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 13/4/06 (Bourgeois). The English view-point is in Viscount Grey, *Twenty-five Years* (1925), Vol. I, pp. 74, 104.

were organized; but the international *régime* beyond this failed, and Morocco sank into an anarchy which grew on itself. Commerce and even security were menaced afresh. The depredations of Raisuli in Tangier became such as could no longer be ignored: the Taflelt side, abutting on Algeria, was in a state of chronic unrest: all commerce from Algeria was suspended in 1906: and practically the whole of the south and east and north were given over to anarchy. In view of this paralysis, and because French nationals had to be avenged, France was forced to occupy Ujda from the Algerian side and Casablanca from the west in 1907.¹⁶ It is quite clear from the documents available that she did not want to pursue a forward policy in Western Morocco at this time¹⁷: but she had to go, and, willy-nilly, had to stay. "The preponderant importance of our commercial interests, to-day beyond question, is such that we could not contemplate with indifference the blow which a troubled situation would mean to the economic progress of Morocco," reported Regnault, the Minister-Plenipotentiary in Morocco, in December, 1907¹⁸: and, because of this, France had to retain the Shawia. The facts of the situation continually demanded a more comprehensive policy and, from the end of 1907, even economic considerations were being merged in wider interests.

France had gone to Casablanca merely to chastise murderers, but the menace of a civil war again changed the situation. Moulay Hafid proclaimed himself Sultan and intervened in the Shawia, that coastal province where the French had established themselves. As the joint report of Lyautey and Regnault showed in April, 1908, this act again "modified the conditions of the problem by obliging us to penetrate to the interior and exercise an energetic restraint over the tribes." But, even when thus compelled by the logic of facts to interfere, the only goal was to subdue the rich Shawia plain and to hold its outlets by a ring of *kasbahs*.

Then, and for long after, the idea at the back of French minds (and it must be remembered that this was the heyday of colonial indifference in Paris) was to occupy the periphery posts only until native troops could take them over. The Shawia was held by natives (April, 1908), with a reserve, but an ever-diminishing reserve, of Europeans. The French concept was purely negative,—to create native forces to hold the country and to enable France to trade in peace. "We will thus form the skeleton of an organism which we can leave to itself when it offers adequate


¹⁶ Livre Jaune, *Les Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. II, 1906-1907, p. 11.

¹⁷ "Our action in Ujda is not a step towards Fez," wrote M. Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in March, 1907. *Les Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. III, p. 206.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 35.


CONFIGURATION

- 0 - 1000 METERS HIGH.
- 1000 - 2000
- 2000 - 3000
- OVER 3000



LANGUAGES

- BERBER
- BILINGUAL TRIBES
- ARAB



guarantees of consistence and stability.”¹⁹ Conquest, as such, was forbidden, and direct rule was out of the question. It is thus quite erroneous to say that France pursued a forward policy in Morocco after Delcassé's fall, or even after the occupation of the Shawia. To the contrary, from Delcassé's resignation up to the proclamation of the protectorate, there was an undue waiting on events, despite adequate pretexts for intervention, both in the west and the east. Nor was this the result of the Algeciras restrictions: the truth was that it was the direct expression of the anti-colonial feeling in France in those years. As a result, the modesty of French demands after 1908 was a positive fault,—a sacrifice of facts to the idealistic policy that the Moroccans could be left to themselves and could restore that tranquillity which was necessary for economic development. To buttress an *a priori* theory of withdrawal, the Quai d'Orsay neglected both facts and the views of the man on the spot. Hence the drift, the solution of which became more difficult with the passing of every year.

While the French wavered, Moulay Hafid had scattered his brother's last *mahalla* and had occupied even the coastal regions. Regnault then negotiated with the new Sultan (August, 1908), and insisted on the French evacuating the outer Shawia, right up to Ber Rechid. He stressed “the provisional character” of the occupation even of the fragment retained. France still believed in the chimera of joint Franco-Moroccan action,²⁰ although, in 1909, the incongruity of the situation was shown by the mutilation of prisoners of war by the Moroccans, and its impracticability revealed by Moulay Hafid's attacks on French agricultural *associés*. The Sultan was clearly adopting a more aggressive policy, spurred on, perhaps, by France's negative attitude. For instance, as late as March, 1910, the French arranged for the complete evacuation of the Shawia as soon as Morocco should have fifteen hundred trained men there.

Indeed, the evacuation of the Tadla had already commenced (November, 1910) when the railway dispute broke out. By that time, pacification had gone far, despite the Sultan's obstructions, and, beyond the *Blad el Makhzen*, the crop of frontier risings and provincial pretenders was noticeably yielding less. As a corollary of this pacification, French trade was quietly but steadily growing, at the expense of her rivals, as the table shows:—

¹⁹ Report by Regnault and Lyautey in *Les Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. IV, p. 215 *et seq.* See pp. 253-254 for the *provisional* nature of the occupation.

²⁰ Livre Jaune, *Les Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. V, 1908-1910, pp. 49, 71, 94 *et seq.*

	1902.	1903.	1904.	1905.	1906.	1907.
			(Millions of Francs.)			
Total commerce. . . .	103	109	97	78	74	76
France and Algeria . . .	32	34	29	30	42	34
England	43	45	39	23	24	25
Germany	9	10	10	7	7	9

That is, it had increased not only in volume, but from 31 per cent. of the total in 1902 to 56 per cent. in 1906.²¹

Therefore, Germany once more took a hand at the commencement of 1911, and protested that France was contravening the spirit of Algeciras by securing an economic preponderance in Morocco. The bone of contention was the railway question, with its corollary of ports. France insisted on linking Casablanca and Fez, and thus making possible a continuous railway-system from Algeria to the Atlantic; while Germany demanded an international railway from Tangier in the north. The French argument was that the diplomatic arrangements of Algeciras had not foreseen the economic problems that had emerged, and that the position had completely changed in the interim.²²

There could be no doubt as to the validity of this last contention. The position had changed beyond doubt in 1911, for the old policy of withdrawal was clearly cracking. The French were no longer content to combine a political *laissez-faire* with a quiet economic penetration. They wanted to strengthen the bonds. In January, 1911, for instance, the *chargé d'affaires* at Tangier had said, "it is absolutely necessary to exercise a vigorous repression in order to put an end to such boundary upheavals as have taken place in the Zaër"; yet it was clear that to go to the Zaër meant to go to Khenifra and that this in turn meant the Atlas foothills. The forests and plains of the Shawia no longer shut in French aims: the broken ridge of the High Atlas was beckoning. So that it is doubtful whether the upheavals at Fez in 1911 were as unwelcome as the French *Livre Jaune* makes out, or as much a pretext as the German *Die Grosse Politik* would imply. Three years before, when Abd el Aziz had been threatened, France stood aloof: now, when Moulay Hafid was menaced by the Berber rising, she resolved to support him to the utmost, her reward to be certain reforms. Clearly, the nature of French policy had changed in the interim. Hence, in April, 1911, a French column was sent to help the Cherifian *harka* relieve Fez.²³

This march was the *tour de force*. France at once demanded reforms, pleading the financial crisis as a necessity. But at this stage, Germany

²¹ *Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord, Compte Rendu*, 1909, Vol. II, p. 655.

²² *Livre Jaune, Les Affaires du Maroc*, Vol. VI, 1910-1912, p. 33 *et seq.* See p. 105 for German *pro memoria*.

²³ *Livre Jaune, op. cit.*, Vol. VI, 1910-1912, p. 233; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XXIX (1925), p. 71 *et seq.*

once more intervened. She sent a vessel of war to Agadir (July 1, 1911) and thus swept the whole Moroccan question, in its new and vitally changed form, into the vortex of diplomacy.²⁴ The German claims that the Algeciras arrangements were antiquated and that the integrity of the Sultan was incompatible with the existing position were to a large degree justified, although the method of her protest, especially since Agadir was a closed port, left much to be desired. After protracted negotiations—negotiations impeded by a militant public opinion in each of the countries concerned—the Franco-German Agreement of November 4, 1911, was agreed upon. In essence, this gave France a free hand in Morocco, even to the extent of a protectorate. "You are the masters of Morocco," said Bethmann-Hollweg to Cambon the day it was signed: and France, by ceding an unhealthy and undeveloped part of the Congo, "was left with her prestige intact and freed from the Moroccan thumb-screws."²⁵

Decisive action was now possible, and France did not delay. Four months later, Regnault went with a Special Mission to Fez and negotiated the treaty of protectorate (March 30, 1912). This was really a repetition, with a few amendments, of the Treaty of Bardo with Tunisia thirty years before, and provided, in one sweeping clause, for a new *régime*, "allowing such administrative, judicial, educational, economic, financial and military reforms as the French Government may deem necessary." The Sultan was to be protected and maintained, and was to be the mouthpiece of government. The Mohammedan religion and institutions, especially the religious lands (*habous*) always so important in a Moslem country, were to be respected. But, over and above those limitations, France, represented by a Resident-General, was to manage all foreign affairs and to supervise internal administration.²⁶ As a result, France had a free hand in Morocco, but with the important limitations of previous diplomatic agreements and the difficulties bequeathed by her own irresolute policy since 1905. It was not so much *carte blanche* as an inky paper and a pencil eraser.

²⁴ For the Agadir episode, see *Livre Jaune*, Vol. VI, 1910-12, p. 386 *et seq.*; *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XXIX (1925), p. 37 *et seq.* For England's attitude, see p. 167 or Grey, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 220. The correspondence in the *Livre Jaune*, Vol. VI, pp. 125-255, shows the emergence of Franco-German hostility. For the French view, see the debates in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 15-21/12/11, 6-11/2/12, or books by A. Tardieu and P. Albin (1912).

²⁵ For negotiations, see *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. XXV, Chaps. cxxxx-cxxxxi, or *Livre Jaune*, Vol. VI, p. 632 *et seq.*

²⁶ Part III of Long's report in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., docts. parl., 1912, No. 1994, or Baudin's report in *Ibid.*, Senate, 1912, p. 873. See *L'Afrique Française*, April, 1912, p. 130 *et seq.*

II. Lyautey's Theory

That was the position in 1912. The Shawia, a rich coastal province with 300,000 people, was effectively occupied: the Fez-Rabat road, though opened in the previous year, was still precariously held: and, on the Algerian side, vigorous movements in the same year had swept up to the Muluya and had opened Debdou market. But, beyond that, everything was difficult. The rebels were "up" everywhere, Fez itself was invested, Moulay Hafid was becoming more xenophobist every day, and French prestige had been gravely weakened by "the excessive reduction of effectives, the absence of an economic plan, and the slowness of decisions." Nor were the least difficulties in Paris, where Jaurès was insisting that "the noble Kabyle democracies" could settle their own affairs! ²⁷

At this moment of indecision, when the accumulated heritage of the past threatened to wreck the promise of the future, General Paul Lyautey was appointed as the first Resident-General of France in Morocco (May, 1912),—the turning-point in the province's history.²⁸ Lyautey was a man with a past and a theory. The experience of the one and the execution of the other combined to make him one of the great French colonials, not the least in that list in which Randon and Bugeaud, Paul Bert and Galliéni had preceded him.

Lyautey had served a lifetime in the colonies.²⁹ He commenced in Algeria and Tonkin, imbued with a deep respect for the ordered plan and rapid execution of British colonial methods. On the road to Tonkin, he summed up his impressions thus, incidentally arriving by a negative process at a realization of the things he desired,—“English power,—unity of plan,—continuity of designs,—governmental stability,—inflexible method, immediate execution,—a practical sense, tenacity, and an essentially elastic adaptation to the country and the climate. In a word, all that we have not.” On the other hand, he noticed that the English method implied an aloofness from the natives and left only a very narrow scope for native co-operation. This seemed to him a fundamental error, because his earlier studies of Mohammedan organization in Algeria had convinced him of the necessity of such co-operation. Conditions in Tonkin confirmed this impression of his, because there he saw for the first time de Lanessan's methods, which were based entirely on a consideration of native susceptibilities. To a realization of what

²⁷ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 17/6/11, 29/6/12. For French divided opinion, see *Ibid.*, Deps., 15, 22, 29/6/12, 2/7/12.

²⁸ *L'Afrique Française*, May 1912, pp. 161, 183.

²⁹ Terrier in *Ibid.*, May 1912, p. 189, or Georges-Gaulis, *La France au Maroc. L'Œuvre du General Lyautey* (1920), p. 40.

the English had and what they lacked, there now came the heritage of Paul Bert and de Lanessan; and Lyautey's ideas soon crystallized. He translated them into practice by pacifying the mountain-pirates of Upper Tonkin, a task hitherto deemed impossible. After two years of this work, he went to join Galliéni in Madagascar and, from 1900 to 1902, pacified the whole of the south. From here to Ain-Sefra in Southern Algeria and then as warden of the boundary lands between Oran and Morocco for eight years,³⁰ Lyautey perfected his weapon and obtained a still wider understanding of Moslem psychology. When called to Morocco in May, 1912, therefore, he was no tyro in these matters. He had a lifetime of service behind him and a complete faith in his theory, which had been tested by Tonkinese pirates and Malagasian hillmen and Arab raiders. There was thus no doubt that it was practical and adaptable, and still less that Lyautey could use it.

This theory he had enunciated as early as 1900, when, as a young lieutenant-colonel who had seen service in Tonkin and Madagascar, he published a study on the rôle of the army in the colonies,—a study astonishingly novel in its conceptions.³¹ This was at the close of that decade in which French colonization had been dominated by a spirit of unadulterated military conquest, and so was the more revolutionary. According to Lyautey, who had developed the ideas of Bugeaud and Lamoricière and Galliéni in this connection, the army was not so much an instrument of conquest as of organization. "A military occupation consists less in military operations than in a progressive organization." Conquest, that is, is synonymous with organization, both economic and social, so much so that the former cannot proceed without the latter. A conquest of any country, he said, employing the simile of his master Galliéni, is like an oil-stain ("*la tache d'huile*"), absorbing everything in a gradually expanding circle. The military column, if used at all, is only a prelude, and, as such, should be dispensed with as quickly as possible, for it passes and leaves nothing behind it. Really, he went on to say, there should be no such thing as exclusively military operations in a colony, for the very *raison d'être* of every colonial action is economic and social. That is, the army is at once a pacifying and an organizing agency: military and political action go hand in hand: the military and political leaders must be the same: and the troops thrown into a new country must stop there and colonize it. Although this seems a little trite and obvious, and in some ways overdrawn, it certainly meant a new orientation at the time it was uttered and was a definite contri-

³⁰ *L'Afrique Française*, Jan. 1911, p. 7.

³¹ *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15/1/1900: reprinted in *L'Afrique Française*, 1900, pp. 196-225.

bution to colonial theory. Lyautey's first point was thus to insist on joint political and military action. The road of march was no longer to be simply a line of invasion determined by military needs: it was rather to prepare for the *commercial* penetration of the day after the conquest.

This was, and always has been, Lyautey's root-idea,—to pacify and organize simultaneously, instead of consecutively, as had previously been the case. "Civil action and military action proceed with the same alert and certain step," he said, or, in other words, "Military action becomes political, and by this means supple and prudent: and political action acquires the force and prestige of military." The two are the same thing viewed from a different angle, and their utility lies in their convertibility.

But how could this be worked out in practice? Was it not mere jugglery with sentiment to say that the French and the foe were not two rivals, not victor and vanquished, but two associates? And was military defeat any the less galling to a Moslem population because it was called "military-cum-political"? Here Lyautey went into details and promulgated the second part of his plan,—the idea of "markets." Choose the nerve-centres of the country, he argued, the market sites, the trade cross-roads, the economic strategic-points! Let these be occupied and, by the aid of mobile columns, the country is dominated! It is true that there was nothing vitally new in this idea: what was new was the rôle assigned to the forces occupying such posts. After the original column occupied a strategic post near the boundary of several tribes, a market by preference, there would be long *pourparlers*, to accustom the surrounding natives to the idea that their institutions would be safeguarded. The peaceably inclined tribes would be won over by persuasion, the warlike ones by a display of force ("make a display of force to avoid its use") or by a sharp taste of the reality; and all the time, the normal economic life of the tribes would be going on. If anything, it would be spurred to fresh activity by the fillip given to sales by the army of occupation. At the same time, the tribesmen would be made curious and finally gratified by medical or sanitary aid. Buy, sell, cure, cleanse, make roads, bring security,—do all of these from the first! "When surrender has been made, I would have the bayonets sheathed and the doctors pass to the front." "A workshop is worth a battalion," said Lyautey time and again, for, to him, an army was less a fighting machine than an assemblage of doctors and artisans and workers to widen tribal life for the natives.²²

Herein was what he claimed to be the basis of his policy,—that the

²² *L'Afrique Française*, Sept. 1912, p. 345 (de Castries).

natives should see in the French troops, not destructive fighters so much as tribal organizers who, like the settled tribesmen of the desert themselves, would fight only when necessity demanded it, but who usually, and for preference, organized in peace. "This is the basis of all my doctrines of colonial warfare,—the negation of violent action from the start: it is that which results in the maximum economy of effort and risk and human lives, and that which leaves behind it the least damage when it is time for construction,—construction, which is the *one* aim of every colonial war." It was "a method without great resounding blows, a method of simply going ahead, rather than of assault." It was the method best summed up by its author, one night, facing that Beni-Snassen *massif* the pacification of which was perhaps the finest example of joint political and military effort in French colonial history:—

"I want my posts to give an impression, not of transition, but of permanence. My great preoccupation is to choose for them such sites as will enable commercial life in time of peace to develop round them. The garrisons, by the variety of their needs, will attract first merchants and then settlers. They will protect the economic activity and the markets, which will continually increase around them. My posts must be the hearts of the future centres of colonization." ³³

These, then, were Lyautey's two contributions to colonial action,—that political settlement should proceed *pari passu* with conquest, and that there should be a progressive organization centring on the ordinary economic life of the people to be pacified. Whether these points were essentially new is somewhat irrelevant to the issue, although it is worth noticing that parts of the plan had clearly been foreshadowed by Bugeaud and even its connected form by Galliéni, to whom Lyautey stood in the relation of pupil to master. What distinguished Lyautey was the success with which he converted this theory into practice, and the insistence with which he reiterated its principles. With it, he reversed the dominant colonial theory of the nineties, reared a new school of colonial administrators, and effectively settled Upper Tonkin, South Madagascar, the Algerian marches, and Morocco. After all, it all comes down to the personality of the man who tries to apply it, and his understanding of native psychology. Everything rests on the man in charge,—during the choice of a vantage-post, during the display of overwhelming force and the tempering of this display by negotiation, during the economic development of the centre chosen, and during the spread of the movement as a drop of oil spreads over blotting-paper,—in fact, at every stage. It is clearly a method best suited to the French system which gives its administrators a varied experience, and to the Gallic temperament which

³³ Georges-Gaulis (1920), *op. cit.*, p. 74.

allows a better understanding of native psychology and a closer contact with their ordinary lives. The very aloofness of the colonial policy of other Powers prevents this and, indeed, makes the theory rather meaningless as applied in their colonies. The nearest approach to it would perhaps be in combining the political and military services on the north-western frontier in India, and yet, even then, the basic contact with native life would still be missing. The theory remains essentially French.

Thus, it was a method of peaceful co-operation, of mutual understanding, and fundamentally one based on economic and social development. Lyautey elevated these aspects to the forefront of his colonial system, and, in so doing, unified colonial activity as it had never before been in his country, save perhaps in a less explicit form under Galliéni in Madagascar. At the same time, he widened its objectives so as to secure the greatest profit to the conquering power at the same time as disturbing native life as little as possible. That was its essence. It was, above all, a method of economizing effort and securing the maximum results, and could be summed up in the one phrase,—orderly economic development as quickly and as cheaply as possible.

III. Lyautey in Practice : 1912-1924

PACIFICATION

When Lyautey arrived in May, 1912, Morocco was in a critical position.²⁴ The Shawia and the environs of Rabat were quiet, but the whole region beyond Meknès was a complete gap, as far as control was concerned. The commandant at Meknès could not even greet the Resident-General with a salvo, lest it should provoke an uprising! Beyond that was simply a narrow line of posts, more or less isolated. Fez itself was besieged by rebel tribes, and the dead were still unburied in its streets. Each day saw new desertions, and, in the South, El Hiba's army was growing rapidly. In the occupied area, the Government was either powerless or openly hostile, and Moulay Hafid (who was forced to abdicate in August, 1912) systematically obstructed the French and "sheltered behind the triple barrier of his aversion, his ignorance, and his duplicity."


But it is doubtful if these internal difficulties harassed Lyautey as much as certain external matters. His hands were bound by the earlier treaties, especially those which guaranteed the economic equality of all nations in Morocco and which prevented drastic economic reforms. Even more serious were the divided councils in France, especially when

²⁴ Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. 10—report of 10/6/12.

FRENCH PROGRESS IN MOROCCO

AREAS OCCUPIED

	TO DEC 31 ST 1907.		TO DEC 31 ST 1912.
	" 1908.		" 1913.
	" 1909.		" 1914.
	" 1910.		" 1915.
	" 1911.		" 1921.



the project of a loan was mooted. This irresolution was worse than the actual revolt, and Lyautey's supporters were justified in crying that "the most formidable *harkas* opposing the progress of France in Morocco are on a row of benches in the extreme left of Parliament."³⁵ Lyautey was by no means a free agent, and it would be quite erroneous to argue from the list of powers given him in his commission. The position both in France and Morocco seemed to doom him to a policy of half-measures, and he had perforce to limit his objectives.

Indeed, it was the severe limitation of aims and methods that distinguished Morocco from the other colonial ventures of France, even from Madagascar. Both from inclination and necessity, conquest was subordinated to organization. The first year was devoted to quelling the native risings, the second to consolidating the results thus achieved. Offensive action was rigidly limited to the minimum compatible with security, and not till 1914 was there an attempt to secure "a harmonious frontier" from Agadir to Debdou. Lyautey was concerned not so much with a forward movement as with deciding the principles of organization: and these were finally chosen as much by the logic of events as by any preconceived theory.

The mountain-interior was clearly out of the scope of French activity for a long time: it was only the coastal strip that counted. Here there were three regions. The rich province of the Shawia, which had been occupied since 1908, was being conquered by agricultural co-operation and was reasonably safe. Beyond that, in the North, was the region dominated by Fez, and it was here that Lyautey applied his "political-cum-military" method. This was at once the centre of Moslem fanaticism and the road to Algeria; and to Lyautey was the key of the situation.³⁶ Indeed, he wanted to confine his actions solely to this region and leave untouched those southern parts in which revolt was endemic rather than political. Accordingly, he concentrated on winning over the Moslem leaders of Fez and, securing the loyalty of the people as he went, advancing to the Muluya and thus uniting the two Moroccos. But this was an even more difficult task than he anticipated, and this region for long absorbed the bulk of French activities. In the south, the position was not nearly as difficult, despite Lyautey's initial apprehensions. Even after occupying Marrakesh (1912), he had been dubious if he could stay there, but he was reassured when the natives saw where their interests lay and when the leaders turned away from the pillaging "blue" armies of El Hiba.

³⁵ In *Dépêche Marocaine*, 22/6/13.

³⁶ Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, introduction, pp. 7, 8. Lyautey reported on this stage of his work to the Commission des Affaires Extérieures in December 1912 (report in full in *L'Afrique Française*, 1912, p. 472).

Irresponsible raiders from the desert found little favour with the traders of Marrakesh or with the feudal *Caïds* of the mountain-tribes; and these two elements both turned to Lyautey. The occupation of the South thus turned out to be the least of the French tasks, and the ease with which he penetrated here left Lyautey free for the more troublesome North.³⁷

By 1914 his policy had come to crystallize in certain directions,—a rapid economic development of the Shawia, neutralizing the South through recognizing the *Grands Caïds*, leaving the Atlas regions untouched, and concentrating on the Fez-Taza sector,—the corridor to Algeria,—in the North. It was the North that caused the trouble, and this was the more irksome because it was so necessary to link the East and the West of Morocco. French activity could not be confined to a mere isolated enclave on the Atlantic coast: economic and political reasons alike made a junction with Algeria imperative. The constant menace in the Fez-Taza region simply had to be removed, otherwise French activity in Morocco would be practically vitiated. For this reason, Lyautey concentrated his every activity on effecting this junction, and finally, after every preparation, both military and political, secured the meeting of the eastern and western columns at Taza in May, 1914.³⁸ Northern Morocco was at last one, but only by a very precarious link. At the same time, the link between Fez and Marrakesh, between North and South, had been secured by smashing the Zaian confederacy, and the "natural limits" which Lyautey had outlined in 1912 were attained.³⁹ But consolidation was far from complete, and, in particular, the communication between the various centres was weak.

At this moment, at the most crucial stage of consolidation, just when economic measures were being taken to buttress the results achieved by military and political means, the European War broke out. Lyautey had been in sight of success: now, the whole issue was thrown back in the melting-pot. Just when he was about to attack along the whole economic front, his action was paralysed by the international situation: and, more, every gain of the past was threatened.

ORGANIZATION

When the West was being occupied by economic measures and the South by political and the North by military means, Lyautey was working

³⁷ *L'Afrique Française*, Sept. 1912, p. 347 *et seq.*, for change of Sultan and events in the South. See Map No. 25.

³⁸ Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. 27 *et seq.*; *L'Afrique Française*, 1914, p. 196; 1915, p. 53.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1914, p. 205; 1915, p. 51.

out his general policy of organization. He was sufficiently astute to see how important was the initial decision, and how the first few years would spell either success or failure. In a way, however, his task was easy, for France was no longer a novice in dealing with native races, and, in particular, with Moslem countries. There were the successes and failures of a century to guide him,—the arrant failure of Algeria, the rather lifeless success of Tunisia, the failure of Cochin-China and the success of Tonkin, and, above all, the wonderful success of his master Galliéni in Madagascar. And he himself had had experience in each of these countries and fully understood the difficulties of dealing with a fanatical Mohammedan population.

So that the difficulty with him was not so much in deciding the basic principle of organization as in applying it to the peculiar conditions of Morocco. Tunisia and Tonkin and Madagascar made it clear that any effective development had to be along the lines of a protectorate. The direct rule of Algeria and Cochin-China and the assimilation of the *anciennes colonies* would have been ruinous, unthinkable, in Morocco : and so Lyautey turned to a protectorate,—not, however, to the protectorate as vaguely outlined by de Lanessan forty years ago, but to the protectorate-idea as tempered and defined by the experience of the intervening decades. As he perceived, the idea of a protectorate, by reason of its very vagueness and nebulousness, could be a cloak for many different, and even diametrically opposed, administrations in practice. In the first place, therefore, he set himself to clear up any vagueness as to the general principles, and defined his policy of a protectorate both in itself and in relation to other theories. He was not going to leave any scope for misinterpretations ; and a world of inapplicable, or of variously applicable, theoretical generalizations held little appeal for him. Indeed, so clear was his definition that it is perhaps the best explanation that exists of the protectorate-policy and of the French attitude towards it. He commenced by saying dogmatically that Morocco had to be a protectorate.

“ But,” he went on to say, “ this word, containing as it does a grand and simple colonial doctrine, is most often regarded as an etiquette rather than a truth : one sees in it, if not a mistake, at least a theoretical formula, a formula of transition, destined gradually to disappear. That is the result of most of our colonial experiences. And this sentiment was so strong, in Morocco as elsewhere, that there was scarcely any resistance, and even that only formal, to that move which many thought inevitable, towards direct government, towards an annexation in fact preceding a legal annexation. The War, however, made a change of direction absolutely necessary : and the new experiment, commenced as a matter of prudence, has clearly succeeded. The Protectorate would thus appear, not as a theoretical formula

or a phase of transition, but as a lasting reality :—as the economic and moral penetration of a people, not by subjection to our force or even to our liberties, but by a close association, in which we administer them in peace by their own organs of government and according to their own customs and laws.”⁴⁰

To carry out these principles, Lyautey had to remove the structure of direct rule erected by his predecessors, although this was difficult, because, to the alertly suspicious Mohammedans, any reversal of a policy spelt failure or weakness. His first step was to restore the position of the Sultan, at least outwardly. He revived the ceremonies and grandeur of the court ; he scrupulously respected the Sultan’s religious authority ; and he associated him with various acts. Nor was this a mere gesture. It might be said that the revival of the old scarlet-and-white Black Guard and the other paraphernalia of barbaric pomp was simply an attempt to divert the Sultan’s mind from the realities of his position : but there could be no doubt as to the reality of the scope left to the native Government. In his official declarations of policy, “ the Resident-General insisted on the absolute necessity, while maintaining direct rule in its entity, of practising, as far as possible, co-operation with the native authorities and the restoration of the Cherifian power.”⁴¹

This co-operation was not limited to the Sultan, but extended to all branches of administration. The old *Makhzen* became more closely associated with the French and enlarged its powers : the Council of Viziers became “ a living institution ” : the Council appointed to administer the religious lands (*habous*) was a genuine religious body : and the lesser native officials were all maintained. In essence, the pre-French system of administration, purified and systematized, it is true, went on, and was as genuinely native as ever,—indeed, more so in some respects, because it was now less oligarchic and far more representative.

At the head of the structure was the Sultan, unfettered in his religious capacity as “ Prince of the True Believers,” but supervised in his political functions. Beneath him were the Viziers. In the olden days, the five Viziers, with their loosely defined powers, had constituted a kind of Cabinet, but there had been little order and practically no efficiency. Lyautey abolished four of their offices as useless, but maintained the Grand Vizier, who corresponded to the President of the Council and the Minister of the Interior in France. In addition, he set up three new ones to supervise justice, the *habous*, and the domain lands respectively. All of these were natives, and together they constituted the Council of Viziers, which managed those departments which the dyarchy-arrange-

⁴⁰ Introduction to Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. xiii.

⁴¹ Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

ment left in native hands. Briefly, they looked after internal civil government.⁴²

Under them, and spreading their influence in the country, were the *Caid*s or tribal leaders, the *Pachas* or town leaders, and the *Cadis* or civil religious judges, all of them age-old officials in Morocco. Legislation was by decrees known as *dahirs*, which were issued by the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, after the approval of the Resident-General. All legislation was in this manner, and, even to-day, the direct decrees of the Resident-General are limited entirely to the French colony. Save for the reconstitution of the Council of Viziers and the reform in all branches of the organization, government, in so far as the ordinary native was concerned, went on as before. There was as little tampering as possible with ordinary civil affairs. Lyautey held that a protectorate implied government by the existing native authorities as far as possible, and that the French were there, not to supplant or even to reform unduly, but simply to supervise. It was a genuine division of power, with the bulk of internal administration left to the natives.

But, over and above this, there was scope for a very real French organization. Clearly, the unobtrusive French officials were the force that galvanized the whole into activity. They so kept their fingers on all developments, even in the most remote rural district of the occupied area, that they could pounce on any case of disaffection or maladministration. The control was in the background, it is true, but it was always there, just as the insignificant buildings of the Protectorate Administration were almost invisible behind the stately palace of the Sultan at Rabat. Moreover, even in internal administration, the French claimed a sphere of their own from the first. They held that their power of supervision implied the right of introducing any reforms they deemed fit, and, of course, the power to reform really meant a permanent control. If the execution of the reform and the *minutiae* of administration rested with the natives, the French retained all power of initiation and direction. For instance, in 1912, Lyautey elaborated his programme of administrative reforms, and it will be seen that, to carry out such a comprehensive programme, the higher French officials were really to administer. The financial system was to be transformed, past disorders to be eradicated, and entirely new bases laid down for the future. The land-system was to be regularized, and, in particular, the State Domains protected from spoliation (this latter involving an inquiry into all previous grants). All public works were to be under the French, and a Department of Economic

⁴² *La Renaissance du Maroc. Dix Ans de Protectorat, 1912-1922* (Resident-General, 1922), p. 116 et seq.

Affairs set up to develop the country. The entire future of France in Morocco was seen to depend on this economic penetration, and, in its furtherance, French agents were to have powers which greatly limited the rights of native officials.⁴³

In short, after Lyautey had eradicated the most obvious abuses in central and local administration, he concentrated on the economic phases of the situation. Naturally, as Morocco was a backward agricultural country, this came down to matters of land and public works. The land position was especially difficult, because that *bête noire* of Moslem countries, the *habous*-question, was here even more involved than in Algeria and Tunisia. The last two Sultans, the one from weakness and the other from avarice, had devastated these religious lands, and the natural sensitiveness of the Mohammedan population made reform almost impossible. Apart from this, the question of the State Domain (*Biens du Makhzen*) was in itself perplexing, because this obvious source of revenue had also been the playing-ground of the last few Sultans. Lyautey found its Treasury completely empty in December, 1912, its resources largely dissipated (Moulay Hafid alone had converted 18 million francs' worth to his own use), and the remaining lands so neglected as to be almost worthless. The consolidation and restoration of both *habous* and Domain were pressing but awkward tasks, especially because the straightening-out of past policies meant the alienation of those powerful natives who had profited by the illicit dispersals of recent years. Yet, because these lands were the pick of the country, the future of agriculture largely depended on the solution of the problem.⁴⁴

This done, Lyautey had to face the wider economic question. Morocco was then, as it must be in the future, almost entirely an agricultural country. In 1912, 61 million francs of a total of 66 million of its exports were of agricultural produce. To develop the country, then, meant to increase its agricultural resources, and this in turn meant public works, which were practically non-existent when the French came. Lyautey therefore insisted on a loan of 230 million francs, because, as he said, "the moving wall of occupation" could not function otherwise. Agricultural development entailed ports and roads and railways, of which the country had practically none. Without these, the 80,000 men whom France was maintaining in the land and the 274 million francs which she had spent up to 1912, were being wasted. It is a good commentary on French colonial methods at this stage to note that the loan-project dwindled to 170½ million francs and took eleven months, until March,

⁴³ *L'Afrique Française*, Jan. 1912, p. 218.

⁴⁴ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 14/6/12 (Poincaré); report in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, 1912, p. 381.

1914, even to pass the Deputies! ⁴⁵ In the interim, Lyautey simply had to mark time, for economic reforms could not be undertaken without the necessary funds. ⁴⁶

In the first three years, therefore, such economic penetration as there was, apart from the formulation of general plans for the future, was carried out by private individuals. In this direction, despite the bad harvests of 1912-1913, the development was remarkable, and indeed unparalleled in the history of French colonization. By the end of 1913, the French population had increased from 5,400 to 26,000, and there were over 400 Frenchmen on the land. Casablanca had become a flourishing commercial city, and, within a year of occupation, the Shawia and the Gharb were given over to civil government. Despite the obstruction of the French Parliament, economic penetration and political organization were proceeding hand in hand in the occupied coastal zone. Nor was this the less important because the South, the land of the *Caid*s, was going on as before, and the North was but precariously occupied: it was the rich coastal-zone that was the key to the country, because the *hinterland* is mainly an unproductive barrier. France had thus started well, ⁴⁷ although, by 1914, further development was clearly dependent on communications,—and here the veto of the French Parliament played the deciding part.

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON MOROCCO

The definite crisis in Morocco came with the War. The demands of France brooked no half-measures, and the ministerial declaration of July 27-28 left no doubts as to the absolute ban on the continued penetration of the country. The aim, according to the official statement, was:—

“To maintain in Morocco only the minimum of indispensable force, as the fate of Morocco will be decided in Lorraine; to reduce the occupation to the principal ports, if possible to the Khenifra-Fez-Ujda line of communication; and to temporarily abandon all advance posts and markets, the first care being to return to the coast all foreigners and Frenchmen in the interior.” ⁴⁸

That is, France was not to advance, not even to hold the organized territory, but to withdraw to a few ports. It was the abandonment of Morocco that was clearly envisaged in these Instructions: Paris, never

⁴⁵ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 19, 21/3/14. For opposition, see *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 16/7/14; Senate, 19/8/14.

⁴⁶ *L'Afrique Française*, Sept. 1912, p. 363.

⁴⁷ *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., 1914, No. 3578 (Messimy Report on Moroccan Budget for 1914), is a long summary of the work of the protectorate,—most important. Compare the Milliès-Lacroix Report in *Journal Officiel*, Senate, 31/3/14.

⁴⁸ In *La Renaissance du Maroc*, 1912-1922, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

too enthusiastic on the Moroccan advance, had given way to panic, as the after-events proved.

But Lyautey stood firm and openly opposed this point of view. He knew that even to stand still meant defeat and that, if France once started to withdraw, that would be the end. The peculiar facts of the Moroccan situation and the vagaries of Moslem psychology made any limitation of French efforts tantamount to complete failure. France had either to go on, and keep going on, or get out for ever. Lyautey therefore insisted, and rightly so, that any partial abandonment was quite impracticable, because it would at once involve a general rising and because the coast could not be held by itself. In a complete disregard of his instructions, therefore, he formulated a counter-policy,—“To keep Morocco for France until the end, not only as a possession or as a conquered prize, but as a reserve of resources of all kinds for the mother-country.” He carried out his Instructions in sending back to France all the troops asked for, but, at the same time, resolved neither to abandon Morocco nor to retreat.⁴⁹

The key to his amazing policy was simple. He knew that Machiavelli's maxim, “All the world believes you are what you seem,” had a peculiar significance in the Mohammedan world, and he knew the importance of the policy of prestige which he had been so resolutely pursuing in the previous years. Further, he was prepared to gamble on his correct interpretation of Mohammedan psychology and to risk everything on a combination of dexterity and audacity. He had to keep on attacking,—that was the crux of the situation. Though his communications were menaced and though he was faced with the fear of a general insurrection ahead, he held his front line. Yet he was unsupported in France and had his effectives reduced by at least two-thirds!

But this was not enough, for the very fact of stopping the advance, an advance that had been continuous since the first days of occupation, in itself created a new position. The fact was that the French defence could not be a passive one, it had to be active. In other words, as Lyautey himself said, there had to be incessant activity even to stand still. But clearly, with his reduced effectives, he could not maintain his former activities. He could not hold the coast and the occupied *hinterland* with the forces left at his disposal, so that a withdrawal in some form or other seemed inevitable. At this juncture he played his master-stroke. Since he could hold only a section, that section would be the front line; since he must evacuate, he would evacuate the settled regions. Instead of withdrawing to the coast, as prudence and his orders dictated, he withdrew from the coast to the fighting-line, leaving his policy of

⁴⁹ Introduction to Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. iv.

public works and economic penetration to guard the coastal regions. He saved the Shawia, not in the farmers' boundaries but in the Atlas foothills. The gradual forward policy went on, the real feebleness of his effectives being masked by an exaggerated mobility.

The policy succeeded by its very audacity. The War had come at the worst possible moment, when the Taza and Khenifra extensions had been undertaken but not completed. Three months sooner or three months later would have made all the difference, because then the new move would have been either unstarted or finished: as it was, France was confronting the hardest fighters in Morocco—the Riata and Zaian, neither of whom had been broken, and withdrawal before whom would have meant a union of the Rif and the Sus, and a bursting of the latent fanaticism all over the land. But the menace was removed by dint of Lyautey's policies of prestige and movement; and the communication between East and West, though still held only by a narrow isthmus between the rebels of the North and the South, was re-established. Further, by the end of 1917, the Meknès-Tafilelt route, perhaps the most important in Morocco from an economic point of view, was secured. This restored all of the South-east to the Moroccan market and incidentally cut the Berber *massif* in two, separating the rebels of the High Atlas from their fellows in the Middle Atlas. By 1919, therefore, Lyautey had increased the occupied area by almost half, from 163,000 square kilometres in January, 1914, to 235,000.⁵⁰ The *Makhzen* was intruding on the *Siba* in all directions, the mountains were pierced, and communication between the four parts of the land secured anew.

Despite this spectacular advance, the more difficult task had been in the coastal regions, where Lyautey was relying on a policy of economic development. And the point was that, if the fate of the Shawia was being decided in the Atlas foothills, the activities in the Shawia were no less deciding the upshot in the fighting zone. As Lyautey himself summed the matter up in January, 1916, "it was, in effect, due to the intense and incessant native and economic policies that the country has been able to guard itself in the advanced front posts. Native policy and economic policy,—these are the two essential factors in the progress realized in Morocco in the past eighteen months." To divert the natives and to take their minds from that uncertainty which was the forerunner of dissidence, Lyautey insisted not only on the maintenance of normal economic activities, but on a speeding-up in all directions. An aggressive policy of public works was to compensate for the diminution of military resources, and the natives, as a result, were to be as much impressed with the French power as ever,—but with the powers of peace as distinct from

⁵⁰ *Annuaire Economique et Financière du Maroc*, 1918-1919, p. 43 et seq.

those of war. The soldiers had passed to the Atlas, the engineers had come, and the natives were taught to look on this as the normal sequence of events, and not as a concession to a crisis.

Accordingly, there was almost feverish activity in the economic field.⁵¹ The coastal programme of a huge modern port at Casablanca and four secondary ports along the Atlantic coast went on: road construction continued, because the problem of Morocco was how to get her farming goods to market: and the railway-programme of 1914 was continued. Lyautey was fortunate in having the loan-money, 70½ million francs of which had been raised in July, 1914, come to hand at this time, and in being able to take advantage of the greater disbursements of money under war conditions. Great exhibitions were held at Casablanca, Fez, and Rabat to stress the essential safety of Morocco and to instil a sense of the country's resources into native minds. In short, everything went on as usual,—public, social, and even artistic works. This attitude towards a crisis was something the fighting Mohammedan could understand. It was a warrior's attitude: its easy fatalism accorded well with their philosophy: and it so cemented their loyalty to Lyautey the man that they came to accept innovations which they would usually have questioned. Lyautey had correctly interpreted Moslem psychology. Thus, his Committees of Economic Studies, founded to supplement the unduly narrow Chambers of Commerce, and to embrace all of the "notables" in a given region, proved very popular. They brought the fact of government home to ordinary natives, while the promise of elective Chambers of Commerce at some future date rallied to his cause those natives who wanted a more liberal *régime*. The upshot was that he not only maintained his position during the war-years, but, in addition, took an inventory of the country's resources, won over the agricultural and trading leaders among the natives, and pushed forward the roads and railways which were to be the main items in that post-war economic struggle for which he was always preparing. "To safeguard Morocco in the actual struggle and to prepare her in advance for the great economic struggle which will follow the War,—such has been the double objective," he wrote. The consequence was that 1919 saw a Morocco, not exhausted or enfeebled, but in a stronger economic position than ever. The bonds between French and natives in the settled zone were stronger than before, the land was conquered up to the Middle Atlas, and Morocco was ready for a new forward policy in the economic world.

⁵¹ Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. xviii et seq.: *L'Afrique Française*, March, 1916, p. 47.

IV. The Results Achieved

NATIVE POLICY.

As has been seen, the crux of Lyautey's policy was always, before and during the War, to bring about a *rapprochement* with the natives. The conscious subordination of the military arm to political methods demonstrated this, as also did the scrupulous care with which he safeguarded native customs. To Lyautey it was clear that the economic and social development of the land had to be firm-built on the foundation of native co-operation, and he knew that this could only be achieved by a negation of the old Algerian policy of *refoulement* and by leaving a definite place for native aspirations. The success of this, in turn, largely depended on a correct analysis of the situation and on rightly forecasting the result of the various reforms on native minds. Toleration was not enough: there had to be sympathy, and, for this to be effective, understanding was necessary.

The native problem in Morocco was far from being an easy one. The bulk of the population are Berbers, who are really a European *enclave*, shut off from Africa by the barrier of the Atlas. The fact that they are in essence white has most important implications for present policy, because their mentality is quite distinct from that of the negro and the Arab. It is true that there has been a great deal of mixture on the Berber basis and that to-day only three large Berber groups (Rifs, Beraber, Chleuh) may be distinguished; but the typical Berber organization is far more widely spread. As revealed by Doutté, it is a patriarchal organization, with great emphasis on local assemblies or *djemaas*. The Berber is a born xenophobist, and, being essentially localist, opposes the governors and *caïds* of the Islamic organization. The religious and civil laws of Islam are anathema to him, even though he will accept a superficial Mohammedanism. These tribes are *par excellence* the mountain-dwellers: as one nears the settled coastal-districts, signs of Arab infiltration become more and more noticeable. But, even in the plains, the Berbers still form the base of the population, and the Arabs, who have been in Morocco permanently since the eleventh century, are only the surface element. Morocco is more a land of Arabized Berbers than of Berberized Arabs, and it is clear that the influence of the Arab conquerors has been much smaller, numerically, than was hitherto supposed.⁵²

On the other hand, the Mohammedan religion and Arab organization were supreme in the plains, and each advance of the *Makhzen* on the

⁵² V. Piquet, *Le Maroc* (3rd edition, 1920), p. 217 *et seq.*, or *Les Peuples Marocains* (1925). See Map No. 21 (p. 546), and No. 24 (p. 554).

Blad Siba meant an extension of the Arab organization: that was one reason why the mountaineers resisted so strenuously. If the Arabs were unimportant from a numerical point of view, their general influence was steadily growing. To complicate the demographical problem of Morocco, there were the Moors who came in from Spain, and the 150,000 Jews who lived under special autonomous councils (*maamads*) and Rabbinical justice. There is thus no one native problem in Morocco, but at least three,—Arab, Berber, and Jew,—each demanding an utterly different solution. The existence of such radical differences rendered one all-embracing solution out of the question, unless France became the sponsor of one section of the population and subjugated the rest. But the distribution of the Arabs and the strength of the Berbers rendered this impossible, even had it been considered. Clearly, any solution of the native problems of Morocco had to be based on a recognition of the differences between the various races, as neither was weak enough to go to the wall.

As has been seen, Lyautey realized this from the first, and formulated the general background of his policy as early as 1912.⁵³ In so far as the natives in general were concerned, his was to be a policy of respect of customs, medical assistance, aid to markets, native education, and active participation in municipal government. But the difficulty lay in the conversion of such a scheme into practice, the phrase "respect of customs" in itself, for instance, raising myriads of troublesome questions.

Fortunately, the nature of the resistance to the French was such as to enable them to deal with each particular native problem as it arose and to prevent the folly of attempting a universal native policy. The issue first arose in the old *Makhzen*, the "Government Land," from Fez and Marrakesh to the coast: and here, a solution was relatively easy, because the tribes were normally law-abiding and tax-paying. The tribesmen of the Shawia and Gharb and Fez were essentially agriculturists. They wanted a stable government, and naturally joined the government which would protect them from the raids of the unsettled inlanders. Their mutual interests made them loyal to France. Here, then, pacification was at a minimum, and all that France had to do was to keep the administration in the hands of *caids*, *pachas*, and *cadis*, and to eradicate the most obvious abuses.

The second problem was presented by the next layer of tribes,—those which had submitted when the Sultan was strong but rebelled when he was weak. To the French, each of these presented a special problem, but most were in the South and came to be organized under the *Grands Caids*. These *Caids* were really feudal barons, with strongly organized

⁵³ In *L'Afrique Française*, 1912, pp. 480, 481.

tribes in the Atlas foothills. France recognized this pre-existing organization and turned it to account by accepting a kind of seignorial tenure over the *Grands Caïds*. Both sides gained by the contract, and France was enabled to build up a buffer-belt of friendly tribes between the settled regions and the unruly mountainous interior. It may be, of course, that such an arrangement, while advantageous to the interests of France and the *Caïds* themselves, placed a premium on the exploitation of the tribesmen by those *Caïds* who used the *imprimatur* they received from the French to abuse their position : and it may be, too, that France was unduly strengthening a cause which might be turned against its benefactor. But the first of these difficulties was the lesser of two evils, and the second proved to be baseless in fact, because so loyal were the *Grands Caïds* that, all through the War, France had only three battalions at most in a territory a third the size of the homeland.⁵⁴ Moreover, the configuration of the country is such that the *Caïds* could only turn against France by taking a stand in the mountains : and, as this would mean abandoning the plains where most of their wealth is concentrated, the French hold that there is a strong material guarantee for the *Caïds'* loyalty. The policy of the *Grands Caïds* has undoubtedly been successful. A quarter of Morocco is effectively safeguarded for France by these suzerains of the Grand Atlas, and, as the lands in question are useless for purposes of colonization, France is losing nothing. All that she does is to proffer general advice, but she does not intervene in ordinary government. The *Grands Caïds* are really protected native princes, managing their own affairs.

Far more difficult was the third belt of tribes, the interior mountaineers, the Berbers proper. The difficulty here is one of a distinct race and language and religion and social organization, although the divisions in none of these fields are clear-cut. The mountaineers are localists and, having a social order founded on an extreme democracy, take a firm stand against the Arab language and the *Makhzen* organization. They fight any outside authority which wants to modify their social state and customs, and therefore France had, above all things, to avoid any introduction of the *Makhzen* institution to such tribes.

" On the contrary, our first care must be to reassure them in this regard, and, as soon as the guns have stopped speaking, to avoid arousing them by narrow administrative measures, or speaking of *caïds* to those who have never had them, or of *cadis* to those who ignore such officials. We must constantly think of local manners and customs, and, when innovation is

⁵⁴ *La Renaissance du Maroc*, 1912-1922, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-155 ; Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

necessary, make it with the utmost prudence, and without believing ourselves bound by those Moslem forms that we have followed elsewhere.”⁵⁵

That is, a separate policy was needed for the Berbers, who were either not at all, or only superficially, “Arabicized.” In particular, Lyautey took care not to give undue privileges to Arab minorities which found themselves within the Berber country. To the contrary, an essentially *Berber* policy was followed. There was to be neutrality in religious matters, in which the tribesmen could either go to Islam or retain their old magic and superstitions or, as was usual, mix them all up together : and, in political organization, *cads* and *cadis*, Arab officials and Moslem judges respectively, were to be kept out. Instead, the old Berber *djemaas* were to be recognized. The existing patriarchal organization was to be kept intact, and the Berbers were to evolve along their own lines.

Beyond these again were another class of tribes, the frontiersmen, who were still fighting. As soon as they were subdued, these had to offer an indemnity, become tax-payers, and keep the local peace. They live in those regions where Lyautey’s “moving wall of occupation” is still gradually advancing. It is a point of honour with them to fight, but it is usually a fight without hate, and, once having resisted, they are prepared to settle down. But a display of force is still needed to impress them and to induce organization ; and it is in these regions that the military “Intelligence Officers,” who are indeed the key to the whole of Lyautey’s organization, play their leading part. As pacification proceeds, they give way to “Civil Controllers,” who perform similar functions, but with the element of force not so much in the foreground.⁵⁶

Thus, there are several distinct native policies in Morocco, the essence of the French attitude being to vary the method according to the circumstances in each case, but always following a fixed general principle. This principle is “the policy of association,” which means that each tribal unit is to develop along its own particular racial or social lines, with each, by reason of the autonomous development allowed, contributing its share to the general whole.

The general native problem found especially troublesome reflections in the particular problems of education and justice. Both of these were very old, both entirely religious and accordingly dangerous to touch. But something had to be done with them, because the one was simply mediæval and the other corrupt : and both were inadequate to meet the demands of modern economic existence. Apart from the ingrained

⁵⁵ Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. 44. A good account is in *Geographical Journal*, August, 1918, p. 88.

⁵⁶ For this transition, see *La Renaissance du Maroc*, 1912-1922, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-129.

conservatism and the religious nature of each, however, the trouble was that there were as many educational and judicial problems as there were races. The problem was to provide varying solutions, all of which should meet the needs of the new economic programme which the French were using to transform Morocco. Education proved the easier of the two in this connection. To be useful in the changing economic conditions and in the new colonial stage when assimilation to France is looked on as an evil, education had to be of a practical nature. "Pre-apprenticeship" is the term the French use in explaining their efforts in this connection,—that is, industrial education in the towns, farming in the country, and secondary education at "Schools for the Sons of Notables" for those whose destiny it is not to work with their hands. Literary education is thus at a discount, and vocational education is the touchstone of the whole system. Little adverse criticism, whether in the way of methods or aims, can be made against this educational system: the only question is whether, here as elsewhere, the practical achievement is not lagging behind the general plan.

Justice was a more difficult problem, because the innate tendency of the Frenchman towards codification is always a hindrance in Moslem countries, where the ambiguities of Koranic law are looked on as something natural, if not desirable. Lyautey naturally declared for an entirely modern organization (March, 1913), because how otherwise, for instance, could economic advance be coupled with the absurd entanglements of native land-laws? Even in the purely native section, the idea behind his reforms was to secularize the law,—to replace the *Cadi's* religious tribunal by political courts. In 1912, France found a land of endless litigation and judicial anarchy. Steps were at once taken to secure central control by means of a Minister of Justice, to limit the *cadi's* authority in land matters, and to make criminal justice less arbitrary. For the rest, the general principles of the Algerian Code of 1903 were followed, with French law in criminal cases and a modernized native system for civil cases. The religious law of the *Cadis* was supervised but, because of its essentially religious sanctions, not vitally altered, save on the economic side: but the civil law of the *cuids*, free from this religious complexity, was entirely reorganized. The special needs of the Berbers, too, were taken into account, and they were allowed to continue their judgments by "Customs" (*izref*),—a privilege which had been denied to their fellows in Kabylie. The regulation of justice was, in a word, based on the same general principles (respect of native organization, modernization, and variation according to various circumstances) which determined the wider native policy. The needs of economic and social advance on the one side, and the prejudices of the natives on the other,

were alike considered, so that French and natives both secured their ends. The compromise was strikingly successful, the more so in such a Moslem country, where land-litigation plays so important a part in native life, and where all law is so mixed up with religion.⁵⁷

ECONOMIC POLICY.

As has been seen, France was successful in her native policy in the coastal regions and in the South ; but the success in this field was, after all, not as striking as was the economic transformation. Here lies the real work of the French in Morocco,—the change by which the backward and anarchic country of 1908 has become the third of the French colonies, in so far as trade is concerned. The change is the more striking because of the intervention of the War and because the pre-existing treaties prevented the application of the protectionist régime on which France relied so much in her other colonies.

The growth is best reflected in the trade statistics:—

	IMPORTS. (Millions of Francs.)	EXPORTS. (Millions of Francs.)		
1913	181	40		
1918	314	115		
1919	480	228	—franc at average of 35 to £1.	
1920	1000-474	268-875	" "	50 "
1921	909-164	306-446	" "	62.5 "
1922	777-675	237-466	" "	62.5 "
1923	779-750	272-384	" "	75 "
1924	925-411	622-482	" "	88 "

Even considering the depreciation of the franc, this table shows a substantial increase. There has always been, it must be admitted, an unfavourable trade-balance, because Morocco is a new country and because the programme of public works unduly inflates the list of imports ; but this is diminishing, especially now that the close of the War has allowed a return to more normal conditions. From 1920 to 1924, exports passed from 25 per cent. to 40 per cent. of the total commerce, despite the crises of 1921–1923 : and this was no abnormal growth, because it was based on the firm foundation of agricultural production.⁵⁸

Another remarkable feature is that Morocco affords the same lesson as West Africa,—that, where France has relied on protectionist methods to secure a trading predominance, she has failed, but that, under "the open door," she has forged to the front, under the spur of competition.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Lyautey Report, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. 210 ; *La Renaissance du Maroc*, *op. cit.*, p. 187 *et seq.*

⁵⁸ *Ce qu'il faut savoir du Maroc* (1926), p. 103, for good analysis ; *Renseignements Coloniaux*, 1923, p. 346.

⁵⁹ J. Donon, *Le Régime douanier du Maroc et le Développement du Commerce marocain jusqu'à nos jours*, for documents.

In Morocco, for instance, despite the principle of equality for all nations, France has come to command 64·5 per cent. of the imports and 52·4 per cent. of the exports. But it must be noted that the decline of the franc, by compelling the Moroccans to resort to France for their purchases, has had a share in bringing about this result on the import side, while, as regards exports, French predominance is easily explained by the fact that Morocco produces the cereals that France needs so badly. Moreover, if France could secure no preference in Morocco, she could secure a preference for Moroccan goods in entering France,—a law of March, 1923, for example, authorizing the free entry of a number of important Moroccan products.

However this may be, there is no doubt that Morocco has expanded remarkably since 1912, although it should be noted that this expansion is not so much in new directions as in merely enlarging tendencies already there. While this is almost inevitable in a country that is primarily agricultural and pastoral, it is curious how little manufactures have developed, even in the way of treating the agricultural products on the spot. Lyautey, while concentrating on the commercial and agricultural sides of economic development, was never concerned with industry, either European or local; and, even in the agricultural sphere, his policy was criticized as not sufficiently favouring capitalistic development,—in the direction of irrigation ventures, for instance. The result was that, until 1919, industry was practically non-existent in Morocco, despite the obvious openings for cement-milling and tanning ventures, to quote instances at random. There were no products manufactured for export, and, as compared with Algeria and Tunisia, even native industries were singularly little developed. There were really none, beyond the tanning at Tafilelt and Fez, the cloth-stuffs and slippers of Fez, and the carpets of Rabat. It is true that there has been a marked development in this direction since 1919, especially in the treatment of oils and grain-products and meat; but the problem has in general hardly been touched.

The French effort has rather been in providing the preliminary necessities for development, especially means of communication. Roads, railways and ports have engrossed their activities. Without these, no progress was possible; yet all of them alike were practically unknown in the Morocco of 1912. The growth of the five ports in particular, where before there had been but silted river-mouths or dangerous bars, is in itself one of the romances of colonization. Casablanca, the brightest spot in French efforts in Morocco, has had a remarkable life. In 1908, it was a squalid Moorish town of some 10,000 people, with scarcely 500 Europeans: by 1918, after Lyautey had made it the pivot of his whole

scheme of development, it was transformed into a well-equipped European town with a population of 82,500, including 37,500 Europeans, and with a trade equal to that of Oran. To-day (1925) the population is over 116,000, and, since the opening of its port in 1923, it is the port of entry for Morocco. Already the seventh of French ports, it does no less than 70 per cent. of the country's trade, for the secondary ports of Lyautey's scheme are only regional outlets.⁶⁰

The railway-question has not been so simple, because, when the French occupied the land, treaties banned all lines except for strictly military purposes, and specified in particular that no commercial railway was to be allowed until the Tangier-Fez project was completed. This was a survival of the Franco-German Agreement of November, 1911, and, as it turned away trade and development from the French centre of Casablanca, was naturally unpalatable to France. But the War removed German surveillance and enabled France to embark on a great railway-scheme cleaving Morocco in two, and linking Casablanca with Tunisia. By June, 1921, the scheme was realized, Casablanca being united with Ujda, on the Algerian frontier. A year before, another line had pushed south from Casablanca to Marrakesh, and, by September, 1925, 1,660 kilometres of railway were in operation. Most of these had the small 60-cm. gauge, for France, despite colonial experience elsewhere, persists in favouring light-railways, as precursors of the normal-gauge lines.⁶¹

Parallel with, and even more quickly than, railways, road-construction has gone on. By 1926, there were 3,000 kilometres of road where there were but 18 in 1913: and the effects of these improved communications, together with the new security, caused a remarkable revival of internal trade. Goods from ever-widening areas could come to those *suks* or markets which are the centres of Moroccan trade and which, since there are only 80,000 Europeans to 5½ million natives, are the most important economic element in the land. The stabilization of money in 1920 and the generalization of the metric system aided this development, the result in general being a complete metamorphosis of Moroccan rural life. As the old analogy says, Morocco is still a panther's skin, all yellow, save for the black spots which represent the cultivated areas and fairs: but now there is the significant difference that the spots are connected as they have never been before. The old opposition between the organized towns and the unorganized country is now giving way to a new opposi-

⁶⁰ *Geographical Journal*, August, 1918, p. 85; *Revue de Géographie Marocaine*, 1926, Vol. V, p. 43; and plans in *La Renaissance du Maroc*, *op. cit.*, pp. 329-333.

⁶¹ Crosson-Duplessix, "Étude sur les chemins de fer marocains," in *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger*, Vol. XXVII, 1922, p. 151; article by Tarde in *Geographical Review*, Vol. VIII, 1919, p. 12; *La Renaissance du Maroc*, *op. cit.*, p. 264 *et seq.* See Map No. 22, p. 546.

tion, an opposition none the less keen between towns and country, which are *both* organized entities, though organized in different ways. The French policy of improved communications has thus come to mean a centralization within each rural area, together with a striking decentralization of influence from the few cities to the wider-spread rural centres,—tendencies which are gradually transforming the balance of power in Moroccan life.

Everything in Morocco comes back to the land. All of the natives, except some 10,000 employees in industrial ventures, are either rural workers or traders, and the financial position of the State is peculiarly dependent on rural prosperity. Most of the taxes are on an *ad val.* basis, although that means that the State's resources fluctuate with the seasons, and that, in last resource, Morocco is at the mercy of its variable climate. While the State shares in a period of prosperity, such as the boom that reached its height in 1919–1920, it also encounters a crisis when harvests fail.

Despite this capriciousness, Moroccan finances have always been sound, as the country is very rich and agriculture is still in a primitive state. There has never been any difficulty in making the budget balance, except in 1913–1914. Even in the war-years, the position was favourable. Because two-thirds of the taxes were indirect, conditions of inflation and rural prosperity swelled the budget receipts,—so much so, indeed, that boom conditions emerged. Greater receipts naturally led to a freer spending policy, and the rapid inflation of the budget, aided as it was by the long currency-duel between the State Bank and the Bank of Algeria until 1924, caused concern in commercial circles. There was a frenzied banking position, an unduly optimistic outlook in State finances, over-ambitious projects of public works, and in brief, an assumption that the boom-conditions of 1919 were permanent and could afford the basis for future calculations. Under these conditions, the general collapse of 1921–1923 was a salutary *douche* to the optimists by showing the necessity for a gradual and consolidated advance. Since then, progress, if more restrained, has been on a sounder basis, and at present is determined, not by the artificial foundation of an inflated currency or by unwarranted credit, but by the expectation of moderate harvests and the rapidly developing phosphate industry. It is reasoned and sound and slow, so that a quiet optimism replaces both the unrestrained optimism of 1919–1920 and the pessimism of the lean years of 1921–1923.⁶²

The general financial position is that Morocco pays the costs of its internal government, while France meets the military bill. Arguing

Survey of Economic and Commercial Conditions in Morocco, Algeria, etc.
1924–1925 (Department of Overseas Trade, London), p. 10 *et seq.*

from this basis, a report of 1922 claims that the country has been entirely self-sufficient since the first day of occupation! Indeed, Lyautey goes further and holds that Morocco has cost France only a milliard of francs in all,—“the cost of five days of war.”⁶³ But he arrives at this result by deducting the cost of maintaining the troops had there been no Morocco, and also the economy effected by keeping the cost of Moroccan cereals one-third that of French during the war! In reality, Morocco cost France 3½ milliards of francs to the close of 1922 (Spanish Morocco in the same period cost over 2 milliards!).⁶⁴ Fighting Moslem fanatics in inaccessible mountain country is not a cheap pastime for a country with embarrassed finances, and no amount of artificial deductions can lessen the real bill.

In addition there is the Moroccan debt of 705½ million francs, a large part of which is guaranteed by the French State. Indeed, by the laws of 1914 and 1920, loans of a milliard francs were authorized for the two big projects of public works alone,⁶⁵ and France stands sponsor for this huge amount. The aggressive policy of public works thus has its reverse side, and it is at least dubious whether France has not unduly emphasized the more expensive and ambitious works to the detriment, the neglect even, of the less spectacular, but even more urgent, agricultural reforms. In a word, it is questionable if the objective pursued has been sufficiently comprehensive.

Nevertheless, Morocco's position is still fundamentally sound. Only a sixth of the revenue goes for debt-payments: the accumulated budget-balances amounted to 180 million francs by 1921: taxation is low: agriculture is flourishing and is capable of vast improvement: and trade is becoming more normal with the development of exports. If the programme of public works is kept sufficiently within limits and, above all, directed to the fostering of agriculture instead of more or less visionary projects of future development, there seems no reason why Morocco should not continue to prosper, for it is one of the richest lands controlled by France.

LAND SETTLEMENT

As has been emphasized, Morocco is a predominantly agricultural country, and naturally, questions of land-law and settlement have loomed largely in the forefront of French difficulties there. Land matters are always difficult in Moslem countries, because they are so interwoven

⁶³ In *La Renaissance du Maroc*, *op. cit.*, pp. 233, 234.

⁶⁴ *L'Afrique Française*, Jan. 1922, p. 40. The Spanish figure is in March, 1923, p. 151.

⁶⁵ The loan of 1914 is for 242 millions, that of 1920 for 774. For the position in this regard, see *L'Afrique Française*, April 1922, p. 195.

with religion : but they are the worse in Morocco, where the position is so complicated as to defy definition. Native life assumes many different forms in the land. There are nomads, *transhumant* semi-pastoralists who mix agricultural and pastoral pursuits, and sedentary fruit-growers : and, for each, there are different property-laws. Each property-*régime* is determined by a mixture of tradition and economics. Fruit-lands, cereal lands in the plains, and pasture lands are all regulated by different systems ; and, to complicate matters, the laws for each type of property vary with the strength of the tribe concerned, its peculiar social customs, and the degree of order in the given district. There is no basic system and no general principle to which an appeal can be made.

As an external complication are the *habous* or religious lands, one of the thorniest problems in Moslem countries. The French had their experience in Algeria and Tunisia to know that a rash venture in this matter more often than not provoked rebellion, and that even supposedly conciliatory policies often produced quite opposite results.

It is true that the French had a century of experience to guide them when the Moroccan issue arose, but, on the other hand, the position there was far more complicated than they had encountered elsewhere. Local variations in custom confronted them everywhere, and were accentuated by the mountainous nature of the country : the degree of disorder in the land prevented any comprehensive view of the problem : the rivalry of Berber and Arab, townsmen and country-dwellers, met them everywhere : the prodigal alienation of the last Alaouite Sultans had taken the best lands and " the dead hand " of Islam was over the most desirable portions that remained : and, once any reform was undertaken, France was confronted by her treaty obligations and the rights of the agricultural *protégés* of the various European Powers. It all seemed an inextricably confused maze : and yet the French had to intervene,—for two reasons at least. They had to find out where they stood in connection with the natives, in matters of taxation, for instance : and they had to provide land for European colonization. The native group had to have security, the Government had to have order, and the settler had to have land. The difficulty was to find the proper principles for deciding these issues and to apply them so as to avert rebellions, and in particular the cry against the sacrilegious Unbeliever,—the dread *Allahu il Akbar* that ran like wildfire through the bazaars and fired the smouldering fanaticism of the Moslems when their religion, through their lands, was tampered with. The position was such as to make the most experienced legislator quail : none knew better than Lyautey how easy, how almost inevitable, it was to arouse distrust. Yet, on the other hand, if the French were to organize Morocco, the position had to be attacked. Delay, as had been

evident already since the onrush of foreigners after 1908, merely accentuated the difficulties of the situation.

The most obvious task was to define the various classes of land. Accordingly, the first act in the *Journal Officiel* of the Protectorate (November 1, 1912) did this and explained how each class was to be dealt with ; and this has been the basis of all subsequent legislation on the topic. Then the rights of the State had to be restored. There had been much squandering of the State's resources under the last Sultans, Moulay Hafid alone having reduced the State patrimony by two-thirds. How serious this evil was may be seen from the fact that the Government compelled grantees to disgorge 230 million francs' worth of land obtained illicitly, and there is still much that is dubiously held. A similar investigation was carried out with the *habous* or religious lands, and France arranged for a native Commission under a Vizier and a rigid earmarking of the receipts for purely Mohammedan purposes. But these reforms were merely clearing the way for the real issue,—the problem of the collective or group-lands which make up most of Morocco and which are inalienable under Koranic law. There had been much illicit speculation in this field before the French appeared on the scene, and this was so fruitful a source of friction and unrest that a *dahir* of July, 1914, categorically forbade the alienation of collective lands.

So far so good. These measures had eradicated abuse and had safeguarded the interests both of Government and natives. But here entered a new element. Settlers demanded land, the more dogmatically because Morocco was clearly under-populated. But the trouble was that all land had claimants, and even unused land was so enmeshed in a maze of traditional claims that its utilization appeared almost impossible, especially with semi-subdued tribes seeking pretexts for rebellion. Yet, if Morocco was to develop from the existing stage of primitive agriculture, there had to be European settlers and capital.

Previous experiments in this direction had not been happy. The Conference of Madrid (1880) had given foreigners the right to own land in Morocco, and the General Act of Algeciras had confirmed this : but the practical difficulties were so numerous that an intermediate form of exploitation emerged,—“ association ” with a native.⁶⁶ The European gave advances to his *mokhalat* or native associate and received half the crop. This arrangement had certain advantages for both parties : the European received a good return on his investment, and the natives received protection, especially from the arbitrary exactions of the *caïds*. But the system, being unsupervised, placed a premium on abuse, and

⁶⁶ *Compte Rendu des Travaux du Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord*, 1909, Vol. II, p. 793 et seq.

merely came to add another complicating feature to an already involved situation.

Accordingly, the French found most of the land locked up in undefined group-areas, a good deal illicitly alienated to Europeans and claimed by various parties, and much under the curious half-way system of "association." But nothing was definite, and the only plain facts were the confusion and the abuses and the determined opposition of the natives to any diminution of their traditional holdings. The position was clearly impossible, and so France followed her Tunisian policy. By this, group-lands were defined, facilities given for converting collective into individual tenures, and provision made for the effective (if not nominal) alienation of such lands for purposes of settlement. It was a policy of three consecutive stages, the one leading to the other; but in the great majority of cases, never even reaching the first, owing to native opposition. Not till the middle of 1923 was there even an approximate census of the collective lands,⁶⁷ although fortunately there was more individual ownership in the coastal-regions, where economic development was more urgent than in the interior. The second stage, individualization, was not so difficult in theory, because the Tunisian code could be transplanted almost *en bloc*. By this, immatriculation, or registration on a modified Torrens basis, gave the native an unimpeachable claim to his land. All the uncertainty was removed, because, after due investigation, the granting of the title meant that no contrary claims could thereafter be admitted. The native thus obtained an asset on which he could raise loans. Such immatriculation commenced in June, 1915, but, as it is a slow process, by reason of the minute examination involved, it is still limited to the four settled regions. As was the experience in Tunisia, it is difficult to make the native see the advantages he obtains, because on the other side are the forces of tradition and the peculiar religious sanctions of the old system. Moreover, thought of the morrow, which is the most obvious advantage of immatriculation, means nothing to the Moroccan tribesman.⁶⁸

The return of land available for cultivation was thus so slow that the Government sought other methods, the result being that a *dahir* of April, 1919, arranged for perpetual leases over lands not actually needed by the members of a given native group. Such lands could then be utilized for purposes of European settlement, but the device has not been very fruitful. The basic difficulty remains, and the complexities of tribal law make it one of the greatest obstacles to the development of Morocco. There is no land available for settlers,—a remarkable situation for what

⁶⁷ Map in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, 1923, p. 291. See articles in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, Nov.-Dec. 1912 (Amar); 1922, p. 33; 1923, p. 277.

⁶⁸ Piquet, *Le Maroc* (1920), p. 322; report in Lyautey, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

is, as far as Europeans are concerned, a new country.⁶⁹ The Domain-lands of the State, which were made available from the first, were practically exhausted by 1925: the *habous*, offering little to colonization at the best, are surrounded by an almost impassable barrier of formalities: private lands realize inflated prices: and the collective tribal-lands, though clearly the most important source of land for settlement, are protected by a wall of native opposition.

Actual settlement in Morocco has therefore been sporadic, the more so since the rise of agricultural prices has induced the native to cultivate himself and to keep a tighter grip on his lands. The position was exasperating. The rich *tirs* of the Gharb and the Shawia, comparable to the black-earth regions of Russia, were given over to natives who left much land idle and utilized the remainder by primitive methods like wooden ploughs, sickle harvesting, no manure, no rotation of crops, winnowing in the wind, and the like. But, exasperating or not, the French could do little, and until the operation of the *dahir* of 1919 restricts the tribal lands to those needed for the actual sustenance of the tribesmen, the difficulty will remain.

The result has been that settlement in Morocco has been quite different from that in Algeria or Tunisia. The village-settlements and free-grants of the former, and the seignorial domains of the latter find no counterpart in Morocco, where the system is a limited one, based on sale and improvements. Apart from the sale of various isolated large blocks and the provision of small areas for *la petite culture* outside the towns, effort has centred on "middle colonization," in blocks of from 200 to 400 hectares. The shortage of land available has determined the system, which is one based on personal residence and rigid conditions. The problem has been, not to attract settlers as in Algeria, but to utilize a small area in the best possible manner.

Such official settlement commenced in 1916, and resulted in the settlement of 98,360 hectares by the close of 1924, mostly in the Gharb and the Shawia, the coastal regions first pacified. But the same difficulties have been encountered as in Algeria, and there is much alienation without effective settlement. In all, taking official and private schemes in the aggregate, Europeans possess 390,000 hectares of land in Morocco, but there is practically no small settlement,⁷⁰ and aggregation has gone on to such an extent that there are only 180 *bona fide* colonists on the land. "There are no colonists in Morocco," protested the deputy of Constantine

⁶⁹ *Revue de Géographie Marocaine*, Vol. V, 1926, p. 35 *et seq.*

⁷⁰ *Renseignements Coloniaux*, 1922, p. 96; *L'Afrique Française*, June, 1923, p. 295.

in 1923, and this statement was little exaggerated.⁷¹ The French in Morocco are essentially town dwellers. Settlement, despite the facilities and safeguards of Lyautey's plans, has clearly failed. Indeed, under the conditions, any other result would have been amazing. The perennial uncertainty in Morocco and the attitude of the natives in land-questions provided the unfavourable background: the more obvious advantages and the greater ease of city-life were powerful counter-attractions: and the lack of capital and of communications added to the already difficult situation: then, even if settled, the colonist was hampered by the lack of irrigation works and his consequent dependence on notoriously uncertain seasons: and finally, he could get no labour, because the natives were themselves cultivating more, and because the Rifs, formerly the best labour-supply, no longer came down from the mountains to work.

All of these conditions combined to place native agriculture in the foreground, and the problem seems rather to modernize the primitive methods employed by the natives than to provide a scope for European settlers. As it is, European exploitation has provided little return for a decade of effort on the part of the Government; and native agriculture, partly owing to insufficient aid from the Government, and more so to the easy fatalism of the tribesmen, remains as mediæval, patriarchal almost, as ever. In view of these facts, although the land-policy of the French has been a marked success, it is still dubious as to how far effort should be concentrated on regularizing the position of the collective tribal lands and on giving priority to schemes for improving native agriculture. Nevertheless, considering the difficulties, much has been accomplished, and with curiously little friction: and not the least gain has been in experimenting with, and eliminating, those policies which are not suited to the needs of the position.

V. Conclusion

It is as yet too early to sum up the experience of the French in Morocco. Clearly, the transformation of the country in the early years of the Protectorate and the *morale* of the war-years were wonderful pieces of work; but, since then, the position has changed and other aspects have come to the fore, especially with regard to Lyautey's policy. His policy, in so far as it concerned the natives,—“the policy of association,”—has been successful, but only up to a certain point. His indirect rule and his tolerance of native customs left little to be desired; and native development on indigenous lines, especially with the Berber mountaineers, has been allowed to a degree quite unusual in French colonial history. And

⁷¹ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 15/3/23. A detailed account of the results for each year is in the article in *Revue de Géographie Marocain*, *op. cit.*, 1926, p. 41.

this has been a genuine development by the natives, especially in the South and the newly conquered outskirts. Sultan, viziers, *caïds*, *pachas*, and *cadis* all retained considerable functions, and there was a real dyarchy, even extended by the reforms of 1919 to the municipal sphere. But it is practically impossible to determine the degree of this co-operation. It is clear enough in the case of the *Grands Caïds* of the South and the small local areas, for there the issue could not have been easily decided otherwise: but it is practically insoluble in so far as provincial and national government are concerned. However, from the general tenor of Moroccan affairs, there is reason to believe that, as the years went on, Lyautey's hand became more rigid on the wider organizations, and a growing discrepancy emerged between his theory of 1914 and his later practice. Perhaps this increasing rigidity accounted for the comparative sterility of the years after 1920 and for the menacing nature of the Rif crisis in 1925.⁷² Certainly, the previous policy, that political measures had to precede military, failed to meet the post-war situation, when Morocco seemed to demand an organization, both political and economic, *after* conquest, and not simultaneously with it. Lyautey himself perceived this early in 1925, but still over-estimated the efficacy of his earlier methods.

In all, then, Lyautey's plan of native government succeeded in its wider principles in so far as it meant development on native lines and with as much native co-operation as was politic. But practical exigencies came to mean a greater stress on the French Residents, and Morocco became a kind of fluctuating compromise between Nigeria and Java, in so far as native policy was concerned. Yet there was clearly more toleration of native customs and a greater variety of policies for the various sections of the people than in any other French colony: and there was a certain scope for the participation of the natives in Government, although probably not as great as the circumstances warranted. Beyond that, there was rebellion in at least a third of the land, hegemony in the southern quarter, something like local autonomy in the Berber regions, and the full native policy applied only in the coastal provinces. Even there, it is dubious if Lyautey's policy boiled down to anything more than what is known as "indirect rule" in England's tropical dependencies, tempered, however, by a Gallican *savoir-faire* which allowed a closer contact with the native. All in all, taking into account the time and the circumstances, it may be said that France's most successful native policy was not in Morocco, but with Galliéni in Madagascar, for, equilibrating the various advantages and disadvantages, the position of Madagascar

⁷² For Rif crisis, see French report by Senator Dumont, *La Lutte contre Abd-el-Krim*, attached to the Budget-report of the Minister for War for 1927.

fifteen years ago was much more satisfactory than is that of Morocco to-day. Lyautey's policy, it is true, stands out in Northern Africa, where the French record has not been enviable; but, compared with French activities elsewhere and the policies of England since 1900, it is seen to be not so much *sui generis* as a rather successful compromise, but after all practically limited to the old *Blad el Makhzen* and the outer fringe of Berber country. Yet it must be remembered that the quietness and loyalty of the tribes within the Debdou-Agadir line are a striking testimony to the French work in Morocco: and, beyond that, the nature of the unsubdued mountaineers, with their juxtaposition of unruly tribes united only by hatred of the foreigner, rendered constructive work impossible. France brought peace and security to the plains and the Atlas foothills, and received in return loyalty. There was her greatest work.

In other fields, Lyautey's work admits of a clearer summary, for there the issue is a more tangible one. His social policy, with its medical and educational and civic aspects, was remarkably successful. So, too, was the first part of his economic policy. Communications have transformed Morocco, and the point is that the return from these is not so much at present as in the future, for which they are, so to speak, a gauge. On the other hand, there is much evidence to support the contention that certain of these projects, especially on the more spectacular side, have been so tenaciously adhered to as to warp the trend of general development. Industry has always been outside Lyautey's ken, and the public works connected with agriculture have been rather neglected.⁷³ European settlement is practically non-existent, native agriculture is little improved, pasture has not changed,—grave defects in a country of primary production.

Lyautey, in a word, troubled little, if at all, over these phases of development: his essential genius was in organizing the country after the original conquest. For the consolidation, a different type of administrator, less spectacular, less of a martinet, with a narrower vision even, was needed. Hence the significance of his replacement by M. Steeg in September, 1925,—a replacement that meant not so much the change from one man to another as from one system to another. Hereafter, Morocco called for the quiet economic organizer and the financial expert,—a more mediocre but useful type of person. Lyautey and the policy of grand gestures had won the prize: it was to be secured by consolidation. He had done much, but mainly in the period from 1912 to 1918. To obviate the drift that had taken place in governmental and economic matters after 1920, a new type of ruler was needed. With the proper

⁷³ Report of Department of Overseas Trade (Morocco, etc., 1924-1925), *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 24.

policy of consolidation, Morocco may yet fulfil the early predictions of Lyautey, but, as the economic events of 1921-1923 demonstrated and the psychology of the Rif revolt in 1925 affirmed, the cross-roads have not yet been passed. The work is half-finished, and the final structure will be a combination of the peculiar genius of "Lyautey Africanus" and the economic reformers of the Algerian school. Lyautey had the vision of the great colonial, and his native policy will continue. To this will be added the native agriculture which he did not sufficiently stress, and the *ensemble* will be the New Morocco. Beyond that, we may not at present go.

CHAPTER XV

SYRIA

AFTER the consolidation of her North African possessions, France was undoubtedly the leading Mediterranean Power; and, with the rise to importance of those possessions and the opening of the Suez link to the East, her policy became more and more Mediterranean. "The Mediterranean will always be the theatre of French activity," declared Gambetta forty years ago, and Flandin, in urging the cause of expansion in this ocean, said in 1921, that "the Mediterranean is the axis of French policy."¹ Indeed, so clear was this orientation that France had a Mediterranean policy before she had a colonial policy,—a policy linking Toulon, Algiers, and Bizerta, and needing only an eastern outpost, Alexandretta in Asia Minor, to make it complete.

The opportunity of rounding off that policy came with the War of 1914, when France could invest her interests in Syria with a new meaning. Those interests in Northern Asia Minor had always been outstanding. Every railway in Syria, except the Hedjaz line, was French: there were more French schools than any others there: French philanthropic work had always gone on: and the most important industry in Syria was that of the Lebanon silk-factories. Syria could thus be termed a region of special French interests, and the interests France wanted there far exceeded those she already had. In particular, she wanted Cilicia, because that province meant cotton and Alexandretta. As M. Briand summed the matter up in the Deputies in June, 1920, this was a matter of life and death for France's Mediterranean policy.² The whole of French expansion in North Africa depended on the safeguarding of her position in the Mediterranean, and, as matters then stood, this only narrowed itself down to Cilicia. "The gulf of Alexandretta is an important thing in the Mediterranean, *its possession is essential to the future of France!*" It was the end of the caravan-routes from the desert: the petrol pipeline from Mosul terminated there (and had not Tardieu said that petrol was the most important issue of the War?): it was the outlet of Aleppo

¹ Flandin in *Journal Officiel*, Depts., 6/4/21.

² Briand in *Ibid.*, Depts., 28/6/20,—an important pronouncement of policy.

and the centre draining the commerce of Persia and Upper Mesopotamia. More, it was the acquisition that was needed to round off France's strategic domination of the Mediterranean. Economic and strategical reasons therefore demanded French control of Northern Asia Minor,—the safety of her North African Empire, and, as the Right and Centre insisted, the safety of mainland France admitted no other solution of the Mediterranean problem.

Allied agreements of 1916 therefore protected the traditional and secular interests of France in Syria. The Sykes-Picot agreement of May of that year gave her control of all Syria and Cilicia, with the *hinterland* to beyond the Tigris.⁴ British troops evacuated both of these regions at the close of 1919, but French plans received a decided shock when the Emir Feisal rallied the Arabs to opposition. Feisal had become the champion of Arab nationalism, and an Arab body termed the Syrian General Congress had declared for independence in 1919 and again in 1920. Once accepting the fact of her permanent occupation there, then, France had no option but to reply to this challenge by taking decisive steps. A note of July, 1920,⁵ demanded redress from Feisal for his "aggressive policy" in general and, in particular, for his enforcement of conscription and his refusal to accept the French mandate. Feisal, who had been hindering organization for six months and who had stopped the export of all cereals, responded to this by a general mobilization in Damascus. To this, there was only one reply; and, after the failure of new negotiations, General Gouraud marched on Damascus (July 25, 1920).

The Arabs were soon cleared out of the capital and Aleppo, and French priority in Syria could no longer be disputed. In the previous year, the device of a "mandate" had been decided upon. Annexations after the world-war had been rejected, and in their place was the idea that mandates were to be given over various ex-enemy lands which were to be administered for the good of the whole by the mandatory Power. As the French viewed this, according to Jonnart's summing-up in the Deputies in April, 1921, "the mandate is something new in international law. It does not confer on us a right of direct administration, it is not even a protectorate. It only gives us a right of aiding and advising a State recognized as independent and serving its apprenticeship of freedom." * The actual terms of the Syrian mandate were not definitely fixed until the London session of the Council of the League of Nations in July,

* *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 17/3/21, especially Lenail.

⁴ Briand gave the French view of these events in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 28/3/20.

⁵ In full with the documents in *L'Asie Française*, July-Oct. 1920, p. 300.

* *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 6/4/21.

1922, and were first published on August 12 of that year.⁷ France was to provide an organic statute for Syria, and, in particular, was to safeguard local autonomies. She was to control external affairs, but was not to have any monopoly of the country's development. The privileges of foreigners were to continue as before, and there was to be no differential economic treatment for the subjects of the various Powers. The limitations on French effort were thus very real and immediate.

By this time, too, another factor had entered to cause discontent. The Treaty of Sèvres of August, 1920, had reduced the French sphere to 100,000 square kilometres, and the later London and Angora Agreements (October 1, 1921) still further limited her opportunities there. The two latter meant that Cilicia, the goal so eagerly desired, passed completely away from French control. Its cotton-fields had gone, Alexandretta remained under Turkish menaces. But this restriction of effort was not as unwelcome as it would have been a few years earlier, because, in the interim, the opposition to the Syrian mandate had steadily grown in France. The extreme Left had wanted evacuation from the first, and, even in 1920, M. Briand had been able to maintain French interests there only by openly defying his parliamentary opponents. If France was to have no special interest there, was she to be "the *gendarme* of the world?" it was asked. If, on the other hand, she was in Syria for her own interests, then she did not want such an extension of interests. "We have Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia," protested Ribot, "and that is quite enough for France at the moment."⁸ And even those who held that, once pacification had taken place, France could not evacuate without diminishing her prestige in all Moslem countries, wanted to reduce the credits. Ribot's party, for instance, opposed the mandate on principle, but accepted small credits for the sake of France's wider Moslem policy. But the Government refused to budge, either in the face of opposition or half-hearted support, because it maintained that there were myriads of reasons why the French should remain in Syria. Beyond the wider question of philanthropy and the duty towards backward races, it adduced the specific interests of strategy and the railway. "We are in Syria," Lenail said specifically in the Deputies, "because France must hold this most important railway between Asia, Africa and Europe." Nevertheless, every successive list of credits was reduced, especially by the Senate, which was the stumbling-block to any aggressive French policy in Syria. At the close of 1921, for instance, when the movement for a *Syria irridenta* was gathering force, the Senate eagerly acquiesced in the Angora Agreement which lessened France's respon-

⁷ *L'Asie Française*, June, 1923, p. 177.

⁸ *Journal Officiel*, Depts., 7/12/21, 31/12/20, respectively.

sibilities in the Near East : being uninterested, they accepted any compromise that would end what was to them merely the tiring Cilician question.⁹

French opinion was thus very divided by the time the terms of the mandate became defined, and these differences played perhaps a greater part than any other factor in making the organization of Syria so difficult a task.¹⁰ The experience of Morocco,—the old tale of divided councils so familiar to the historian of French colonization,—was being repeated here in a particularly accentuated form.

I. French Policy

By 1920, however, it could be said that the French were definitely in Syria and were going to stay there. The question of organization therefore arose, and was complicated by the presence of various racial and religious antagonisms. Syria has less than three million people in its 60,000 square miles, but these are so divided in race and religion as almost to defy analysis. The racial diversity is most noticeable outwardly. The land is the cross-roads between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf, between Arabia and Egypt, and the trouble is that, although the Arab-Semitic type dominates and the Arab language is the most widely spread, "nationality follows religion." There are at least thirty different religious societies in the land, having as the only feature in common a hatred of Turkey. Syria is "a kind of museum of religions," with Sunnites, Jews, dissident Moslems, and Christians all mixed together. After the French organized the land into five sections, they found that the Sunnite Mohammedans were in the ascendant in three States, the Moslem Druses in another, and the Christians in another, with strong fighting minorities in each case. Under these conditions any nationalism could only be a sectional movement. There was no real national unity. Moreover, the Turks had always refused to educate the Syrians from a political point of view, so that there was no effective native government (except in Lebanon which had been autonomous since 1861). Once the Turks evacuated the land, therefore, the machinery of government simply fell to pieces. That was the position France found,—a land of mutually fighting religions with no shadow of nationalism and little State organization.¹¹

Under these conditions, the French had perforce to administer the land themselves until March, 1920. They tried to restore native officials

⁹ See debate in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 30/12/21. For support, see Flandin in *Ibid.*, Senate, 6/4/21.

¹⁰ Lenail in *Ibid.*, Deps., 31/12/22.

¹¹ *L'Asie Française*, Feb. 1920, p. 42 ; June, 1924, p. 240.

and native assemblies, but the process of filling the gap was of necessity a slow one. By 1920, however, it was felt that administrative control could replace a direct administration, and that the French could turn to the wider question of national organization. It was obvious that no governmental body could be created for Syria as a whole: the existence of the many minorities precluded any such centralization. There had to be a system of local autonomy on a regional basis, and it was in this direction that France moved in creating the four States of September, 1920. Syria was only a geographical expression, and economic and political considerations joined in demanding such a regional solution of the difficulty.

Gouraud, the French High Commissioner, therefore set up four autonomous States (Aleppo, Damascus, Lebanon, and the State of the Alaouites) in the latter part of 1920, and finalized this federal idea by the constitution proclaimed at Aleppo in June, 1922.¹² Previously to this, Lebanon had been separated from the rest of the Syrian organization. This hemmed-in little country was so traditionally independent and so much a Christian *enclave* that it could not readily be absorbed in the general Syrian structure. Its independence was therefore continued, and it was provided with a Chamber elected by universal suffrage,—the only one at that time in the Near East. No question interesting Lebanon was to be decided without coming before this Council, all legislation had to be submitted to it, and all fiscal charges meet with its approval. But, on the usual French model, the High Commissioner could provide for “the indispensable charges” above the heads of its members. Beyond this restriction, however, the Lebanon retained its genuine autonomy.¹³ For the rest of Syria there was to be a Federation. The remaining three States were to form what was known as “the Federation of Autonomous States in Syria.” A federal organization was to be the spokesman of French interests, although all residuary power was to remain with the individual States. The Councils of Government in each State were to elect five members to sit in a Federal Council, and this Federal Council in turn was to choose a President or executive head. Finances, public works, and civil services were to be ministerial departments, and the Federal Council could legislate on most economic matters. The customs, the other indirect taxes, and ultimately certain tax-receipts handed over by the States were to form the federal budget, which was to concern itself chiefly with matters of general economic development. The aim of this system was clearly to centralize the existing organization and to provide for a more easily executed French control. In the preceding

¹² *Ibid.*, April, 1923, pp. 127–129.

¹³ *Ibid.*, June, 1922, p. 244.

two years, French relationships with the Mohammedan world had improved: this Syrian centralization and the interference with the privileged position of the Lebanon were the first-fruits of that improvement, and were so construed by the parties interested.

That the trend was at once perceived by the Syrians was evident by the secessionist movement from that time onwards. All through 1921 the people had been sullenly passive and kept in order only by military force. Next year the discontent became more openly expressed. The previously localized riots now spread over the whole country, especially after the depreciation of the currency and the attempts to aid French trade. The agitation, though quieter, continued into 1923, and the Syrians resolutely opposed the division of their land into five segments, claiming that this effectively prohibited the emergence of a national spirit. As a concession to their demands for a constitutional government, Gouraud's successor, General Weygand, set up representative Councils in each of the States of the federation (August–September, 1923).¹⁴ These had been contemplated in the federal scheme of the previous year, but the difficulties of introducing the suffrage to a politically uneducated community had hitherto held back the French. Hereafter, however, they were to be elected by universal suffrage on a population-basis, special measures being taken to see that religious minorities secured adequate expression. Their powers were to duplicate those of the Lebanon Council, and, in particular, the dyarchical arrangement whereby "essential expenses" were outside the State's control was extended to these States. As in the Lebanon, however, no tax could be created or enlarged without a favourable vote of the Council. This budgetary activity, as in the French colonies proper, was the main function of the new bodies. In legislation they were confined to an advisory rôle, and, at every stage in the new constitution, the French inserted adequate—indeed, over-elaborate—precautions to prevent surprises or to keep the councillors away from a world of theory. Chief amongst these precautionary measures were the powers of the High Commissioner to approve all fiscal arrangements, to annul any deliberation of the Council on administrative matters, and to veto any of its proposals whatsoever. The controlling power of the executive is thus complete, and, if it so wills, the councils from the outset can be reduced to mere bodies of mummers. The Council's powers really reduced themselves to advice on most matters, a right of decisions on a few, a voting of the non-essential expenses, and the right to be consulted before new taxes were imposed. But the Government's power of veto and of general interference could nullify all of these. The Council *might* be a

¹⁴ Full text in supplement to *L'Asie Française*, Nov. 1923, p. 235.

body exercising these powers : it would be what the executive allowed it to be.

The French view-point was that they were not sufficiently established in Syria to risk hazardous legislative experiments, even had such a tendency at all characterized their colonial policy : and, secondly, that conditions in Syria,—a land of totally ignorant peasants and a self-seeking landlord-class,—were not such as to allow anything like a sovereign Assembly. The Syrians, it was held, could understand uniformly administered power but not constitutional liberty. However this might be (and it would appear from the elections that the French were in many ways justified in their point of view), the Syrians, especially in the towns, bitterly opposed the new constitution, because the powers it gave were so few as to amount almost to a mockery. Moreover, it stereotyped the federal *régime*, which was most unpopular as an attempt to weaken the Syrians by dividing them. Although they had never had any nationality, they resented any attempts against that artificial nationality in the existence of which they liked to delude themselves, but which, localists to the core as they were, they did not really want. They viewed nationality as a cause for agitation rather than as something to be realized in practice. But, as a grievance, it was real enough, especially when to it there was added the sectional opposition of the urban middle classes,—the commercialists who thought that the decrees of 1923 unduly favoured the despised rural dwellers.

The first elections in October, 1923, clearly showed this balance of forces. The most obvious fact was that the rural masses stood firm for France, because their agricultural position was being steadily improved. The result was viewed in France as eminently satisfactory, especially because of the failure of the British in the Palestine elections, the grave check in Iraq, and the failure to register as many votes in Egypt as in Syria. The State of Damascus, however, remained as ever the centre of dissidence. Only half of the people on the electoral rolls there voted, and there was successful passive resistance in every part of the State, both rural and urban, and also in the towns of Aleppo.¹⁸

These features, both good and bad, clarified the issue for France. Lebanon, if its peculiar local liberties were safeguarded, could be counted upon as standing for France, and the adjacent territory of the Alaouites, which had enjoyed no rights at all under the Turks and where the peasants were usually simpler and more illiterate than elsewhere, presented no difficulties. It was the two inner States of Aleppo and Damascus that refused to co-operate, and here that the danger lay. Before there could be any further progress, therefore, the opposition of these two States had

¹⁸ Analysis by Froidevaux in *Idid.*, Jan. 1924, p. 8 *et seq.*

to be met. But they wanted nothing less than a constitutional government and a scope for their Syrian nationalism. That is, they desired a unitary State and a responsible parliament. The French, because it was evident that the federal system was cracking, gradually came round to this point of view. Lebanon and the land of the Alaouites were moving in the direction of untrammelled independence, and the other two States were drifting together, so much so that nothing short of permanent force could stop them.

Accepting the inevitable, therefore, Weygand in June, 1924, promised the suppression of the federal *régime*.¹⁶ A decree of December 5 of that year carried out this promise and dissolved the Federation of 1922.¹⁷ Hereafter, the State of the Alaouites was to be fully autonomous, the Lebanon and the land of the Druses were to go on as before, and Damascus and Aleppo were to be combined in one State with a responsible parliament. What localism there was after this was to be natural, and not, as the system of 1922 had been, artificial. The inexorable force of circumstances had thus determined the policy France was to pursue in Syria, and Gouraud's system, unable to meet the facts, had to go root-and-branch. At this stage, the French seemed to have settled the Governmental difficulties for the time, although the sudden recall of the successful Weygand—and for reasons quite unconnected with Syria¹⁸—certainly boded ill for the success of his experiment. The organization was there at the close of 1924, and the people, given a tactful administration, were not indisposed to accept it, since it had been shaped in accordance with their desires. Everything depended on the sympathetic tact of the administration, and it could fairly be said that the prospects were as much there for success as for failure.

II. Economic Development

The question of Syria's economic possibilities played a large part in France's eagerness for the mandates. Those who wanted the mandate viewed the land as a rich path of passage and a desirable prize in itself,—almost as a land of milk and honey. Over against these were the pessimists. In the Senate in July, 1920, for instance, Bernard called it "a heap of inhospitable stones and sterile burning soil," and Bompard said that Syria "has a very slight economic value." The truth is partly midway between these two points of view. Syria is at present a comparatively poor agricultural land, little organized and sparsely peopled.

¹⁶ Speech in *L'Asie Française*, Sept.-Oct. 1924, p. 356. For the position of the Alaouites, see Barrès in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 16/11/23.

¹⁷ In *Rapport sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, 1924 (1926), p. 9.

¹⁸ *L'Asie Française*, Dec. 1924, p. 424.

There are possibilities there, it must be admitted, but these require time and development.

The population is much smaller than was formerly supposed, the first Census of 1923 placing it at less than 2,140,000.¹⁹ The land itself is relatively poor, and only 28 per cent. of its surface is cultivable. It has no minerals or coal, and is almost entirely a cereal country. Its greatest product is a million tons of wheat a year, but the present population needs this much for its sustenance. French experts, however,—Huvelin, for instance,—hold that this present total may be at least trebled, given material and juridical security. The land is there waiting: its exploitation depends primarily on the provision of favourable conditions. But its other crops are unimportant (it was Cilicia that was to have produced two-thirds of France's cotton needs, and Cilicia is no longer French!), and its flocks and herds are weak and declining. It is estimated that the total rural products can amount to 23½ million sovereigns in pre-war values,²⁰ but there is a good deal of hazard in this, and, even if realizable, the total amount is, after all, insignificant as compared with the trouble France has gone to in Syria.

On the industrial side, too, there is little development. The only possible secondary industries are in transforming agricultural products, but the silk-industry is practically extinct, and cloth-manufacturing cannot for long stand against European competition unless it is industrialized. At present, about an eighth of the people are engaged in industry, but all is on a rudimentary scale, and there are not a hundred establishments in the whole land that could properly be termed "industrial."

The trouble is that, both in the towns and the country districts, there has never been any security. Even when the land was at peace, there was never that trust without which progress is impossible. The Turkish political régime and the social system alike hindered advance, and, in addition, stamped the people with a certain supinely fatalistic type of psychology. They not only prevented progress in itself; what was far worse, they eradicated the spirit of progress. It is needless to specialize: the causes of backwardness were all jumbled together in one confused mass,—the *latifundia* system, the quasi-serfdom of the tenants, usury, insecurity of goods and person, the grip of exploiters, the absence of roads or irrigation, the scarcity of labour, and so on until the compiler wonders how even existence was possible under such conditions. In a

¹⁹ In *Ibid.*, Nov. 1923, p. 416. See Bernard in *Annales de Géographie*, 15/1/24.

²⁰ Analysis in Huvelin, *Que Vaut la Syrie ?* (1921), pp. 8–10; Ruppin, *La Syrie Economique* (1917), p. 34 *et seq.*

word, the land was not at peace with itself. The Turks governed and, refusing to take the Syrians into their confidence, were interested neither in efficiency nor progress. Within the land, a class of feudal landlords ground down the uneducated and only half-free peasantry, and the townsmen lived by exploiting the country-dwellers.²¹

The French were therefore confronted by the problem of modernizing the entire economic life of a people who were so accustomed to subservience that they would accept any yoke as long as it was justified by ancestral tradition. But, once France started her programme of reform, she was confronted by three factors,—the obscurity bequeathed her by the Turkish *régime*; the shortage of labour; and the innate opposition of the people to reform of any kind,—and it is difficult to say which of these three factors was the worst.

The illogicalities and corruptions of the anterior *régime* were certainly the most immediate, however, and France set to work to infuse some kind of order into the life of the people. Material tranquillity and moral confidence were the two primary needs. Nothing could be done unless people felt safe: if this confidence were not there, life merely reduced itself to a process of survival. The French therefore taught the Syrians, especially in the country districts, that a Government did not of necessity mean capricious extortion. By emphasizing such matters as re-afforestation, public works, and irrigation, they demonstrated their theory that a Government had duties as well as rights of taxation, and this ocular proof did more with a credulous peasantry—a peasantry who believed what they themselves could see—than a multitude of organic constitutions or proclamations of rights. Material improvement was what they wanted, and this was what the French gave them,—quite as much, it must be admitted, with the idea of raising a counter-element to the opposition of the townsmen as for the abstract improvement of the Syrian peasants, but none the less effective because of this ulterior motive.

The first specific task was land-legislation, because this was at the basis of Syrian life. The position in this connection was basically simple, though difficult of solution.²² Most of Syria was grouped into large landed-estates or *latifundia*, held by titles of doubtful legality and in few cases really defined. The French had two tasks: they had to define every man's rights (and incidentally let the State know where it stood, as in Morocco), and they had to prevent usurpations and thus indirectly foster the emergence of a class of small peasant-proprietors. There had been a State register in the land for fifty years, and, in the face of this

²¹ Huvelin, *op. cit.*, p. 15—report of a Mission of 1919.

²² Articles in *L'Asie Française*, Jan.-Feb. 1923, p. 22; July-Aug. 1924, p. 280.

strongly planted Moslem institution, France had to continue the existing system and yet contrive to make it efficient. Curiously enough, though this was perhaps the fundamental part of Syrian organization on the economic side, France did not obtain uniform control of land-matters until June, 1923, although it is inconceivable how there could have been a delay for so long.

This simplification of the land position is but a stage in the direction of the ultimate reform, as has been seen. The real evil is the existence of an idle landlord class who let out their lands to serfs and, charging 400 per cent. on capital advance, kept these serfs in economic slavery.²³ As the only other provision for credit in an essentially agricultural land was a Turkish State Bank that had made no more than 45,000 advances to 1914, the cultivators had no alternative other than submitting to this robbery: their past debts and their peculiar attachment to their ancestral land kept them there: and an easy-going fatalism that is the most marked trait in the Syrian rural character made efforts to secure a change out of the question. With taxes that were "farmed" and a Government that spoke for the landlords, the tenant was in a hopeless position. France hopes to remedy this, and to extend to all of Syria the system evolved by the Lebanon natives,—a small-property system in the hands of natives who are said to be so assiduous that they can make even the rocks fertile! But the fatalistic immobility of the peasantry in the North would seem to prevent such an extension, for any real change, however aided from outside, must be self-help in some form or other. The Syrian cultivator must, by a gradual educative process, be introduced to the idea of beneficent change and a salutary spirit of endeavour. Then, when the psychological difficulty is overcome, there remains the question of finance. Even if the cultivators should acquire the desire to progress, they have no means of fulfilling it; and France, with the credits available for Syria being continually diminished by Parliament, cannot afford funds for such intangible schemes of rural improvement. Yet, unless agricultural credit is organized in Syria on the Egyptian model, the land will not progress, and, even given a quietness on the part of the people, the French mandate will not be a success. Agricultural education and credit-facilities are needed to banish the forces of ignorance and usury: and *there*, once the frothy political grievances have been settled, lies the real Syrian problem.

Equally distracting is the French difficulty in regard to population. The population of Syria is much less than was previously supposed and is very unevenly distributed. Owing to the inordinate concentration in the urban districts, there are scarcely enough *fellahs* to till the land

²³ E. Achard, "Notes sur la Syrie," in *L'Asie Française*, 1922, p. 98 *et seq.*

actually under cultivation, and none at all available for the breaking of those new lands which are to treble the agricultural production of Syria. The Bedouins will not settle, the townsmen refuse to go back to the country, and the much-lauded project of enticing back some of the 500,000 Syrians abroad fails, because the immigrants, whose position cannot be any worse in their new lands, have no desire to return to a war-ridden Syria, and, even if they did so, they were town-dwellers in the first place.³⁴

In short, Syria has everything to make it stagnant, and lacks that pre-requisite for reforms,—the spirit of trust in the French. With that, the schemes of the mandatory Power may have had some chance of converting themselves into practice: without it, the countrymen vegetate as before, and the town-dwellers resort to non-co-operation in the bazaars. The whole land needs modernization and industrialization, yet any reform is at once *tabooed*, because associated with the French invaders. Under these conditions, beneficent change is impossible. The land is not suited for industry, yet the townsmen dominate: it must be agricultural, and yet the farmers will not change. The dilemma is complete. Syria stagnates, and the French are thwarted.

III. Conclusion

There is no doubt about the extent of the French failure in Syria. They thought to make it a second Morocco, they have succeeded in making it a second Rif. In a land where everything depended on the co-operation of the natives, the natives have been alienated. Up to 1923,³⁵ it could have been said that the French had at least won over the farming classes, and that they were, after all, the basis of the community. But the farming classes of the State of Damascus had never been conciliated in this way, and, in the disturbances of 1924, the ominous feature was that the old cleavage between country and town dwellers was for the nonce bridged, and all combined. The efficacy of the French scheme of agricultural improvement seemed to have lost its force.

Weygand's successor, General Sarraill, coming at the moment when conciliation was more than ever the primary *desideratum*, moved in exactly the opposite direction. By attacking local liberties, he estranged even the Lebanese, the most Francophile of the natives. The whole land rose, and, in the second half of 1925, practically all of Syria was

³⁴ Huvelin Report (1921), *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁵ Up to this date the achievements are in *Rapport sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban*, 1924 (1926), p. 60 *et seq.*, or *Compte Rendu du Congrès français de la Syrie* (Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, 1919). A good article is by "Testis" in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15/3/21, 1/3/21.

abandoned by the French except Damascus, Lebanon, and Beyrout. The rebel leaders proclaimed a National Government, Damascus was needlessly bombarded by the French (October), Sarrail was ignominiously recalled, and a civil High Commissioner, M. de Jouvenel, sent out. Constitutions were promised as pacification progressed, but clearly the French work had broken down.

France failed, because she antagonized the town-dwellers and then, almost inconceivably foolish though such a procedure was, alienated her former supporters, the rural producers. This she could only accomplish by a studious disregard of their interests. The constitutional experiments up to 1924 may have had some justification, because the problem was in many ways unique and singularly complex: but the events of 1925 read like a satirist's parody on a policy. At present, therefore, France rests on the Syrian coast, unpopular and unwanted: and Syria remains an annual charge on French finances, equally unpopular and unwanted. The old dreams of "Alexandretta and Cilician cotton" and "rounding-off Mediterranean dominion" have all gone: and the French Parliament cannot see beyond its melancholy record of failures, the purblind alienation of even the Lebanese and Druses, and the growing cost of the Syrian adventure. Morocco produced something for the sacrifice, but Syria seems in French eyes to be a new Mexico. Now that the petrol and cotton *motifs* have gone, the land offers nothing except the dubious strategic advantages, which were always more artificial than real. Syria therefore remains a disastrous hazard for France, and certainly none of the reforms that usually accompany French colonial efforts have been possible there,—neither the tariff-assimilation of the colonies proper, nor the *mise en valeur* of the protectorates, nor even the legal and social reforms of Morocco. In every way, even in the direction of raising the serfs as a new farming class against the landlords, Syria remains a confessed failure. As an experiment in colonization, it is more than void: it is distinctly weakening to France's position in her other Mohammedan lands along the Mediterranean littoral—and therein, after all, is the real significance of France's Syrian policy.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FRENCH EMPIRE SINCE 1914.

I. The Effect of the War of 1914-1918

COMPETENT observers of all shades of opinion agree in emphasizing the fundamental importance of the War of 1914-1918 on French colonization. Up to then, colonization had been drifting since the period of African conquest in the nineties. The French had conquered a vast Empire of 10½ million square kilometres, but, when the conquest was finally over in Mauretania and Wadai, nobody knew what to do. France disliked the task of organizing her new lands and could not for the moment see of what use they were going to be to her. The part that appealed to her was the conquest and such magnificent gestures as the burial of the conqueror of Wadai, Colonel Moll, in the walls of the Invalides. But, beyond this, the colonial scandals in the Congo and Indo-China sickened the public taste and reawakened that anti-colonial feeling that had been nascent since Ferry's time. The colonies were a burden, their organization an unprofitable expense, and their existence, if anything, an additional element of weakness to the French State. Hence came the period of colonial lethargy after 1905 and the frequent reversals of policy in the years immediately preceding the War. Hence, too, the vagueness of most Frenchmen at home on colonial questions. It was said that the chief French thought on the colonies was either in terms of Bernardin de Saint-Pierre's romance or Toqué's sombre tragedy of the Congo. There was always this mixed feeling, always the combination of good and evil, always the feeling that the lands down there produced such intangible complaints as "colonial amnesia," "bush nostalgia," and the like. In the years before 1914, for instance, the Janus-nature of colonization had its interpreters in Loti and Fabre, the romanticist and the stark realist. Outside of this blurred image, "this story of public sentiment," stood only the specialists, and those who were not the henchmen of the *bureaux* were separated from the mass of Frenchmen by the technical nature of their work and were not very powerful in affecting policy, because they could not elevate their problem to the status of a political issue and, if they became too articulate, were condemned to the sanctity of moderation by the gift of the red ribbon or rosette of official beatitude.

It needed the War to transmute this vagueness into a sense of colonial realities. The War visibly brought the facts of colonial existence home to the metropolitan Frenchmen: they realized for the first time that the colonies, expensive though they were, might conceivably be of use to the mother-country,—that they might strengthen instead of weaken. Hitherto, looking at the French domain sprawled over the world-map which vied with a Bottin in ornamenting his *café*, the Frenchman had seen only an enormous territorial frontier, along the whole of which France could be attacked. Now, on the other hand, he saw each of these far-flung territories definitely aiding France, alike in men and money and products. He realized the individuality of the various French possessions and saw how each could produce something that France needed. The colonies had changed from a sandy desert mopping up French blood and French capital and leaving little trace, into a vast cornucopia, giving out instead of absorbing.

First came the overseas troops, muster on muster until they were 1,918,000 strong, and 680,000 of them actual combatants. Colonials were actually in France in large numbers, and the stay-at-home Frenchman saw, as it were, a living kaleidoscope of the Empire in his streets. Arabs and Berbers and Tunisians, negroes and Moors and Somalis, Hovas and Sakalavas and Betsileos, Annamites and Pacific-Islanders and creoles of the Old Colonies were all there, and the Empire had at one stroke been vitalized. It was "*une organisation qui vive*," as much a part of France as the outer limbs of the body. The dimly realized abstractions had become realities of flesh-and-blood, and a France, overwrought with war emotions, was thrilled with the interest of it all. It is difficult to reconstruct this emotional intensity, or to feel how France gasped and quivered before this sight of her new-felt colonies. The presence of the scarred Bambaras and the immobile Arabs, side by side with the coppery Malagasians and the *capote*-hidden *tirailleurs* from Indo-China, with perchance a prognathous Melanesian or a tawny Tahitian from Mangin's brigade, was a fine sight: but it was more,—it symbolized the *living* nature of French colonization.¹ The two million colonials on French soil thus exercised an influence out of all proportion to their military worth: indeed, even remembering Douaumont and Verdun, it may be said that their military performances were the least of their services. They created a new French attitude of mind, and made possible a unified colonial policy. Their work was as propagandists rather than wielders of bayonets, for French colonialism was really brought home to the metropolis in these years.

¹ C. Régismanset, *Questions Coloniales* (1923), Vol. I, p. 51. For military effort, see Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 39.

After the original interpretation of the colonies' share in the War in emotional terms came a more reasoned, but an equally telling, economic view-point. France had had men from the colonies, but her needs gradually changed until she wanted raw materials more than anything else. The colonies, therefore, gave a milliard of francs in money and, excluding North Africa, 2½ million tons of products. That is, colonial enterprise demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt that it could definitely strengthen continental France,—and more, that colonization could *pay*. It was a sound financial proposition.²

By 1918, then, it could truthfully be said that, if there was not already a completely new colonial orientation, all of the materials, especially the frame of mind, needed for that new orientation were in process of being assembled. The French mind had realized the colonies, and the colonial question had at last become a national one. Instead of being a neglected matter dealt with by a few governmental *bureaux*, it had become linked up with the destinies of France, strengthening or weakening France as it was strong or weak. This concept, that France was directly affected by the position of her colonies, was something quite new, because hitherto the view-point had been that the colonies meant payment—always payment, with an incommensurate return.

Next, the War had awakened a new kind of imperialism. It was not only that France, under the seduction of Mangin's jugglery with numbers, dreamed of the possibilities of drawing tens of millions of men from her hitherto-untouched colonial reservoirs: the real significance lay far deeper,—that France had incorporated the colonies in her life and now saw in them a France, even if a different France, outside France.

This realization necessitated a plan of organization and development. The easy *tracasserie* and general atrophy of the pre-war stage could no longer be applied to the New Empire. The colonies had been galvanized into a coherent life and associated with the mother-country: therefore, there had to be a uniform and progressive policy for them in the reconstruction after the War. The War, in this sense, created a colonial policy. "I said," proclaimed Simon, the Minister of the Colonies in September, 1919, "that the colonial empire of France was built without a regular plan, and almost at the hazard of events, or even at the caprice of certain audacious individuals who simply handed the country the *fait accompli*."³ All of this ill-advised and haphazard empiricism had to go. "The first lesson of the War," added Simon, "was to show that a regular plan was necessary,"—and this realization in itself justified the

² Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 46.

³ Simon in *Journal Officiel*, 18/9/19, or see L. Hubert, *Une Politique Coloniale* (1918), p. 4.

claim that the War was the pivotal point of French colonial theory and practice.

Moreover, the War had shown that this colonial plan of necessity had to be primarily economic. The fundamental importance of the colonies had been in their grains and oils and other food-stuffs and raw goods, and it was in this direction that development had to go on. "We must now be able to count on the economic solidarity of our colonies as we have hitherto counted on their military solidarity." That is, schemes of colonial policy were hereafter not so much concerned with the earlier questions of administrative decentralization or with legal status so much as crops and finance and labour-supplies. The various elements in the colonial syllogism had obtained different values, and, with the premises thus altered, the result was far different. It was a new colonial problem that confronted France in 1919, and that is why the sterile disputes of the period from 1905 to 1914 seem so very distant, and almost inconceivable, as applied to the post-war colonies.

Lastly, another element had received a new stress. The rise of the theory of association since 1900 had involved a greater emphasis on the moral values of colonization, but this had largely been discounted by the suffering of the Algerians and Indo-Chinese and by the Congo atrocities, and had not been a serious force in colonization, save in the short-lived emotional disgust after the Toqué-Gaud case in 1905. The rallying of the natives to France, however, placed the question of French responsibility to them on a new plane, especially after Germany was deprived of her overseas possessions on the ground of "colonial unworthiness." That very phrase implied a moral value in colonization, and, according to the French school of theorists under Sarraut and Simon, this moral value was quite as important as the economic. Even if it was a little difficult to consider the materialistic France of the post-war years as influenced by this factor in itself, there was the faintly enunciated, but very telling, argument that henceforth the French in the colonies had to depend on the natives. The War had shown that colonization was mainly economic and that France absolutely needed colonial products: facts also demonstrated that, the position of the French Empire being what it is, these products could only be forthcoming under conditions of native production, and the natives would not produce to the limits of their capacities unless they wanted to. A liberal native policy was therefore a sound economic proposition.⁴ As a result of both of these arguments, humanitarian and coldly economic, France turned to a new consideration of native policies.

The war-years thus changed the nature of the French outlook towards

⁴ Hubert in *Journal Officiel*, Senate, 10/7/18.

colonies. They showed France the importance and extent of her colonial wealth, both human and material: they showed the intrinsic strength of the overseas colonies: they showed the potentialities still dormant there and the profitable nature of developing them: they showed the absolute need of a coherent plan and a vigorous policy in furthering this development: they showed that any such plan had to be of necessity both economic and moral: and they revealed the sudden birth of the New French Empire, with all of its new problems and new duties and new responsibilities. The colonial question had changed in every way, both in itself and in the way in which the French regarded it; and it seemed impossible for the pre-war lethargy to come back again. The colonial problem, in one phrase, had at last merged with the wider national problem, and as such, had to be solved or shelved. But hereafter it could not idly be put aside unless the French paid the price in added national weakness,—and this realization, after all, was the greatest gain France made in the colonial field during the War.⁵

II. The Economic Problem

After the War had brought home to France the real nature of her colonial empire, practical steps had to be taken to realize the possibilities offered by the colonies and by the changed metropolitan outlook. Inasmuch as the problem had become national, it meant that the individual colonies had to be strengthened and also that they had to produce more and more for the benefit of France. Hence, a *mise en valeur* of the whole French Empire became a primary need, and both policy and necessity determined that any such progress had to be on the basis of native collaboration.

Taking stock of their existing position, the most obvious feature, despite the frantic effort of the War, was how fruitless and weak the work of the past had been. Despite the extreme protectionist system in force in most of the French colonies, France commanded only 53 per cent. of the colonial exports and 54 per cent. of their imports in 1913, the proportions changing to 21 per cent. and 48 per cent. in 1920. The enjoyment of half their exports and a quarter of their imports, and the maintenance of the former only by the restrictions on export which were in force until February, 1921, could not be termed a good showing. Less than an eighth of the nation's total trade came from the colonies, and, even in the favoured Algeria, development was slow, if it was taking place at all.⁶

⁵ *L'Afrique Française*, April, 1922, p. 189.

⁶ See analysis in *Le Monde Colonial Illustré*, Dec. 1926, p. 274, and compare Girault (1916), *op. cit.*, p. 168, to show lack of development.

On the other hand, it was readily evident that the position of colonial trade *might* become increasingly important. The colonies had suffered from metropolitan neglect, from the multitude of changing policies, and from the dead-weight of tariff-assimilation: and yet had come to absorb 12 per cent. of the nation's trade. If this result could be achieved under the unfavourable conditions hitherto existing, and without much emphasis on the new crops for which the various colonies were adapted, what might not the result be, it was asked, if colonial production were definitely systematized, and aided? An official investigation of 1917 positively declared that the output of the colonies could at least be doubled and that this retarded development was due, not to themselves, but to the paucity and misdirected nature of French aid. The cotton and cereals and wool and minerals that France needed so badly were all there, and could be produced if the conditions were satisfactory. The onus of development was thus thrown on the French themselves, and it was no longer doubted that the colonies could become both a centre for provisioning France with food and raw materials, and a huge market for the sale of her manufactured goods.

The argument, briefly put, developed through several successive stages. The colonies do not trade with France as they should do,—the official statistics amply demonstrated that point: that they *could* trade with France was evident from the undeveloped nature of their resources and the reports of several commissions on the handicaps hitherto existing: and lastly came the argument that, for reasons of national development, they *had* to trade with France, and to an ever-increasing degree. The last stage in the argument was the new one, because, before the War, few would have argued that France's national safety depended in part on colonial trade,—yet that is what the new contention amounted to. A Report of the National Association for Economic Expansion in 1921 thus stated definitely that “the essential basis of our return to normal economic conditions is the integral *mise en valeur* of our colonies.”⁷ And it was this view that gradually found official existence.

“To live in our domain on the products of that domain” had become the dominant formula. To do this, France resolved to widen the basis of her policy of tariff-assimilation and so change it as to allow colonial strength as well as metropolitan. The British and Italian idea of Imperial Preference was to be carried to its furthest logical implication,—not, as Sarraut affirmed, to the extent of creating an economic world within a world and thus dying of economic anæmia, but at least to the degree

⁷ In Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 73.

of strengthening both France and the colonies in one co-ordinated structure, competing against other nations.

France had had an increasingly adverse trade-balance in the years after 1913 and therefore had to obtain colonial trade to correct her position. Her 55 million colonists and her 12 milliards of colonial trade (1921) were too important an element in national prosperity to be neglected any longer: therefore, various projects for a *mise en valeur* were formulated to make them as productive as possible.

This point of view had been quietly emerging for some time. Those pre-war reformers who wanted "tariff personality" for the respective colonies had been groping in this direction, and Camille Guy, an African Governor and well-known publicist, had specifically urged a *mise en valeur* as early as 1900.⁸ He wanted a new *Pacte Colonial*, one benefiting both sides and securing a genuine economic solidarity between France and the colonies, and claimed that it was economically, and not administratively, that the colonies were prolongations of France. This feeling grew throughout the war-years, although it was realized that the efforts of the various councils and reform-bodies before the War, by over-emphasizing colonial individuality, had been going too far in the direction of decentralization and had almost viewed the problem as a series of local desires rather than as a unitary matter of national urgency.

The first important step was the war-organization itself. Under the strain of war-conditions, a considerable degree of administrative and economic grouping had been introduced, the idea being to secure increased efficiency. Local units, in Africa and Oceania, for instance, were combined, and the emphasis came to be on such natural federations and intensive production as would mean the maximum efficiency. This meant that the situation was neither as isolated nor as unduly diffuse as it had hitherto been. The machinery, in a word, was emerging for the post-war schemes. After Lyautey had demonstrated in Morocco that reconstruction was the real objective of hostilities, events moved still more rapidly. Vivien du Streel, in *Le Rôle des Colonies dans l'Après-Guerre*, showed in 1916 that the colonies could become the principal provider of raw materials and the main buyer of finished goods, and André Maginot, when Minister of the Colonies, gave an official *imprimatur* to this view by the economic *cahiers* he had drawn up for each colony. He called a Colonial Conference of experts to determine the means whereby the future economic development of the colonies could be co-ordinated with that of France: and his Conference proved beyond doubt that production could at once be greatly increased.⁹

⁸ In *La Mise en Valeur de notre Domaine Coloniale*.

⁹ Regiamanset (1923), *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 71-77.

The Ribot Cabinet fell, and with it the details of the Maginot scheme, but the general struggle went on, although not much could be done before hostilities were over. In July, 1918, for instance, Flandin caused an interpellation in the Senate on the subject of increased colonial production, but only fifteen senators thought the matter important enough to listen to!¹⁰ Despite this apathy, the Minister of Colonies for the time being, Henri Simon, propounded a scheme for the economic regeneration of the colonies, and thus kept breath in the official project.

The first real awakening came with the realization that the main economic struggle in world-affairs was commencing *after* the War. The commencement of the post-war crisis gave point to this assertion, the result being that when Lucien Hubert, a former budget-reporter, again introduced the matter to the Senate, it was at once emphatically taken up. The Hubert interpellation of February 19 and 27, 1920, was the most important colonial debate for thirty years, and certainly the most fruitful one since Ferry's time.¹¹ Hubert, supported by the new colonial group which had emerged in Parliament since the War, showed how the issue was one of national gravity and could no longer with safety be postponed. Of 6 milliard francs' worth of colonial produce imported to France before the War, two-thirds could have come from the French colonies, yet actually 90 per cent. of this trade was in the hands of foreigners! And that despite the fact that France had an adverse trade balance of 1½ milliard francs! Despite the artificial protection of war conditions, this position continued and, in 1920, France obtained only 10 per cent. of her food-imports from the colonies and 5 per cent. of her raw-materials; and even such products as sugar and coffee and cocoa, wool and cotton came from foreign colonies. "The colonial empire *must* make a new effort," cried Hubert in his budget-reports, because to waste the resources actually in the French colonies was as weakening to the country as a military defeat.

This skirmish in the Senate once more popularized the question, and, from that time onwards, it was not a question of the end so much as the means to be employed. A general *mise en valeur* of the colonies was inevitable, it was everywhere agreed: the only question was how this could be achieved. This question had been swept into the general hysteria of the elections of November, 1919, and, it must be confessed, was given a largely distorted importance. "We must produce more or disappear as a nation," the Premier, Millerand, asserted, and such emotional utterances were accepted as grave economic truths. But, emotional or

¹⁰ *Journal Officiel*, 10/7/18,—an important debate.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Senate, 20, 28/2/20,—fundamental. Compare article in *Colonies et Marine*, March-April, 1920, p. 34.

not, this phase was in the ascendant, and the *mise en valeur* plan must be considered in the light of these influences. Sarraut introduced the plan, and he was simply the expression of his time. He saw colonial matters in this importance, he was a member of a Cabinet which was striking out in new directions. Only three members of the Millerand Cabinet were professional politicians, for the Premier had responded to the national crisis by turning away from the political *coteries* inside Parliament to the economic groups outside. "The Millerand Ministry," it was written at the time, "emphasizes the passing of Parliamentary rule, and the rise to power of the economic unit in government."¹² It was dominated by outside bankers and business men, and, called into being by a huge majority to solve the nation's economic problem, was relying on economic technicians, for the colonies as for the mainland itself. It is as an offshoot of this wider movement and as one expression of the new economic *Zeitgeist* and the emotional intensity of 1920 that the Sarraut plan must be considered. Divorced from this wider context, it seems inflated, almost unreal; but, considered as one element in the general recasting of national affairs, it becomes more easily explained. If the thwarted instincts of post-war France had not found expression in this economic channel, and if the colonial problem had not formed one part of a similar national issue, it would have been difficult to explain either the scope or the ready acceptance of the Sarraut plan. But, thrown against this background, the element of mystery about it vanishes, and the feeling that it was only a spectacular gesture goes too. Largely the product of overwrought emotions it might be, but it was still a part and parcel of a wider national scheme, and as such came down to reality.

Albert Sarraut,—the Radical deputy who has already come into this survey, as a successful Governor-General of Indo-China, and as the leading exponent of the *association* theory,—outlined his policy in Indo-China in the French Senate as early as February, 1920, and in the Deputies in July of the same year.¹³ But it was not until April 12, 1921, that the scheme was put forward in its final form,—in that form of a general programme which has since been accepted as the basis of colonial development.¹⁴ He commenced his exposition by showing how the general colonial question had been metamorphosed by the conditions of the War. Until then, the image had been blurred: but, by 1920, he argued, the pressure of economic facts had given it definiteness. The

¹² "New York Nation," 10/4/20, in E. M. Sait, *Government and Politics of France* (1920), p. 326.

¹³ E.g. in *Journal Officiel*, Depts., 3/7/20; Senate, 28/2/20.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Depts., 13/4/21, 19/6/21. Compare *Colonies et Marine*, August 1921, p. 481.

theory of the day was that French destinies depended on increased production. To do this, colonial and metropolitan action had to dovetail in to each other, and the colonies were to become reservoirs of raw material and emporia for home manufacturers. But the striking feature, as he emphasized it, was the mutual interdependence of France and the colonies, and the realization that the former depended on the latter as much as the latter did on the former. A new interpretation was given to this interaction. "Here again," said Sarraut, "and the phenomenon is of a relatively recent date, the image of colonial reality comes to adapt itself as a necessary complement to that of metropolitan existence"; and this realization on the part of French politicians was something entirely new.¹⁵ Instead of the improvised empiricism of pre-war years, there was to be what Sarraut called "colonial incorporation," a term which in itself expressed the mutualism and the necessity of colonial aid.¹⁶

To realize this new objective, Sarraut held that all colonial efforts had to be co-ordinated. The earlier policy of *petits paquets*,—of desultory and discontinuous schemes, was anathema to the reformers. The Millerand Ministry stood for the elimination of such policies from national existence, and nowhere had they been more noticeable in the past than in the colonies. There, a fixed plan was needed above all things. A division of labour was necessary, if the maximum output was to be obtained, and this meant specialization. Each colony, therefore, had to confine its development to those particular directions that would strengthen the general structure: the older notion of an attempt to secure something like colonial self-sufficiency was definitely discarded. Colonization had to become specialized. "Our colonies must be centres of production and no longer museums of specimens,"—development had to be made efficient and co-ordinated. Mass-effort on the best factory-principle was the word of the day,—in short, the application of the principles of modern industry was to transform the colonial régime.

The new method of colonization was thus to impose a division of labour on the colonies as a whole, and to introduce efficiency-methods in each part. Sarraut in this much was extending the newer Belgian theory. Lucien Franck, who had been the Belgian Minister of the Colonies since 1919, had consistently urged this "policy of industrialization," and had said that colonization was only a synonym for industrial modernization under post-war conditions.¹⁷ A leader of industry, Lippens, had been appointed Governor-General of the Belgian Congo, and was to manage

¹⁵ Speech at Brussels Colonial Conference, in *L'Afrique Française*, May 1923, p. 247.

¹⁶ *La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises*, p. 316.

¹⁷ *L'Afrique Française*, Feb. 1922, p. 113; compare May 1921, p. 162.

the colony as he would a huge industrial undertaking. Sarraut readily adopted this idea. Despising what he dubbed *colonisation en jardins*, he turned to a huge programme of imperialistic specialization. The colonial world was roughly divided up into groups, each of which was assigned a certain range of products and provided with facilities for an intensive and efficient development. That, in brief, was the Sarraut method. West and Central Africa had to give oils and timber: West Africa had also to follow the Gold Coast in providing cocoa and had to stress cotton in the Niger valley: North Africa had to concentrate on food-stuffs and phosphates: Indo-China, in addition to its rice, was to provide cotton and silk and rubber: Madagascar had to give meat and grains, and the Antilles sugar and coffee. The products of each were to go into the great national pool. Work was apportioned so that it would produce the maximum result, and, really, the whole Empire was to become a huge factory, using every device of industrial specialization.¹⁸

The first step in securing this increased output was in providing facilities for the development of the wealth that was latent in nearly every colony. The Sarraut programme, as translated into practice, thus came to mean a scheme of public-works, empire-wide. He took the general principles of his predecessors, Simon and Hubert, and gave them a definite practical expression. Above all, he wanted a development that was practical and that would secure the most return. Therefore, he invoked the aid of the specialists. In February, 1921, he appointed a Commission of technicians to outline a plan for the scientific development of the colonies, in particular by picking out those nerve-centres which could serve as the principal centres of production. On these strategic points in the economic world, his State efforts in the direction of communications and other facilities were to centre. Commissions had previously been instituted in each local group of colonies: now, their findings were co-ordinated, and the whole resolved into what is known as "the Sarraut Plan." This was to construct public works to the value of four milliards of francs and allow future colonial development to take place round these pivots. The North African possessions, being under other Ministries, did not come under the scheme, but every other colony was to benefit.¹⁹

The main works were naturally in the larger colonies, especially those which, like Indo-China and West Africa, produced the most. For instance, in West Africa, the Dakar port was to be extended and the Thiès-Kayes railway completed; and development in general was to centre as far as possible on the Niger irrigation-scheme. Equatorial Africa, the most

¹⁸ Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, pp. 339-341.

¹⁹ For details, see Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 342 *et seq.*

backward of the French colonies, was to be released from its dependence on the Belgian Congo by the construction of a railway from Brazzaville to the sea, and the Cameroons were to have their economic future, already a bright one, enwidened by the extension of the central railway-line to Yaundé. Indo-China was to receive four extensive harbour-works and the completion of the Vinh-Donghoi and Tourane-Saigon railways. The lesser colonies all benefited, though effort in most was restricted to ports and roads. For the first time in their history, all of the French colonies, outside of North Africa, had a general scheme of development. Their economic development was chosen for them in certain directions, and the site and nature of their public works determined with this end in view. The building of those works would provide the various colonies with the materials for development and remove the complaint that production had hitherto been diminished because of inadequate governmental aid. Hereafter, with the expenditure of 4,000 million francs, public works would for some time be in advance of the productivity of each group, and there would be no reason why the doubling of colonial production, as forecast by the Colonial Conference of 1917, should not be achieved. Sarraut's facilities once provided, there could be no excuse for any more delay in realizing the potentialities of each colony.²⁰

The plan itself was deposed as a *projet de loi* in April, 1921, and approved both by Parliament and the various Chambers of Commerce.²¹ It is true that everything at the moment was auspicious. Parliament had been awakened by the Senate's activities in the previous years; the Press, usually so indifferent to colonial matters other than scandals, had followed the *Temps* and the new colonial periodicals in supporting the project; and the country, stirred up by the entry of the colonial matter into the last election ("the first time a rational appeal was made to the electors about the latent resources of overseas France"),²² was interested to a quite unusual degree. The Colonial Group in Parliament now numbered a hundred members, and colonial matters had been regularly discussed in the elections. The Economic Agencies which had been created in Paris by the Governments of the leading colonies in 1918-1920 and the Agency-General of the Colonies (1920) were furthering the contact between the colonial markets and the metropolis, and, in general, advertising the colonies. A Colonial Economic Council had been instituted in 1920 as a part, perhaps the most vital part, of the reformed *Conseil Supérieur des Colonies*, and permanent Commissions on colonial questions alone had been set up in Parliament in 1921 for the first time. There had

²⁰ See Sarraut (1923), Appendix I, for details.

²¹ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 19/6/21. Compare Briand in 21/6/21.

²² Important article in *Colonies et Marine*, May 31, 1920, p. 263.

never been so many colonial agencies, never such co-ordination, never such interest in questions of colonial development.²³

The Sarraut project itself was confined to an examination of principles and a statement of the necessary works: the financial side was not dealt with for the moment. In this connection, Sarraut adopted the view that the colonies themselves could aid, especially the richer Governments-General like Indo-China and West Africa. The backward colonies,—the Congo and the Pacific, for instance,—would naturally require metropolitan aid, but the others could largely finance their own propositions. Indo-China and West Africa were in a sound financial position, had few loans, and large undeveloped resources. Indo-China, in particular, had an excess of capital, and could, as was shown in 1925, easily raise money by internal loans. The financial aspect of the Sarraut plan, strangely enough, was not the most pressing difficulty, even with a France embarrassed by a war-strain and a depreciating currency. The fundamental points were to secure the acceptance of one general plan, to divide activities amongst the colonies so that they would produce the maximum return, and to arouse the country's interest: and all three of these had been achieved.

The execution of the project, therefore, went on at different rates in each colony, and its main features were soon secured in the larger ones. The railways in West Africa and Indo-China were finished by 1925, and that in the Congo was progressing. Works on the ports in each of these places were in progress. The irrigation-scheme for the Niger was approved and missions sent out to investigate, and a start was made in the direction of controlling the water-supplies of Indo-China. Even in the poorer colonies,—Tahiti, for instance,—the works went on to some degree, the harbour-improvements of Papeete being recommenced. But the lesser parts of the project had to be postponed, because the position changed. The prevalence of high prices up to 1922 meant a considerable degree of colonial prosperity and a general growth of prosperity; and this in turn led to a greater budgetary stability and a general spirit of optimism. Reaching its height,—a somewhat hysterically dizzy height,—at the Colonial Exposition of Marseilles in 1922, this optimism failed to survive the reaction, because the stagnation of European markets reacted on the colonies and budgetary deficits reappeared.²⁴ Moreover, the financial embarrassment of France, coupled with the expenditure of at least 5 milliards in Moroccan and Syrian wars, turned attention away from the *mise en valeur* scheme²⁵; and under the circumstances, the

²³ Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, pp. 149, 150.

²⁴ For analysis see Besson in *L'Afrique Française*, July 1921, p. 233.

²⁵ Cachin in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 7/12/24.

wonder was, not that the project was not carried out in its entirety, but that even its major lines should have been sketched. The metropolis could afford practically no aid, because, although most of the colonies paid their civil expenses and the larger even made grants towards their military charges, the great bulk of the Minister of Colonies' appropriation was already earmarked. Although the three North African States and Syria were not under his control, the Minister of the Colonies had to pay 197 million francs out of his total budget of 232 million (1924) for military expenses. An extra 13½ million went for the penal expenses of Guiana, and this left only 21½ million for the civil expenses of all the colonies. Even of that, 13 million went for temporary aids to colonial budgets and to railway charges of the past, so that there was clearly nothing left for new public works.²⁶

Fortunately, there were certain alleviating factors. The budget of the Minister of Public Works included many colonial charges. Indo-China could easily look after itself and even finance the Pacific schemes. Equatorial Africa and the sugar-islands were so badly off that their works were not urgent. Madagascar was so quietly prosperous that new works there were not of paramount urgency. So that only West Africa remained. It was there that the need was the most vital, and that a given expenditure could produce the most return. West Africa still holds this peculiar position in the French Empire, and so far little has been done to overcome it. For the parts of the Empire not under the Colonial Minister, the position varied. Morocco was amply provided for by its own budget, and Tunisia, a land of city-dwellers and traders, did not need much: but Algeria, where the presence of 750,000 Europeans gave the problem a quite unique significance, simply drifted. It needed works more urgently perhaps than any other colony: its budget, which did not re-attain equilibrium after the War until 1925, could make no new provisions: and it had to depend on metropolitan aid.

The Sarraut project therefore needs re-stating and bringing up to date. Sarraut's successors, Daladier and André Hesse, performed yeoman service in continuing his work, but it was a new theorist with an executive mind who was needed, rather than loyal henchmen. Moreover, as this is a really national question, provision should be made for all the colonies, irrespective of the particular Ministry under whose control they may be. It is a matter for the Minister of Public Works rather than the Minister of the Colonies. In addition, financial provision should be made with the formulation of the scheme, and not, as was the case with the original Sarraut project, left haphazardly and to varying degrees with the different colonies. The Sarraut scheme accomplished much: more still remains

²⁶ Hubert Report, in *Ibid.*, Senate, docts. parl., 1923, No. 320.

to be done by a scheme beginning where that of Sarraut left off and based on the needs of the French Empire as altered by the post-war travail,—that is, on the Empire as it emerged from the test in 1925.

The general problem remains the same as when Sarraut commenced his labour. There has been little increased production, and France received only 10 per cent. of her colonial goods from her own lands in 1925. As Archimbaud, the budget-reporter for 1926, bitterly protested in the Deputies in December, 1926, the colonies were drifting. In 1925, for instance, France imported 3,200 million francs' worth of wool, of which North Africa gave only 6½ per cent., yet its wool-lands were very similar to those of Australia! Of 4,100 millions of cotton 2 per cent. only came from the French colonies, the Niger scheme and the Indo-Chinese ventures notwithstanding! She absorbed 2,145 millions of cereals other than rice, and of this North Africa,—the lands of the Tell and the black-earth,—provided 13 per cent.! And he could have gone right down the list.²⁷ The old evils remained; the new projects belonged largely to the world of theory. The scheme to industrialize colonization had barely commenced, despite its success in the Belgian Congo; and the cotton-project in particular had practically stopped at the stage of investigation by missions of inquiry. Colonial industry, which had been given a fillip during the war-years (witness the development of Tonkin, the nickel and blast-furnaces of New Caledonia, and the secondary industries in West Africa and Madagascar), found itself shackled anew by metropolitan restrictions. Since the War, France has constantly been slipping back in the import-trade of her colonies and has not been able to command any more of their exports; and the old policy of tariff-assimilation, self-annulling though it might almost be termed, has increased in proportion to the loss of colonial trade by France. This, when joined to the actual diminution of colonial production, led to a new lethargy,—a lethargy accentuated by the national financial crisis of 1925–1926. The *mise en valeur* project was thus of necessity swept into the background.

Yet the potentialities of the French colonies are more clearly defined than ever, and the successful parts of the Sarraut plan, achieved as they were in the face of great difficulties, show what can be done, if the capital and the progressive spirit are there. The colonies can give France the bulk of the colonial materials she is absorbing in greater quantities every year,—that is clear beyond the possibility of doubt.²⁸ Cereals come first in the list, because the country depends on them for her food-supplies.

²⁷ Archimbaud Report in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., docts. parl., 1926, No. 3401. Compare *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 2/12/26.

²⁸ For detailed analysis of each article, see Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 154 *et seq.*

Here North Africa and Syria, the wheat-lands, have their scope. At present, North Africa produces 23 million metric quintals a year, and Syria 2, and between them they export $3\frac{1}{2}$ million to France,—about one-tenth of France's annual imports. The wheat-lands in each of these colonies, however, are capable of great expansion, with both a qualitative and quantitative increase. The fault here is directly a remediable one. It is due to the failure to improve native methods, to offer adequate facilities to a European population (witness the flight from the land in Algeria and the failure in Morocco), and to minimize the chances of failure by irrigation and rural-credit. France openly admits her weakness in all of these directions, yet is hindered in her future policies by the legacy of the past and the mistrust of the people.

With wool, the next article in the colonial cornucopia, the position is worse. It is a strange fact that the French have nowhere succeeded in implanting a strong pastoral industry in their colonies, and have even, as in West Africa and Algeria, allowed native pasture positively to decline. France needs fine merino wool, but has to go mainly to the British colonies and Argentine. In 1920 her own colonies furnished only 104,000 metric quintals out of 1,630,000,—a negligible help, although the Central Wool Committee, instituted in 1920, is hopeful about the future. But what France has lacked in the way of achievement, she has always made up for in the way of committees! Nevertheless, in this case, she had the materials. The *hauts plateaux* of Algeria are good sheep-lands, the Central Niger deltasawits flocks go up by leaps and bounds during the war-years, and Madagascar has offered fair returns. But, to date, despite the presence of essentially pastoral races like the desert Arabs or the Peuhls of West Africa, little has been achieved, and that little rather in the direction of weakening native pasture than introducing new varieties.

The next, and most emphasized, article on the colonial list is cotton. This is a most vexed question. In so far as France's economic policy in the colonies could be defined after the War, it could almost be termed a policy of cotton. This was a matter immediately touching French industry, and the hold of the industrialists on colonial policy has been a truism since Ferry's day. So vital was it that, until the over-production of 1926, it attracted more attention than any other question in colonial life.²⁹ The French colonists, said Sarraut, can and must help here. They gave only one-hundredth of the cotton-imports in 1920, one-fiftieth in 1925, so that France was dependent on the United States for the very maintenance of an industry that employed 300,000 workers. She needs at least three million metric quintals of raw-cotton every year, yet the

²⁹ E.g., Governor Angoulvant in *Colonies et Marine*, 1921, pp. 567, 645 *et seq.*, or *L'Afrique Française*, Sept. 1923, p. 466, or Sarraut (1923), pp. 163-175.

colonies, suitable though many of them are for cotton-growing, produce 24,000 ! The lesson, if it needed any pointing, was amply driven home by the suffering after the crop-failures of 1903, 1907, and 1921, and by the success of the British Cotton-Growing Association in the African colonies adjacent to the French. The one showed the need for self-reliance in this matter, the other showed what could be done under similar conditions to those of the French colonies. France therefore concentrated on this question of cotton-production, and that was one reason why the mainland Chambers of Commerce were so enamoured of the Sarraut project. Two regions in particular were favoured,—Indo-China and West Africa. In the former, some 600,000 hectares of river-land are available, but the trouble is that labour is scarce, and, moreover, since Indo-China has already entered the industrial stage, the colony is more concerned with importing raw-cotton than producing it. In West Africa, the early failures showed that cotton depends primarily on irrigation, although, when the Béline Mission settled doubts on this score in 1920, problems of labour and transport came to the fore. On the one hand is the undoubted fact that there are two million hectares of irrigable land in the Niger basin, mostly suited for cotton, and especially for the native-produced variety, the American form, which France wants so badly. But against this are the difficulties caused by native ineptitude and by the passage over the intervening 1,200 kilometres to the coast. Neither of these, it must be admitted, is insoluble ; and, now that the irrigation and railway projects are proceeding, the Niger valley, the failure of the past notwithstanding, remains one of the most hopeful cotton-centres of the world. In the meantime, American price-control has shown France more than ever the need of her independence in this matter, although the over-production of 1925–1926 has somewhat altered the premises of the French argument.

These are the main colonial supplies that France wants from her colonies. The others are much more satisfactory. The oleaginous products, though still largely drawn from abroad, are satisfactorily developed in French Africa : France gets her rice from Indo-China : the rubber-position occasions no disquietude : the lumber-resources of the African forests, though hindered during the War, have been offering more and more since 1905 : the production of coffee is increasing, though much still remains to be done : and the colonies can do little to minimize France's dependence on the foreigner for metals other than iron and antimony. In all of these directions, except the last, the French effort has accomplished much, and the future lies with a mere extension of what had already been done. It is not these lesser products, but cotton and food-supplies, that provide the real difficulty, and here the achievement has been least.

There France remains at present, with her colonial needs very clearly defined, but no more realized than when the Sarraut policy was promulgated. Her colonial policy is clear. It aims at the strengthening of both France and the colonies by a policy of industrialization. "France, organizing its future on the most powerful foundations," said Sarraut, "must demand from her colonies and protectorates men for the army, money to lessen the budgetary expenses, raw materials and products for her industry, and commerce, food, and exchange."³⁰ France presents the bill to her colonies, with a covering note that its payment will increase their own prosperity! But she is a little reluctant to recognize that it also entails an added sacrifice on her part, and that the result cannot be achieved as long as the great part of her colonial revenue is spent on military expeditions in Morocco and Syria. Until the initial help comes from the metropolis for a new Sarraut plan, the colonies will limp on, with their present stationary production.

To-day, only four—Indo-China, Morocco, West Africa, and Madagascar—may be said to be in a satisfactory position, and, as a whole, the French possessions remain backward. At least, the actual production is in no sense commensurate with the possibilities, or even with what could reasonably have been expected under the circumstances. France is only at the threshold of the economic task in the colonies, and, owing to the financial crisis of the metropolis, the whole question finds itself back again in the position it was in when Sarraut first raised his standard for a *mise en valeur*. It is estimated, for instance, that France has about 7,087 million francs invested in her colonies, two-thirds of which is in North Africa. By way of contrast, Holland has 20,000 millions in the works and commerce of the East Indies alone, and an additional 6,500 in loans,—a total of 26½ milliards in all. That is, in one colony, the Dutch have three times more than France has in all her overseas domain, and at least ten times what France has in tropical colonies of the East India type. So resourceful has Holland been that she has called in 40 per cent. of foreign capital and has set up whole industries (Sumatra rubber, for instance) by invoking this outside aid: France, for her part, has practically none, and, despite certain spasmodic discussions of the matter in the Press and colonial circles (as in 1922 and late 1926), shows little desire of having it. The position could not be clearer: the French colonies are, and always have been, starved for want of capital,—and until this basic defect is removed, little development, if any, can be expected.³¹ The

³⁰ Sarraut (1923), p. 41. Compare *L'Afrique Française*, Nov. 1923, p. 615, or Hubert budget-report, *op. cit.*, 1923.

³¹ Important article by Restany in *Revue des Questions Coloniales et Maritimes*, March-April 1924, p. 50 *et seq.*

colonial process divides into conquest and organization : as a comparison with Egypt and India and Java will show, France has not so far realized this.

III. The Budgetary Position

THEORY

As the French Empire expanded, one of the first and most difficult problems that emerged was that of the budgets, because herein lay most of the colonial problem. France was receiving revenues and defraying expenses, part of which were in the colonies ; and each colony was similarly getting and spending. But what relationship was there between these various items ? There were clearly not four distinct accounts, and yet they could not be merged into one. Some of the French money spent in the colonies was for expenses that could be termed national, because they concerned Imperial welfare, yet other amounts were for purely local concerns : similarly, some colonial receipts were not due only to colonial activities, but came from facilities of a national character. Defence, for example, concerned both colony and mother-country, yet which was to pay for it ?

The presence of wider national interests thus prevented France from dissociating herself with the finances of any colony : and, on the other hand, the fact that each colony depended for its very existence on mainland French activities allowed the entry of other than colonial factors into the budgetary situation. What, therefore, was the relationship between these various sets of factors ?—that was the problem. Was there to be one national budget or separate ones for each colony ? If the former, how were purely local interests to be safeguarded ? And if the latter, what was to be the relation between the State Budget of France and each local budget ? How were the finances of any colony related to those of the Metropolis and to those of the other colonies ? With an Empire flung over both hemispheres and yet controlled from France, the budgetary problems were thus very real,—the more so because the Budget was, as it were, the barometer of colonial liberalism. The vagaries of French colonial policy found expression in changes in the colonial budgets, so that the budgetary question here was even wider than, say, with the British colonies.

Three financial *régimes* could be conceived for the colonies. The first, the natural one in French theory, would be a complete assimilation. The colony was incorporated in the nation, therefore its affairs would be dealt with in a section of the State Budget passed by the French Parliament. The colony would have no more individuality than Périgord or Picardy,

or any other French *département*, and local budgets would deal only with the charges of municipal administration, as in France. Strange as it may appear, Algerian finances were thus dealt with between 1859 and 1901, although they had a special section to themselves. In addition, a trace of this system still survives in France, because many exclusively colonial charges come under the Budgets of the Ministries of War, Foreign Affairs, and Public Works. This was, in short, the system the French preferred; although the growth of the Empire made such a rigid centralization impracticable. The other extreme in theory is the system of autonomy. Each colony, under it, is viewed as a State within a State, and has a budget of its own on a par with the central budget of France. All colonial charges figure on the local budget, whether they are of national or purely local interest, but the colony supports no national charges,—that is, it pays nothing for the Navy or the metropolitan army. This reads very well in theory, but unfortunately does not succeed in practice. Defence, for instance, is thrown exclusively on France, and, still more important, there is no adequate guarantee for those interests which, though confined to one colony, immediately concern the welfare of the whole nation. Theoretically, these go to the colonial budget; but in practice, the metropolis must keep such affairs under its control, because, however much they may be colonial in name, their nature is clearly more than colonial. If there is complete autonomy, it is impossible to draw a line between purely local and national matters: and, in fact, the French have come to hinge their whole budgetary theory on these local expenses which have a national character,—“expenses of sovereignty,” as they are called. The *régime* of autonomy in this fashion would have come to wreck on the interaction in certain matters between colony and metropolis, even had France wished for such a system.

Two theories were thus put out of court. That of budgetary assimilation was removed by the factors of colonial growth and distance, while the autonomy idea was disposed of by the difficulty of defining and dealing with national interests. The only way left out of the resultant dilemma was by some sort of a compromise. Each colony would have a budget of its own for those local affairs which did not concern the nation as a whole: but, at the same time, it was recognized that certain charges arise from the general fact of metropolitan sovereignty and, subject, of course, to colonial aid, had to be met by the metropolis. To carry out this, there would have to be a general colonial budget as a part of the State Budget of France, to deal with matters like defence and other items that could not with safety be left entirely to the colonies. Beyond this, there would be the purely local budgets for each colony. After many hesitations,—and possibly because events had proved that there

was no other way out of the dilemma,—France thus came to look upon assimilation and autonomy as ideals or tendencies when applied to the budgetary sphere, and, by way of compromise, adopted the “mixed system,”—a system which, while mainly autonomous, partakes of the nature of assimilation to the degree to which national interests enter.³²

As in most colonial matters, the French have vacillated time and again in their solutions of this problem. After 1815, however, the general principle came to be that expenses of sovereignty and protection were defrayed by the State Budget of France, while local charges were dealt with by the local budget in each colony. The term “expenses of sovereignty” was the key-note of the situation, because it included those charges which were of more than colonial importance and the existence of which prevented any rigid separation of colonial and imperial matters. Beyond such charges, the principle, formally posed in a law of January, 1825, was that the colonies should be self-sufficient, paying their own expenses. Naturally, a good deal depended under these circumstances upon the definition given to “expenses of sovereignty.” As these increased, so the colony became in a better position, and vice versa, so that the budgetary history of the colonies came to be a succession of new charges and reliefs, according to variations in the list of expenses borne by the State Budget.³³

Under the Monarchy of July, when decentralization was in favour, a law of April, 1833, gave the Colonial Councils the right of controlling the local budgets, subject to Royal sanction. This was the nearest approach possible to the system of budgetary autonomy, but, even then, the expenses of general administration and military costs still went to the central budget. The new system came to grief because the colonials had had no education in the matter of communal responsibility: they interpreted their privileges in terms of antagonism to the mother-country, and, taking advantage of the proviso whereby the State had agreed to come to their aid in the case of deficits, systematically created an excess of expenditure over receipts. They had all the joy of spending and none of the responsibility in meeting the accounts,—a position to which they had no objections.

Under these conditions, France had no choice except to revert to a system of budgetary assimilation, which was accordingly set up again by a law of June, 1841. This distinguished between expenses of general

³² Antonelli, *Manuel de Législation Coloniale* (1926), p. 175; *Congrès des Anciennes Colonies*, 1909, p. 216.

³³ Mérignhac, *Précis de Législation et d'Economie Coloniales* (1912), p. 457. A history of these systems in full is in G. François, *Le Budget Local des Colonies* (1908), p. 12 et seq.

interest and those which were purely and exclusively local, and arranged for the first to be voted by Parliament and the latter by the Colonial Councils in each colony. But so narrowly limited were the "expenses of sovereignty" under this dyarchy that the system in practice meant the exploitation of the colonies. France was exacting compensation for the colonial excesses in the previous stage. The State received more from the colonies than it spent on them, all of the customs-receipts, for instance, being reserved for the central Treasury. It was a system of tribute, and obviously unfair to the colonies, which received more expenses and less receipts.

Once more, therefore, the system was restored to the position that had pertained before 1841. A *sénatus-consulte* of May, 1854, revived a limited autonomy, under which the colony received all its taxes and paid all of its expenses, excepting matters of general interest.³⁴ But, as usual, the pendulum had swung too far in the way of reaction, and the State had to take on itself many colonial burdens. The result was that increasingly larger grants-in-aid were necessary, and the colonies were in fact exacting an uncalled-for tribute from the metropolis. To put a stop to this anomaly, a further *sénatus-consulte* of 1866 strictly limited the "expenses of sovereignty," which were borne by the central Government. Hereafter, they were to include only the Governor's expenses, the *personnel* of justice, military costs, and a few lesser charges: beyond that, the colonial budgets were to be autonomous. They were to receive their own revenues and meet the great part of their own expenses.³⁵ This system at first applied only to the *Anciennes Colonies*, but it was gradually extended to all of the colonies, and remained as the basis of the budgetary system until the great reform of 1900.

In the meantime, the North African possessions had been evolving separately. It was not unnatural that Algeria, in view of the settlement-schemes and the closer contact with mainland France, should have had a separate system: it would have been very strange if its budget had *not* been more closely connected with that of the metropolis than those of the other colonies. Accordingly, there was much less alternation there between the two rival budgetary theories. Algeria knew practically nothing of that "see-saw" movement that characterized the other colonies in this regard. After 1839, it is true, there was a distinction between the Algerian and metropolitan budgets, and a growing recognition that receipts from any one province should be mainly used in that

³⁴ Dislère, *Traité de Législation Coloniale* (1906), Vol. I, pp. 84, 218 *et seq.* The Isaac Report on it is in E. Petit, *Organisation des Colonies Françaises*, Vol. I, 1894, p. 103.

³⁵ François (1908), *op. cit.*, pp. 31-34.

province. But this was inchoate until a decree of October, 1888, definitely gave each of the three Algerian provinces a Council-General and a budget of its own,—a position which was similar to that of the French *départements*. At the same time, a further step in the direction of assimilation was taken by abolishing the budget for Algeria as a whole. The colony thus lost the financial personality which it had enjoyed for the previous nineteen years, and its budget was attached *in toto* to the French State budget. Thus, assimilation had triumphed in Algeria in the very years when the rival system of autonomy had been growing in the other colonies, and the exception became more noticeable when the protectorate of Tunisia was given complete autonomy for its budgetary affairs, the only outside stipulation being that France was to pay its military expenses.

As the century neared its close, however, this general budgetary position occasioned many protests, especially in France. The old theory of "expenses of sovereignty" had fallen into disrepute, and France was not so solicitous of national interests. The most obvious feature of the situation as she saw it was that the State Budget was meeting many charges that were clearly colonial. An ingenious budget reporter in 1893, for instance, calculated exactly how much each Frenchman was paying a year for the pleasure of calling a negro of the Antilles or Senegal a fellow-citizen! Every negro in Martinique cost the State Budget 13½ francs, every fisherman of St. Pierre levied a toll of 44.70, every exile in Guiana 52 francs: and it is a sufficient commentary on the newer French attitude that such a calculation should have been made and given extensive publicity. But France felt a very real grievance in this matter. "The metropolis perceived that it was playing the rôle of a dupe," said Girault, "and had grown tired of this anomalous position."³⁶

From 1893 onwards, therefore, a definite reform movement became noticeable, actuated almost entirely by the desire to limit central charges. This point is most important, because, in after years, the reforms of 1900 came to be surrounded with a roseate halo and interpreted as the most striking manifestation of liberal tendencies in French colonial policy. In reality, the so-called liberal reform was more in the nature of an economy for the metropolis. As Caillaux, who was the Colonial Minister when the law of 1900 was passed, definitely said in introducing it:—

"It is common knowledge that the metropolitan taxpayer had to pay not only all the expenses of the metropolis, but in addition 44 per cent. of the charges incurred by the colonies, whereas the colonial taxpayer, while contributing nothing towards metropolitan finances, pays only 56 per cent.

³⁶ Girault (1922), 2.1.694.

of his own expenses. Any administrative and financial system that allows such an inequality seems to have no justification.”³⁷

The motive behind the reform was thus quite clear, although it must be conceded that there was some desire to foster the growth of the colonies themselves. This was especially the case with Algeria, whose budgetary position was more reactionary than in the case of any other colony. There, the upheavals of the nineties had resulted in the abolition of the system of *rattachements* which had denied administrative freedom to the country: and the consequent institution of a powerful Government-General naturally indicated budgetary autonomy as the next reform. Algeria, having fought for, and obtained, administrative liberty, now demanded a corresponding degree of financial privilege, and argued rather noisily that it was incompatible with her new status to be shackled to metropolitan finances.

After a curious interlude of 1893, when for the first time a contribution was levied on the colonies for the civil and military expenses and “the general charges of the State,”—a form of Imperial tribute quite contrary to the *régime* of 1866,—the direction of change was clear. The newer idea was that the colonies should meet the whole of their expenses, irrespective of the fact whether the charges in question were or were not “expenses of sovereignty.” The old shibboleth of “expenses of sovereignty” was now buried for ever, and the goal was, as Caillaux said, in explaining his reform, to consider “each colony as a distinct unit, having its own resources and particular interests, organizing itself in proportion to its development, and, while aided in the last resort by the metropolis, taking care above all things to create its own finances and credit.” The principle was that of autonomy, with the State paying all military expenses, beyond the aid given by colonial contributions. The reform, since it was regarded mainly as a measure of economy, encountered little opposition.

It had been proposed by Siegfried in 1899,³⁸ approved by a Parliamentary Commission of Local Budgets in the same year,³⁹ and embodied in the famous law of finances of April 13, 1900. Section 33 of that law was perfectly concise on the matter. In somewhat staccato phraseology, it said that “all the civil expenses and the cost of the *gendarmerie* are to be defrayed by the local budgets of the colonies.—Grants can be given to the colonies from the State Budget.—The colonies can be made to grant to the State amounts up to the cost of their military expenses.” Each

³⁷ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 12/12/99.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Senate, docs. parl., 1899, p. 25.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 28/7/99, p. 5401. For previous Commission, see *Ibid.*, Senate, 31/3/98.

colony was given a civil personality, each received all its revenues (subject to a varying military contribution for the more prosperous), each met all its own charges, each secured its own loans, and each, should the need arise, could obtain a grant-in-aid from the State Budget of France. But, in general, the finances of any normal colony were to be kept distinct and included everything except military charges.⁴⁰ That is the system which, as organized anew in the fundamental decree of December 30, 1912, still rules.

The central budget is, of course, dealt with as a part of the general State Budget, and is subject to no special influences. On the other hand, the local budgets in each colony vary considerably in their methods. Certain points are shared in common. Every colony has a "moral personality" and has a budget like a French *département*, and a power of raising loans. All budgets, too, are divided into obligatory and optional portions, the former entirely under executive control: and all are communicated to the French Parliament. In practice, there is a further similarity. In effect, the local budgets everywhere (save in Algeria) are drawn up and controlled by the executive, though with certain limitations in the case of colonies which have representative councils. In colonies not so favoured (or, as the French would say, not so limited), and in mandated territories, the Governor, advised, but in no sense compulsorily influenced, by his Executive Council, draws up the budget, which is approved by a Ministerial decree from Paris. But "it is the Governor who is the master of the situation"⁴¹: he decides where the money is to come from and how it is to be appropriated, and it is this predominance of the local executive which accounts for the great variations between the financial systems of the colonies,—why one might have mainly indirect taxes, another direct; why one might tax land and another natives, and so on.⁴²

In those colonies which have representative assemblies, the procedure is more complicated. The Governor, aided as before by his chief executive officials, draws up the budget in its original form and then submits it to the *Conseil-Général* for its approval. But this approval has nothing to do with the so-called "obligatory charges" which include all of the essential features of the administration. The items kept away from the assembly are more inclusive than in the case of the *Conseils-Généraux* of France itself, and the whole idea of a dyarchy is evolved with the aim

⁴⁰ For the debates, see *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 13/4/1900, p. 847; Senate, 10/4/1900, p. 414. Decrais's explanation is in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 12/12/99. A long legal analysis of the passage is in François, *op. cit.*, p. 89 *et seq.*

⁴¹ Mérygnac (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 431.

⁴² François (1908), *op. cit.*, p. 86 *et seq.*

of safeguarding the executive from interference by the representative body. The Council can therefore only vote on the "optional" expenses, and if it does not make provision for these, or, for some reason or other, fails to pass the budget, the Governor can do so of his own authority and over its head. France wastes no time in dealing with recalcitrant legislative bodies: they have to conform to the executive's wishes or be ignored. In the matter of deciding taxation, the accepted principle is that no tax can be raised without the approval of the *Conseil-Général* (except Customs); although, in practice, no tax decided upon by the local Council is accepted unless approved by a decree of the Council of State. In every sphere, therefore, executive control remains. The Council has power over the "optional" expenses, but the actual extent of its powers depends on the attitude of the local officials. They are all permissive rather than actual; and it is the checks, or rather, the possibility of the checks, that dominate the situation. The peculiar feature of the arrangement is the part to which such control enters even the budgets of the various federations, where one would naturally expect a greater degree of freedom. In such groups, the Governor-General fixes the budget with the aid of his advisory Council of officials, and it is approved by a Ministerial decree. Representative assemblies play no part in determining the federal budgets of West and Equatorial Africa, or Indo-China, while in Madagascar, the only check, if such it might be called, is in the advice proffered by the new *Délégations Financières*. Similarly, the provincial budgets within each of these federations are determined entirely by the executive, the only exceptions being that *Conseils-Coloniaux* play in the peculiar colonies of Senegal and Cochin-China the part that *Conseils-Généraux* have in the *Anciennes Colonies*. Beyond these exceptions, executive control is entirely unchecked.

Algeria has a special and more complicated system, though in essence it merely duplicates the principles followed in the colonies which have a *Conseil-Général*.⁴³ Many systems were possible under Algerian conditions. The budget could have been voted by at least four Powers, but France, perceiving the difficulties involved in all of these limitations, adopted none. The law of 1900 tried to conciliate all of them by giving a part to each, and allowing the collaboration of the Governor-General, the *Délégations Financières*, the *Conseil Supérieur*, the Minister of the Interior, the President of the Republic, the Council of State, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Senate, allotting to each a fixed rôle! Presumably at this stage, the ingenuity of its draftsmen became exhausted, although there still remained the Academy of France and the Soldiers' League! The position is remarkable. The Governor-General drafts the special

⁴³ Mérignhac (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 477 et seq.

budget and communicates it to the Minister of the Interior, who is responsible for Algerian affairs. After that, it goes to the local representative body, the *Délégations Financières*, where it is submitted to a Commission of Finances for examination, and then approved in a plenary session of all the branches of this mixed body. Where Algeria differs from the other colonies at this stage is not in theory but in practice. Her development has been so rapid and her European population is so large that more extensive rights of control had to be allowed in practice, even though the theoretical rules applying to her were not of any special character. As a result, the "optional expenses," over which the *Délégations* have control, have steadily grown until they now absorb about 80 per cent. of the whole. The power of the *Délégations* is therefore very real, and a recalcitrant Chamber may considerably hamper the work of administration. Once voted by them, however, the budget is sent to the *Conseil Supérieur*, which is a partly elected body whose function it is to ratify or reject certain of the *Délégations'* decisions. Then it goes once more to Paris and is made applicable by a decree of the Council of State, being finally authorized by the annual law of finances in the French Parliament. The remarkable feature is that this cumbrous and intricate machinery, though lumbering a little awkwardly and slowly at times, should have worked fairly well in practice.⁴⁴ Every theoretical indication would have been to the contrary, and yet in practice the system is far from a failure, probably because it is largely in accord with the general "checks and balances" of French political life.

Thus, it is clear that, in general, the executive officials control the budgets in the French colonies, and, even in places like Algeria, where a limiting convention had grown up to the contrary, the officials have power to step in if the occasion should arise. In most colonies, the executive is completely untrammelled, and, in the remainder, mainly so, although special privileges have been vouchsafed in practice to Algeria. France still adheres to the theory of executive action in this regard, and continues to look upon the position of the Algerian *Délégations* as entirely an exception, due to the fact that Algeria is not, properly speaking, a colony at all. Where representative bodies exist elsewhere, their position is deemed to be mainly advisory, and at the most, to deal with a minority of the appropriations, and to suggest or approve of any new taxes that may be necessary. The items under their control are invariably the non-essentials, the main aim, as has been seen, being to keep sufficient powers in the hands of the executive officials to enable them to continue the ordinary work of administration under any conditions. Even where some scope is allowed to assemblies, checks to secure the safety of the executive

⁴⁴ L. Hubert, *Politique Africaine* (1904), p. 84 et seq.

are always present. Financial matters in French colonies, other than Algeria, are clearly viewed as executive preserves, with the functions of the people's representatives limited as much as possible.

THE ACTUAL POSITION

In practice, the system of 1900 has achieved its ends. Caillaux introduced it with the specific idea of diminishing the charges on the State Budget. That has certainly come about, because the 45 per cent. of the colonial expenses which had been met by the State in 1895 had dwindled to 25 per cent. by 1910, and the aggregate cost of the colonies remained fairly constant. The central budget of the Ministry of Colonies was practically stationary between 1910 and 1914, and the State benefited in other ways. In ten years the direct aid given to the colonies by France fell from seven to two million francs, and during the same period, the military contributions made to the metropolis rose from ten to fourteen million francs. That is, the system of budgetary autonomy saved the French taxpayer at least ten million francs in the first ten years,—exactly the amount that Caillaux had predicted, and it should be remembered that this did not include the North African colonies, where the saving was greatest.⁴⁵

The central budget, therefore, became of a dwindling importance. At various representative dates, it has been allotted as follows:—

	1895.	1900.	1905.	1910.	1924.	1927.
	(Millions of Francs.)					
Civil . . .	14-836	14-710	9-551	9-805	21-2	21
Military . .	54-635	82-716	93-076	83-766	191-5	320
Penal . . .	9-867	9-066	8-150	7-467	13-4	—
	<hr/> 79-338	<hr/> 106-492	<hr/> 110-777	<hr/> 101-038	<hr/> 226-1	<hr/> 341

On the other hand, extremely satisfactory as this table is (and indeed it is one of the triumphs of French colonization), it should not be forgotten that it does not reveal the whole situation. It would be entirely erroneous, for instance, to say that the colonies cost France only an average of 105 million francs a year between 1900 and 1910, or that the present cost is 341 million francs. Nothing would be further from the point. French Government statistics do not always show the whole of any given situation, and certainly not in this case. This budget does not include the cost of North Africa or the mandated territories, nor does it take account of those purely colonial charges that are reckoned in the budgets of other Ministries. Certain charges are so inextricably mixed with other central accounts that they cannot be distinguished. The above budget, for example, places the military cost of the colonies at 320 million francs,—a sufficiently formidable sum. But to it has to be

⁴⁵ François (1908), p. 143 *et seq.*; Mérignac (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 60 *et seq.*

added the expense of the colonial troops which are under the Minister of War. In 1922 their charge was 219 million francs, as compared with the 185 millions under the Minister of the Colonies, yet the former sum did not occur in any colonial accounts. In addition, many colonial charges figure in the budgets of the Ministries of Marine, Education, and Foreign Affairs: the Minister of Public Works has extensive colonial appropriations, especially for communications: and, in all, the budget of the Colonial Minister reflects far less than half the purely colonial charges. How much more there is cannot exactly be determined, owing to the financial system employed by the French, but it can at least be asserted that it more than doubles the nominal cost of the colonies.

Even allowing this, however, the position of the central budget remains satisfactory. It is mainly concerned with military expenses, and, taking into account the degree of depreciation, has not been increasing since 1900. Still more satisfactory has been the rapid increase in the charges borne by the various local budgets. Their total increased from 97 million francs in 1895 to 154 in 1910, and a milliard in 1927, even excluding North Africa. Adding the 1,400 million francs of North Africa and the 200 millions of the protectorates, the prodigious amount of 2,600 million francs is reached,—prodigious even when considered in terms of purchasing-power rather than depreciated francs.⁴⁶ The local charges have gone up by leaps and bounds, and in general, credit-balances have emerged, even if, on the opposite side of the ledger, the loans raised by the colonies have increased from 190 million francs in 1900 to 671 millions in 1910. This increase was shared by all the colonies, except the declining *Anciennes Colonies*, as the table shows:—

	LOCAL BUDGETS							
	1895.		1900.		1905.		1910.	
	Rev.	Exp.	Rev.	Exp.	Rev.	Exp.	Rev.	Exp.
	(Millions of Francs.)							
	(est.)							
West Africa (general and local)	10.5	9.2	21.4	15.0	51.8	49.9	51.2	—
Equatorial Africa	3.0	3.0	4.8	4.6	7.5	5.5	9.7	—
Madagascar	11.3	11.3	19.3	17.0	33.9	31.1	30.5	—
Indo-China	58.0	59.2	94.8	84.9	103.0	102.5	129.5	—
Guadeloupe	6.3	6.3	5.9	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.6	—
Martinique	5.5	5.5	6.5	6.5	4.8	4.5	9.7*	—
New Caledonia	2.1	2.2	2.8	2.7	4.1	4.0	3.5	—
Tahiti	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.5	2.1	2.1	1.6	—
	97.8	97.8	157.2	137.1	212.0	204.4	240.3	—

* Including a loan of 6 million francs.

Such financial autonomy as the Act of 1900 conceded was thus very real. It was far from nominal. Even within a decade, it meant that

⁴⁶ Discussion in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 2/12/26.

the metropolis was saved ten million francs and that the annual budget charges borne by the colonies had increased almost half. The State Budget at present gives subsidies only to the New Hebrides, Equatorial Africa, and Oceania, and the backwardness of all these is due to special features. All of the other colonies pay their own civil expenses, many have amassed considerable reserves, and the colonies pay in all 28 million francs to the metropolis, mostly as a contribution towards their military expenses. This is of course only about six per cent. of what the State had to pay out, but, on the other hand, it means that, apart from those charges which justly devolve on the sovereign Power, the colonies pay their own way. They are self-sufficient, from an economic point of view, and every year the subsidy they give France is increasing. France receives from the colonies more than she contributes to the civil expenses of the more backward ones, and thus is in a favourable position. The financial position of the French colonies, especially in view of their relation to the mother-country, is at basis sound, even if it is at present unduly confused by the distribution of colonial accounts between several Ministries. In the main, the position may be easily summarized. The colonies pay all civil expenses, while the State bears the cost of defence: small grants are made from the one to the other in certain cases, but that is the general position,—a gratifying contrast with the burden of central charges which France had to meet in the nineties.

But whether France realizes that such financial independence is leading in the direction of a distinctively colonial point of view is another question. The colonies are perceiving that they can stand by themselves, and any such attitude must exert an influence on their general relations with the metropolis. The reflex side of France's success in the budgetary matter is thus an increased dogmatism on the part of the colonies, which view their gains in this direction in much the same light as the British colonies regarded the increased powers of their Legislative Assemblies. But, on the whole, the situation is decidedly good. It is, of course, easy to discern its weaknesses. The above-mentioned confusion of accounts is not helpful: nor, as the post-war crisis showed in Algeria and elsewhere, was the financial strength of the individual colonies as great as was supposed: nor again is it clear what provision has been made to meet colonial loans: but, these difficulties to the contrary, the general principles of the situation remain. France, it must be re-asserted (for this is one of the few successful features of French colonization), has undoubtedly solved the budgetary problem by allowing even the most backward native-country to settle its own civil charges, while she took the military costs on her own shoulders, subject always to the acceptance of any contribution that she deemed the colony strong enough to afford.

CHAPTER XVII

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

THE starting-point of any comparative study of French colonization must be to note the peculiar position in which France stood from the commencement. The whole of French colonial organization was coloured by certain influences which did not come in so clearly with any other Power. In the first place, France was not under the same imperious necessity of colonizing as was England. She was not sea-girt and confined to a small area : her population was not increasing at a menacing rate : and she did not experience overweening difficulties in feeding her people. Up to the twentieth century, Gambetta's point of view was supreme on this matter. That astute Meridional saw that " a policy of conserving and maintaining our patrimony " was quite sufficient, because France found her stationary population adequately supported by her agriculture and was not as primarily industrial as was England.¹ Colonization therefore, while a matter of economic life and death to England, was to France only an outlet for her energies. So much was this so that, at first, French theorists agreed with Bismarck that it was a weakening vice of a great nation. It was an unwise dispersion of the country's resources, weakening at the moment and producing but a dubious return in the future. This feeling provided one basis for that anti-colonialism which always influenced and, up to Etienne's reorganization in the early nineties, dominated French colonization. So far, then, the argument stood thus. French life was so many-sided and so rural that there was no grave economic problem, so that colonization remained at the best a somewhat dubious investment and at the worst an almost treacherous waste of the country's wealth. In any case, it was a venture not directly connected with the problem of national welfare. It was only a hazard—Mexico over again—expressing the pent-up exuberance of the Gallican spirit or a nation chafing under the grind of its conventional life. But, as a duty, as a necessity, or even as a strengthening investment, colonization remained unknown. Even in the period of militaristic expansion in the nineties, this outlook did not change. Africa remained simply a *jeu d'armes*, and, when Fashoda clouded the horizon, the issue was not

¹ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 2/12/81.

so much colonial as a mere changed provenance of international rivalries : it might as easily have been Pendjeh or Verdun or Fiume. Colonial efforts might be an admirable military training, but how could fights against Samory or Ahmadou or the pirates of Upper Tonkin affect the destinies of the nation ? If France won new provinces, she held reviews at the Invalides and felt justified, but, in the main, that was all.

But the events of the nineties slowly caused a change, at least in the minds of the minority that counted. The public, and even the colonials who found expression in *L'Afrique Française* (1891 on) or *La Quinzaine Coloniale* (1897 on), might still interpret Africa in terms of military patrols, but Etienne had taken up the work of Ferry and, over and above his dreams of a vast African Empire, employed a point of view that was primarily thinking in terms of trade. More, trade was coming to be mainly a matter of raw materials. The selling of manufactured goods was the lesser task, getting rubber and oils and other tropical products the major. Only when this perception arose could France be said to have a colonial policy, and, when these considerations were once grasped, other factors, metropolitan indifference and the rule of the *bureaux*, for instance, had come in.

Because of this belated realization of the functions of colonization in the industrial world, France suffered. She did not really enter the colonial race until the nineties, and by that time the temperate regions had all been occupied and, even in Africa, only isolated coastal portions and the vast desert interior remained. Hence the amorphous nature of her huge African Empire, hence the lack of natural frontiers and compactness, hence the vast proportion of useless territory, good only for colouring the map. France obtained the second Empire of the world by seizing the world's bad-lands, and even these would not have been obtained had the nineties not seen a militarist triumph at home. That was the second factor in France's colonial stand,—that, as a result of the failure to view colonization as an integrally national problem, she had to take mainly inhospitable tropical lands.

At this point, two factors coalesced. The position of these tardily acquired colonies forbade European settlement, and so colonies on the model of the English Dominions were out of the question. But France did not want such colonies, even could she have had them. Her citizens in the main did not want to emigrate, and national policy was to stop the trickle of emigration to the New World and to keep the French nationals at home producing food or making manufactured goods. Admitting that the South-East offers no opportunity, the argument ran, the persons driven out of here can go north within France. "Internal colonization" could solve their problem. Or, if they could not be kept from leaving

France, there was Algeria, which was neither a colony nor a mainland *département*—simply a piece of France at a distance from the mother-country and endowed with certain colonial attributes. But the remainder could be kept at home, even in the unlikely event of a rapidly increasing population. France's attitude on this matter was exactly that of the Japanese,—to have the spheres of influence outside the metropolis provide the necessary food, raw materials, and markets, and to offer safety and employment even to an increasing home population. This is diametrically opposed to the British idea of forming new societies overseas, and even to the German theory which confused the two aspects of emigration and raw materials, as the position of Germany demanded both outlets. France, to the contrary, like Japan, viewed the mother-country as a machine, and the colonies as feeders. Emigration on any large scale was therefore out of the question, both as a matter of policy and because of the pressure of facts: and France could easily understand Japan's desire to absorb her 800,000 additional people every year by drawing supplies and markets from the colonies and thus providing work for the new hands in the metropolis itself. Such a concept was a natural offshoot of the growing industrialization of the two nations concerned, and viewed the country as a vast economic machine which, to keep from disintegration, had to produce more and more every year. Then, when the mainland population of France began its steady decline in the years from 1871 to 1911, the desired theory received another support. Dispersion of the country's human wealth under such conditions,—in other words, emigration,—became almost a treachery to the nation, and the relentless facts of the Census-reports joined the preconceived theory to sever the idea of emigration from that of colonization in French minds.

This orientation naturally involved the last characteristic of French colonial policy,—the conscious subordination of every colonial matter to the interests of the metropolis. The spirit of the *Pacte Colonial*, beyond the possibility of thought in the British colonial system after 1840, has always dominated the French concept,—and never more than in the twentieth century. Colonial subordination remains the central fact in French overseas effort,—a fact that cannot be too strongly emphasized, because it determines the whole of French colonial policy. Reduced to fundamentals, the French system is simply subordination. The colony exists only to strengthen the mother-land: its own strength is to be fostered as a distinct aim, only to the degree to which it secures an added advantage to France. As Harmand said, the colonial problem is to draw from the colonies the maximum of advantage for the minimum of inconvenience, and, even if Sarraut added to this a belief that, in so doing, the native welfare might be secured, the fundamental attitude

remains the same. The colonies were thus to be subordinated as a matter of general principle: that was the function of a colony, that was the relation it should bear to the mother-country. Moreover—and here entered a different set of factors—that was the relationship and the method most in accord with the spirit of French life. It reflected the centralization that is the natural attribute of French administration, it necessitated that uniformity which is the keynote of French governmental life, it allowed that domination from Paris which permeates every phase of French activities.

A definite colonial theory once more united with natural French inclinations,—this time in the direction of refusing any right of development to a colony wherever situated, and demanding the utmost degree of bureaucratic centralization. The English idea of a colony as a society, or the theory that rulers of native countries should have as free a hand as possible, was thus rejected. France stood firm for the position that, as far as possible, a colony should be governed like a mainland *département* and, in any case, by French officials directly responsible to Paris in every way. Even for the most recently acquired Crown Colony, the English never employed the first part of this theory and allowed a greater degree of decentralization for the second, at least to the extent of giving the Governor a freer hand. France stood alone in carrying the two parts of this policy to extremes and in combining them in a single theory: no other colonial Power has so indissolubly linked the ideas of extreme assimilation and centralization. These two always remained, despite the fitting of various native theories across the Parisian stage: the surface might change, the basic administrative structure and ideas went on as ever,—especially the theory of executive dominance and the untrammelled control of the Parisian departments. These phases stamped French activities with an unmistakable mark from the first, and have consistently formed a part of French colonization.

France thus went overseas with definite ideas and definite dispositions of mind, and these have remained, however much other theories have emerged or conditions in the colonies themselves have changed. She went out, not for colonies of settlement, but for economic strongholds: she did not want new societies, but mere extensions of the administrative machine offering increased advantages for the larger responsibilities that she was undertaking: and under these conditions, she saw no necessity for a colonial growth wider than the development of a *département* at home, or for a means of control or a point of view other than those, say, in Auvergne or Picardy. The same administrative methods and the same centralized officialdom were to apply; and there was no concept of a view-point specially orientated towards colonial conditions. And this

applied to all colonies alike, to Equatorial Africa with its handful of French officials and to Algeria with its 750,000 Europeans. For was it not in Algeria that the theory reached its apex? Was it not there that, by the system of *rattachements*, all colonial services were immediately subordinated to Paris? And that prefects and sub-prefects and departmental councils were transplanted from any *département* of France? And that even the *Code Civil* was introduced? There was no differentiation between the colonies, and, in the French view, no need for any. Differences in practice had to emerge, that was evident; but each was grudgingly admitted as an exception to a desirable rule, as with a recognition of the Moslem officials in Algeria or the mandarins in Indo-China. But the theory went on.

These ideas predominated in every discussion of the colonial question in France, and their gist at least was reinforced by the events of the twentieth century. The definite linking of the country's destinies with those of the colonies during the war-years made the colonial question national, but only in the sense of making France realize that she *had* to have colonial men and money and markets. That is, subordination had to be continued and even increased. It might be conceded that there was a newer point of view favouring native improvement and that the desirability of differences in colonization was at last recognized; but, despite these two changes, the ideas of colonial subordination and centralization remained, and, coupled with them, the system of executive supremacy,—or what this means in a French system, a large degree of the old uniformity. The fringes of the colonial *régime* changed, its methods were adapted to the newer circumstances, but the old basis, the frame of mind that emerged in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, still continued in its essentials. It always has been, and *is*, French colonization policy,—subordination, centralization, uniformity, officialdom.

The most obvious contrast with this point of view is the British idea of colonization. This, it must be admitted, was largely determined by the geographical situation of the early English colonies and by the population-position of the British Isles: but there is a quite different frame of mind behind these material factors. Conditions played a large part, but disposition or national temperament also counted. But it should be remembered that there is a fundamental distinction between the Dominions and the native lands or Crown Colonies and protectorates. Properly speaking, the Dominions should be compared only with Algeria; yet, on the other hand, a wider comparison is legitimate, because running through the whole of British policy, a certain general outlook may be traced.

The first contrast with France is in connection with emigration. During the centuries, England has colonized for purposes of settlement. She wanted to establish new communities of overseas Britons, both to relieve the pressure of home-population and to safeguard her food supplies. The need for raw materials did not enter as an important element until the close of the nineteenth century, nor was there any trace of that other French idea that overseas establishments existed in part to provide outlets for the growing official caste of the metropolis. The idea, to the contrary, was that outlined for Algeria by Prévost-Paradol in 1868,—that colonization meant the emergence of new societies overseas. But this idea was so unusual in France that Prévost-Paradol's *La Nouvelle France* has become a kind of myth, adding a touch of idealism on the horizon of the colonial world. It is a dream divorced from practice,—a touching and very beautiful dream, to be coupled with the perennially popular *Marie Chappdelaine* of Louis Hémon, but something quite out of accord with the colonial process as it goes on in practice. The Frenchman likes to have his emotions pleasantly and yet painfully raked by such a *Traümerei*: he dreams of Frenchmen overrunning new provinces, of the farms of *la douce France* there, of *la gloire*, of the spread of French civilization, until he realizes that colonization as he knows it is a question of tropical heat and bush nostalgia and recalcitrant natives. Prévost-Paradol was a pipe-dreamer, and his smoke-wreathed visions have found reflections only in the novels of Louis Bertrand. France toys with the concept of colonies as societies, but invariably brushes it from her mind when the practical question rises. Save in Northern Algeria, and for a time in New Caledonia, she neither had nor desired this end for her colonizing efforts.

She was not concerned with the emigration aspect, and has made no real effort even to attract capitalists to the colonies beyond North Africa. Feillet's scheme in New Caledonia, for instance, the only other part of the Empire in which a European labouring-class can live, failed for lack of official support, and the same could be said of the larger scale colonization of Madagascar and Indo-China. The African colonies, while offering nothing to small or even large settlers, still left a scope for the utilization of private capital, but even that was passed over. France did not wish to be concerned with overseas emigration, and it is a mistake to explain this away in terms of the tropical nature of her land. The real cause lay far deeper: nor was it concerned, as has been somewhat recklessly supposed, with the inability of the French to colonize as individuals. The survival of French Canada alone would give the lie to such an assertion: and isolated Frenchmen were to be found in the earliest days on the furthest pampas of the Argentine and the back-

stations of Australia. The cause for the failure in question (if it could be termed a failure) lay with the fact that mainland France was under-peopled and, all through the years of the Third Republic, was becoming increasingly so. As the industrialization of the north went on apace, the labour-shortage became more and more manifest. Any drainage of man-power from France was therefore directly weakening, and, even if it only went to the French colonies, the sense of loss was still there,—not as keen, of course, as if it had gone to the La Plata or to Upper Canada, but still discernible.

Therefore, apart from Algeria, with its 750,000 French subjects, the entire overseas Empire of France has only 1,044,000 European settlers, the great bulk of them officials. There has been practically no *peuplement* and no drain from the mother-country, as in the case of Germany and Great Britain. All of the French possessions are doomed to be overwhelmingly native lands, so that France can know nothing of that basic division in the British Empire between settlement-lands and native-lands. The absence of this has given a unitary basis to French colonization, and hence allows it to be more clearly defined than, say, the British system. It also provides one (but only one) explanation for the contrast between the French emphasis on subordination and the British on autonomy. This cannot, it must be noted, be explained away by saying that France has no lands of settlement; it goes deeper, and the habit is so ingrained that it extends, in a suitable form, even to Britain's native lands, whereas France has provided no vestige of autonomy on native lines, save for certain embryonic councils in the interior of West Africa. It is not the result of circumstances alone: the general direction of colonial effort varies in the two cases, and, with it, the methods.

Nor is this quite the same thing as the next difference between France and England in this regard. The French emphasize the national point of view in the sense of the central organization, whereas England tends to view the colonies, the Dominions naturally and even the Crown Colonies to a lesser degree, as societies, evolving their own lives and interests. This is naturally largely a result of the emigration aspect, but it goes beyond it. It is inconceivable, for example, to think that France could reject schemes of Imperial Preference in the same way that free-trade England has done: contrast the tariff-system set up in 1892 and the *mise en valeur* scheme of the post-war years—projects which carry the idea of an Imperial *Zollverein* to its logical limit. The French carry this to the extent of denying, or at least minimizing, the special interests of the colonies, and consider only the interests of "the French nation," which is a thinly veiled euphemism for "the metropolis." The *Pacte Colonial*, changing its details as conditions alter, always goes on in some

form or other. The English, on the other hand, emphasize the local interests of the colonies to such a degree that the very concept of a federated Imperial trading organization has never been admitted. In so far as trade is concerned, the colonies have been developing as nations, freed from shackles since the abolition of the Navigation Acts in 1849,—so much so that the Chamberlain schemes to re-link them with the metropolis were resolutely opposed, and more, be it noted, by the mother-country than by the colonies. To France, this is colonial theory perverted to the degree of ludicrousness. Even discounting the influence of the free-traders, a further distinction between the English and French outlooks is present. England considers the colonial problem as multiple (hence the colonies were allowed to arrange their own trade-treaties with foreign nations), France as unitary. England deals with a number of young organisms, France with outflung limbs of the central organism. The societal point of view does not enter French colonization, and least of all in the direction of considering each colony as a unit distinct from the others: they do not admit the idea even of one undifferentiated colonial society, still less that *each* colonial society may vary. On the other hand, the French point of view that colonies, whether as developed as Algeria or as rude as Equatorial Africa, exist only as parts of a central problem, is unknown in the history of British colonization.

The next distinction (though all of these are allied) is that between the centralization of France and the decentralization of Great Britain,—and here we reach fundamentals. At this point, the above-mentioned attitudes of the French are reinforced and unified by the dominating force in French life—administrative centralization, a force that commands the colonies just as it does the metropolis. The denial of autonomy or the societal point of view may have arisen separately, as has been seen above; but they are clinched and, in last resort, made inevitable by the centralizing view-point. Here we have the basic distinction of direction and method between the efforts of the two great Colonial Powers. They stand poles apart in this regard, so much so that their outlooks can in no sense be reconciled. The one believes in centralization as rigidly as it may be conceived, the other in the maximum degree of devolution that is compatible with the maintenance of the Empire. The difference has been best summed up by a German authority, Rudolf Asmis, whose views were endorsed by Sarraut. In Asmis' words (and he had had a long African experience):—

“While in the English system, centrifugal tendencies are always splitting the empire up into numerous centres, French Africa offers a spectacle exactly the opposite,—the application of a method of continued fusion and concen-

tration spread over long years in a systematic and persevering way. It is a method to which apparently the natives lend themselves with a good grace, and which they willingly adopt, even if the first years are marked by armed upheavals in the interior regions."²

That is, the one system centralizes by its very nature, the other means local control: and this is as characteristic of purely native possessions as of dominions. It is not the difference between a British Dominion and a French colony: it is the separate method applied, say, in the adjacent West African colonies of the two Powers. In French West Africa, for instance, there is undoubtedly a pure direct rule. The land is divided into *cercles* or administrative subdivisions, ninety-eight in all, the affairs of each being controlled to the smallest detail by a French administrator. Equatorial Africa has the same directness of control: it has forty-four *cercles* with Europeans at the head, and 164 smaller divisions with either a European lieutenant or a native-associate at the head of each.³ The only part played by the natives is in a few advisory councils set up in the Volta region in the past three years, and still viewed as an astounding experiment in liberalism, but as a kind of toy somewhat apart from the serious work of administration. France has no indirect rule anywhere, except with the mandarins of Indo-China (and we have seen how stormy has been their history) and the *caïds* of parts of North Africa. British Africa, to the contrary, has been the home of indirect rule, both in the sense of utilizing native officials and of developing along native lines. Nigeria has its policy determined by British Residents and the general work of administration overlooked by them: but the ordinary system of rule is by powerful native chiefs and councils, which have the power of drafting local budgets and imposing taxes.⁴ A similar system pertains in the British territories in East and Central Africa, and especially in the Bantu lands of the South, where the powers of the chiefs and councils make possible a genuine self-government on native models. All of this is unknown in French Africa. The French insist on the maintenance of all power in the hands of the European executive officials. There is centralization within each colony, and the corollary of a centralized relationship between the colony and France. The *bureaux* extend their paramountcy, their immediate control even, to every sphere; and the colonial history of France since 1880 has been a

² *Preussische Jahrbücher*, Dec. 1921, in Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 90, note. Compare J. Harmand, *Domination et Colonisation* (1910), p. 9.

³ For denial of part to natives, see Van Vollenhoven in *Journal Officiel de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, 18/8/17,—"there cannot be two authorities in the *cercle*, native and French, there is only one!"

⁴ For this difference, see E. Baillaud, *La Politique Indigène de l'Angleterre en Afrique Occidentale* (1912), pp. 540-546.

constant alternation between offers of an illusory decentralization and renunciations of those offers. To mention a few of the outstanding instances in this undulating movement, there were the Algerian *rattachés*, the restoration of the Governor-General's powers under Cambon, the tighter hold of the *bureaux* at the close of the century, the budgetary autonomy of 1900, the centralization of 1905-1911, Lebrun's decentralization in the next three years, the increased uniformity during the War, the dabbling with newer theoretical tendencies after 1915 when colonial technicians were reconsidering the whole situation, and the subordination in *excelsis* of the Sarraut plan. It is a monotonous tale of delusion, with the old centralization running through the whole and never seriously attacked.⁵ Sarraut can write to-day as Cambon did forty years ago, and parts of their complaints are practically interchangeable. Each small concession was always followed by a more than commensurate reaction, and centralization,—in other words, the control of the permanent executive,—remained the dominant force.

This leads to the fourth general distinction between French and British efforts. The one system is limited to, and never goes beyond, the executive officials. This applies, it should be noted, as much to the determination of policy as to the execution of details. The Parisian *bureaux* have all the powers exercised by the British Colonial Office over the Crown Colonies, and in addition, a practical freedom from outside control in the determination of policy. The officials are everything in colonial policy. Save for the exercise of Parliamentary patronage and various legislative pronouncements more or less out of touch with the actualities of colonial life, they are a self-sufficient oligarchy. The Minister of Finance interferes from his side, but, even so, only on general points, and in such a way that his Commission must rely on the *bureaux*. France does not know the reality of Parliamentary control or interference in colonial matters in the same way as Great Britain.⁶ One advantage of a *régime* of decrees is that the great part of ordinary administration is placed outside the likelihood of discussion in the Legislature: it never comes to their ears, and the only fields open to the politicians are those where general principles are concerned, as with the enfranchisement of the Algerians in 1919. Going through the colonial annals of France, it is astonishing to find how little Parliament has intervened. The members are usually bored by the prodigiously long budget-reports on the colonies and are only too pleased to have this task over. That means that colonial matters in the main are relegated to the Ministry, and, within the Ministry,

⁵ Good analysis in Regismanset, *Questions Coloniales* (1923), Vol. I, pp. 218, 219.

⁶ Bluyssen, "Le Rôle et les Pouvoirs du Ministère des Colonies," in *Colonies et Marine*, Oct. 1920, pp. 580-583.

the force of circumstances means the supremacy of the permanent officials. Party changes in France are so frequent, and the Ministry of the Colonies so uniformly despised and relegated to the least important Minister, that any other result would have been surprising. In the last thirty years, only one Minister of the Colonies in France had any previous colonial experience or was an important politician at the moment he assumed office. Not for nothing was the Minister of the Colonies termed the Wandering Jew of the Cabinet. The recipient almost invariably viewed it as an unwelcome *pis aller*, the alternative to being excluded altogether from the Cabinet: and, since his main consideration was to vacate it as soon as possible, it was not unnatural that the Minister usually interfered little. It is a moot point to what extent an interested and capable Minister *could* dominate the situation. So deep-rooted is the French system that only one Minister, Sarraut, tried extensive reforms, but his reforms coincided so aptly with the spirit of the nation for the time being that he encountered little opposition. Usually, it may be said, the officials within the Ministry have the work of deciding the issues that arise. This position clearly does not pertain in England. There, the impress of the Minister is clearer and more immediate, and there, too, Parliamentary interference is by no means of a purely academic significance.⁷

Nor does France know the various Councils and outside agencies that influence colonial policy in England, nor has she articulate colonies at the other end, as England has. In the colonies themselves, the outlook towards the officials and towards executive control is different in both systems. In a French colony the officials *are* the colony. Take, for instance, Cochinchina, which is an instance favouring the French, if anything, because of the large degree of outside commerce that is possible. There, the colony is notoriously official-ridden,—so much so that their grip on colonial life was one of the specific instances most adduced against the system of assimilation. They provided the majority at the elections, they chose the representatives to the French Parliament, they determined the taxes and allocated the proceeds, and they consigned the natives to outside oblivion and the traders to a position in which they were tolerated as necessary evils. Again, contrast Fiji and New Caledonia,—an instance again favouring France, because, since the time of Sir Arthur Gordon fifty years ago, Fiji has notoriously been one of the most sterilely official of the British Crown Colonies, whereas New Caledonia has one of the largest European populations of

⁷ The position of the Ministry is analysed by a series of articles in *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales*, 1/9/10–1/11/10. Regismanset's accounts, especially a study of 1904, are the most analytical.

the French colonies and has been favoured with a succession of reforming Governors. Yet, despite this, New Caledonia cannot be said to have a community-spirit other than the official. The official is everywhere, from the gendarme in the native reserve to the multitudes of clerklly workers in Nouméa. No other class finds adequate expression, yet, in Fiji, the trading and planting classes are articulate and even the Indian immigrants noisily give vent to their grievances.

This difference is aided in the French colonies by the absence of effective Legislative Councils and by the presence of a proletariat of European officials, unknown in the British system in its tropical lands. The British leave their minor work to natives: the French employ Europeans receiving two or three pounds a week,—an anomaly that has arisen because of the inordinate part patronage plays in the duties of the Minister of the Colonies, and because the French have up till recently denied opportunity to the natives. However this may be, it is calculated that, under similar conditions, France employs three times as many colonial officials as the British.⁸ Most of these are underpaid (before the War, for instance, a cadet in India received three times as much as the average official in Indo-China), and, of necessity, those in the lower ranks are of dubious qualifications and poor quality. The able Frenchman does not go overseas to a tropical land for a salary of £150 or £200, and the colonial service in general is not viewed as one of the peaks of the official world, as, for instance, the Indian Civil Service is in England. This fact explains many things,—the comparative sterility of French officialdom, the throttling of colonial points of view, the exorbitant charges of the official *régime* in the annual budgets (a quarter of the annual receipts in Indo-China!) and the grip of the officials on every side of colonial existence. England relies on fewer officials in native countries, but insists on a higher class, and, as far as possible, leaves routine work for native auxiliaries. Then, having reliable officials, she allows them power, whereas, as has been seen in the section dealing with “inspection,” France insists above all things on retaining central control and making official action mechanical. Even the Governors-General are regulated in every way, and practically the only free agent in French

⁸ *La Quinzaine Coloniale*, 25/5/99, p. 298. The position in 1900 was thus:—

Senegal	620	officials to	470	colonists
Sudan	107	„	184	„
Guinea	241	„	42	„
Ivory Coast	398	„	52	„
Dahomey	363	„	33	„
Congo	580	„	78	„
Guiana	521	„	579	„

Martinique had 973, Guadeloupe 1,152, and Réunion 904 officials.

colonization was de Lanessan in Indo-China in 1891, and he was recalled in ignominy for daring to use the powers given him! Every measure to give more freedom to local Governors has been repulsed, and one of the leading planks in the platform of the reformers is still to allow the Governors a freer hand in deciding purely local matters. France deluges a colony with officials, allows them to stifle the development of the colony in any but the orthodox direction of officialdom, and yet refuses to give them any freedom of action. None of these three attributes can be taken to represent the English outlook. In the British colonial world the executive is controlled from outside: the Colonial Office, while checking policy, allows a greater freedom to its Governors: there are fewer officials, but they have a higher status and greater powers as individuals: and their outlook is in general wider, as they consider other interests than the purely official,—such as the trading.⁹ The basic principle is different in each case, and the fact that certain British Crown Colonies,—in the Far East and the Pacific, for instance,—may be named as approximating rather closely to the French idea of control by an official caste does not affect the general distinction.

As a result of these general influences, differing as they do in each case, there have emerged what might be called the French and British norms in the colonial world. The French commence by emphasizing the executive and central control, and never go beyond that stage. The most developed colony, like the newest, is to remain under the Parisian *bureaux*. Native colonies in general are to be governed by exclusively French officials, nominated from Paris and responsible to Paris, the degree of responsibility being as pronounced for a Governor as for the least of the officials. The natives are to be governed but not heard, and France, *mirabile dictu*, still has no native councils in this age when native administration is defined in terms of indirect rule. There are a few embryonic local councils in the Niger region of West Africa, and panels of natives in the joint assemblies of the larger colonies; but, beyond such purely advisory and minor participation, the natives in general are not taken into co-partnership, as they are in the British colonies of Africa.

In the developed colonies, advisory councils are allowed. They are primarily to represent the French citizens, officials and settlers, although, in some colonies, like Algeria and Cochinchina, groups are given to the natives. Such colonial co-operation reaches its height in the Old Colonies, where there are Councils-General elected on universal suffrage, but in no case is there any real self-government. Such Councils are invariably to advise the Executive, but their advice may be passed over, either by

⁹ *Colonies et Marine*, 30/6/20, p. 389 *et seq.*, for contrast of the two.

the local or the central officials. They are overridden by the Governor and the Council of State. The utmost concession is a kind of financial dyarchy. Certain "optional" expenses, the unimportant fringes without which administration can still go on, are placed under the immediate control of the Councils; but the others, the "obligatory" charges, remain under the executive, which also retains a right to override the Council's decisions even on the "optional" charges.¹⁰ But this is an extreme measure, and usually the tendency in practice is to allow more and more items to come under the control of the Councils, provided always—and herein is the key to the system—that they behave themselves from the Administration's point of view! The most liberal aspect of French colonial theory is thus in those few privileged colonies where, solely as a result of constitutional conventions and not because of any specific Charter, a species of dual responsibility is admitted. The Governors in the Antilles, for instance, are responsible to the colonial Council for matters of purely local finance and local administration, and to the Ministry for general matters. But the significance of this is minimized when it is recognized that the *bureaux* retain power over all matters, and that they admit the co-operation of the Councils only as a tolerated privilege, liable to be overridden at any time in whole or in part. The colonial charter never goes beyond a tolerated control of certain financial matters: the executive can take charge of anything (though such retrogression would admittedly occasion turmoil in places like the sugar-islands and Algeria): the major economic matters,—tariffs for instance,—may not be mentioned by the Councils, and all manner of political discussions are entirely forbidden. Beyond this fragmentary concession, there is no other arrangement for colonial co-operation,¹¹ and, did not the *régime* in practice allow a considerable degree of deviation from this rigid principle, the position of the advanced colonies would be intolerable. Indeed, the position of Indo-China, even with the toleration allowed, is a marvel of retarded development.

In general, then, the hand of the executive, both local and central, is over everything in the French colonies, and that of the central executive in Paris is at all times over the local. Even the furthest flights of theory do not seem able to consider anything beyond a partly elected, partly nominated Council in the colonies, aiding but in no sense controlling the executive. Theorists tend rather to demand executive decentraliza-

¹⁰ Dialère, *Traité de Législation Coloniale* (1906 edition), Vol. II, Chap. 7. Compare Chap. XVII, Part III, above.

¹¹ *Journal Officiel*, 9/12/20, for reorganization of West Africa in these directions, and Merlin's speech in *Colonies et Marine*, March 1922, p. 224, for as far as the French will go.

tion,—that is, a larger freedom of the local officials from interference by the *bureaux*. As Sarraut summed up this trend :—

“ We would speak of the work of decentralization which will give to the Governments of our main colonies a larger degree of administrative autonomy, a wider power of initiative and action, against which there will be, as checks, a strongly maintained control by the Ministry and by Parliament, and the existence of local representative organs in which French and native representatives, either in separate or mixed assemblies, will aid and control.”

But that is all, and it will be noted that this theory more than balances any concession by a corresponding degree of control. That is the most magnanimous Colonial Charter that is deemed possible, and even in this form it remains only the dream of reformers, having been expressed in almost the same words by the various theorists since Ferry's time. Ferry cried in 1892 that the colonial governments needed more autonomy : that position, despite the development in the interim, still remains. And, until this preliminary step of decentralization is taken, it seems useless to speak of effective colonial assemblies, which are thus doubly postponed. French colonial theory is not concerned at present with such assemblies.

The British, on the other hand, have a far different theory. Indeed, they have had a different direction from the first, although there is naturally a basic distinction between their lands of settlement and those destined only for the natives. For the former, the colonists are to be taken into co-partnership as soon as conditions warrant that privilege. From the initial stages in each colony, nominated Councils expressed the viewpoint of the colonists as against the executive officials. These Councils gradually became more representative and more sweeping in their criticisms, until a full stage of representative government was reached. Under this, the colonial Council criticized the executive and usually, as in the Australian colonies in the forties, advised on budgetary matters. Conditions were generally such as to make their advice largely a matter of control, as in New South Wales at the time of the Land Fund (1835) or the squatting taxes of 1844.¹² Then, when the time was deemed auspicious, the colony was given responsible government, which meant that the local executive became responsible only to the local legislature. Such responsible government, though at first limited, gradually assumed wider functions (for instance, control over land, immigration, tariffs), until the colony became a Dominion, that is, a partner of the metropolis in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the only link being the personal bond of the King. The colonies even came to have an embryonic control

¹² S. H. Roberts, *History of Australian Land Settlement* (1925), p. 216, or, full analysis in E. Sweetman, *Australian Constitutional Development* (1926).

over their foreign affairs, and in reality were independent nations, subject to the wider considerations of defence and diplomacy.

This system means that there are from the first certain diametric oppositions with the French standpoint. Decentralization is the basis of this scheme of development, as opposed to the protracted dominance of the *bureaux* in Paris. A local Parliament emerges as soon as possible, whereas France, even in lands like Algeria that are destined for hundreds of thousands of French settlers, will admit neither a Parliament nor a political Council nor even a controlling economic Council: she does not countenance anything beyond advisory economic Councils, although in practice such a Council may virtually decide most of the items in the Budget. The one form of colony thus receives responsible government without British control but with Governors linking England to the colonies and an Agent-General in London linking the colonies to England: while the other stands for rule by functionaries from France, and, with this supremacy of the executive, control from Paris. "*Organisation de Paris*" is the key-note of the whole,—or what Jules Delafosse called in the Deputies, "*Centralisation à outrance*"—coupled with "this abominable mania that we have in France of peopling our colonies with officials and of using them only as receptacles for the export of bureaucrats."¹³ As a result, the Governor in the English system is largely an ornament in those colonies which have responsible government, and the central power of veto is practically nominal. In France, on the other hand, the Governor is invariably the working head of the administration, and the institution of veto dominates colonial matters. The Governor vetoes, the *bureau* vetoes, the Minister vetoes, the Council of State vetoes, the permanent Commissions veto, the other Ministries concerned veto, and Parliament vetoes. The French colonial system is thus a rising scale of negations. The French colony remains an administrative *bloc* governed like a part of mainland France, represented in the Paris Parliament like a piece of France, and with no more individual peculiarities than a part of France. The British is the exact contrary. It has no representation at Westminster and is in no sense governed like a county. It re-creates English institutions in miniature and starts a parallel development, with a Westminster of its own and a subordinate executive-class of its own. There are several Englands, as Seignobos concludes, but only one France,—a gradually expanding, but essentially unaltered, France.

As a further consequence of this, the English colony comes to have its own budget and a real financial independence. Indeed, it partly achieves this long before it reaches the stage of responsible government. In Australia, New South Wales had a budget early in last century, and,

¹³ *Journal Officiel*, Deps., 27/11/90, pp. 2284-5.

once approved by the Governor and the Legislative Council, even though the Council was nominally only an advisory one, this budget stood. Such matters as emigration and land-revenues were partly relegated to the control of the Minister at home, or, what this meant, to that unique body of armchair-theorists, the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners. But, even with these wider matters, the colonies came to usurp and hold a considerable degree of control. For instance, the excess land-revenue (after certain charges were met) fell to the Council, and the active help given to immigrants largely depended on the attitude of the local Council. That is why emigration differed, say, in New South Wales and South Australia. In last resort, the Governor could, and, if he were a strong man like Sir George Gipps, *did*, override the Council; but usually, when the two were not in conflict, the amount of control exercised by the Council was a considerable one and extended to the ordinary round of administration.

In the French colonies under similar circumstances, the Governor draws up the Budget and the local body approves; but the fundamental part is with the officials in the colony or in Paris. The only exceptions to this are in Algeria and the *anciennes colonies*, where effective control is conceded to the Council in most ordinary matters. But usually, the Budget may be altered by the executive at every stage, despite the so-called cession of budgetary autonomy in 1900. This was not budgetary autonomy in the English sense so much as the right of having local budgets—quite a different matter, and one granted to the English colonies in Australia almost as soon as they were established. The budgets of the British colonies with responsible government have nothing to do with the British official world or the Parliament at Westminster, and the Dominions may even please themselves as to what military contribution, if any, they make to the Empire. Even the budgets of the Crown Colonies are in practice controlled by the local executive, although the Colonial Office could here interfere in detail if it so desired. The British Parliament does not receive budget-reports on the separate colonies, as does the French. Every year the Deputies and Senate hear extensive reports on the separate colonies and decide their budgets. Nor are these mere divisions of the general budget. There is no one budget-speech in France but several, not one budget but many. The "Budget-Report, Service of Algeria," for example, is distinct, and deals with every detail of Algerian administration for the ensuing year: and it is in the drafting and amending of this that the *bureaux* and the Houses retain their immediate control over colonial affairs. Great Britain knows nothing of this procedure. The self-governing colonies look after themselves, and the Minister of the Colonies receives a general appropriation, interfering in

the local budgets of the Crown Colonies only in the case of financial crisis, The colonies make no specific contributions to the British budget, nor do they usually receive grants: the French do both. Every detail of colonial finance is under the closest surveillance of both the Parisian officials and, if they so pleased, the legislators; and the *service d'inspection* includes both travelling and fixed central officials who report on the smallest detail of finance. It is in these directions that the natural tendency of the French to centralize finds its strongest expression in the colonial field.¹⁴

The point most strongly insisted upon in the financial field is that the tariff-system may not in any wise be determined by the French colony. That is essentially a metropolitan prerogative, essentially a national matter. Thus, France stood as strongly for tariff-subordination, even for colonies in the position of Indo-China and Algeria, as Britain does for tariff-autonomy. The issue was finally decided in the British colonies in 1872, when it was ruled that the colonies could not only fix their own tariff systems but could even discriminate against British goods. Later, the Dominions were even allowed to make trade-treaties against Britain. Canada and the United States, for instance, might arrange a treaty by which certain British goods were virtually to be boycotted, and the British representative, having had nothing to do with the negotiations, would be called upon to sign the treaty so arranged. Practically all of the British colonies, even the Crown Colonies which were still directly controlled by the Colonial Office, adopted protectionist systems as opposed to the free-trade of the metropolis. This is inconceivable under the French *régime*: there, the colonies are subordinated, their interests are purely secondary, they have not the slightest voice in the determination of the fiscal *régime*, and, save for a brief interlude from 1833 to 1848 in three colonies, never have had.¹⁵ They simply carry out the policy determined by metropolitan Frenchmen for the interests of metropolitan Frenchmen. There is no secret about this: such a procedure is completely in harmony with the French theory of the *rôle* a colony should play; and this is the main field in which colonial protests are forbidden from the first. Indeed, the only protests were in the campaign for "tariff-personality" before the war-years, and even then, the aim was more to have the tariff influenced by varying local conditions than to hand its determination over to the individual colonies. But this campaign died out, and the issue has never been heard of again.

Tariff-subordination is one of the bases of the post-war policy of France, and the colony's interests are deliberately and of set purpose ignored, however much they may suffer thereby. Never since the

¹⁴ See Chap. XVI, Part III, *ante*.

¹⁵ See Chap. II, *ante*.

Navigation Act has England had anything approaching the French law of tariff-assimilation (1892), even for the Crown Colonies ; nor has there been anything like the restrictions imposed on Algerian shipping since the old days when the English overseas establishments were viewed as " plantations." The French stand for one huge *Zollverein* (not a union of equally developing parts, but of one centre and several outside subsidiaries), while the British have frequently rejected any system of Imperial Preference, even in its most innocuous form. As a corollary of this, industries in the British colonies are allowed to develop, even against those of Great Britain ; whereas, in France, they are repressed if they compete with the metropolis. There, as in Tonkin, industries were for long discouraged, because they might conceivably clash with the interests of the French manufacturers at home, and because, moreover, it was not in accord with the dictates of a sound colonial policy to allow any colony to become too strong or self-sufficient. The latter part of this attitude, it must be admitted, has lost much of its force in the past few years, but the former remains as strong as ever.

It might perhaps be asserted that these vitally different theories arose because England had Dominions and France only colonies of exploitation. But that assertion evades certain facts, because the changes are not merely in methods differing with certain material circumstances. They go further and concern the ultimate direction and point of view. Even comparing colonies on an equality, as, for instance, the above-mentioned lands in West Africa, conspicuous differences emerge. There is not the same excessive centralization in the British colonies. The local Governors and the Residents each have wider powers, and the immediate control of London is less, and is confined to questions of general policy rather than ordinary matters of administrative detail. But the French official is nothing more than a cog in a machine. " They will bring with them that passion for uniformity, that mania for routine, that love for making regulations, that regard for form, that dread of initiative and of responsibilities which crush the mother-country as well as the most vigorous of our colonies." ¹⁶

Then again, both Powers approach the native problem differently. As has been seen, since indirect rule has been the accepted British method, —that is, since about 1905,—the native rulers have as much power as possible, and the Resident is more and more behind the scenes. All of Nigeria, for instance, is covered with native councils deciding local questions ; whereas, until 1925, the French had none of these and still do not believe in them. The natives have a wider scope in Nigeria and, even where this is curtailed, their traditions and customs are given con-

¹⁶ J. Chailley-Bert, *The Colonisation of Indo-China* (1894), p. x.

sideration. Justice and administration in British West Africa are not as impregnated with the details of metropolitan practice as in the French possessions. Despite the recent changes, the civil code of French Africa largely retains the ideas of the *Code Civil*; that of the British lands is based on native customs, save those that are anti-social or employ methods that could not possibly be sanctioned under a civilized administration. The Code is made to fit the local conditions and is such that the natives can understand it. But even local native-courts are "a comparatively recent innovation in French West Africa. In this sense, indirect rule has been a material part of British colonial policy for twenty years; but, in France, though partly accepted in theory under the guise of the theory of association, it has remained distinct from administrative routine, save for certain more or less spectacular exceptions. The French retain the essential view-point of direct rulers, and, where they must, utilize native officials only as a *pis aller*, as subservient aids to direct rule, to be employed only because there are not enough French officials.¹⁷ At the same time, native customs, as in Indo-China and West Africa, have to fight their way to recognition, and often, as in Kabylie and the Pacific lands and Cochin-China, are completely repressed.

The general difference between the two colonial policies may best be seen in this attitude towards the natives. There, England and France, as has been seen, stand poles apart. The French come more into contact with native life. They impregnate themselves with the traditions and thought and peculiarities of the native mind, and endeavour to understand. The English, on the other hand, stand aloof. They have no Delafosse, no Robert Randau, no novels of the *grande brousse* school. Such delvings into the mysteries of native psychology have little attraction for them, and it was not until recent years that there was even an agitation to train all British officials in anthropology,—and it still remains an agitation. Contrast with this the extensive courses on comparative anthropology and on every phase of native life at the *École Coloniale* in Paris. The French, in consequence of this training, turn out officials who are in a position to understand and synthesize the many contradictory phases of native existence. Then the individual, thus attuned by his training to a sympathetic understanding of native idiosyncrasies, finds himself helped by his Latin temperament. The French draw no colour-line and accept the fact of race-difference rather than that of any innate racial inferiority. Hence the tolerant attitude towards miscegenation in the French lands. This is in no sense associated with that biting

¹⁷ Contrast, for example, the points of view in Van Vollenhoven and Merlin, *op. cit.*, and that of Lugard, in *Étude de Colonisation Comparée* (Franck, 1925), pp. 36-41.

contumely with which the phrase "gone native" is regarded in British colonies. Nor is the *métis*, the offspring of such relationships, denied a place in the community. He follows his father's status, if recognized by him, and can, certain technical difficulties notwithstanding, obtain the rights of citizenship. In English lands, the case is far different, and the half-caste falls into an outer position which leaves no scope for him, either with the old or the new. Again, such a device as the "mixed battalions" which the French have in Morocco cannot be imagined in any English colony. In them, French conscripts and native soldiers are mingled indiscriminately. It is not that separate platoons of French and natives co-operate as fighters in a wider unit: they are dispersed amongst the same platoons, living every detail of their lives in common and with absolutely no differential treatment or privacy. The system is the negation of racial difference,—a reduction to one level, that of the lowest. On a par with this concept is the attitude of France towards her subject-races in the metropolis. They receive equality, and, if the *âme nègre* movement in post-war literature and art means anything, almost more than equality. They are not relegated to their special niche and tolerated as long as they keep there: there is no obvious differentiation.

On the other hand, the Englishman approaches the native from a certain aloof standpoint. Respect rather than *camaraderie* is the relationship he seeks in his colonies, as a contrast between, say, the West African native corps and the mixed battalions of Morocco will prove. The Englishman insists on the fundamental distinction, even when he does not term it inferiority, and seeks refuge in a polite, and almost pained, aloofness. As Lord Cromer said, Englishmen assimilate less than the French because "our habits are insular, and our social customs render us, in comparison at all events with the Latin races, somewhat unduly exclusive." The Englishman, says the same critic in another place, is wanting in that "social adaptability, in which the French excel."¹⁸ Understanding, if it can only be obtained by mixing indiscriminately in the ordinary life and emotions of his charges, has no appeal for the average English official, nor would his caste permit him so to mingle, even if he wished it. He decrees things for the benefit of those under him, thinking that the judicial impartiality of his attitude is the utmost advance he can make to meet the situation. In a word, he makes the native problem an objective one, the Frenchman throws himself heart and soul and body into native life and makes it essentially subjective. The English tend to be analysts, logical and cool and aloof, calmly dissecting the various phases of native life as they would an anatomical fragment and inter-

¹⁸ Cromer, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, pp. 84, 85.

preting each part in the terms of their own thought-processes : whereas the French are synthesists, getting the whole atmosphere and revelling in the getting. Under similar circumstances, the English official tends to withdraw into his thought-laboratory, take away the human phases of the problem, treat it impersonally and according to his code, and, supported by his deity of racial dignity, invoke the spirit of judicial fairness in assigning each element its value. Nor is this a mere rhetorical distinction : it permeates every phase of colonial existence, and explains why the relationships of French and natives are generally more immediate and more emotional than those of English and natives. The one would sacrifice understanding for a judicial view-point, the other would almost sacrifice their cultural dignity if understanding could be bettered that way.

It is no mere hazard that England completely lacks the class of colonial literature that France has so abundantly. In the difference lies the whole root of the matter. As the Leblonds, themselves psychological novelists of note, say in their *résumé* of colonial literature, there is an opposition of ideals between France and England in this regard. "Our colonial literature is impregnated with an instinctive sympathy for the native and has no need to find its models abroad. It remains peculiarly French."¹⁹ The difference is most remarkable. Take Marius Leblond's *Zézère* or *Ulysse Caffre*, with their intimate studies of the souls of natives, —and these, it must be remembered, are but the culmination of a whole school of development. There is a world of difference between these intimate psychological studies and the romantic imagination of a Châteaubriand or the superficial impressionism of a Pierre Loti. Delafosse started the newer study in his analyses of the Congolese,²⁰ and the intimacy of contact reached its height in the writings of Masqueray and Isabelle Eberhardt, that strange Russian who lived in the desert as an Arab and gave the first real analyses of the Arab soul. Victor Sagalen, in *Les Immémoriaux*, did the same for Tahiti, Robert Randau for Algeria and "la brousse," Pierre Rives for Madagascar, and Daguèrches and Ajalbert for Indo-China. These writers have no counterpart in England. What is there, for instance, to approach the analysis of the contact of races and tropical neurosis given by Claude Farrère, in *Les Civilisés*, that novel of Indo-Chinese life which was awarded the Goncourt Prize in 1905 ? What is there like that spontaneous communion with native life which Isabelle Eberhardt achieves in *Dans l'Ombre chaude de l'Islam* (1906) or *Le Trimardeur* (1922), or Bertrand's *Pépète le Bien-Aimé*, or Ajalbert's *Raffin-Su-Su*, or those two remarkable complements, René Maran's *Batouala* and

¹⁹ *Le Roman Colonial* (1926), pp. 9-13.

²⁰ Series of articles in *L'Afrique Française*, Feb. 1909, et seq.

Gaston Joseph's *Koffi, Roman Vrai d'Un Noir*—wonderful analyses of environmental influences and cultural antagonisms? All of these, and they are but a minority taken at random, testify to that sympathetic study of native life so aptly furthered by the French, and in themselves are conclusive evidence on this one direction of French colonial activities. In the same field, England has *Kim* and little else,—no analysis of the Egyptian spirit, nothing on negro Africa, nothing on India or Malaya, and not even anything on that laboratory of surcharged emotions, the Pacific. If France has hundreds of such psychological novels, many of them based on deep scientific study as well as infused with this sympathetic spirit, and England, with the largest native population in the world, has no such studies, there must be a great divergence between the ways in which each approaches the problems of native life. The constant stream of such studies from Fromentin's Saharan observations of eighty years ago to *L'Étendart Vert* and *Mireille entre les négresses* of 1926 is one of the most interesting, and certainly one of the most revealing, phases of the French colonial effort. It differentiates English and French activities, it explains the easy camaraderie which the Frenchman is able to set up between himself and his native charges, and shows why French native policy is in many ways so striking. England has not this literature, England could not have this literature: and therein is the basic difference between the two native methods.

But, to this easy understanding and sympathetic insight, the French add a certain callousness, inbred by their greater reliance on the military arm and their view of new colonies as providing field-work for the cadets of the *École Militaire* and as training the future leaders of the metropolitan army. Coupled with this is that inverted egoism which finds expression in the destruction of native institutions as a preliminary to an assimilation with the ineffably superior spirit of French civilization. The individual Frenchman will narrow the gap between the native and himself, but will not relinquish this almost religious belief in the peculiar exaltation of his own civilization. He cannot forget the apostolate of 1789, viewed now not so much as a Red Revolutionary spirit as a moderate civilization, hallowed by the efflux of time and, though almost stodgily respectable, unquestionably superior.

If these two attitudes are joined to the sympathetic understanding of the individual, the French relationship towards native populations, or rather the complex of interacting factors that go to make up that relationship, may be understood. These three factors are always there, but they vary in quantity, and it is because of the sudden welling-up of one of them, to the temporary submergence of the others, that the many outward contradictions of French policy are due. But consider the

three as the varying ferment at the back of French ideas, and the variations become capable of explanation. Toqué's cruelty in the Congo, the countenance of miscegenation, and the concession of assimilation, which represent each of these three in turn, thus all became natural. French native policy has been a constant ebb and flow between the contradictions of these three factors, and between the innumerable combinations in which the three may join in varying quantities. That is why one authority will speak of their policy as one of sympathetic tact, and another describe it as dominated by a *concessionnaire* spirit, while a third will term it one of destruction by military repression. All three are right, but none of them goes the whole length and takes into account every phase of French policy. It is really a compound, with the relative importance of each factor determined by the actual conditions in question. The English policy is more unitary, more certain, and clearer, even if it is more limited. It cannot reach the heights of understanding attained at times by the French, but neither does it so often go down to the depths. England has one Tasmania, one Kenya, but France has Algeria and Cochin-China and the Congo and New Caledonia, and *refoulement* in each. The French policy, in a word, is more temperamental and, because of that, may be very much better or very much worse for the native than the English. But perhaps an uninspired fairness and a just mediocrity are at times to be preferred to an undependable emotional understanding, especially when this latter is garnished by trappings of *refoulement* or destruction. Of recent years, English and French theory in this connection have met on the common ground of "association," but, even so, there is still a fundamentally different approach towards native questions, at least in practice.

On the whole, the presence of these varying attributes explains why the French have been successful with negro populations but have failed with Mohammedan. There is no unrest in France's negro-lands, nor has there ever been any serious turmoil since the original suppression of the native States. France understands the easy iconoclasm and the atavistic phases of negro-existence in Africa, and offers legal equality to some, military service to some, and sentimental platitudes about ultimate rights to all. The negroes in the French lands do not want present equality or even present opportunity so much as this imaginative tact. Unenterprising as individuals, the *fact* of progress means little to most of them: they want the spirit of toleration and a jugglery with phrases about their possibilities. These the French give them, and win them over by their sympathy. There is no doubt that France gets nearer to the hearts of the negro-populations than any other European Power. That was why the last Negro Congress, with 400 delegates

from all over the world, became "apostles of the glory of French colonization,"²¹ and why Sir Harry Johnston, speaking from his wide experience in Central Africa, said that "taking all in all, I am of the opinion that, since 1871, the French nation has treated the negro problem in a wiser, saner, and more successful fashion than we, the English, have." France gives the franchise to all the negroes in the Antilles and to some of the Senegalese, and relegates none to an outer world through the bars of which they may regard the wonders of superior civilization as exemplified in the person of unimaginative officials,—as the English do.

But this applies only to populations which, like the negro, do not dominate their lives by an attachment to tradition. Religion is not the seal of their society and does not enter into every act of their daily life. Hence, French destructiveness does not find itself in conflict with the bases of their society: they rather welcome the change. It is quite different with Islamic peoples, whose attachment to tradition is religious, and whose religion is a matter of everyday life and quite as much a code of behaviour as a theological dogma. Here, French innovations and even French overtures find themselves brought up against an impassable wall of religious bigotry. They are the despised outsiders, the Unbelievers, whose advances are uniformly repulsed. Their concessions, which would delight an emotional negro population, rouse here only scorn, and any attempt to make them obligatory leads to a *Jehad*. The Moslem invokes his religion to protect himself against French reforms in any field of existence. He shuts the Frenchman out of his life, even if he has to tolerate him as a temporal conqueror, and is not sympathetic towards the French attempts to understand his psychology. Indeed, he regards French inquiries in this direction as one more proof of the inferiority of their civilization. So much a cultural and religious bigot is the average Mohammedan that he cannot conceive of any advantages which he might receive from the French. These latter, therefore, repelled alike in their schemes of reform and their attempts to understand, feel thwarted and resort to their usual Algerian methods of *refoulement*, only to find the gap increasing and the Moslems drawing more and more into the shell of their religious exclusiveness. The French irritate the Moslems and are half humoured, half despised, by them. The childish pride with which the negro accepts the overtures of the French are unknown in the dour Moslem world, because the Mohammedan cannot see the desirability of what he is offered or why he should demean himself by taking unworthy things. He is conquered by the French military machine, that is *Kismet*, but let the Unbelievers remain outside the barrier Mohammed erected

²¹ Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 124 note.

and live their own life.²² That is why France has uniformly failed with Moslem populations. Algerian *refoulement*, Tunisian unrest, the Syrian fiasco, the long wars in Morocco—all are open to the same explanation.

But it is precisely in such a case that the British ideas of cultural aloofness and respect of their adversaries' traditions succeed. The British make their pride in their own culture felt, they disapprove of any attempt at proselytism, and, safe within their own barrier of cultural self-esteem, leave the Moslems within theirs. It is a mutual recognition of non-interference. Both sides have the same unreasonably priggish smugness regarding their civilization: the Englishman makes up for the lack of religious sanctions in his daily life by an ineffable pride of race and caste: and the Moslem, duplicating this attitude from his own standpoint, understands. Both parties surround themselves with a ring-fence, whereas the French, under similar conditions, would endeavour to mix the two flocks in one paddock.

Moslem unrest with the French is therefore more in the nature of cultural antagonism than it is with the English, with whom it is largely a desire to obtain self-government or to clash with other people like the Hindus. In the one case it is mainly social, in the other chiefly political. Despite their emphases on Moslem research, and despite such gestures as the opening of the Paris Mosque, the French have never won over the Moslem soul as they have the negro. So that, in speaking of the "human" nature of their native policy, it must always be remembered that this applies to the negro-lands,—the lands where emotion and an inferiority-complex assume the place taken by religious tradition and cultural pride in Islamic lands.

In conclusion, the French policy of mixed sympathy and destruction may be termed a varying success. The issue depends on the cultural permeability of the subject-race. If, as with the Moslems, they take a firm stand on this question, the French policy fails at the outset and can only lead to irritation and force. That is in cases where their religion is an aggressive force penetrating every phase of existence. It is also in cases where, as with the Arabs and Berbers, the French camaraderie, as interpreted in terms of sexual partnership, finds itself, not esteemed an honour for the recipient, as in negro countries, but the ultimate degradation. The Arab social system thus joins the Mohammedan religion in foredooming the French method of breaking down barriers to failure. Confucianism plays a similar part in forming a cultural barrier in Indo-China, but the conditions of the Pacific, especially in Polynesia, where native custom is decadent, duplicate those of negro-Africa. The relative

²² The best analysis is in Part III of J. Brevié, *Islamisme contre Naturisme au Soudan Français* (1923),—a long examination of France's Moslem policy.

success of the French method thus comes back to the religious and cultural virility of the people concerned. The French have evolved no method that would suit the Arab and the negro alike, or the Tahitian and the Annamite. Their policy, its subjective nature to the contrary, is not an elastic one in practice.

In the last resort, it comes down to two factors. With races that do not surround themselves with an impassable ring-fence of religious or social aloofness, the French can succeed, because they narrow the gap between ruler and subject, and "humanize" native relationships. That is what is meant by the frequently reiterated platitudes that the French win the hearts of their subjects,—an assertion in which even the militarists join. As Sarraut sums it up :—

"The secret of our colonial place is less in the reality of our force than in the sign of our authority. That sign is the heart, and the native knows it. We are for him friends, beings of the same family,—the great family of human beings. *Less generous perhaps than other nations in the verbal liberalism of the constitutions granted*, we compensate for the parsimony of our colonial franchises by a sincere feeling. With others, the man of colour obtains larger charters perhaps, but never is the threshold of the European residence opened to him or his hand taken by that of the European."²³

There is much truth in this : the French do not make the natives feel so insignificantly outside the pale as do other Powers, and to this extent the claim that they show the most sympathetic understanding is justified.

But over and against this is the military emphasis, the destruction entailed in the old assimilative *régime*, the *concessionnaire* spirit of the French Congo, and especially the influence of officialdom. The individual official finds himself bound by the letter of his instructions, and, even if he is convinced of the need for a *rapprochement* with the natives in certain directions, he is powerless. As Lord Cromer said, speaking from actual experience, "they are wedded to bureaucratic ideas, and fail to see that it is wiser to put up with an imperfect reform carried with native consent than to insist on some more perfect measure executed in the teeth of strong, although often unreasonable, native opposition."²⁴ A logically impractical scheme is preferred to an illogically practical one : but it is obvious that the successful native policy has perforce to sanction many customs that are hopelessly illogical from the European point of view but which, when interpreted in terms of native existence and dovetailed in with the peculiarities of the native outlook, assume an entirely different aspect. The Frenchman remains a formalist, and this tends to make

²³ Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 122. Compare *Études de Colonisation Comparée* (1925, Franck), p. 4 *et seq.*

²⁴ Cromer, *Political and Literary Essays* (1913).

arid all of the *rapprochement* brought about by his Gallican *bonhomie*. It is the bureaucratic view-point that seeks uniformity and assimilation to European concepts: it is this that secures destruction and insists on the military arm, that refuses to recognize native existence as something distinct, and that takes away any adaptability a native policy may possess. It is this influence that has alienated the Arabs and that accounts both for the rebellions of the past and the turgid stream of native unrest at present. The individual administrator might have the capacity and the desire for an understanding of his charges, but the administrative *régime* makes him forget everything except that he is a mechanical official. The good points which the French temperament might have made possible in one direction are thus made sterile by the influence of the bureaucratic element: and this always comes to the front. So that, if French native policy is a compound of the Encyclopædic universalism and the liberalism of 1789, if it allows a considerable degree of human understanding and an undeniable sense of native *milieux*, it also countenances much militarism and destruction of native institutions, and is, in the long run, dominated by the one outside factor,—the excessive formalism and consequent mechanical nature of the administrative world. This is the ineradicable feature, the basic element to which priority must be given.

There is thus a clear difference between the customary French and British methods. But it should not be assumed that the French were never influenced by this British concept. On the contrary, until about 1905, it was the excellence of the English method that was preached in France, largely as a contrast to the haphazardly empirical nature of the French themselves. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, for instance, in his editions of the classic *De la Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes* between 1874 and 1905, praised the English method as the goal and deprecated the efforts of his own countrymen as a series of disconnected and contradictory experiments. And Leroy-Beaulieu was, it must be remembered, the first, the greatest, of the colonial vulgarizers. The Galliéni school, and Lyautey in particular, also took this stand, and they,—who introduced the only element of order there was in the French colonial world,—were constantly looking to what they thought was the ordered plan of British colonial existence, especially in India. This humility lasted for about twenty years, until Marcel Dubois started in a new direction in 1895 with his *Systèmes Coloniaux et Peuples Colonisateurs*. He said that there was no absolute theory of colonization, that the problem was essentially variable, and that, even if it were not, it was very difficult to define any one British colonial method. In a word, he insisted on variation. As the French were even then finding in the difficulties they were experi-

encing in Algeria and Indo-China, it was evident that "the work of colonization depends on the character of the colonizing people and the nature of the people colonized." This especially applied to native policy, where colonial dogmatism had to go and be replaced by a more living human idea. This new orientation was aided by the downfall of extreme assimilation at this time, and by the failure of the uniform method that had been employed in Algeria, Cochin-China, and the Old Colonies. At the same moment, too, the varying colonial policies of the Powers were becoming evident, and France, breaking both from her military methods and from the undue praise bestowed on one foreign system, adopted an elastic comparative view-point. "The mobile, living, and complex idea," wrote Regismanset, himself a specialist at the Ministry of Colonies, "sometimes contradictory but ever conforming to the universal dialectic that we must make of human actions and societies, is infinitely nearer to the fact than the repose of a formulation of abstractions."²⁵ That is, the French mooted to advance through constant change, the very fact of change and flux testifying to the deeper unity of progress. In this way, Bergson's philosophy of change came to influence colonial doctrine, and all of these factors combined about 1905 to produce the new outlook. France sought adaptability in her colonial policy, especially on its native side, and took stock of the policies of other Powers, until the post-war school arose, preaching the beatitude of a single method of colonization, and that, needless to say, their own—or rather, the one urged during the *Ancien Régime*. The flexibility of a Dubois had given way to the arid dogmatism of a Girault, and French colonial philosophy was once more reduced to something between a legal commentary and a sermon on the duties of colonizing Powers. But, in the interim, the comparative view-point had done its work, and France had been borrowing from other Powers.

The first group of such influences was that of Germany and Belgium. The former in particular influenced French colonial policy at regular intervals, both positively and by way of reaction. As has already been seen, it was Germany's attitude that largely shaped the course of France's colonial activities. Ferry might repudiate with scorn the suggestion that Bismarck had pushed France into Tonkin and Madagascar and Tunisia, but there was some causal relationship. Germany's economic advance after 1870 led France to look on colonies as a safety-valve and in part to overcome the colonial aversion of the eighties. Her turn towards colonization in 1884 made France adopt a forward policy to the last kilometre, even though her own instincts were at this time in quite the opposite direction. Then, it was Germany's early lack of success in Africa,

²⁵ Regismanset, *Questions Coloniales* (1923), Vol. I, p. 36.

especially when combined with the wonderful harvest reaped by Belgium, that spurred France on in the nineties. It was the increase of Germany's population as compared with that of France, too, which largely shaped the new French native policy,—of better treatment for the natives, a larger respect for their traditions, and association through military service in the "Black Army." At the same time, German methods were influencing the situation in yet another direction. Their efficiency-methods as applied to native production were carefully watched by France after 1900 and, though checked by the outburst against colonial scandals in 1905, were again powerful when France dallied with the idea of industrial colonization. Here the German ideas of securing efficiency in the field of production once more entered, and France, contrasting the economic backwardness of her own colonies, could not but notice. Clearly, therefore, it was not only in matters like going to Morocco to maintain her *amour-propre* that France was influenced by Germany. The Germans often forced the events of French colonization, but, over and above this, their methods and colonial doctrines exerted an appreciable influence.

German colonial methods, like those of any other Power, were curiously mixed and varied from colony to colony.²⁶ Their system was undoubtedly the most scientific of all and perhaps, in its search for implacable efficiency, the least concerned with human values. They had a definite theory—the exploitation-theory shared with the Dutch and Belgians—and, in the pursuit of that theory, were content to use any methods and accept any sacrifices from the subject-populations. It was the attitude of the all-powerful State, the State of Treitschke and Bernhardi, extended to another sphere. The well-being of the Empire was all that counted, and the natives were considered no more than any inanimate agent of production. They were instruments of efficiency, and only considered as such. The theory was thus simple in its outlines and openly expressed by official agencies. The German Colonial Congress of 1902, for instance, summed up both ends and means :—

"The Colonial Congress thinks that, in the economic interests of the country, it is necessary to render it independent of the foreigner for the importation of colonial raw materials and to create markets as safe as possible for manufactured German goods. The German colonies in the future must play this double rôle, if the natives are forced to labour on public works and agricultural pursuits."

²⁶ There is no adequate account of German colonization in either French or English, though a start was made in A. Cheradame (1905). The best way of arriving at an estimate is going through such a collection as, say, Schnee, *Deutsches Kolonial Lexikon* (3 vols., 1920)—where both the good and the bad aspects emerge, because the purpose is scientific rather than propaganda. The statistical position is in *Deutsches Kolonial Kalender und Statistisches Handbuch*, 1914.

That is, they wanted a monopoly—just such a monopoly as is advocated by the French theory of a *mise en valeur*, be it noted—based on forced labour.

¶ To realize this development, they employed large companies. The *Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft* in Samoa, for example, established German trading supremacy all over the Central Pacific: the Jaluit Company extended it to Micronesia: the New Guinea Company acquired Northern Papua: the *Deutsche Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft* obtained East Africa: and Companies on the model of the great English Chartered Companies were set up in South-West Africa and the North and South Cameroons.²⁷ These Companies, State-aided in many cases, had a monopoly within the colonies and sometimes, as in New Guinea, a delegation of governmental authority. The German State was definitely linked with the German trading-house—*Die Flagge folgt dem Handel*!—and colonization was officially taken off the State hands by large *concessionnaire* Companies. Policy beyond that was largely determined by the *Colonialamt* in Berlin, more a commercial body than anything else.

The natives were therefore so many chattels to be dragooned into obedience. Hence the appearance of "the iron hand" so often. There were twenty-nine punitive expeditions in the Cameroons in twelve years (1891–1903); the Hereros of South-West Africa were ruthlessly exterminated in the war of 1907: the natives of New Britain were driven back: and everywhere the military were predominant. In 1897, for instance, there were 2,182 Germans resident in the colonies, and of these two-thirds were soldiers and officials. "We must forswear all sentimental humanitarianism," declared the deputy Schleinitz, and this was literally the order of the day until 1905.²⁸ The Germans converted their colonies into efficient factories, handed over to *concessionnaire* companies, and with native interests considered only so far as they resulted in increased efficiency.

But this was not the whole of German policy. English commentators usually stop here, failing to recognize that a partial presentation under these conditions is deliberate misrepresentation. The German colonial system had many features that could not be explained by the above summary. The account given would explain the constant revolts in South-West Africa, in the Cameroons, and in East Africa: and it must be

²⁷ P. Decherme, *Compagnies et Sociétés coloniales allemandes* (1903), Chap. 4 *et seq.*

²⁸ For this aspect, see E. Lewin, *The Germans and Africa* (1915), pp. 270, 271. A more impartial account is in Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsche Südwest Afrika*.

admitted that most of the blame for these rested with the German failure to understand their native charges. The French did not have as many armed expeditions as these territories saw, nor has there been anything in the French colonies like the fall of Peters or the several instances of gross perversion on the part of individual governors. Still, there are other sides to the situation, and it must be remembered that most of these uprisings took place in the early days of German colonization (in the nineties, when the French were progressing in West Africa through a constant welter of blood), and that in certain territories the cause lay mainly with the recalcitrant populations. The northern slave-states of the Cameroons, for instance, are still unsubdued, even under a mandatory Power; and the natives of all the interior and even part of the coast of ex-German New Guinea still stand out. It is useless, under these conditions, to make a list of military expeditions without analysing the situation to be dealt with. As well interpret British policy in India in terms of the single fact that there are over 300 military expeditions a year on the northern frontier!

Apart from this negative limitation, however, there were certain positive features of German colonial policy.²⁹ The Germans made Samoa the best-governed colony in the Pacific, as even English missionaries admitted, and secured the loyalty of the natives. In New Guinea they set up native officials,—*tultuls* and *luluais*,—and gave them real power of local government, more indeed than the subsequent mandatory power saw fit to concede. In addition, they laid the basis for an educational system which, far in advance of the existing needs of the situation, has since been continued by the Australian mandatories. Despite their harshness in such matters as corporal punishment, they were not unpopular in New Guinea, because the natives understood a consistent policy of equitable force, whereas, as the Australians found to their cost, the vagaries of an uncertain humanitarian policy were beyond their comprehension. Finally, they developed the plantations of the group far more than the Australians did in the adjacent Papua, despite the more favourable conditions in the latter.³⁰ In their African colonies a kindred development was noticeable, especially in East Africa; and Germany, her poor lands notwithstanding, made her colonies more productive than did France. Moreover, in winning over the natives, it is a moot point whether the *askaris*, the native militia, of the Germans were not as loyal as the French *tirailleurs*. Everywhere, too, even if in a somewhat detached scientific manner, the Germans promoted schemes

²⁹ See, for example, the account in O. H. Kobner, *Einführung in die Kolonialpolitik* (1908), p. 71 *et seq.* Page 25 onwards is a good comparative view.

³⁰ S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (1927), p. 162.

for the material well-being of the natives. The motive may have been, probably was, utilitarian, but the result was there just the same. The last budget of Samoa, for instance, provided for various medical specialists and agricultural experiments on a scale unknown, say, in British Fiji; and throughout the African colonies there was the same medical and agricultural care. Compare, for example, the budget-provisions for these matters in the Cameroons and in the neighbouring French Equatorial Africa, or in Togo and Dahomey.³¹ The result is perfectly clear. The scientific side of German colonization thus left little to be desired. The encyclopædias on the German colonies remain monuments of colonial erudition and the most comprehensive works of their kind achieved by any Power. A glance through the volumes of Dr. Schnee's *Deutsches Kolonial Lexikon*, for instance, published after the Germans lost their colonies, vindicates their claim to be the most scientific colonists, and this was evident in every colony alike.

Nor can it be asserted that the dominant theory which disregarded native welfare as an end in itself went unchallenged. It was largely a passing phase, in the same way that the policy of assimilation was passing in the French colonies, or subjection in the Belgian Congo. One Minister of Colonies, Bernhard Dernburg (1907), stood out entirely against the older ideas and fought for toleration and progress along native lines. He wanted, he said, "to inspire in native minds, not a terror of the conquering German, but the sentiments of respectful sympathy towards white men, whose principal preoccupation should be to ameliorate the condition of the natives."³² Even though this emphasized respect where the French would perhaps have stood for sympathy (and in so far approximated more to the English model), it was clearly related to the French idea of "association." Again, Dernburg stood for the passing of that company-*régime* which had been unquestioned since the time of Bismarck and Kayser. "We have not gone to East Africa to found three or four hundred plantations," he argued, "and, interesting though the planters are, the Government cannot compromise the peace and prosperity of the colony simply to give them satisfaction." Schulz, a fellow-reformer, went further and gave practical expression to his system in New Guinea. He insisted that, under the new conditions, "our colonies are colonies of plantations by and for the natives, and their future depends entirely on the cultural development of the natives."³³ His *Kiap*-plantations, as they were called, were ventures at native peasant-proprietorship

³¹ See *Die Deutsche Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Sudsee, 1912-1913* (1914),—Section 4 on each chapter on finance.

³² Meynier, *L'Afrique Noire* (1911), pp. 250-252.

³³ J. Harmand (1910), *op. cit.*, p. 127 note.

under the control of the German Residents. Similarly, in Samoa, the New Zealanders had but to continue the experiments of their German predecessors in native plantations. Germany was thus evolving the same system of native welfare, both as regarded native officials and native plantations, that the British were working out in Nigeria and East Africa.³⁴

In so far as the French interpreted German colonization, however, they saw only the unreformed aspect and borrowed from the Germans the idea of colonial efficiency secured, if need be, by military means. They saw the German executive officials predominant, as their own were, and trying to convert their colonies into factories producing on an industrial model; and in this, too, France wished to follow them. France contrasted the efficiency of the German colonies with the haphazardness of her own, and wanted to infuse a similar directness and force into her overseas possessions. She coveted both the industrialization and the scientific nature of German colonization, but passed over the way in which the Germans utilized native officials and endeavoured to produce peasant-proprietorship, and minimized the importance of the public services which Germany extended to the colonies. Those parts of the German system which she could not utilize, France attacked, and there was the humorous spectacle of the Power that had invented the word *refoulement* and employed this method in the four quarters of the globe in driving back her native populations, the Power that had revelled in a continual military picnic in Africa from 1890 to 1910, taking the Germans to task and labelling their colonial policy as only one of "brutality"! ³⁵ The truth was that France used some German methods, rejected the stark efficiency of the earlier German colonial system, and was jealous of the remainder.

With Belgium, the interaction and the borrowing on the part of the French were more direct. France in her Central African policy was influenced more by the Belgian experience than by any other single factor. The phenomenal success of Leopold in the Congo directly led to French activity in Equatorial Africa: the French borrowed the *concessionnaire* idea from Belgium: Belgian *personnel* was largely used for the police and company forces: Belgian capital played a leading part in the company scheme of 1899: Belgian native methods were adopted *in toto*: and, after the scandals, France reproduced in the Congo every successive stage of Belgian practice. The first thing thus borrowed was the basic idea,—that a colony was a huge domain to be exploited as

³⁴ For this native policy, see *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Kolonialkongresses* (Berlin, 1924), p. 24 *et seq.* (Rechenburg), or important section, by Zache, in *Das Deutsche Kolonialbuch* (1926, ed. Zache), pp. 41-73. Compare pp. 270, 394.

³⁵ E.g. by Besson in *L'Afrique Française*, 1921, p. 101.

rapidly and as efficiently as possible. The natives, as the Belgians believed in common with the Germans, were to be subordinated to this end: in their eyes, at least in the early stage, the native problem was only one of production. Forced labour, therefore, was a cardinal feature of the Belgian colonial policy. The natives were denied rights and reduced to semi-slavery. The Belgians officially and openly promulgated this theory, which was not in any sense viewed as an inevitable but deplorable concession to circumstances. They formulated a definite theory, based on colonial exploitation and native subjugation, and proceeded to enforce it, through the medium of *concessionnaire*-companies and troops of black mercenaries.

In detail, the Belgian theory meant an initial destruction of all that was vital in native life and then a reduction of the amorphous mass that remained to the status of a vast black proletariat. As the Governor-General's circular of 1906 summed up the matter:—"In annihilating the prestige and authority of the native chief, this policy ends in leaving the State face to face with a population freed of all social liens and without any attachment to the soil."³⁶ This was the Algerian policy of *refoulement* carried still further and defined with a cynical frankness (or an unconscious cynicism) unusual with colonial Powers. The basic features of native life—polygamy and domestic slavery, for instance, or anything else that gave coherence to existence,—were thus attacked. The political organization was deliberately smashed, as when a decree of 1910 broke the original tribal groupings and set up artificial chiefdoms, which did not at all correspond to the old units. Then, when the old power was effectively shattered, so was the new. The police reorganization of 1917, for instance, consciously weakened the authority of the new chiefs, the idea being to leave the natives as an unorganized mass. By this date, the Belgians had achieved their one end and had so far broken native rule that they could resort to direct administration, without the intermediary of any native officials, either old or new. The customary native organizations were therefore replaced by a delegation of administrative authority, and Belgian officials stood alone, directly opposite a native rabble.

This policy, as is at once evident, sums up the history of the French Congo as well. Indeed, to the time of the reforms of 1907, the French colony might have been simply an extended province of the Belgian, so similar were the methods it employed. But there was the difference that the Belgians secured an efficient exploitation, whereas the French, though

³⁶ In G. van den Kerken, *Les Sociétés Bantoues du Congo Belge et les Problèmes de la politique indigène* (1920), p. 121 et seq. Compare *Compte Rendu du Congrès Colonial National* (Brussels, 1921), p. 323.

resorting to the same means, could not make their work effective and simply saw their colony limping on from year to year. Both States alike, however, used the same methods. The natives were refused rights: regional-guards dragooned them into slavery: all unoccupied land was viewed as belonging to the State: and the interests of the *concessionnaire*, with whom the Government worked in a narrow collaboration, alone counted.³⁷

After about 1911, however, a change came. The drift in the French Congo and the publicity given to the scandals led the Belgians to make conditions in their colony more like those of West Africa. There, the French, while keeping in the main to direct rule, at least considered native customs and traditions, and, especially after 1910, tempered the directness of their rule by insisting on a larger degree of association. The theories of Paris softened the directness of the men on the spot, and, owing to the force of circumstances, a gradually widening amount of development on native lines was allowed. With the Belgians this realization came more slowly. As long as they drained raw rubber from the Congo rivers, questions of administration remained in the background. But when, after about 1917, the draining stage was over and production needed to be fostered artificially, the newer considerations obtained a hearing.

The earlier theory broke down. It had aimed at making a working rabble of the mass of the natives and assimilating those whose aid was necessary for the sovereign State to achieve its ends. The Belgian charter denied rights to most of the natives, but gave a minority, like soldiers and workers and mission-educated natives, all the civil rights of Belgian citizens. This was an ingenious combination of the French theories of assimilation and exploitation, and in both cases was aimed at destroying the earlier native structure. Assimilation, however, played a larger part in the Belgian Congo than in French West Africa, and, in the years after 1910, it appeared as if this tendency were gathering support. But, when the planting conditions changed and when colonization became an industrial proposition, the Belgians changed their policy to conform to the changing conditions. Colonization was industrialized and made more efficient, but efficiency could scarcely be promoted by a mass of "denationalized" natives, neither those reduced to serfdom nor those divorced from their native life by the concession of the franchise. In either case, there had to be a reversion to the saner and healthier policy of development on native lines—to the indirect rule of the English or the *association* of the French. In November, 1920, therefore, the Belgian Minister of Colonies admitted the failure of the earlier policies and

³⁷ Van den Kerken (1920), *op. cit.*, pp. 153, 229 *et seq.* Compare paper by Franck in *Études de Colonisation Comparée* (1925), p. 79.

outlined the new one. "We absolutely break with the policy of assimilation. We claim that the native society should freely develop after its own manner, its own nature, its own milieu. We must respect and *develop* native institutions, and not, as heretofore, break them." ³⁸

The Belgian conversion could not have been more pronounced. Passing through the stages of exploitation and "exploitation-cum-assimilation," they were at last on the firm foundations of development on native lines. During the same years, an exactly similar development had been taking place in West Africa, and, although the French had dispensed with the idea of assimilation at an earlier date and started dabbling with the idea of association before the Belgians did, the similarity of development between the two colonies was very striking. Each Power affected the other, especially in the final stages. Joint Colonial Conferences were called, as when Franck and Sarraut, the Belgian and French Ministers of the Colonies, met in 1924 and reached uniformity on the essentials of native policy. The two policies, therefore, have interacted on each other, especially in the first and last phases: the central phase in the Belgian Congo, though reminiscent of the French division between the privileged communes and the outsiders in the Senegal, was never so developed in French lands. But, at the other stages, the reciprocal influence was most marked. At present France is seriously cognizant of the Belgian attitude towards native policy and views the abnegation of past methods as a striking confirmation of her own *association* policy: and, in turn, the Belgian interpretation of colonization as primarily an industrial function has been perhaps one of the strongest forces since the Millerand Ministry extended its ideas of economic specialization to the colonial world. Belgium perhaps ranks higher than Germany in thus directly influencing modern French colonial policy, and certainly the influence seems growing.

In Africa, France also watched Portuguese policy. At the time of the Company-boom of the nineties in particular, the French had plans of becoming the economic sponsors of Portuguese colonialism and turned with interest to the Portuguese policy. That policy was even simpler than the contemporary Belgian or German schemes, though very similar. It was a method of colonizing by concessions. South-east Africa, for example, was largely partitioned amongst four Companies, one of which, the Mozambique Company, had unlimited sovereign rights over 150,000 square miles of territory. In Angola, the Company of Mossamédès received 23 million hectares in 1894 with absolute control

³⁸ *Congrès Colonial National*, Brussels, 1921, p. 325 *et seq.* Compare Second Congress, 1926, p. 195.

of over a million natives, and most of the capital was French.³⁹ Beyond this delegation of powers, Portuguese policy was one of oppression pure and simple. The Governor or the *cessionnaire*-company was the proprietor of everything, natives included, and there was no native policy other than subjection. The *Pacte Colonial* applied in all its vigour: slavery was maintained: the natives were kept in order by corps of Pombeiros, half-castes who were the result of the extensive racial mixture: and in general, colonial methods never got beyond the stage of the seventeenth century. The Portuguese colonies certainly seemed to support the lesson of the Belgian Congo and to buttress France in her ideas of colonial exploitation and the utilization of *cessionnaire*-companies. But French policy was never as baldly devoid of duties as was the Portuguese, which may surely be termed the negation of policy.⁴⁰

On a far different plane were the Dutch ideas, which largely influenced France's tropical policy, especially in Indo-China. The experiences of the Dutch in Java and the English in Ceylon were constant beacons to French policy, and reappear again and again as a *motif* in the determination of that policy. Until about 1875, Dutch policy was clear. It was avowedly one of exploiting these rich tropical archipelagos in the most direct fashion. Holland wanted to draw as much wealth as possible from them and for the smallest expenditure. The Dutch Government was simply "an armed instrument for extracting wealth."⁴¹ This went on unchecked until the brief but important interlude of 1811-1814, when an Englishman, Stamford Raffles, took over control for a time and shaped the lines of future policy.⁴² After three centuries of Dutch rule, he found a military road, "a bankrupt and terrorized people," and a large export trade. He tried to reverse all this and to consider the native view-point. He reformed everything,—revolutionized the legal system, revived the village or communal government of the natives, established the idea of rule by a native aristocracy advised by European officials,

³⁹ Darcy, *Conquête de l'Afrique* (1900), pp. 163-178, or Meynier (1911), *op. cit.*, pp. 210-212.

⁴⁰ The account in A.-L. de Almada Negreiros, *Colonies Portugaises. Les Organisations politiques indigènes* (1910) is clearly apologist, but the real system is hinted at, e.g. in pp. 103, 162 n., 167, 189. A much better analysis is by de Lannoy in *Bulletin de Colonisation Comparée*, 1909, pp. 97, 149 *et seq.* See esp. p. 104 for "The New Era, 1878 onwards." A decree of 23/10/26, it should be noted, gives the natives in Portuguese colonies all the rights of Europeans. Their traditions are respected, the powers of their chiefs recognized, special tribunals for native affairs set up, and a Committee of Protection instituted in each district. The need for a change was quite obvious.

⁴¹ C. Day, *The Dutch in Java* (1904), or the introduction to J. Chailley-Bert, *Java et ses Habitants* (1914 edition). A good short article is in *Bulletin de Colonisation Comparée*, 1909, p. 49.

⁴² R. Coupland, *Raffles* (1926), p. 31 *et seq.*

ended the evils of the Dutch feudal system, abolished the old compulsory delivery of crops, and encouraged the natives by means of long leases to become small planters. Naturally, all of these cataclysmic changes were anathema to the Dutch, and Raffles was forced to go in 1815. But, in the century after him, the Dutch, almost against their own will, gradually adopted every principle for which he stood.

Nevertheless, their conversion was very slow, for the exploitation-idea died hard,—or rather, the Dutch were slow in seeing that new and more conciliatory methods of exploitation could be more efficient, even from a frankly utilitarian point of view. At first, they kept Raffles' governmental system, as they soon saw that indirect rule through controlled native chiefs was the most effective under the circumstances. But they rejected his economic reforms and kept as the basis of their system the ideas of "forced cultures." This, the idea of Governor van der Bosch, was really part-time slavery. Previously, the natives had paid to the Government a certain proportion of their crops as a tax: hereafter, they were to put at the Government's disposal a certain proportion of their land and labour. This was the system which soon became recognized as the chief feature of Dutch colonial theory, and the last vestiges of it lingered on till 1917. Of course, the sole desire was to obtain more money for the Dutch Treasury; but, as time went on, the system involved more and more compulsion with a constantly diminishing return. It was a form of slave-labour, with all of the economic weaknesses of slave-labour.⁴³

It lasted intact, however, despite its growing economic faults, until about 1870, when the rise of the Liberals in Holland necessitated a change. Multatuli's *Max Havelaar*, one of the most telling novels ever written on the problems of tropical colonization, had exposed the evils of the system; and, over and above this humanitarian motive, it was becoming clear that a freer form of development could even increase the State yield under the new industrial conditions. The main part of the system, therefore, was abolished in the twelve years after 1870, but it went on for three of the principal crops after that date, and it was not until 1917 that the culture-system was abolished for coffee, the last of the crops so limited.

With the collapse of this frankly spoliatory system, Dutch colonial policy underwent a radical change, so much so that it is completely erroneous to describe the policy of the years after 1882 in terms of the system which prevailed before that date. Methods and aims alike differed, and in some respects, as regards indirect rule and the technical

⁴³ J. A. Collet, *L'Evolution de l'Esprit Indigène aux Indes Néerlandaises* (1921), p. 27.

education of the natives, for instance, Dutch rule is one of the most liberal in the colonial world. Since about 1909, as it has been said, "they have been endeavouring to atone for the past." At present they realize that native co-operation in government and native proprietorship in the economic world are fundamental desiderata.⁴⁴ That is why, for example, they allowed a *Volksraad* or embryonic Parliament in 1918,—so real a concession that it has become the model aimed at by the Indo-Chinese agitators.⁴⁵ That is why, too, they have developed credit-institutions and established model agricultural colonies so that to-day the natives produce 40 per cent. of the entire produce of the group. The educational programme of 1917, drawn up with these new ends in view, vies with that of the Philippines in being one of the most suitable for native populations. In all of these directions, and in many others (the solution of the problems of the 100,000 *Indos* or half-castes, to take a case at random), the Dutch have vindicated their claims to be progressive reformers, and it can reasonably be asserted that Java to-day is one of the most instructive native regions of the world.

In so far as French policy was concerned, there was never anything directly like the Dutch culture-system outside of Equatorial Africa. But the French knew the basic principle, and, in Indo-China and West Africa, resorted to forced labour until quite recently. Moreover, if they did not know the abject exploitation of the earlier years of Dutch policy, neither did they share the progressiveness which has transformed that policy in the last quarter of a century. Reformers in the French colonies at present advocate the Dutch system of government and economics as a kind of goal on the horizon: official circles, however, will only go as far as recognizing the desirability of many of the economic reforms and the educational system, but do not regard the Dutch system of decentralization and the *Volksraad* with any favourable eye. The French Government in Indo-China, for instance, has sent numerous economic missions to Java and has also investigated the causes of the far greater efficiency of the Dutch official system than their own. But they resolutely refuse to advance in the direction of the political enfranchisement allowed by the Dutch.

What intrigues them about the Dutch system is the nature of its officialdom. The Dutch have far fewer officials than the French, and yet manage State matters more exhaustively and efficiently. Officialdom is the dominant note in Java, as it is in Indo-China, but the order and effectiveness of Java contrast very markedly with the haphazardness of official control in Annam and Tonkin. The Dutch policy is to leave the

⁴⁴ Paper by Idenburg in *Études de Colonisation Comparée*, 1925, p. 55 *et seq.*

⁴⁵ J. A. Collet (1921), *op. cit.*, p. 92 *et seq.*

native chiefs in office and to guide them by means of Residents behind the scenes. Until a few years ago, the idea was to obtain a rigidly centralized officialdom ; but now, while officialdom is still to be triumphant and while the benevolently despotic control is to go on, it is no longer as centralized or as immediately felt. It is always in the background, ready to be produced, but the chiefs are the visible symbols of power, the intermediaries between Government and people. Contrast with this effective system the numerous vacillations in Tonkin and the utter ineffectiveness of French control in Annam, though nominally the system there closely resembles the Dutch !

The French, in a word, envy the efficiency and method of control of the Dutch executive, but cannot uproot the pall of inert bureaucracy, —the bureaucracy so pilloried by Messimy and Viollette fifteen years ago and that covers most things in Indo-China. Perceiving this, they tend to deprecate the Dutch system as concealed direct rule and to oppose the political concessions as the height of folly. As a result, they concentrate on following the Dutch example on the economic side alone,—both as regards the flourishing European plantations and the vast scale of native agriculture. Dutch colonial policy remains a mystery to the French, and, while they cannot deny the results so achieved, they tend to minimize the significance of that which they themselves can neither emulate nor understand. Colonial theorists, however, and still more, native reformers, couple Java with the Philippines in the forefront of their list of tropical achievements,—at least under conditions somewhat similar to those of France's Asiatic lands ; and it may reasonably be assumed that there will be a great increase in the growing interaction which has been noticeable between Indo-China and Java in the last twenty years, especially since the modernization of production and the introduction of new crops in Cochin-China. The Dutch have made themselves the mentors of colonial methods in South-eastern Asia, and the French are conforming, just as in Africa they are coming into line with the Belgian methods of industrial colonization. In both cases, French colonies adjoin those of other Powers which have had greater achievements, particularly on the economic side ; and in both cases they are drawing closer. This adaptability, and even the recognition by the French that they are lagging behind in some respects, is certainly more hopeful than the earlier aloofness. It is more profitable to learn from one's neighbours in such cases than to deny or criticize their achievements, and the French have been realizing this in the last two decades.

A further important influence has been exerted on general French practice by the latest entrant in the colonial field,—Italy. Here, the impulse has been entirely in the direction of reaction, but it was the

stronger because of that antagonism. The French have violently opposed the principles of Italian colonization and have, through this reaction, been more confirmed in their own methods. They describe Italian methods as "a more or less happy combination of Latin *camaraderie*, political cleverness, and a very Mediterranean skill of diplomacy." But the crux of this policy is in two features,—its adroit winning-over of the Moslem fraternities of the desert, and the concession of very liberal rights to the natives,⁴⁶ both of which work in the direction of antagonizing France's Mohammedan populations, and which, France asserts, are influenced, if not actually dominated, by that consideration. The seat of the leading fraternities is in the Libyan *hinterland*, and these bodies have always been the gravest obstacle in the way of any settlement of France's policy towards Islam. This Franco-Italian antagonism in the colonial field reached its height in 1919, when, at the height of the French difficulties in Tunisia, Italy, at a single stroke, enfranchised the whole of her Libyan subjects. She gave these Mohammedans, scarcely subdued though they were, all the rights of Italian citizens and in addition, allowed them to keep their characteristic Mohammedan privileges,—their *état civil* and the like. Yet the Algerians and Tunisians were pleading, in parts almost fighting, for even a small degree of recognition along these lines, while France would not concede the principle of naturalization to the masses, and, even for the privileged few, made the renunciation of their Mohammedan privileges a necessary prelude to any naturalization. Just at this moment, Italy allowed *all* natives to become citizens, and all to keep their religious rights!⁴⁷ It will easily be understood, therefore, why the French resolutely oppose the principles of Italian colonization, because the Italian acts have been the hardest blow France has ever had to counter in dealing with her North African populations. The schemes to represent Italian colonials, even those resident in foreign possessions, in an Imperial Roman Parliament also accentuate the French difficulties by increasing the unrest amongst the Italians in the three Mauretaniae. Under these conditions, France not unnaturally rejected the adroitness and ultra-liberalism of the Italians, and Italy, by thus directly inhibiting certain lines of advance, became a real force shaping French colonial policy.

In all, then, France has learned most from Belgium, Germany, and Holland. She has always assumed British methods, both those of the Dominions and the native countries, to be quite apart from her own, and was curiously little influenced in practice by them. The aims and methods

⁴⁶ See *La Rinascita della Tripolitania* (1926, ed. Volpi), Part 2, Chap. 2, p. 125—"Il nuovo indirizzo politico."

⁴⁷ See Chap. VII, Section V, above.

of British colonization found little support in France after the time of Leroy-Beaulieu, and indeed, until the rise of the *association* theory, French and British policies had little in common. Moreover, in the last resort, even taking into account the influence of neighbouring tropical possessions, French policy remained largely French. It had essential attributes of its own, and was always predominantly North Latin. The idea of exploitation in some form or other was always in the background. Even now, colonies are considered mainly as subordinate agencies strengthening the mother-land and existing to be exploited, even if this exploitation is no longer, as formerly, to be secured at the cost of native suffering. Over and above this basic principle, French policy remains a mixture,—a fusion in varying degrees of understanding and impulsiveness, of force and assimilation, or more often the destruction that precedes, and is the only practicable part of, assimilation. Always a tendency to direct rule, always centralization within the colony and from Paris, and always executive control,—these remain the pillars of the colonial structure.

This gets to the root of the matter. France rules her colonies as she does her departments, and these she rules in the light of that spirit which has most shaped modern France,—the spirit of Romanization. In essence, things French are Roman, and nowhere does this apply more than in the colonial field, for there, changed conditions notwithstanding, France is directly endeavouring to repeat Roman methods. The similarity is striking, so striking and obvious in fact, that one tends to pass over the characteristics in question as being distinctively neither Roman nor French, but component parts of *any* scheme of colonization. But a little reflection shows that this is not so, and that these characteristics are not obvious platitudes in the colonial scheme of things, but the result of the positive duplication of Roman methods in the modern French colonies. Louis Bertrand, in his works fighting for a recrudescence of the Roman spirit in North Africa, and dreaming again of the three Mauretanas and a neo-classical Empire, is thus no mere visionary, no dreamer of impractical things, but an exponent of what the French have actually accomplished, and what they stand for. He is more an observer than a romanticist, because the French Empire *is*, and always has been, Roman.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be stated that these attributes of French policy, varied though they may be, find expression in a remarkably uniform practice, however different may be the conditions in the colonies in question. Over all is the centralized bureaucracy, controlling every-

thing in colonial existence and denying the colonies an adequate development as separate entities. In particular, no form of political evolution is countenanced. The colonies are insufficiently developed from an economic point of view. They offer but a tithe of what they could produce, given reasonable aid in capital and public-works, and find their development hindered, and at times positively forbidden, by the absurd system of tariff-assimilation. For the natives there is a policy which differs in theory and practice. Theoretically, it is one of *association* or collaboration, allowing the maximum degree of development on native lines ; yet, in practice, the old ideas of direct-rule by a European executive crop up in most of the colonies. It is only in certain cases that native officials are utilized to the utmost degree and only recently that native codes, in Indo-China and West Africa, for instance, have been sufficiently taken into account in the legal and administrative worlds.

In detail, France has been successful with negro populations, but has tended to alienate Islam, although not to the extent of causing chronic unrest in her Mohammedan lands. At present, accepting the prosperous Indo-China as a bulwark of her Oriental interests, she dreams of a North Africa leavened by a French basis and spirit, and linked on to a black Empire to the South, with the whole forming a compact *bloc* and furnishing raw materials and men to strengthen the metropolis.

In the last resort, the French remain Imperialistic visionaries, vacillating between theory and practice. They want Romanization, and every instinct of their being works in this direction of assimilation. Yet they prate of *association* and do everything except introduce a genuine indirect rule ! They dabble with widespread economic schemes and plan projects for a systematic *mise en valeur* for the whole of their Empire, but keep away from conditions of hard fact and refuse to tackle the more immediate but less spectacular reforms. And so they continue, with new theories and still more theories, but always with the same basic executive control and the same immobility, necessitating as these do an almost complete gap between their theories and their actual policies. This cleavage it is which allows France to dream of the Empire as one of continual flux and yet to continue the single system of control. French colonial policy is in this sense large-scale national delusion : it remains for the most part immobile and, at basis, subject to the same principles which were used in dealing with Canada in the days of the *Intendants*.

Yet it is difficult to convey any impression of its many-sidedness in a few statements. It is a mixture in which many elements or influences enter in an inextricably confused fashion. It is a brew compounded of many things and greater than the sum of its component parts. First and foremost comes the basis—Tartarin and Quixote. " There is always

a little of Tartarin in the French temperament," exclaimed Daudet : in the colonial world, it becomes the basis. Add the *marsouin* Barnavaux, Pierre Mille's type of the ubiquitous colonial soldier, for the men who made it,—not forgetting the stalwart native *tirailleur* who aided them. Mix in any regulation-ridden official of the École Coloniale for the spirit,—the type is unmistakable,—Class B in the *Annuaire du Ministère*, rarely thinking as sentient individuals, and with their world and thoughts limited by those acts which will ensure the red rosette of the Legion of Honour after thirty years of painstaking service. Bava, Zimmer's Falstaffian figure, must not be forgotten for the politician and lesser functionary of Paris,—busily well-intentioned and always interfering, but unfortunately never quite in touch with the reality of the situation. Then come a number of flavouring elements, bearing the same relation to the foregoing as the juices of flowers do to the old spirit in a well-mixed *liqueur*,—the Galliéri type for the idealism, Randau's Cassard for the dilettante settler, Toqué for the atavistic side, Sarraut for the perfect schemes that never come to very much, any Luigi Antonelli or Ah Toy for the only private enterprise there, and a Guignol touch for the pathos and comedy mixed. Then mix the whole, and neutralize any element that might give distinction to the mixture by infusing again with the spirit of the cravatted gentlemen of the Rue Oudinot : stir with the pestle of French industrial interests (the second greatest force in French colonization), and place the mixture in the only surrounding where it has any meaning,—the dinner of general French existence.

The resultant *liqueur*, very piquant but not very substantial, will be typically French and will exemplify both the good and the bad features of their colonial policy. But it still leaves the partaker uncertain which element is the most typical. Perhaps, after all, it might be the spectacle of the Senegalese mothers hastening to the five privileged communes to be delivered, with a reflection that the fathers of the children are just such persons as that Sergeant Malamine who, assisted by a tricolour and a negro nonchalance, defied Stanley's entire field-force on the Congo forty years ago. Yet again, Tahiti, on the other side of the world, might be taken as summing up still more of the features of French policy. Tahiti, with its merry little Paris of Papeete and its undeveloped interior, its erstwhile Minister of the Interior whose only charges were mountain goats, and its Board of Agriculture without a single practical farmer, its harbour-scheme that is so virile as to survive fourteen years of continual reports and that still remains a scheme : Tahiti, with its crowds of officials and its complaisant natives, its Chinese immigrants who alone are energetic and who are obtaining a hold on everything in the group, its heaps of *arrêtés* and its huge scope for

development ; and over all, the plaintive note of *ari'ana*,—" by and by." *Ari'ana*,—a feverish activity to little purpose and a turning-away from the things that are vitally urgent to general plans that are impracticable,—best represents French effort. Despite the sacrifices of those who built up the Empire (and the conquest, say of the Sahara, from Flatteré to Laperrine, is nothing short of an epic), the reward has been disproportionate to the effort. The French remain elaborate town-builders but not sewage-experts : and yet they keep their populations stable, except in Moslem lands. In these last four facts, jumble though they may seem, one perhaps gets as near as possible to the real nature of French colonization,—a great work, but one more heroic than efficient, and one still full of faults and extravagances—and opportunities !

APPENDICES

LIST OF CHIEF COLONIAL OFFICIALS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

LIST OF CHIEF COLONIAL OFFICIALS

UNDER-SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Felix Faure	November 14, 1881–January 30, 1882.
Berlet	January 30, 1882–August 8, 1882.
Felix Faure	September 22, 1883–April 28, 1885.
A. Rousseau	April 28, 1885–November 10, 1885.
De La Porte	January 15, 1886–June 7, 1887.
Eug. Etienne	June 7, 1887–January 5, 1888.
Felix Faure	January 5, 1888–February 19, 1888.
De La Porte	February 19, 1888–February 23, 1889.
Eug. Etienne	February 23, 1889–March 8, 1892.
E. Jamais	March 8, 1892–January 11, 1893.
Delcassé	January 11, 1893–December 3, 1893.
M. Lebon	December 3, 1893–March 20, 1894.

MINISTERS OF THE COLONIES

(Date of appointment given : tenure of office—till next date.)

Boulanger (Casimir Périer Ministry)	March 20, 1894.
Delcassé (Dupuy Ministry)	May 30, 1894.
Chautemps (Ribot Ministry)	January 26, 1895.
Gieuyssé (Bourgeois Ministry)	November 4, 1895.
André Lebon (Méline Ministry)	April 29, 1896.
G. Hanotaux	June 1, 1898.
Trouillot	June 28, 1898.
Guillain	November 1, 1898.
Decrais (Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry)	June 22, 1899.
Doumergue (Combes Ministry)	June 7, 1902.
Clémentel (Rouvier Ministry)	January 24, 1905.
G. Leygues (Sarrien Ministry)	March 14, 1906.
Milliès-Lacroix (Clemenceau Ministry)	October 25, 1906.
Trouillot (Briand Ministry)	July 24, 1909.
Morel	November 3, 1910.
Messimy (Caillaux Ministry)	March 2, 1911.
Lebrun (Poincaré Ministry)	June 27, 1911.
Resnard	January 12, 1913—the start of the short-term Ministries.

Morel	January 21, 1913.
Lebrun	December 9, 1913.
Maunoury	June 9, 1914.
Raynaud	June 13, 1914.
Doumergue (Viviani Ministry)	August 26, 1914.
Maginot (Ribot Ministry)	March 21, 1917.
Besnard	September 13, 1917.
H. Simon (Clemenceau Ministry)	November 17, 1917.
A. Sarraut	January 20, 1920.

GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF ALGERIA

Vice-Admiral de Gueydon	March, 1871-June, 1873.
General Chanzy	June, 1873-February, 1879.
Albert Grévy	March, 1879-November, 1881.
Tirman	November, 1881-April, 1891.
Jules Cambon	April, 1891-September, 1897.
Lépine	September, 1897-August, 1898.
Laferrière	August, 1898-October, 1900.
Jonnart	October, 1900-June, 1901.
Révoil	June, 1901-April, 1903.
Jonnart	May, 1903-March, 1911.
Lutaud	March, 1911-January, 1918.
Jonnart	January, 1918-July, 1919.
Abel	July, 1919.

RESIDENTS-GENERAL OF TUNISIA

M. Roustan	for original negotiations.
Paul Cambon	March, 1882.
Massicault	November, 1886.
C. Rouvier	November, 1892.
R. Millet	November, 1894.
S. Pichon	March, 1901.
Alapetite	December, 1906.
Flandin	October, 1918.
Saint.	

GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF WEST AFRICA

Chaudié	1895-1900.
Balley	1900-1902.
Roume	1902-1908.
Ponty	1908-1915.
Clozel	1915-1917.
Van Vollenhoven	1917-1918.
Angoulvant	1918-1919.
Merlin	1919-1923.
Carde	1923-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

An attempt has been made to deal with works on each section or topic, mainly in chronological order, but trying in each case to indicate the comparative worth of each book. Note, however, that it is impossible to estimate the relative worth of a source from the space allotted to it in this bibliography. The *Journal Officiel*, for instance, with the numerous reports annexed to it, is more important than all the rest together, and so with a primary collection of documents and events like *L'Afrique Française*.

Debates are not usually given, as they come under the generic heading, *Journal Officiel*: the most important series, however, are mentioned. Articles in periodicals are not defined, unless they also are of more than usual worth.

In the bibliography as a whole, three astonishing features emerge,—the advantage of having one all-embracing source of debates and reports like the *Journal Officiel*: the elaborately documented reports of Colonial Congresses on a scale unknown in England: and the number of doctoral theses on documentary lines, which make accessible masses of documents that could not otherwise be obtained without an undue expenditure of effort.

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O. Taillart, "Essai de Bibliographie Méthodique et Raisonnée de l'Algérie jusqu'à l'année 1924" (1925).

TUNISIA.

P. Caron, from 1866 to 1897 (1912), with continuations to 1913.

MOROCCO.

Playfair, "Bibliography of Morocco" (1892), in Supplementary Papers of Royal Geographical Society, London, Vol. II, 1887-1889.

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For North Africa as a whole, see Bernard in "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger," periodically since 1898.

WEST AFRICA.

E. Joucla, "Bibliographie de l'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1912). A lesser attempt was by Lebel, 1925.

EQUATORIAL AFRICA.

G. Bruel, "Bibliographie de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française" (1914).

MADAGASCAR.

G. Grandidier, "Bibliographie de Madagascar" (1905).

SYRIA.

P. Masson, "Eléments d'une Bibliographie française de la Syrie" (2 vols.).

General bibliographies are in Lorentz, annual; "Annales de Géographie," annual since 1892; and in "Colonies et Pays du Protectorat," 7 vols., 1900.

PART I. PERIODICALS AND OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

GENERAL.

Journal Officiel.

This is the basic source for any question concerning French colonization. It is a source far more comprehensive than is to be found in the official records of any other country, because it gives debates, parliamentary documents, and outside reports all within the same covers. The whole of the official side is to be found here, and much that is unofficial. Each day, the *Journal Officiel* has five distinct parts:—

- (a) The official section, consisting of Acts, Ministerial communications, a résumé of Parliamentary activities, the proceedings of learned bodies, transactions on the Bourse, etc.
- (b) Senate debates in full.
- (c) Annexes to the proceedings of the Senate,—projets de loi, reports of Commissions, etc.
- (d) Debates of the Chamber of Deputies in full.
- (e) Annexes to the proceedings of the Deputies,—projets de loi, reports of Commissions, documents of all kinds.

(References in the text are usually to the last four sections, distinguished by the explanation, "Senate" and "Deps.," for sections *b* and *d*, and the addition, "Docts. parl." (Documents Parlementaires) for sections *c* and *e*.)

The chief materials contained within the *Journal Officiel* may be summarized as follows:—

1. Debates of both Houses, both in summary-form and in full.
2. Budget-reports. These are made separately, and in quite distinct forms, to each House, and constitute an annual summary of the events in each colony, as well as a statement of reforms on every subject. There are separate reports for Algeria, for Tunisia and Morocco (under the Minister of Foreign Affairs), and for the remainder of the colonies, which alone come under the Minister of the Colonies. Usually, they are published separately, because they are most voluminous. Since 1870, certain budget-reports stand out as being of fundamental importance, especially,
 - Hérissé, 1906,—for the Congo.
 - Messimy, 1909 and 1910,—the start of the reforms.
 - Violette, 1911,—the reform-budget *par excellence*.
 - Archimbaud, 1922 (doct. 3142).
 - " 1923.
 - " 1926 (No. 3401).

The above were all to the Deputies and on the colonies in general. Among the Senate reports, those of Ciceron in 1910 and Hubert in 1923 were outstanding. For the separate "service of Algeria," the reports were of a higher uniform standard, those of Burdeau (1892), Jonnart (1893), and especially Cochery (1909) being fundamental documents. The two volumes of the Cochery Report in particular mark a standard not since attained. In all, the budget-reports to each House constitute the most important source on French colonial history.

3. Reports and Documents of Parliamentary Commissions. The reports are usually summarized elsewhere; the evidence is, as a rule, accessible only here.
4. Annual Reports on each colony, and frequent "Rapports d'Ensemble." The importance of these are obvious: they represent the situation from the Governor's point of view, just as the budget-reports do from the Minister's.
5. Annual Trade Reports, both for France and for the colonies.

In dealing with the *Journal Officiel*, attention should always be paid to the distinctions between the sections for the Senate and the Deputies, between the debates and the documentary sections, between the ordinary and extraordinary sessions (noted as sess. ord. and sess. ext. respectively), and between the separate reports on most subjects to each House. A reference to *Journal Officiel*, unqualified by any of the above notes, is to the general section (Part a, above), but, usually, it is to one of the four latter sections. In any case, the separation of the Journal into daily parts allows references to any particular topic to be quickly located.

Less important publications relating to Parliamentary proceedings are:—

1. "Annales du Sénat et de la Chambre des Députés."
2. "Impressions," that is,—projets de loi (the preliminary explanations are usually in the nature of reports), reports of special Commissions. (Both of the above are also in the *Journal Officiel*.)
3. "Bulletin des Lois,"—for texts of laws.
4. "Tables analytiques du Compte Rendu des Séances,"—a good yearly guide.

Three sets of periodicals afford admirable supplements to the *Journal Officiel*, alike by reproducing important documents, giving historical accounts of important questions, and examining legislative projects from a legal point of view. These are:—

1. Dareste, Appert, and Legendre, "Recueil de Législation, de doctrine, et de jurisprudence coloniales,"—monthly since 1898. This is the best current account of colonial affairs from the legal standpoint. It is a symposium of experts on current events. Cited as "Dareste," or "Recueil Colonial."
2. Penant, "Recueil de législation, de doctrine, et de jurisprudence coloniales,"—a similar collection, since 1891.
3. "Revue algérienne, tunisienne, et marocaine de législation et de jurisprudence," 1885 onwards. A somewhat similar source for North Africa.

All three of the above are general basic sources, of first-rate importance.

OTHER OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.

- "L'Annuaire Coloniale," 1877 onwards, for each colony.
- "Annuaire du Ministère des Colonies,"—not including North Africa.
- "Budget des Dépenses du Ministère des Colonies,"—published separately every year.
- "Bulletin Officiel de l'Administration des Colonies,"—1 vol. a year since 1887.
- "Bulletin de l'Office Coloniale," since January, 1917.

"Bulletin de l'Agence Générale des Colonies,"—irregular, but usually monthly, since 1921.

"Productions Coloniales" (Colonial Office).

FOR STATISTICS.

Agence Générale des Colonies. "Recensement de la Population des Colonies Françaises," e.g. 1921 (the data from which are used in this book).

Ministère des Colonies. "Statistiques Coloniales." These are in three distinct sections,—2 volumes a year on commerce since 1896, another on navigation, another on finance. They are frequently issued at intervals, as, e.g., decennially (e.g. in 1899).

The Colonial Office issues periodical reports on the colonies, e.g. "Rapports sur la situation économique des colonies françaises."

The basic collection of statistics for the last thirty years in detail is a publication of the Colonial Institute of Marseilles, "Le Commerce et la Production des Colonies Françaises" (1926). This, and Pelet's Atlas, can never be far from the elbow of any student of French colonization, as they are the basic raw-material.

PERIODICALS.

France has been singularly well-situated in this regard, her colonial literature being marked by the variety and excellence of periodicals with authoritative articles and documents. The most important are:—

1. "L'Afrique Française," 1891 on,—a monthly organ of the Comité de l'Afrique Française, and a standard collection of sources for all of the African colonies. Vies with the *Journal Officiel* in being the most important source.
2. "Renseignements Coloniaux,"—documentary appendices of (1). Reports of all kinds, but especially the reproduction of important debates, reports of missions of inquiry and of travellers, and the speeches of local Governors, not readily accessible elsewhere.
3. "L'Asie Française," monthly since 1901. The Asiatic analogue of "L'Afrique Française," and the organ of the Comité de l'Asie Française. It also publishes documentary Supplements. Of recent years, one of its most important functions has been in reprinting the debates and reports on Syria.
4. "L'Océanie Française," monthly since 1911. The organ of the Comité de l'Océanie Française, and the basic source for the history of Tahiti and New Caledonia since its origin.
5. "Revue de Madagascar," since 1898. The organ of the Comité de Madagascar.
6. "La Quinzaine Coloniale," a fortnightly from 1897 to 1914. This review, the organ of the powerful "L'Union Coloniale Française," was built up by J. Chailley-Bert, one of the leading French colonial theorists, and was the most useful of the periodicals for the actual events. It dealt with all of the colonies and was, in general, a kind of clearing-house for colonial information.
7. "Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales," fortnightly from 1897.

Especially useful for bibliographies and statistics: it usually gave a summary of current periodical literature.

8. "Colonies et Marine," a fortnightly from 1917 to August, 1922. Especially useful for the articles of ex-Governor Angoulvant.
9. "Revue des Questions Coloniales et Maritimes,"—bi-monthly from 1875. Useful articles of a high quality, especially by Casmille Fidel.
10. "L'Année Coloniale," Vols. I-IV, 1899-1903, for good articles and extensive bibliographies.
11. "Revue Coloniale" (Minister of Colonies),—1 vol. a year from 1895 to 1911. An official running-survey.
12. "L'Expansion Française Coloniale,"—monthly from 1899. To do the work regarding exploration, first performed by "L'Afrique Française."
13. "Revue des Colonies," 1913-1918,—short-lived but useful.
14. "Annales Coloniales," from 1914.
15. "Revue Africaine," from 1856.

Far more important than the last few are the relevant articles in—

1. "L'Economiste Français," 1873 onwards, especially under Leroy-Beaulieu.
2. "Revue Politique et Littéraire," especially 1881.
3. "Revue Politique et Parlementaire,"—continual articles since 1900, especially on Algerian affairs.
4. "Revue du Droit International Public," since 1894.
5. "Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique,"—a section on "Chroniques Coloniales" in each.
6. "L'Action Coloniale," monthly since 1904.
7. "La Revue Indigène," especially after 1906, for an exposé of the natives' wrongs.

The leading geographical journals frequently have important articles, especially as regards exploration and commercial development, e.g. "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie Commerciale de Paris" (1876 on)—colonial articles of a high order: "Revue de Géographie" (1874 on); "La Géographie" (1888 on); and "Les Annales de Géographie" (1894 on). Their bibliographies are an important feature.

Of the newspapers, "La Dépêche Coloniale" (daily, but with a monthly illustrated edition since 1896) is solely colonial, but mainly economic. The monthly, "Le Monde Colonial Illustré" is useful but popular in its nature. Of the wider dailies, "Le Temps" gives the best account of colonial matters, usually in a mildly pro-colonial form. "L'Humanité" may be depended upon for an exposé of abuses, as at such times as the Congo Scandals of 1904-5. The other newspapers usually ignore the colonies.

Periodicals, other than journals, include:—

- "Annuaire Coloniale,"—general position and legislation each year.
- "Annuaire-Général de la France et d'Etranger,"—yearly since 1920. Exhaustive colonial sections each year. Useful for current statistics and a bibliography on each colony. Should be compared with the "Statesman's Year Book," e.g. 1925 edition, pp. 898-945.
- "Société d'Etudes et d'Information Economiques,"—"Chroniques Coloniales,"—three-monthly.

"French Year Book," 1919, pp. 851-1009 on the colonies.

"Académie des Sciences Coloniales" (Paris). "Compte Rendu des Séances" (1922 onwards).

A running encyclopædia is in the Monthly Larousse, since 1907.

CONGRESSES.

Such meetings have played a peculiarly important part, not only in collecting information and ventilating grievances, but in shaping policy and opinion. They are more often the work of experts and politicians than in England, and consequently, their elaborate reports are one of the basic sources for French colonization. The more important were:—

1. Congrès Colonial International, 1889 (3rd general session),—important for the debates on native policy and the adoption of assimilation.
2. Congrès Colonial National, 1889-1890. "Recueil des Délibérations,"—3 vols. This was the Congress that made French policy in all fields one of assimilation. The Reports in Volume II are particularly important.
3. Congrès Colonial International, 1900,—shows how colonial methods had come to be varied. Adopts a querying attitude.
4. Congrès International de Sociologie Coloniale. "Rapports et Procès-Verbaux,"—2 vols., especially for native policy. Analyses the questions of labour-supply and convictism in full.
5. Congrès Colonial National de 1904,—especially the separately published economic reports. A similar body met in 1903 and 1905.
6. Congrès Colonial de Marseille, 1906. *Compte Rendu and Rapports*, in 2 vols. The most important of all the Conferences after 1889, as it was the turning-point in colonial theory. It definitely saw the fall of assimilation in colonial theory. It coincided with the Exposition Coloniale de Marseille, and may be considered as one whole, together with the publications of the Exposition, viz.:—
 P. Masson, "Les Colonies Françaises au Début du XX^e Siècle. Cinq Ans de Progrès,"—3 vols. Also volumes by G. Darboux (fishing), Treille (health), and Barré (exploration). More important volumes were P. Gaffarel's "Histoire d'Expansion Coloniale de la France depuis 1870 jusqu'en 1905," and P. Masson's "Marseille et la Colonisation Française."
7. Congrès Colonial de Bordeaux, 1907,—to show reaction still further against the old policy.
8. Congrès des Anciennes Colonies, 1909,—1 vol. Useful for the revolt against assimilation in all its branches and the statements of general colonial principle.
9. "Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord. *Compte Rendu des Travaux*,"—2 vols., 1909. A fundamental source, full of authoritative papers. A milestone in African sources.
10. "Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale," 1912. A large volume, mainly on Madagascar.
11. "Congrès Colonial de Lyon," March, 1918. Only an incomplete *Compte Rendu* was published, but it is useful as showing the

beginning of the *mise en valeur* movement. See especially Maurice Long's contribution.

12. "Congrès d'Agriculture Coloniale Française," 1918. *Compte Rendu* in 4 vols. A useful economic survey of the colonial problem in its post-war form.
13. Marseille. Exposition Coloniale Nationale. "*Compte Rendu et Rapports*," 1923,—2 vols., mainly geographical.
14. Congrès du Régime Douanier Colonial, Marseille, 1925. *Compte Rendu*,—a most valuable report, especially for the tariff position since 1892, and the effects of assimilation on each colony.

In this conference series, a fundamental source is the publications of the Institut Colonial International (Brussels),—one volume of report on each conference since 1895 (22 to 1926), and the series of documents and reports in the "*Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale*," published by the Institute. These are the basis for any comparative study and the easiest place to find the documents on French colonization relating to the following topics:—

1. Labour in the colonies,—3 vols.
2. Colonial Officials,—3 vols., esp. Vol. II, 1910.
3. Land Systems,—6 vols.
4. Protectorates,—2 vols. Both of these are full of documents relating to French colonization. They are a basic source for Africa, Madagascar, and Indo-China, and indeed, may be termed one of the best source-books for the French colonial empire.
5. Railways,—3 vols.
6. Mining Régime,—3 vols.
7. Irrigation,—4 vols.
8. Forest Régime,—3 vols., and volumes on less important topics.

The Institute also published a short-lived "*Recueil International de Législation Coloniale*" (3 vols., 1911–1914), in which French legislation appeared.

FRENCH LIVRES JAUNES (DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES).

The most important series of these State documents on colonial matters are:—

TUNISIA.

"Affaires de Tunisie, 1870–1881," and supplement for the crucial period of 1881.

TONKIN.

"Affaires de Chine et du Tonkin," 1885–1886.

MADAGASCAR.

"Affaires du Madagascar,"—4 vols., 1881–1895.

CENTRAL AFRICA.

"Affaires du Haut Nil et du Bahr-el-Ghazal, 1897–1898." (Fashoda crisis.)

MOROCCO.

"Affaires du Maroc,"—6 vols., 1901–1912, 2,484 pages in all.

These are, of course, fundamental sources, as all are concerned with crucial periods in the history of the colonies concerned. They usually give the earlier documents relating to the questions involved at the moment,

and represent the utmost degree of information which the Foreign Office is prepared to release on any given question. For practically all of the colonies except West Africa, the *Livres Jaunes* are fundamental.

Compare with them the English Blue Books (e.g. on Tahiti, Siam, Fashoda, Madagascar, Morocco), and especially the documents of the German Foreign Office, "*Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*," which supplanted the earlier-published White Books and threw much light on practically all of the international aspects of French colonization. In particular, the volumes on Morocco (Vols. XXI, XXII, and XXIX) are fundamental, because they tell quite a different story from the French *Livres Jaunes*, and even from the German White Books published at the time.

For this international aspect of French colonization, see also—

de Clercq, "*Recueil des Traités de la France*."

de Reinach, "*Recueil des Traités conclus par la France en Extrême Orient, 1684-1902*" (1902).

R. de Card, "*Les Traités de Protectorat conclus par la France en Afrique, 1870-1895*."

"*Le Régime des Protectorats*" (*Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale*),—Vols. I-II, 1899,—all full of documents. A companion to de Clercq is Hertslet, "*The Map of Africa by Treaty*,"—3 vols., 1896. These documents best reveal the territorial expansion of the Third Republic.

Commentaries on them are in—

Debidour, "*Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe*," for the period 1878-1916,—2 vols., 1919.

Despagnet, "*Essai sur les Protectorats*" (1896).

J. Chailley-Bert, "*Le Régime des Protectorats*" (1899).

J. Darcy, "*Cent Ans de Rivalité Coloniale*" (1904),—an especially trustworthy survey.

PART II. GENERAL LITERATURE (UNOFFICIAL)

I. BEFORE 1815.

CONTEMPORARY,—for the theory of colonization.

E. Petit, "*Droit Public ou Gouvernement des Colonies Françaises*,"

—2 vols., 1771,—reprinted in 1911 with introduction by A. Girault,

—the basis. An admirable exposition of the Pacte Colonial.

Articles "*Colonie*" (Veron de Forbonnais) and "*Compagnie*" in "*La Grande Encyclopédie*."

Comments in Montesquieu's "*Esprit des Lois*."

Dupont de Nemours, "*Du Commerce et du Gouvernement*."

Quesnay, "*Rémarques sur l'Opinion de l'Auteur de 'L'Esprit des Lois' concernant les Colonies*."

LATER WORKS.

De Chazelles, "*Etude sur le Système Colonial*" (1860),—the first systematic attempt to examine the colonial policy of the earlier century.

L. Pauliat, "*La Politique Coloniale de l'Ancien Régime*" (1887),—a somewhat overrated work, but doubtless of some importance at the time.

Documents in Isaac's Report, in *Journal Officiel*, Senate, docts. parl., sess. ord., 1888, p. 43,—a most useful series and a report by a recognized authority.

L. Deschamps, "Histoire de la Question Coloniale en France" (1891),—a good section on the nineteenth century in addition.

— "Les Colonies Pendant la Révolution" (1898),—both graphic accounts from original sources. The priority of these accounts remains undisputed.

J. Chailley-Bert, "Les Compagnies de Colonisation sous l'Ancien Régime" (1899). Compare a similar study by Cordier (1906).*

G. Roloff, "Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleon I" (1899).

Garneau, "Histoire du Canada" (5th edition, 1913).

C. Schefer, "La France Moderne et le Problème Colonial" (1907),—a misleading title, since the book is on the Ancien Régime. Compare work of 1928 on the Second Empire.

P. Gaffarel, "La Politique Coloniale de la France de 1789 à 1830" (1907),—a very readable account.

A good summary from a legal point of view is in P. Dislère, "Législation Coloniale" (3rd edition, 1906), Vol. I, Chap. 1.

The "Revue de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises" (since 1913) is mostly limited to the First Colonial Empire of France.

II. AFTER 1815.

The outstanding works are—

J. L. de Lanessan, "Principes de Colonisation" (1895),—by a leading reformer in Indo-China.

J. Duval, "Les Colonies et la Politique Coloniale de la France" (1884) and "Algérie et les Colonies Françaises" (1877),—two capital books. Duval was a rival of Leroy-Beaulieu in first popularizing the cause of colonization in France and in giving the French colonies a theory.

P. Leroy-Beaulieu, "De la Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes" (6th edition, 1908,—2 vols.). This was the first colonial classic in France and the basis of all later works. Leroy-Beaulieu remains the greatest vulgarizer of French colonization and influences students on the topic in every way. These volumes, and his fights in "L'Economiste Français," leave unforgettable impressions. They are fundamental, though, unfortunately, the volumes have not been kept up to date since 1908.

A. Girault, "Principes de Colonisation et de Législation Coloniale." The fourth edition is quoted throughout in the text (as Girault):—Part I. General Theory and the Period before 1815 (1921). Part II. Colonization since 1815,—in 2 vols., 1922–1923 (all of the Empire except North Africa and Syria). Part III. North Africa (1922). A fifth edition of this part was issued in 1927.

This is the present standard work on French colonization. It is a useful summary of events and especially of the present legal position. Girault is more a legal analyst than anything else, and these volumes are a summary of colonial legislation. The bib-

liographies in particular are useful. In all, Girault is a little overpowering. Compression to half the size and the introduction of a little comment,—in short, a personal note, would transform the book. As it stands, however, it is far and away the most important work on French colonization, though less a history or an analysis than a painstaking collection. It is thus primarily a source-book.

M. Dubois et A. Terrier, "Un Siècle d'Expansion Coloniale" (1902),—prepared for the Exposition of 1900. This is the most compact history of French colonization and the standard book of colonial documents. The documents are given in full, and the less important ones summarized, at the end of each chapter. It remains a fundamental source-book for the period before 1900.

Less important general accounts, chiefly for the presentation of facts and events, are:—

"Notices Coloniales" (1885)—for the Antwerp Exhibition. Compare similar collections of 1858 and 1866,—very useful for the earlier period.

J. L. de Lanessan, "L'Expansion Coloniale de la France" (1886),—an encyclopædic account of each colony, with myriads of facts in its 1,016 pages and many documents difficult of access elsewhere.

L. Henrique, "Les Colonies de la France" (6 vols., 1891),—prepared under the direction of the Under-Secretary for the Colonies. An uninspired encyclopædia.

L. Vignon, "L'Expansion de la France" (1891),—a good account by an authority with very decided opinions.

P. Gaffarel, "Les Colonies Françaises" (6th edition, 1899),—a reliable statement of plain facts. But never becomes more than a reliable summary.

Important series for the Exhibition of 1900 (prepared under the direction of the Ministry):—

C. Roux, "Introduction Général,"—a statement of general position and theory.

Dubois et Terrier, *op. cit.*

Arnaud et Meray, "Organisation administrative, judiciaire, politique, et financière,"—a good summary.

Camille Guy, "La Mise en Valeur de notre domaine colonial,"—the first scheme for a concerted economic improvement of the French Empire.

I. de la Tour, "Régime de la Propriété."

Dorvault, "Régime de la main-d'œuvre,"—a pressing problem at the time.

Lecomte, "L'Agriculture aux Colonies."

Separate notices were also published for each colony, both for this Exposition and that of 1906.

H. Lorin, "La France Puissance Coloniale" (1906),—an excellent historical and analytical account of each colony and of general policy. A very good survey by an authority, especially on North African matters.

M. Fallex et A. Moirey, "La France et ses Colonies au Début du XXe Siècle" (1906).

Fallot, "L'Avenir Coloniale de la France" (1902),—shows how the problem was beginning to attract attention.

H. Jumelle, "Les Ressources agricoles et forestières des Colonies Françaises" (1907).

C. Humbert, "L'Œuvre Française aux Colonies" (1913),—the position before the war.

The position at each of these pre-war periods is best summarized in—

G. Despagnet, "La Diplomatie de la Troisième République et le Droit des Gens" (1904),—all of Books II, III, and IV. A good summary of colonial negotiations and policy, especially in the protectorate-stage of the eighties and nineties.

A. Rambaud, "La France Coloniale" (7th edition, 1895),—the most popular of the early accounts.

"Les Colonies Françaises" (2 vols. and supplements, edited by M. Petit, in Librairie Larousse, 1901),—bibliography. Useful accounts in encyclopædic form.

Of the general accounts since the war of 1914–1918, A. Sarraut, "La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises" (1923), is undoubtedly the most important. It is a detailed analysis of the position of each colony (except North Africa) and a plan for an economic *mise en valeur* and a newer native policy for the whole. It is the documentary background of that Sarraut Plan which was adopted by Parliament and which, since that date, has attracted most attention in French colonial matters. It has excellent maps and useful statistics,—such statistics as only a Minister of the Colonies could easily obtain. Compare his article in L. Franck, "Etudes de Colonisation Comparée" (1925), or in "Colonies et Marine," August, 1921.

Lesser works since the war are—

E. G. Lop, "Les Ressources du Domaine Colonial de la France" (1922).

R. Doucet, "Notre Domaine Colonial" (1921).

A. Meggle, "Le Domaine Colonial de la France" (1922),—a good short summary of the position of each colony.

H. Busson, etc., "Notre Empire Colonial" and "La France aujourd'hui et ses Colonies" (1921).

C. Regismanset, etc., "Ce que tout Français devrait savoir sur nos colonies" (188 pp., 1924).

Useful general accounts are in—

P. Gaffarel, "Notre Expansion Coloniale en Afrique de 1870 à nos Jours" (1918) and "Les Explorations Françaises depuis 1870,"—chiefly for military and exploring events.

Lavisse, "Histoire de la France Contemporaine" (1921) gives a dependable summary of colonial events in Vols. VII, VIII and IX. All of Vol. VIII is by Seignobos, pp. 326–400 being colonial.

Studies by foreign critics are in—

Zimmermann, "Die Europäischen Kolonien,"—the volume on France, 1901, is a good comparative study.

L. Brentano, "Die Französische Kolonialpolitik" (in "Wolkwirtschaftliche Zeitfragen," No. 805).

R. Ermels, "Frankreichs Kolonial Handelspolitik. Geschichte, Wirkung, und Kritik derselben" (1910).

Asmis in "Preussische Jahrbucher," December, 1921,—the best of the criticisms.

So far as English historians are concerned, the French colonies or French colonial theory do not seem to exist. There is practically no comparative study of English and French methods.

Useful aids to the student are the excellent series of atlases, issued at various times in France, and especially—

1. *Nouvel Atlas des Colonies Françaises*, 1891,—published by the Colonial Under-Secretariat.
2. P. Pelet, "*Atlas des Colonies Françaises*" (1902),—a series of 27 maps described at the time of its appearance by the leading American geographical journal as "the finest colonial atlas of any country."
3. V. Beauregard, "*L'Empire Colonial de la France*" (1924),—20 maps by Barralier,—a compact colonial atlas, admirably showing the expansion of the French.

These should be used with H. Mariol, "*La Chronologie Coloniale*" (1922), which gives the actual events of the expansion.

FOR COLONIAL THEORY (as apart from a history of the events, as in the preceding entries), see—

J. B. Say, "*Traité d'Economie Politique*" (1828), Chaps. 6 and 22 of "*Economie Publique*,"—the first of the pro-colonial economists.

C. Gide—articles in "*Revue de Géographie*," 1886, 1890,—at the time of the colonial awakening.

Collected Speeches of Jules Ferry (edited Robiquet), esp. Vols. V-VI, and

"Discours et Plaidoyers de M. Gambetta," Vol. X, 1884.

Yves Guyot, "*Lettres sur la Politique Coloniale*" (1885).

M. Dubois, "*Systèmes Coloniaux et Peuples Colonisateurs*" (1895),—the first to react from the English dominance in colonial theory.

Aubry, "*La colonisation et les colonies*" (1909).

P. de Thozée, "*Théorie de la Colonisation au XIX^{me} Siècle et rôle de l'Etat dans le développement des colonies*" (1902),—a discussion aroused by the company-régime of the nineties. Compare "*Les Compagnies de Colonisation*" (1893), by Etienne.

Jules Harmand, "*Domination et Colonisation*" (1910),—the most important work of abstract colonial theory in France by an ex-plenipotentiary in the Far East. A fundamental work as regards the shaping of opinion. Is still the most important theoretical work on French colonization,—especially for the political, economic, and educational aspects. Shows the position of advanced political theory as applied to the French Colonial Empire at the dawn of the war.

"*Bulletin de Colonisation Comparée*," 1904-1914, especially for events in the African colonies, and the way in which the policies of other colonial Powers influenced France.

P. B. Piolet, "*La France hors la France, notre emigration, sa nécessité*,"

- ses conditions,"—a work crowned by the French Academy. An exhaustive analysis of the emigration-problem as applied to the French colonies. See Piolet's article in "La Réforme Sociale," May-July, 1899, and Poiré in "L'Emigration Française aux Colonies" (1897), or the publications of the Comité Duplex, especially "Doit-on aller aux colonies?"
- L. Vignon, "Un Programme Politique Coloniale. Les Questions Indigènes" (1919),—very drastic but sane criticisms by an eminent veteran authority. The best of the post-war books on the theoretical side, and most important as showing the trends of French opinion. The analysis of the results of French contact on native races is very good.
- L. Hubert, "Une Politique Coloniale" (1918),—analysis by an ex-Governor-General. Shows the drift of policy and the need of change because of the events of the war-years.
- C. Regismanset, "Questions Coloniales, 1900-1912" (1912),—1 vol., and "Questions Coloniales, 1912-1923" (1923),—2 vols.,—suggestive collection by an official at the Ministry of Colonies. Very useful as a running comment and as showing the general tendencies of policy. With this should be compared
- J. Chailley-Bert, "Dix Années de Politique Coloniale" (1902), and editorials in "La Quinzaine Coloniale." Chailley-Bert carried on the tradition of Paul Bert and reflected the point of view of a detached theorist, always in opposition. Useful as a counterpoise to the official view.
- E. Richet, "Le Problème Colonial" (1919),—a theoretical survey in general terms. Good chapters on the officials and the Ministry.
- Symposium on "La Politique Coloniale de la France" (250 pp., 1924), by H. Brenier, A. Lacroix, etc. The record of a Conference at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques. Useful for gathering up the various strands.

To these theoretical works should be added the leading debates on colonial questions in the French Parliament. A perusal of the voluminous debates on the following occasions best shows the tremendous changes in the French colonial outlook, and also the way in which the same basic premises run through the whole. The leading debates were:—

1. The Ferry debates, 1885-1886.
2. The debates on the Congo Companies, 1893.
3. Debates on the reorganization of the Congo, February, 1906.
4. Debates on the Messimy and Viollette reports. Budget-speeches, 1909-1911.
5. Debates on the native question, as aroused by affairs in Tunisia, 1912 (February), and Algeria, December, 1913-February, 1914.
6. The Flandin interpellation in the Senate on colonial production, March, 1918.
7. The Senate discussions on colonial methods, July 9, 1918, February 27-29, 1920.
8. The Sarraut debates on *mise en valeur*, April, 1921.
9. The debates in the Deputies on colonial methods, January 24-31, 1921 (*re* the Algerian crisis), and March 21, 1922.

These are the nine most important debates on colonial affairs, and are full of matter for the historian.

With this should be compared the view-points of the leading statesmen who influenced colonial destinies, e.g. :—

Ferry's collected speeches, *op. cit.*, and A. Rambaud, "Jules Ferry" (1903),—a history in the form of a biography.

Gambetta's collected speeches, *op. cit.*, and P. Deschanel "Gambetta" (1920).

G. Geffroy, "Clemenceau" (1918), or Clemenceau in the Deputies, October 31, 1883.

Etienne in Deputies, May 11, 1890, December 2, 1891, or in "Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales," January 15, 1901,—for the views of the man who built up the organization of the Empire.

Waldeck-Rousseau's famous speech on native policy, June 15, 1901. Compare Clémentel, February, 1906.

LEGAL COMMENTARIES.

The legal point of view is singularly well-expressed in French colonization. There is more of this kind of comment than of any other,—indeed, so much so is this that it militates against the development of wider critical studies, because the progress of legal commentary has meant that French colonial works have become summaries of texts rather than discussions of events and principles.

To the Dareste, Penant, and "Revue Algérienne," already cited, add—
"Recueil des Lois, Décrets, et Arrêtés concernant les Colonies" (Ministry of the Marine, 1877),—to show the position at the dawn of the new Empire.

E. Petit, "Organisation des Colonies Françaises,"—2 vols., 1894–1895, for documents. A most important collection.

P. Dislère, "Traité de Législation Coloniale" (3rd edition, 1906,—this is the edition cited in the text, because it was the fullest. A 4th edition was issued in 1914, but it condensed the three volumes to two, and omitted the documents). Vol. I gives a general account, Vol. II the documents. This is the standard account, and certainly the most exhaustive,—a monument to the detailed studies of French jurists in colonial matters.

J. C. F. Rougier, "Précis de Législation et d'Economie Coloniales" (1895), (1912),—a summary of the above larger works.

A. Mérignhac, "Précis de Législation et d'Economie Coloniales" (1922),—the most useful analysis. Enlarged and re-issued in 1925.

G. Francois et A. F. Rouget, "Manuel de Législation Coloniale" (1909),—really a history.

More compact accounts are in—

E. Antonelli, "Manuel de Législation Coloniale" (1926),—a useful summary, with a convenient table of legislation at present in force.

R. Foinet, "Manuel Elémentaire de Législation Coloniale" (1925),—gives more detail, and has very useful summary-charts.

All of the above are indispensable commentaries, and are really primary sources, especially the index to Dareste (in the issue for 1912). Their worth as sources is the greater, because of the restraint with which their contributions

are offered. They provide solid matter, and there is practically no preliminary digging-away of extraneous coverings.

PART III. SPECIAL TOPICS CONCERNING THE WHOLE EMPIRE

The works above-cited cover the whole field for all of the colonies. In addition to them, are sources for special topics,—still considering questions generally but not covering the whole colonial field. As divided into Political, Economic, and Native Affairs, these include—

POLITICAL AFFAIRS. (See especially under *Legal*, above.)

A. FOR THE MINISTRY AND CENTRAL QUESTIONS.

P. Bluysen, "Le Rôle et les Pouvoirs du Ministère des Colonies," in "Colonies et Marine," October, 1920,—an important analysis.

Compare "Constitutions Africaines" in March–April, 1920.

C. Regismanset, "La Ministère des Colonies" (1902).

— "Les Conseils Coloniaux métropolitains" (1909).

G. Boussenot, "Pour la Représentation coloniale au Parlement" (1909).

Girault in "Revue Politique et Parlementaire," January, 1918, "Dépêche Coloniale," November 21, 1911, or Appendix to Part III.

For an examination of organic relationships, see the Hérissé Budget-Report (1905) and the Messimy Reports in *Journal Officiel*, April 5, 1911, May 28, 1911.

Important articles on various phases are in "Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales," September 1, 1910–November 1, 1910; "Revue Politique et Parlementaire," September, 1904, December, 1917, 1918.

B. FOR RELATIONS WITH THE COLONIES.

J. Cambon, "Le Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie" (1918),—collection of papers relating to the period 1891–1917, and showing the struggle for the abolition of the system of *rattachements*. The turning-point of French colonial theory on the political side. An important, though somewhat haphazard, collection. A history of this period in Algeria, fully documented, but explanatory, is greatly needed.

For the legislative aspect, see—

Jules Harmand, *op. cit.*

Girault Report ("Rapports politiques entre métropole et colonies") to Institut Colonial International, 1903, or "Quinzaine Coloniale," July 25, 1897.

A. Duchesne, "Du Régime Législatif des Colonies" (1893),—thesis. Compare Daresté, 1912, 1915.

Isaac, "Questions Coloniales. Constitutions et Sénatus-Consultes" (1897) and the Isaac Reports on the same topic, in *Journal Officiel*, 1889, 1893. Compare H. Bableb, "Mouvement de la Législation Coloniale, 1886–1906."

For the question of officials, see—

"Les Fonctionnaires Coloniaux" (Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale), Vol. I, 1897, Vol. III, 1910,—the basic collection of

- documents and reports. Very full,—especially useful for the *École Coloniale*, the position of the functionaries, *inspection*, etc. Compare Girault's report in *Institut Colonial International*, 1905.
- E. Boutemy, "Le recrutement des Fonctionnaires Coloniaux" (1895); compare Chailley-Bert's report to *Institut Colonial International*, 1895, and Girault's of 1911.
- C. Regismanset, "Les Fonctionnaires" (1911).
- P. Charmeil, "Les Gouverneurs-Généraux des Colonies Françaises: leurs Pouvoirs et leurs Attributions" (1922). Compare Dareste, 1904.
- G. François, "Le Guide des Carrières Coloniales" (1908) and Piques, "Les Carrières administratives dans les Colonies Françaises" (1904), for details.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. (See under *General*, above.)

Running commentaries are in "*L'Economiste Français*" (especially February, 1913), "*Journal des Economistes*," and the "*Revue D'Economie Politique*." The various Congresses, especially those of 1906 and 1909, were primarily economic, and, in fact, the bulk of the post-war colonial literature of France has been almost entirely economic.

For the old economic system, see J. Normand, "Le Pacte Colonial" (1912), and the Isaac Report on the abolition of the Pacte, in *Journal Officiel*, Senate, docs., 1888, p. 43.

For the tariff problem, see—

A. Girault, "The Colonial Tariff Policies of France" (1916),—a good *résumé* of facts.

Articles in "*Journal des Economistes*," 1892-3.

Debates in *Journal Officiel*, July, 1891-January, 1892, for the new system.

R. Ferry, "Le Régime Douanier de l'Indo-Chine" (1912),—the best thesis on the general problem.

Ferreau, "Le Régime Commercial des Colonies Françaises" (1912).

Arnauné, "Le Commerce extérieur et les Tarifs de Douane" (1891).

The Thierry protests in *Journal Officiel*, April 4, 1911, June 16, 1911,

December 18, 1912,—the view-point of the Southern traders.

Girault and Regismanset in "*L'Action Nationale*," December, 1922.

United States Tariff Commission. "Colonial Tariff Policies" (1922), pp. 130-225,—the fundamental collection to date.

Congrès Colonial Douanier de Marseille, 1925,—the present stand of the reformers.

Publications of the *Institut Colonial de Marseille*, especially—

(1) "Régime Douanier des Colonies Françaises" (1924).

(2) A. Artaud, "Introduction à la Révision du Régime Douanier des Colonies Françaises" (1925),—an account of all the legislation to this time.

(3) "Le Commerce et la Production des Colonies Françaises" (1926).

All of these afford the necessary documentation for this troublesome question.

For the financial problem, see—

- G. François, "Le Budget Local des Colonies" (1906),—an admirable thesis on the achievement of budgetary autonomy and its results.
 Articles by Caillaux in "Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales,"
 March-May, 1899,—by the man responsible for the change of 1900.
 Annual Budget-Reports on each colony.

For the general economic problem, especially in its post-war aspect,
 see—

- A. Sarraut (1923), *op. cit.*,—fundamental.
 H. Paulin, "L'Outils des Colonies Françaises."
 D. Bellet, "L'Alimentation de la France et les Ressources Coloniales" (1917).
 E. Bischoff, "Die Englischen und Französischen Untaten auf Koloniale Erde" (1917).
 C. Chalot, "Principales Exportations des Colonies Françaises en 1917" (1919),—an analysis of the post-war problem.
 M. Dewavrin, "Comment mettre en valeur notre domaine colonial" (1920).
 R. Delacourt, "Les Relations économiques de la France avec ses Colonies au lendemain de la Guerre" (1922).
 Pradier et Besson, "La Guerre Economique dans nos Colonies."
 But the best source for this topic is in the debates from 1918 onwards, especially for the Flandin and Sarraut projects.

For specialized aspects, the following are good:—

- Seligmann in "Essays in Colonial Finance" (1900).
 F. Zay, "Histoire Monétaire des Colonies Françaises" (2nd edition, 1905); compare Reports to Institut Colonial International, 1911-1912.
 P. Restamy, "Le Problème des Capitaux dans les Colonies Françaises" (1922) and in "Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales," 1924,—a most important aspect. His conclusions replace the tentative generalizations of Sarraut in this regard.

For land-problems, see—

- Anton, "Le Régime Foncier aux Colonies" (1904).
 I. de la Tour, "Le Régime de la Propriété" (1900).
 Lasne-Desvareilles, "La Législation Domaniale aux Colonies" (1913).

For railways, see—

- Three volumes in "Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale."
 E. Lemaire, "Les Chemins de Fer aux Colonies Françaises" (1900).
 E. de Renty, "Les Chemins de Fer coloniaux en Afrique" (1904).
 Godfernaux, "Les Chemins de Fer coloniaux français" (1911).
 Archimbaud Budget-Report, 1923.

NATIVE AFFAIRS.

Most of the above-mentioned general works deal exhaustively with the native problem. But special mention should be made of—

- Sections in the Congresses of 1889 and 1906.
 Reports in the volumes of Institut International Colonial.
 L. Vignon, "Un Programme de Politique Coloniale" (1919),—most important.

- L. de Saussure, "Psychologie de la Colonisation Française dans ses Rapports avec les Sociétés Indigènes" (1899),—a good examination of assimilation.
- B. Sylvain, "Etude sur le Traitement des Indigènes dans les Colonies d'Exploitation" (1899).
- Important article of Delafosse in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, 1922.
- Van Vollenhoven's Report to 1921 meeting of Institut Colonial International; compare the *Congrès international de Sociologie Coloniale*, 1900 (2 vols.), for this subject of native customs.
- P. Giran, "De l'Education des Races. Etude de Sociologie Coloniale" (1913).
- "L'Enseignement aux Aborigènes" (Brussels Conference, 1910).
- J. Alaude, "La Question Indigène dans l'Afrique du Nord."
- L. Franck, "Etudes de Colonisation Comparée" (1925),—paper by Sarraut, Lugard, etc.
- R. Fonville, "De la Condition en France et dans les Colonies Françaises des Indigènes des pays de protectorat français" (1924),—a thesis, but indicative of the problems.
- See also the sections on Natives in each chapter, below.
- For Islam, see—
- L. Roches, "Trente-deux Ans à travers l'Islam, 1832-1864" (1884-1887),—the first Frenchman to really analyse the problem and establish contact with the heads of political Islam.
- de Castries, "L'Islam" (1896).
- L. Rinn, "Marabouts et Khouans" (1884).
- E. Doutté, "L'Islam Algérien en 1900." This, and Doutté's other writings, are the most important sources for this problem. His "Magie et Religion dans l'Afrique du Nord" (1909) is especially good.
- Depont et Coppolani, "Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes" (1897).
- E. Fazy, article in "Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales," 1901.
- Le Chatelier, "L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale" (1899),—see section on West Africa for other works on this aspect, especially Brevié, "Islamisme contre Naturisme au Soudan Français" (1923), Part III of which is the best account of France's policy towards Islam in the last sixty years.
- Fallot in "Revue Politique et Parlementaire," 1904, for North Africa.
- O. Houdas, "L'Islamisme" (1904),—crowned by the Academy.
- Binger, "Le Péril de l'Islam" in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, 1906.
- "The Mohammedan World of To-day" (ed. Zinemer, 1906).
- B. del Monte Santa Maria, "L'Islamisme e la confraternita dei Senussi" (1914),—growth of Senussi and relationship to colonizing Powers.
- A. G. P. Martin, "Précis de Sociologie nord-africaine" (Vol. I, 1913; Vol. II, 1920),—textbook of the Mohammedan world in Africa.
- E. Montet, "L'Islam" (1919).
- Acker, "Der Islam und die Kolonisierung Afrikas," in "Jahrbuch des Deutschen Kolonien," Vol. IV, 1911, p. 113.

PART IV. REGIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. THE FRENCH IN AFRICA AS A WHOLE

"L'Afrique Française," 1891 onwards,—basic.

G. Hanotaux, "Le Partage de l'Afrique," 1896,—by a Minister for Foreign Affairs. Compare similar work by V. Devillé, 1898.

A. Lebon, "La Politique de la France en Afrique" (1901),—an account of French advances in the nineties by a Minister of Colonies at the time.

J. Darcy, "La Conquête de l'Afrique" (1900) and "Cent Années de Rivalité Coloniale" (1904),—the best general accounts in French.

Scott Keltie, "The Partition of Africa" (2nd edition, 1895), and Sir H. Johnston, "A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races" (1899).

Bonnefon, "L'Afrique politique en 1900" and H. Lorin, "L'Afrique l'entrée du XX^e Siècle" (1901),—for conditions after the partition.

E. Ferry, "La France en Afrique" (1905),—for policy.

For the general expansion of France in Africa, see—

A. DOCUMENTS.

R. de Card, "Les Traités de Protectorat conclus par la France en Afrique" (1895); "Les Territoires africaines et les Conventions Franco-anglaises" (1901); "Traités de Délimitation concernant l'Afrique Française" (1910), and various volumes on Morocco.

Hertslet, "The Map of Africa by Treaty" (3 vols., 1896), and du Clercq, "Recueil des Traités." See entry, *Diplomatic*, above.

"Le Régime des Protectorats" (Vol. II, 1895).

B. EXPLORERS' ACCOUNTS.

See reports of following explorations:—

Rohlf, 1864–1866—Guinea coast.

Nachtigal, 1869 onwards—Chad.

Caillié, 1827–1828—Senegal-Timbuktu-Morocco.

Magé and St. Questin, 1863–1866—the Niger to Ségou.

Soleillet, 1878—Niger to Ségou.

Caron, 1887—Bamako-Timbuktu by water.

Binger, 1887–1889—coast-Niger region.

Monteil, 1891–1893—Senegal-Say-Chad-Tripoli.

Mizon, 1891–1892—Niger-Benue regions.

Bluzet et Hourat, 1894–1896—Upper Niger.

{ Gentil, 1895–1900—Chad region.

{ Foureau and Lamy, 1898–1900—across the Sahara to Chad.

{ Joalland—Senegal to Chad.

(The last three missions met to overthrow Rabah—the culminating point of the French penetration of Africa.)

Lenfant, 1901—up the Niger (for communications).

Lenfant, 1903—by river via Niger and Benue to Chad and Shari.

Chevalier, 1902–1903—Shari region south-east of Lake Chad.

Tilho Mission, 1909—to Chad—voluminous reports.

Chudeau, 1903-1906—Sahara to Chad and Timbuktu.

Laperrine (Sahara), 1904—junction with West Africa.

For the Congo, see—

Du Chaillu, 1850, 1863—Ogowé regions.

De Brazza, 1876 on—Ogowé and Lower Congo.

Crampel, 1891—towards Lake Chad.

Dubowski and others following Crampel, 1893.

Liotard,—Marchand, 1896-1898—to Upper Nile.

Accounts of each of the above were published, usually a year or two after the actual expedition.

General accounts are in the works of Gaffarel, *op. cit.*; A. Terrier et C. Mourey, "L'Œuvre de la Troisième République en Afrique Occidentale, L'Expansion Française et la Formation Territoriale" (1910).

Other aspects are in—

Mangin, "Regards sur la France d'Afrique" (1924).

Zimmermann, "Das Deutsche Kaiserreich Mittelafrika" (1917).

R. Ronge, "La Question D'Afrique" (1910), and H. Beyens, "La Question africaine" (1918).

For the question of connecting the various French possessions, and especially for the Transsaharien scheme, see—

P. Leroy-Beaulieu.

A. Souleyre, "Le Transsaharien" (1911).

Meynier in "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger," Vol. VIII, 1913.

A. Schander, "Die Eisenbahnenpolitik Frankreichs in Nordafrika nebst einem Überblick über das Problem der Transsaharabahnen,"—an extensive survey of 594 pages, with maps.

II. ALGERIA (CHAPTER VI)

General official reports of primary significance are:—

1. Annual report on special budget of Algeria to the French Parliament—a separate one to each House, published in the *Journal Officiel*, and separate from the State Budget since 1901. These are usually collections of facts and statements of reforms.
2. Annual report—"Exposé de la Situation Générale de l'Algérie" (published at Algier),—1 vol. yearly since 1884.
3. "Procès-verbaux des Délibérations du Conseil supérieur du Gouvernement" (prefixed by the Governor-General's annual report). In 2 vols. to 1906, since then one separate volume yearly.
4. "Procès-verbaux des Délibérations des Délégations Financières Algériennes,"—1 vol. yearly since 1898. More useful than the preceding, in indicating the trend of opinion within the colony. Very important for the budget each year.
5. "Documents Statistiques sur le Commerce de l'Algérie,"—annual, Algier.
6. "Statistique Générale de l'Algérie,"—annual, Algier, 1867 onwards.
7. "Bulletin de l'Office du Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie,"—monthly, Paris, 1896 onwards.
8. *Annuaire de l'Algérie*.

For current review of events, see—

"L'Afrique Française" and "Renseignements Coloniaux,"—monthly since 1891.

"Revue du Monde Musulman,"—from 1906.

"Revue Algérienne, Tunisienne, et Marocaine de Législation et de Jurisprudence,"—1 vol. yearly since 1885. Most important articles, especially by Larcher. Quoted in text as "Revue Algérienne."

Articles in "Bulletin de la Société d'Etudes politiques et sociales,"—Algier, since 1904; and "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger" since 1895. The "Revue du Droit Public" is also very good, especially for the crucial years of 1898 to 1902.

For the legal side, see—

Larcher, "Traité Élémentaire de Législation Algérienne," 3 vols., 3rd edition, 1911,—the basic source for documents.

Estoublon et Lefebure, "Code de l'Algérie Annoté" (1896), and supplements—reprints documents in full, especially the various land-laws.

L. Charpentier, "Précis de Législation algérienne et tunisienne" (1899).

M. Morand, "Introduction à l'Etude du Droit Musulman Algérien" (1921),—most important papers and studies by the official who codified Moslem law for the first time.

Larcher et Rectenwald, "Traité élémentaire de Législation algérienne" (1925),—3rd edition,—useful for indicating the present position.

The basic sources for the period before 1900 are the voluminous reports of various Parliamentary Commissions, which not only sum up the position at the moment and the history of the events leading to it, but afford critical analyses. The most important—indeed, the most comprehensive investigation ever undertaken in the French colonies—are the "Rapports de la Commission Sénatoriale de l'Algérie," 1892–1894. In order of publication, these reports were:—

1. Combes Report.—"Instruction Primaire des Indigènes," in *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., sess. ord., 1892, p. 254.
2. Ferry Report.—"Organisation et Attribution du Gouvernement Général," in *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., 1892, sess. ext., p. 491, —the most important of the lot.
3. Clamageran Report.—"Régime Fiscal," in *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., sess. ext., 1892, p. 518.
4. Guichard Report.—"Forêts" (an aspect gravely touching the whole of native life), in *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., sess. ord., 1893, p. 34.
5. Franck-Chauveau Report.—"Propriété Foncière," in *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., sess. ord., 1893, p. 252,—most important as showing previous abuses.
6. Dupuy Report.—"Offices Ministeriels," in *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., *ibid.*, p. 411.
7. Second Combes Report.—"L'Enseignement Supérieur musulman," in *Journal Officiel*, sess. ord., 1894, docts. parl., p. 10.
8. Labiche Report.—"Colonisation," in *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., sess. ord., 1896, p. 15.

9. Isaac Report.—"Justice," in *ibid.*, p. 43.

Separate Reports were :—

1. Burdeau Report, reprinted as "L'Algérie en 1891" (1892). See *Journal Officiel*, Deps., December 5, 1891, or docts. parl., p. 2271. The full Report was the most important ever issued on Algeria, in so far as the determination of policy was concerned.
2. Jonnart Report, in *Journal Officiel*, docts. parl., Deps., sess. ord., 1892, p. 1818.
3. "Procès-verbaux des Délibérations de la Commission d'Etudes de l'Impôt Arabe" (Algier, 1893).
4. "Commission d'Etudes des Charges Fiscales" (Algier, 1898).
5. "Documents de l'Enquête de la Commission de Protection de Propriété indigène en Algérie" (Algier, 1898),—an essential source for the position of the natives.
6. "Commission pour l'Etude des Impôts Arabes" (Algier, 1902).
7. "Une Enquête sur l'état de la Propriété indigène," published in "*Revue Algérienne*," 1905.
8. "Rapport et Dépositions de la Commission Sénatoriale d'Etudes des Questions Algériennes" (1902).
9. De Peyerimhoff, "Enquête sur les Résultats de la colonisation officielle de 1871 à 1905" (2 vols., 1906),—the basic work for land-settlement and population-movements in Algeria. Monumental.

THE EARLY STAGE (TO 1870).

For the conquest :—

- C. Rousset, "Les Commencements d'une Conquête : L'Algérie de 1830 à 1840" (2 vols.), "La Conquête d'Algérie, 1841-1857" (2 vols. and atlas), 1889,—useful statements of fact.
- G. Esquer, "Les Commencements d'un Empire. La Prise d'Alger" (1923),—a documented account of origins.
- R. Valet, "L'Afrique du Nord devant le Parlement au XX^{me} Siècle" (1924), for 1830-1888,—a full account, especially of French opinion. Documents and bibliography.
- E. le Marchand, "L'Europe et la Conquête d'Alger" (1913).
- V. Piquet, "Campagnes d'Afrique, 1830-1900."

For various phases of the settlement :—

- "Tableau de la Situation des établissements françaises en Algérie, 1838-1858,"—statistics.
- H. Ideville, "Le Maréchal Bugeaud,"—3 vols.
- V. Démontès, "La Colonisation militaire sous Bugeaud" (1917),—a long account of 632 pages dealing with perhaps the most interesting experiment in Algerian history.
- P. A. Guillaume, "Conquête du Sud Oranais" (1910).
- Letters of Napoleon III.—"Lettre sur la Politique française en Algérie," February 2, 1863, to Pélissier (on native and land policy), and to MacMahon, June 20, 1865, on justice.
- P. de Reynaud, "Annales Algériennes" (1854),—important for the policy of the Empire.
- De Beaudicourt, "Histoire de la Colonisation d'Algérie" (1860).

V. Démontès, "Les Préventions du Général Berthezène contre la colonisation de l'Algérie" (1918).

C. N. Lacrosette, "De l'Algérie au point de vue de la crise actuelle" (1868).

A. Béhic, "Rapport de la Commission instituée par décision impériale du 5 Mai, 1869,"—an important report on conditions at the beginning of the Republic.

M. E. Mercier, "L'Algérie en 1880."

Prévost-Paradol, "La France Nouvelle" (1868),—for the myth of "la France outremer."

For statistics and documents:—

Martin and Foley, "Histoire Statistique de la colonisation algérienne" (1851).

Dr. Ricoux, "Démographie figurée de l'Algérie" (1880).

"Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de l'Algérie après 1830" (1914),—very raw material.

De Ménerville, "Dictionnaire de législation algérienne,"—to 1872; continued by Hugues and La pra to 1878 and Sautayra to 1886.

GENERAL WORKS.

P. Gaffarel, "L'Algérie, histoire, conquête, et colonisation" (1883),—a lengthy survey of 708 pages.

P. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Algérie et la Tunisie" (1887)—enlarged edition, 1897. The best economic work on North Africa to that date.

M. Wahl, "L'Algérie" (3rd edition, 1897, quoted. This was definitive, though there was a fifth edition by Bernard in 1908),—the standard work, easily the best summary of history and position, especially Part IV (population).

L. Vignon, "La France dans l'Afrique du Nord" (2nd edition, 1888),—the best critical account of conditions in the eighties. Another work in 1893.

Thirty-four notices published for the Exhibition of 1900.

H. Lorin, "L'Afrique du Nord" (1908),—a valuable work on regional, economic, and political conditions. Bibliography.

V. Piquet, "La Colonisation française dans l'Afrique du Nord" (2nd edition, 1912),—very concise summary of events.

E. Larcher, "Trois Années d'Etudes algériennes, 1899-1901" (1902),—useful documents.

R. Aynard, "L'Œuvre Française en Algérie" (1912),—a good and reliable survey, especially on the critical side.

Lesser accounts are in—

M. Ferriol, "Demain en Algérie" (1907).

Article by Black in "American Political Science Review," November, 1909.

"L'Afrique du Nord" (1913)—conference at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques. May be termed a footnote to the "Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord," 1909.

G. Casserly, "Algeria To-day" (1923).

GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS.

- "L'Algérie assimilée. Etude sur la Constitution et la Réorganisation de l'Algérie,"—a useful pamphlet of 1871.
- J. Cambon, "Le Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie" (1918), *op. cit.*,—for *rattachements*.
- C. Benoist, "Enquête Algérienne" (1892),—a criticism of the official work.
- Lumien, "Le Régime législatif de l'Algérie" (1895),—thesis.
- "Les Communes mixtes et le gouvernement des indigènes en Algérie" (1897).
- Mallarmé, "L'Organisation gouvernementale de l'Algérie" (1901),—for the changes after Cambon.
- Articles in "Revue politique et parlementaire," 1900, 1903,—for the changes.
- H. Smelin, "Die Verfassungsentwicklung von Algerien" (1911),—a long survey of over 600 pages.
- J. Méliat, "La France et l'Algérie" (1919).

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. (See under *General*, above.)

For general accounts, see—

Consular and Diplomatic Reports, Annual Series (London), and late publications of Department of Overseas Trade,—useful annual reports on economics, especially Cd. 3087, 1906.

"Programme d'Organisation Economique" (Gouvernement-Général, 1918).

V. Démontès, "Renseignements sur l'Algérie Economique" (1922),—a fundamental work of an authority.

G. Laboubée, "Notes sur l'Industrie en Algérie" (1917).

Series in "Dépêche Coloniale Illustrée," November-December, 1906.

A good analysis of causes for the arrested development is in "Scottish Geographical Magazine," 1894, p. 195 (maps).

For land-questions (largely at the basis of Algerian economics), see—

Pouyanne, "La Propriété Foncière en Algérie" (1900),—a basic source on settlement. Vies with de Peyerimhoff, *op. cit.*

For the earlier laws, see Dareste, "De la Propriété en Algérie," 1864; Robe—works of 1875 (for law of 1873), 1885, and 1891.

E. Mercier, "La Propriété foncière chez les Musulmans de l'Algérie" (1891), and articles in "Revue Algérienne," 1895, 1897, and 1898,—by the leading authority on native land-tenure.

G. Garcin, "La Colonisation officielle en Algérie sous le Régime de 1904" (1913),—a sequel to de Peyerimhoff. Compare "L'Afrique Française," December, 1923.

For the position of agriculture, see in addition—

"Le Mal de l'Algérie" (1894),—for decadence.

Trabut et Marès, "L'Algérie agricole en 1906."

Achard-Picard, "L'agriculture algérienne,"—thesis, 1914.

G. Saint-Hilaire, "L'Élevage dans l'Afrique du Nord" (1919),—for criticisms.

Jais, "La Banque de l'Algérie et le Crédit agricole" (thesis, 1902).

Compare a long study by Lavergne in "Revue d'Economie Poli-

tique" (1918). An earlier thesis was Philippart, "Contribution à l'Étude du Crédit agricole en Algérie" (1903).

For the financial system :—

Peringuet, "L'Autonomie financière de l'Algérie" (1904),—for the change of 1900.

L. Rouget, "Le Budget algérien, la colonisation" (1900),—a good pamphlet.

L. Bonzom, "Du Régime fiscal en Algérie" (1899).

For trade :—

P. Delorme, "Le Commerce Algérien" (2 vols., 1906),—the basis.

E. Déchaud, "Le Commerce algéro-marocain" (1906).

Moucheron, "Les Douanes en Algérie" (1907).

L. Lusinski, "Étude sur les Relations commerciales et économiques entre l'Algérie et la France" (1922),—a good thesis on the shipping position and monopoly.

For railways :—

Hamel, "Les Chemins de fer Algériens" (1885). Compare study by Courau (1891).

A. Bernard, "Les Chemins de fer Algériens" (1913),—a lengthy account of their history and position at the time. Fully documented.

POPULATION PROBLEMS.

For the statistics and basis for this troublesome topic, see—

V. Démonet, "Le Peuple Algérien" (1906),—619 pages. The standard work on this topic: contains all the necessary statistics on population-movements, settlement, and production to this date, and reasoned conclusions from them.

G. Loth, "Le Peuplement Italien en Algérie et en Tunisie" (1904),—a full statistical account.

H. Lorin, "L'Évolution Sociale des Espagnols en Oranie" (1908), and articles in "La Réforme Sociale" (1899).

Démonet in "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger" (1901),—on the problem of naturalization.

Cohen, "Les Israélites de l'Algérie et le Décret Crémieux" (1901),—385 pages on the Jewish problem. Important in its bearing to the natives.

NATIVE PROBLEMS.

For ethnology, see—

Hanotaux et Letourneux, "La Kabylie et les Coutumes Kabyles" (3 vols., 1872-1873).

Duveyrier, "Les Touareg du Nord" (1864); compare article in "Geographical Journal" (London), January, 1926.

V. Piquet, "Les Civilisations de l'Afrique du Nord" (1909),—the pre-French stage.

A good short account of the ethnology of Algeria is one of the most needed documents in French colonization. It is astonishing how uncertain and inadequate information in this regard has deleteriously affected French policy in the past.

For the position of the natives :—

L. Rinn, " Histoire de l'Insurrection de 1871 en Algérie " (1890).

Compare his articles in " Revue Algérienne," 1889-1890, for the legal problem.

Doutté, " L'Islam algérienne en 1900 " (1901) and " Enquête sur l'Avenir de l'Islam," *op. cit.*

E. Mercier, " La Question indigène en Algérie au commencement du XXme Siècle " (1901),—a most important analysis. Compare his earlier work, " La Propriété Foncière chez les Indigènes d'Algérie " (1891).

Glorieux, " La colonisation française dans ses rapports avec les indigènes algériens " (1900). Compare similar work by de Saussure, 1899, *op. cit.*

J. van Vollenhoven, " Essai sur le Fellah algérien " (1903),—excellent account of land-policy and settlement. Good for criticisms of the natives. Compare with it

Ibn Habilas, " L'Algérie Française vue par un Indigène " (1914),—a moderate statement of the reforms needed on the part of the Government.

I. Hamet, " Les Musulmans Français du Nord de l'Afrique " (1906),—important.

Drapier, " La condition sociale de l'indigène en Algérie " (1900).

H. Lavion, " L'Algérie musulmane dans le passé, le présent, et l'avenir " (1914), and " Le Service obligatoire pour les Musulmans de l'Algérie " (1913). Compare Lebe, " La Conscription des Indigènes d'Algérie " (1912).

Pradier-Perreau et Besson, " L'Afrique du Nord et la Guerre " (1918).

V. Piquet, " Les Réformes en Algérie et le Statut des Indigènes " (1919),—an analysis of the reforms of 1914 and 1918.

For the legal aspect, see—

Gentil, " Administration de la Justice Musulmane en Algérie " (1895),—a legal thesis.

M. Morand, " Etudes de Droit Musulman algérien " (1910).

B. Luc, " Le Droit Kabyle " (1917),—for the peculiar codes of the non-Arabs.

Alittacène, " Les Malcakmas " (1923), and article in " Revue Algérienne," 1913.

For education, see the Combes Report, 1892, *op. cit.*, and Rambaud, " L'Enseignement primaire chez les Indigènes musulmans de l'Algérie " (1892).

For the reforms needed, see—

Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord, 1909, *op. cit.*

Ibn Habilas, 1914, *op. cit.*

" L'Œuvre de la France en Algérie jugée par les indigènes," in " Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger," 1910.

E. de Metz, " Par Colons. L'Algérie aux Algériens et par les Algériens " (1914).

Gourgent, " Les Sept Plaies de l'Algérie " (1891),—to show the insecurity of native existence. Still holds, as the protracted post-war drought proved.

Debates in *Journal Officiel*, December, 1913–January, 1914, and especially January 24–31, 1921 (a long debate in seven *séances*).

FOR THE SOUTH OF ALGERIA (separate military territories)—

L. Rinn, "Nos Frontières Sahariennes" (1886).

Documents of the Flatters Mission, 1881.

Vaillot, "L'Exploration du Sahara" (1895).

E. F. Gautier, "La Conquête du Sahara" (3rd edition, 1922,—a sound piece of critical history).

A. Bernard et N. Lacroix, "La Pénétration Saharienne" (1906),—events.

de la Martinière et Lacroix, "Documents pour servir à l'étude de Nord-Ouest Afrique" (5 vols., 1894–1897),—on the natives.

Annual Report. "Les Territoires du Sud de l'Algérie; exposé de leur position,"—since 1902.

Bernard in "Renseignements Coloniaux," 1920.

"Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales," Vols. XXXV–XXXVI, 1913, for Touareg.

III. TUNISIA (CHAPTER VII). (See the general North African works under *Algeria*.)

A. THE ACQUISITION.

Livre Jaune, "Affaires de Tunisie, 1870–1881" (1881) and supplement for April–May, 1881,—the basic collection of documents.

Jules Ferry, "Les Affaires de Tunisie" (2nd edition, 1893),—speeches of Ferry and selections from despatches, edited by Rambaud.

"P.H.X." (Estournelles de Constant), "La Politique Française en Tunisie. Le Protectorat et Ses Origines, 1854–1891" (1891),—the best analysis of French policy in this regard.

Documents in "Le Régime des Protectorats" (Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale), Vol. I, 1899.

R. Valet, "L'Afrique du Nord devant le Parlement au XX^{me} Siècle" (1924), Part II,—a useful analysis of events in view of the latest documents available.

Leroy-Beaulieu in "Revue Politique et Littéraire," August 28, 1880–July 16, 1881; "L'Economiste Français," August, 1880–May, 1881; "Revue des Deux Mondes," November 15, 1886,—a running commentary and criticism.

Ferry's Collected Speeches (ed. Robiquet), Vol. V.

R. de Card, "La Turquie et le Protectorat Français en Tunisie" (1916),—documents for the period, 1881–1913.

G. Charmes, "La Tunisie et la Tripolitanie" (1882) and "La Tunisie" (1884),—for conditions at the time.

B. Hofstetter, "Vorgeschichte des Französischen Protektorats in Tunis bis zum Bardo-vertrag" (1914).

B. LATER DOCUMENTS.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs—"Rapport sur la Situation de la Tunisie",—yearly summary of the position, 1 vol. a year.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs—"Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie,"—these are the two basic sources for the derivation of facts.

"Rapports annuels au nom de la Commission du Budget," especially that of Cochery, 1904,—the best annual survey for criticisms and the point of view of French opinion.

"Journal Officiel Tunisien,"—since 1904.

"Bulletin Mensuel de l'Office du Gouvernement Tunisiens" (Paris),—since 1906.

"Procès-verbaux de la Conférence Consultative Tunisienne."

Important reports on the general situation include—

Flandin Report to the Deputies on Tunisia, 1903.

Pichon Report on Tunisia (Senate document, No. 85 of 1912).

Alapetite Reports in the Deputies and the Tunisian debate, November 25, 1911–January 4, 1912,—an important analysis. Alapetite gives a general review of French effort, and the debate inquires into the causes of the troubles that had broken out.

Rapport Général de la Commission d'Amélioration de l'Agriculture indigène,—the Report of the Decker-David Commission (Tunis, 1912), a monumental work of 777 pages. Inquires into the general economic position.

"La Tunisie au Début du XX^{me} Siècle" (1904),—encyclopædia and bibliography.

Zeys, "Code Annoté de la Tunisie" (1901), and annual supplements. Lagrange et Fontana, "Codes et Lois de la Tunisie" (1912),—for documents.

Annual reports in Consular and Diplomatic Reports and Department of Overseas Trade, London.

For events, see "L'Afrique Française," "Renseignements Coloniaux," and the Congress of North Africa, 1909,—all of fundamental importance.

C. GENERAL WORKS (especially Piquet, Leroy-Beaulieu, and Girault, *op. cit.*).

N. Faucon, "La Tunisie" (1892), 2 vols.,—preface by Ferry.

P. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Algérie et la Tunisie" (1887),—sketchy for Tunisia.

"La Tunisie," 4 vols., 1896,—an encyclopædic account published by the A.F.A.S., the Association for the Advancement of Science (compare the special number of the "Revue Générale des Sciences," November–December, 1896).

J. L. de Lanessan, "La Tunisie" (1st edition, 1887; 2nd, much enlarged, 1917),—a good authoritative account, the best book on Tunisia.

J. Saurin, "L'Œuvre Française en Tunisie,"—the fundamental account of settlement to 1909,—the report of a special mission.

G. Loth, "La Tunisie et l'Œuvre du Protectorat" (1907),—a year-book in its nature.

Rood Balek—long series in "L'Afrique Française," 1920–1922 (reprinted as "La Tunisie après la Guerre"),—the best critical account and statement of reforms.

M. S. Mzali, "L'Évolution Économique de la Tunisie" (1921),—a good thesis.

An important general work is H. Lapic, "Les Civilisations Tunisiennes."

siennes"—an account of the natives, Jews, and Europeans,—crowned by the Academy.

Lesser general works are—

L. de Campou, "La Tunisie Française" (1887).

P. Giffard, "Les Français en Tunisie" (1883).

E. Guillot, "La Tunisie."

Lallemand, "La Tunisie" (1890).

A. Vitry, "L'Œuvre française en Tunisie" (1900).

H. Pensa, "L'Avenir de la Tunisie" (1902).

R. Blanchard, "La Tunisie au début du XXe Siècle" (1904)

Gaudiani et Thiaccourt, "La Tunisie" (1910).

For legal questions, see—

V. Bismut, "Essai sur la Dualité législative et judiciaire en Tunisie" (1922),—a legal analysis and bibliography; wants Gallicanization.

M. Dauphin, "La Conférence Consultative tunisienne" (thesis, 1919).

Article by Berge in "Bulletin de la Société de Législation Comparée," 1885.

E. Fitoussi, "L'Etat Tunisien" (1901).

M. Smaja, "L'Extension de la juridiction et de la nationalité françaises en Tunisie" (1905).

S. de Pagnadoussa, "La Justice Française en Tunisie" (1897).

All analysing the problems that emerge in a protectorate.

For land-questions, see—

Report of Decker-David Commission, above.

P. Cambon's report of 1885 on "la loi immobilière tunisienne": see Bessis, "Essai sur la Loi Foncière Tunisienne" (1912), p. 62 *et seq.* For document, see Cambon et Massicault, "Loi Foncière de Tunisie" (1893). The new system is analysed in Dain, "Le Système Torrens."

Lescure, "Le Double Régime Foncier de la Tunisie" (1900).

Zolla, "La Colonisation agricole en Tunisie" (1899).

J. Terras, "Essai sur les Biens Habous en Algérie et en Tunisie,"—to explain the locking-up of the land.

G. Loth, "L'Enfida et Sidi Tahelt" (1910),—for the first extensive settlements.

"Société des Fermes Françaises: 25 Ans de colonisation nord-africaine" (1926),—record of a private company.

J. Crozet, "L'Agriculture en Tunisie" (1909).

"Etude sur la Colonisation Officielle en Tunisie,"—a lengthy investigation of 1914.

For the railway-problem, see—

Vatin, "Les Chemins de fer en Tunisie" (1902) and Chappdelaine Report in *Journal Officiel*, 1920, docts. parl., p. 1788.

For the Italians, see—

G. Loth, "Le Peuplement Italien en Tunisie et en Algérie" (1905),—and articles in "Quinzaine Coloniale," 1901-1902,—valuable statistical accounts.

E. Corradini, "Sopra la vie del nuovo impero. Dall' emigrazione

- di Tunisie alla guerra del'Egeo" (1912),—a fair section on Tunisia, showing the Government's attitude.
- C. Tumedei, "La Questionne Tunisina e l'Italia" (1922),—a very important documented account, though anti-French.
- O. Fidel and Rood Balek in "L'Afrique Française," 1911 and 1921.
- J. Saurin, "Le Peuplement Français en Tunisie" (1910).
- Jacqueton in "Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales," 1905.
- For a statement of the reforms needed, see—
- M. al Asram et P. de Dianous, "Questions Tunisiennes" (1907),—a moderate statement of problems.
- "La Tunisie Martyre" (Sheikh Taalbi), 1920,—the Koran of the extreme *Destour* party. The book that occasioned most of the post-war unrest.
- A. Durau-Angliviel, "Ce que la Tunisie demande à la France" (1921).
- Rectenwald in "Renseignements Coloniaux," 1923. Compare 1922, p. 247 *et seq.*

IV. MOROCCO. (CHAPTER XIV.)

A. OFFICIAL.

Livres Jaunes.—"Affaires du Maroc" (6 vols.).

Vol. I—1901–1905.

Vol. II—protocol and account of Algeciras, 1906.

Vol. III–IV—1906–1908.

Vol. V—1908–1910 (Fez rising).

Vol. VI—1910–1912 (Franco-German Agreement of November 4, 1911).

These 2,484 pages are the fundamental source for the early period, but should be checked and amplified either with the contemporary German White Books or the documents of the German Foreign Office in "Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914," Vols. XX, XXI, XXIX. The two sources together, with the commentary and private accounts, say, of "L'Afrique Française," give a fair view of this period before the protectorate.

Other Reports are—

Regnault and Lyautey on the Protectorate, in Livre Jaune, Vol. IV.

Long and Baudin Reports in *Journal Officiel*, 1912, Deputies documents No. 1994, and Senate No. 873.

First Lyautey Report, December, 1912 (in "L'Afrique Française").

Messimy Report on Moroccan Budget for 1914 (*Journal Officiel*, February 24, 1914, No. 3578),—a long and most important summary of the work of the protectorate.

Milliès-Lacroix Report in *Journal Officiel*, March 31, 1914.

Report on Government in "Renseignements Coloniaux," 1916, p. 153.

Lyautey, "Rapport Général sur la Situation du Protectorat du Maroc au 31 juillet 1914" (1916)—with introduction bringing

the account to January, 1916. This is the basic source for the early years of the protectorate, and is referred to in the text as "the Lyautey Report."

Resident-General, "La Renaissance du Maroc, 1912-1922. Dix Ans de Protectorat" (1922),—a sequel to the above, of unusual value. Annual Budget Report on Morocco (Minister of Foreign Affairs),—the most important source for current events.

Bulletin Officiel du Maroc, since November 1, 1912 (analysis by P. L. Rivière in 4 vols., 1923-1925).

"Annuaire Economique et Financière," 1917 onwards,—a fundamental source for the period after 1912. The best current review of affairs from the official standpoint. Bibliography, documents, and treaties in full.

"Maroc. Service du Commerce et de l'Industrie. Ce qu'il faut savoir du Maroc" (1926),—the best short official survey, with statistics to the end of 1925 and an excellent map.

The proceedings of the two official Fairs or Exhibitions, viz., "Conférences Franco-marocaines," Rabat, 2 vols., 1916,—the Moroccan prototype of the 1909 conference for Algeria,—fundamental: and "Exposition Franco-Marocaine de Casablanca. Rapport-Général," 1918.

British Foreign Office Handbook, No. 101, 1920.

Department of Overseas Trade, London, "Reports on economic and commercial conditions in Morocco, etc." (1921 on) and "Reports on the Trade, Industry, and Finances of Morocco" (1920 on),—excellent statistical and general comments.

Documents in "L'Afrique Française" and "Renseignements Coloniaux," especially 1910-1912: and general North African sources under *Algeria*.

For the legal side:—

P. L. Rivière, "Table Générale analytique des Traités, Codes, Lois, et Règlements au Maroc, 1912-1923" (4 vols., 1923-1925).

"Recueil de Législation et de Jurisprudence Marocaines," from 1912.

L. Holtz, "Traité de Législation Marocaine" (1914).

Goulven, "Précis élémentaire de législation et d'économie marocaines" (1920),—2 vols.

"Revue Générale de Droit International Public," especially 1904, 1906, 1912.

E. R. de Card, "Le Traité de Versailles et le Protectorat de la France au Maroc" (1923).

Good articles are occasionally in "Revue de Géographie marocaine," and the "Annuaire du Maroc" may be referred to. The "Revue Algérienne" is, of course, fundamental.

B. UNOFFICIAL.

(1) *Diplomatic.*

Of differing worth are—

V. Bérard, "L'Affaire Marocaine" (1905).

Gourdon, "La Politique Française au Maroc" (1906).

- A. Tardieu, "La Conférence d'Algéciras" (1907).
 — "Le Mystère d'Agadir" (1912), and article in "Revue Politique et Parlementaire," 1908,—very good.
 P. Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir" (1912).
 R. Raynaud, "En marge du Livre Jaune" (1923),—an account of 1904–1912.
 E. R. de Card, "Documents diplomatiques pour servir à l'Etude de la question marocaine" (1911). Compare his collections of North African treaties (1906) and treaties concerning the protectorate (1914).
 L. Deloncle, "Statut international du Maroc" (1912),—a good thesis.
 L. Maurier, "La Politique marocaine de l'Allemagne" (1916).
- (2) *Pre-French Conditions.*
 E. Aubin, "Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui" (1904),—the best account of the Sheriffean régime.
 Erkmann, "Le Maroc moderne" (1885).
 De Foucauld, "Reconnaisances du Maroc," 2 vols., 1889.
 B. Meakin, "The Land of the Moors" (1901).
 Cousin et Saurin, "Le Maroc" (1905).
 E. A. Andrews, "Old Morocco" (1923).
 W. B. Harris, "Morocco that was" (1921).
 Papers in Congrès de l'Afrique du Nord, 1909.
- (3) *General Accounts.*
 The two best accounts are—
 V. Piquet, "Le Maroc" (3rd edition, 1920). Very concise. Compare his "Les Peuples Marocains" (1925).
 A. Bernard, "Le Maroc" (6th edition, 1922),—one of the classic works of French colonization, far more profound than Piquet.
 Other accounts are in—
 G. Wolfrom, "Le Maroc" (1906),—bibliography.
 G. Jeannot, "Etude sociale, politique, et économique sur le Maroc" (1908).
 A. Salmon, "Le Maroc, son état économique et commercial" (1907).
 Encyclopædic accounts in "Revue Générale des Sciences," January 15, 1903–June 15, 1903.
 W. B. Harris and W. Cozens-Hardy, "Modern Morocco" (1919),—an excellent account for the Bank of British West Africa.
 J. McLeod (a British Consul), in "Geographical Journal," 1918, and "Journal of the African Society," 1917–1918. Compare good articles in Round Table, 1924, p. 293, and "Geographical Journal," Vol. XXXIX, 1912.
- (4) *Lyautey and the Protectorate.*
 Lyautey's article in "Revue des Deux Mondes," January 15, 1900.
 A. Britsch, "Le Maréchal Lyautey" (1921),—documented.
 B. Georges-Gaulis, "La France au Maroc. L'Œuvre du Général Lyautey" (1920).
 J. de Taillis, "Le Nouveau Maroc" (1923),—largely a compilation from "L'Afrique Française."

M. Touron, "Notre Protectorat Marocain" (1913).

Besnard et Aynard, "L'Œuvre Française au Maroc" (1914).

S. Berge, "La Justice Française au Maroc" (1917). Compare "Revue Algérienne," 1923, and "L'Afrique Française," 1916.

Articles by Bernard in "La Géographie," Vol. XXXIV, 1920 (work in the preceding eight years).

H. Annie, "Le Maroc, hier et aujourd'hui" (1925).

(5) *Economic.*

J. Goulven, "Le Maroc. Les Ressources de ses Régions" (2nd edition, 1920),—the best economic analysis.

F. Bernard, "Le Maroc économique et agricole" (1917).

De la Revilière, "Les Energies françaises au Maroc" (1917).

H. Dugard, "Le Maroc au lendemain de la Guerre" (1920),—270 pages.

"Pour s'enrichir au Maroc" (1921),—an official account of 122 pages.

Graux, "Le Maroc, son production agricole,"—a long account of 400 pages.

Articles in "Revue d'Economie Politique," 1920 (Loriot on crisis), and "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger" (1913),—settlement.

For finance, see Colomb, "Étude sur le Régime Financier au Maroc" (1914),—a thesis; and U. Jaeger, "La Banque d'État du Maroc" (1912).

For trade, see J. Donon, "Le Régime Douanier du Maroc et le Développement du commerce marocain jusqu'à nos jours,"—for documents.

For railways, see Crosson-Duplessix, "Étude sur les Chemins de fer marocains," in "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger," Vol. XXVII, 1922.

For land-questions, see—

E. Amar, "Organisation de la Propriété foncière au Maroc" (1912).

A. Mesureau, "La Propriété foncière en Maroc" (1921).

L. Milliot, "Démembrement du Habous" (1918).

— "Les Terres Collectives" (1922). Article in "Renseignements Coloniaux," 1922–1923.

For actual settlement, see an excellent article in "Revue de Géographie marocaine," Vol. V, 1926.

V. WEST AFRICA. (CHAPTER VIII.)

("L'Afrique Française," "Renseignements Coloniaux," the usual general periodicals, *Journal Officiel*, and Joucla's Bibliography.)

1. OCCUPATION.

Documents in Dubois et Terrier (1902) and "Le Régime des Protectorats," 1899, *op. cit.*

Berliou, "André Brué, ou l'Origine de la Colonie Française en Sénégal" (1874).

Ancelle, "Les Explorations au Sénégal" (1887).

P. Gaffarel, "Administration du Général Faidherbe en Sénégal" (1884): compare his work of 1918, Chaps. 4–7.

P. Cultru, "Histoire du Sénégal du XV^{me} Siècle à 1870" (1910),—the most exhaustive account. Bibliography.
 Binger, "Du Niger au Golfe de Guinée" (2 vols., 1892) and Lenfant, "Le Niger" (1907),—for important explorations.
 G. Hardy, "La Mise en Valeur du Sénégal de 1817 à 1854" (1921),—a long survey of 376 pages by the Director of the École Coloniale. For the opening of the interior, see under *Africa, General*, and the reports of the Brosselard, Binger, Faidherbe, Madrolle, and Parvise Missions.

2. OFFICIAL.

Journal Officiel du Sénégal, from 1888 (in its present form), and for each other colony at various dates.

Journal Officiel de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, from 1905 in its present form.

"Rapport d'Ensemble du Gouverneur-Général sur la situation de l'Afrique Occidentale Française," 1909-1913.

Annuaire du Gouvernement-Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, since 1921,—the basic facts and statistics.

"Bulletin Economique et Politique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française," from 1920 (Dakar).

"Bulletin Mensuel de l'Agence Economique de l'Afrique Occidentale Française."

"Bulletin du Comité d'Etudes historiques et scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Française," and Annuaire since 1917.

Deputies Document No. 4231 of 1916 (Valude's Report, important for native law).

Series of six economic maps published by the Ministry of the Colonies, 1923,—important: a history in themselves.

Series published by the Government-General—

"L'Œuvre de la Troisième République en Afrique Occidentale Française" (560 pages, 1910).

"Les Chemins de fer en Afrique Occidentale" (3 vols., 1906).

"Campagne Cotonnière de 1906" (Henry), 1907.

"La Côte d'Ivoire" (1906).

"Le Dahomey" (1906).

"Le Haut-Sénégal et Niger" (1906).

"La Guinée" (Rouget), 1906.

"Le Gouvernement-Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1908).

3. GENERAL.

M. Faidherbe, "Notice sur la colonie du Sénégal" (1859).

P. Gaffarel, "Le Sénégal et le Soudan Français" (1890); compare his "Samory" (1884).

G. François, "L'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1907),—the standard work, very fully documented.

Deherme, "L'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1908),—a full account, very analytical, by a Comtian sociologist. The best survey of native policy and the slavery question.

L. Sonolet, "L'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1912),—a good shorter survey.

Hild, "L'Organisation judiciaire de l'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1912).

L. Hubert, "Une Politique Africaine" (1904) and "L'Éveil d'un Monde. L'Œuvre de la France en Afrique Occidentale" (1916),—by a local Governor and one of the leading colonial reformers.

J. van Vollenhoven, "Une Âme de Chef. Le Gouverneur-Général van Vollenhoven" (1920),—the work of one of the most striking figures in French colonial history.

E. Terrier et al., "L'Œuvre de la Troisième République en Afrique Occidentale" (2 vols., 1921),—the standard work on West Africa.

J. Saint-Genest, "Un Voyage de M. Albert Sarraut en Afrique" (1922),—part of the plan for a *mise en valeur*.

E. Pelleray, "L'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1924).

Carde, "L'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1923),—a shorter account by a reforming Governor. Useful for its fresh point of view.

4. ECONOMIC.

For various aspects, see—

Daresté, "Recueil Colonial," 1904, 1908 (land).

Hervet, "Le Commerce Extérieur de l'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1901).

Y. Henry, "Le Coton en l'Afrique Occidentale Française" (compare Angoulvant in "Colonies et Marine," September, 1921).

— "Matières Premières africaines," Vol. I, 1918.

François, "L'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1920),—an economic survey of each product. The clearest exposition of the colony's situation in this regard.

Cosnier Report (H. Cosnier, "L'Ouest Afrique Française," 1921),—the standard economic work. Compare his long article in "Colonies et Marine," February 15, 1920.

For irrigation, and especially the Niger-project, see—

Mission Béline, "Les Irrigations du Niger. Etudes et Projets" (1921),—the basic inquiry.

Y. Henry, "Irrigations et Cultures Irriguées en Afrique Tropicale" (1918).

For railways, see—

J. Chautard, "Les Chemins de fer de l'Afrique Occidentale Française" (1909).

Hubert Report on railways, in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., docts., No. 848, 1903.

Good articles in "L'Afrique Française," November, 1923, and "Colonies et Marine" (Angoulvant), September, 1920.

5. NATIVE PROBLEMS (see *General*).

M. Delafosse, "Les Noirs de l'Afrique" (1921).

J. Henry, "Les Bambara" (1910); C. Monteil, "Les Kassonkés" (1915). Series by Tauxier, "Le Noir du Soudan" (1912); "Yatenga" (1917); "Bondoukon" (1921).

Marc, "Le Pays Mossi" (1908); Mangin, "Les Mossi" (1916).

For various problems, see—

Delafosse in "L'Afrique Française," 1922, p. 27.

R. Lemié, "L'Enseignement en Afrique Occidentale Française" (1906).

G. Hardy, "Une Conquête Morale: l'enseignement en Afrique Occidentale Française" (1917).

Mangin, "La Force Noire" (1910),—for the military and population problem. Compare articles in "L'Afrique Française," February, June, 1922.

For the legal aspect, see—

Clozel et Villamur, "Les Coutumes Indigènes de la Côte d'Ivoire,"—especially for the relationship to the new French law.

Daresté, 1910, 1916,—for the naturalization episode.

Beurdely, "La Justice Indigène en Afrique Occidentale Française" (1916).

For Islam in French West Africa—

Le Chatelier, "L'Islam en Afrique Occidentale" (1899).

A. Quellien, "La politique musulmane française en Afrique."

Arnaud, "L'Islam et la politique musulmane française en Afrique Occidentale," in "Renseignements Coloniaux," 1912.

P. Marty, "L'Islam en Maurétanie et au Sénégal" (1915-1916); "Etudes sur l'Islam au Sénégal" (2 vols., 1917); "L'Islam au Guinée" (1921), etc.

P. J. André, "L'Islam Noir" (1924),—a good summary.

J. Brevié, "Islamisme contre Naturisme au Soudan Français" (1923),—perhaps the most important analysis of French Moslem policy. Important for interactions between fetichists, Moslems, and French.

6. FOR THE SEPARATE COLONIES.

SENEGAL.

M. Olivier, "Le Sénégal" (1907),—official publication.

Courtet, "Etudes sur le Sénégal" (1903).

G. Ribot, "Dakar, ses origines, son avenir" (1907).

A. Pérignon, "Haut-Sénégal et Moyen Niger" (1901).

IVORY COAST.

Michelet et Clement, "La Côte d'Ivoire" (1905),—especially for the governmental aspect.

Villamur et Richaud, "Notre colonie de la Côte d'Ivoire" (1903).

Clozel, "Dix Ans à la Côte d'Ivoire" (1906),—by one of the best Governors.

Angoulvant, "La Pacification de la Côte d'Ivoire, 1908-1915,"—by a Governor.

G. Joseph, "La Côte d'Ivoire" (1917),—the standard analysis.

J. le Barbier, "La Côte d'Ivoire" (1916),—commercial.

M. Delafosse, "Les Frontières de la Côte d'Ivoire, de la Côte d'Or, et du Soudan" (1918).

DAHOMY.

Touté, "Du Dahomey au Sahara" (1889).

— "Dahomey, Niger, Touareg" (1898),—for the pioneer work.

D'Albea, "La France au Dahomey" (1895).

G. François, "Notre Colonie de Dahomey."

GUINEA.

- A. Fleurimont, "La Guinée Française" (1900).
 Machat, "Les Rivières du Sud et la Fouta Djallon" (1905).
 Arcin, "La Guinée Française" (2 vols., 1907, 1911),—exhaustive.
 Ternaux, "La Guinée Française" (1908).

SUDAN.

- Sarrasin, "Les Races Humaines du Soudan Français" (1902).
 F. Dubois, "Notre Beau Niger" (1911),—fifteen years of French colonization in the Sudan.
 Series published by Governor Clozel—
 1st Series. 3 vols. M. Delafosse, "Le pays, les peuples, l'histoire, les civilisations" (1912).
 2nd Series. 2 vols. J. Menraud, "Géographie Economique" (1912).

TOGO.

- Reports to the League of Nations (especially Bonnecarrère's, 1923).
 Togo debate in Deputies, 1921.
 "Guide de la Colonisation au Togo" (188 pages, 1924).

VI. EQUATORIAL AFRICA. (CHAPTER IX.)

(Same general sources as for West Africa, especially "L'Afrique Française," *Journal Officiel*, and the usual periodicals. Consult Bruel's bibliography [1914] for details.)

1. OCCUPATION.

- British Parliamentary Paper. Correspondence regarding the West African Conference at Berlin, 1885,—5 parts.
 Debates in *Journal Officiel*, November, 1882.
 Ancel on formation, in "Renseignements Coloniaux" (1902),—a very valuable collection with documents and an extensive bibliography.
 Neuville et Bréard, "Les Voyages de Savorgnan de Brazza: Ogowé et Congo, 1875-1882" (1884),—documents and original material.

2. EXPANSION.

- See explorations under *Africa, General*.
 Dubois et Terrier (1902), *op. cit.*, for documents.
 For the Fashoda episode, see—
 Livre Jaune, "Affaires du Haut Nil et du Bahr-el-Ghazal" (1897-1898).
 English Blue Books, C. 9054, 1898, and C. 9055, 1898.
 R. de Caix, "Fachoda" (1899),—a standard account of events from 1890, with a fair account of diplomacy.
 G. Hanotaux, "Fachoda, le partage de l'Afrique" (1909),—a good diplomatic account, especially for the French argument. Collection of leading African treaties (100 pages),—an analysis by a Minister for Foreign Affairs.
 Blanchard in "Revue Générale de Droit International Public," 1899,—an important article.
 E. A. Lenfant, "La Grande Route du Chad" (1905),—for the fundamental problem of communications.
 See also sections in each of the works under *General, Development*.

3. GENERAL DEVELOPMENT.

A. *Official.*

Journal Officiel, 1887 onwards (under different names at various times).

Annuaire du Gouvernement-Général de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française, 1913 on,—most valuable, especially for an excellent account of the discoveries and expansion.

Rapports annuels, especially Gentil's "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation du Congo Français," 1903.

Hérissé budget-report, 1906.

Clémentel Report, February, 1906, and discussion of it in Deputies.

B. *Unofficial.*

M. A. Rouget, "L'Expansion coloniale au Congo Français" (1906),—a documented account, the best to date, especially for the economic aspect, expansion, and railways. A long bibliography of books and articles.

— "L'Afrique Equatoriale" (1913).

A. Chevalier, "L'Afrique Equatoriale Française" (1907).

M. Rondet-Saint, "L'Afrique Equatoriale Française" (1921),—slighter.

G. Bruel, "L'Afrique Equatoriale Française" (1918).—2 big vols. Very detailed but more encyclopædical than analytical. Valuable statistics.

H. Paulin, "L'Afrique Equatoriale Française" (1924),—the most important general survey, especially for economic position and development.

4. THE COMPANIES.

E. Etienne, "Les Compagnies de colonisation" (1897),—by the Colonial Under-Secretary. The starting-point.

Debates in *Journal Officiel*, March-June, 1895.

Pauliat Report in *Journal Officiel*, Senate, 1898, p. 13.

H. Cu villier-Fleury, "La Mise en Valeur du Congo Français" (1904).

J. Lefébure, "Le Régime des Concessions au Congo" (1904),—the most important survey.

Articles in "Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales," January 1, 1900, November 1, 1900, and 1908.

"West Africa," 1901-1905, for the English dispute. Compare E. Morel, "The British Case in the French Congo" (1903),—an anti-French account.

Captain Renard, "La Colonisation au Congo Français" (1900).

Messimy's budget-report, 1909, or "Notre Œuvre Coloniale" (1910), p. 313.

For the de Brazza inquiry, see "Le Temps," September 23, 1905, and issues of June, 1905. F. Challaye, "Le Congo Français" (1909), by de Brazza's lieutenant, is an excellent account to 1908, and is well documented. Important.

For the abuses, add to the above, "Revue Indigène," 1905, and "L'Humanité," 1905, especially Rouanet's articles.

G. Toqué, "Les Massacres du Congo" (1907), for the details of abuses,

by one of the accused in the Toqué-Gaud affair. One of the most striking documents in colonial history.

Debate in Deputies, February 20-22, 1906, on reorganization—the most important source for Congo affairs, especially the Clémentel Report.

Dareste, "Recueil Colonial," 1902-1905, for judgments.

5. ECONOMIC. (See *General*, above.)

"L'Union Congolaise Française" (2 reports)—

1st. "Les Sociétés Concessionnaires du Congo, 1900-1904" (1906).

2nd. *Ibid.*, 1905-1909 (1909). Good documentary analyses from the companies' standpoint. Valuable.

Journal Officiel, Deps., reports on railway, No. 364, 1908, and Nos. 2212, 2268 of 1909.

For discussion of position, see the loan-debate, Senate, March 30, 1923.

6. NATIVES. (See *General*, above.)

Cureau, "Les Populations primitives de l'Afrique Equatoriale" (1912).

F. Gaud, "Les Mandja" (1911).

Gohr in "Institut Colonial International," 1921,—depopulation.

For the problem in the Cameroons, see—

Reports to League of Nations, 1923 on (by Carde),—for "the policy of races."

Journal Officiel, September 7, 1921,—long debate.

"Colonies et Marine," July-August, 1920.

Report of Foureau Mission, 1918.

Marabail, "Etude sur les territoires du Cameroon" (thesis, 1919).

Articles in "Renseignements Coloniaux," October-December, 1915; July-October, 1918.

VII. MADAGASCAR. (CHAPTER X.)

("L'Afrique Française," the usual periodicals, and *Journal Officiel*.)

1. OCCUPATION.

Malzac, "Histoire du Royaume Hova depuis ses origines jusqu'à sa fin" (1912),—for the background.

Livres Jaunes.—"Affaires du Madagascar"—1881-1883 (1884); 1882-1883 (1884); 1884-1886 (1886); 1885-1895 (1895),—the basis. Contain consular correspondence (especially of Baudais), peace-negotiations in full, England's attitude, etc.

Debates in Deputies, July 25, 1885-December 28, 1885, for French opinion; November, 1894 (especially important); March-July, 1896.

"Rapport sur un Crédit extraordinaire pour les Dépenses de Madagascar" (242 pp., 1884).

Madagascar. "Correspondence et Conférences entre le Gouvernement de Madagascar et les plénipotentiaires de la République Française" (1884),—also 1885.

Articles in "L'Economiste Français," August-October, 1895.

For the conquest:—

G. Duchesne, "Rapport sur l'Expédition de Madagascar" (1897),—a volume of 475 pages on the details of the conquest.

A. Hellot, "La Pacification de Madagascar" (1900),—a volume of 528 pages on events from 1896 to 1899.

J. Poirier, "Conquête de Madagascar, 1895-1896" (1902),—435 pages.

H. Lyauté, "Dans le Sud de Madagascar" (1902), and collection of letters in two volumes, 1916,—for a stage in the development of "the policy of races."

For accounts of conditions at this time:—

H. d'Orléans, "À Madagascar" (1895),—a good impression of conditions.

E. Mignaud, "La domination française à Madagascar" (1900),—a legal thesis, giving a good analysis of the positions in 1885 and 1895-1896.

G. Hanotaux, "L'Affaire de Madagascar" (1896, 3rd edition),—speeches of the Minister for Foreign Affairs,—a primary source for 1894-1896, especially for diplomacy and Parliament's attitude.

L. Grandin, "Les Français à Madagascar" (2 vols., 1896).

A. Lebon, "La politique de la France en Afrique, 1896-1898" (1901),—account of Madagascar by the Minister of the Colonies.

E. J. Villars, "Madagascar, 1638-1894" (1912).

2. OFFICIAL.

Annual budget-reports of the Minister of the Colonies,—as elsewhere, primary sources.

Annual report, "Situation de la colonie."

Galliéni Reports. 1st. "Rapport d'ensemble sur la situation générale de Madagascar, 1896-1899," in *Journal Officiel* May 1, 1899, *et seq.*

2nd. "Rapport d'Ensemble, 1899-1905" (1906).

"Neuf Ans à Madagascar" (1908).

Article in "L'Année Coloniale," 1900.

—all primary sources of fundamental importance.

Pennequin Report, 1899-1900,—2 vols., 1901.

Bulletin Officiel de Madagascar, 1896 on.

Journal Officiel de Madagascar, 1896 on.

Annuaire Générale de Madagascar,—2 vols. a year,—a basic source with good historical accounts.

"Bulletin Economique de la colonie de Madagascar," 1901 on.

"Les informations de l'Agence Economique de Madagascar,"—periodical.

Gouvernement de Madagascar, "Guide de l'Immigrant à Madagascar" (3 vols. and atlas, 1897),—a remarkable survey.

Codifications of the law by Gamon (2 vols., 1906) and Sibon et Delacour (1905).

Congrès de l'Afrique Orientale, 1912,—a most important collection of reports, largely by officials.

3. GENERAL.

For various phases, see—

M. I. Guet, "Les Origines de la colonisation française à Madagascar" (1888).

- A. Martinique, "Etude de politique. Madagascar en 1894" (1894),—500 pages.
- L. Brunet, "La France à Madagascar" (1895), and "L'Œuvre de la France à Madagascar" (1903),—by the deputy of Réunion.
- Fournier, "Notice sur Madagascar" (Direction des Colonies),—148 pages, 1900.
- R. Blanchard, "La Madagascar au Début du XXe Siècle" (1902),—465 pages.
- E. F. Gautier, "Madagascar" (1902),—for geography and races.
- P. Ellie, "Le Général Galliéni à Madagascar" (1902).
- A. You, "Madagascar: Histoire, Organisation, Colonisation" (1905),—636 pages.
- P. Guau, "La France à Madagascar" (1909).
- C. E. A. Condamy, "L'Insurrection dans le Sud de Madagascar, 1904-1905" (1914).
- L. Truitard, "Madagascar et les Intérêts français" (1912),—mainly economic.
- M. A. Leblond, "La Grande Ile de Madagascar" (1907),—by editor of "Revue des Deux Mondes," has bibliography.
- G. Grandidier, "Le Myre de Vilers, Duchesne, Galliéni. Quarante Années de l'histoire de Madagascar, 1880-1920" (1923),—the best documented account of history of Madagascar from 1880 onwards, especially for the earlier period.
- A. Dondouau, "Géographie de Madagascar" (1922),—really a history. The best modern general account, especially good for ethnology and economic position.
- H. Paulin, "Madagascar" (1925),—a good account.
- For current happenings, see "Revue de Madagascar," monthly from 1878 to 1911,—a publication of the "Comité du Madagascar." For and after these years, too, see the issues of "L'Afrique Française."

4. ECONOMIC. (See preceding section.)

- G. Foucart, "Le Commerce et la colonisation à Madagascar" (1894).
- L. Duquenois, "Situation Economique de Madagascar en 1901" (1902).
- H. Loisy, "Madagascar: Etude Economique" (1914),—a good survey of 306 pages.
- G. Gayet, "La Circulation Monétaire et le Crédit à Madagascar" (1921), especially for statistics.

5. NATIVES.

- A. and G. Grandidier, "Ethnographie de Madagascar" (4 vols., 1901-1918),—the basis.
- G. Julienne, "Institution politiques et sociales de Madagascar," 2 vols., 1908, on an important topic.
- A. Cahuzac, "Essai sur les Institutions et le Droit malgaches," 1900.
- "Notes, Reconnaissances, et Explorations" (official series, 1897 on),—especially Bartholoné on land-law. Compare Dareste, 1911.
- L. Spas, "Etude sur l'Organisation de Madagascar" (1912).
- Documents in Government publication, "Lois et Coutumes mal-

gaches " (1908). This side of native policy was very fully developed in Madagascar.

VIII. INDO-CHINA. (CHAPTER XI.)

1. OCCUPATION.

For the earliest stage, see—

A. Septans, "Les Commencements de l'Indo-Chine française" (1887).

P. Vial, "Les Premières Années de la Cochinchine" (1874).

P. Cultru, "Histoire de la Cochinchine des origines à 1883" (1920),—has a bibliography.

Documents are in—

"Le Régime des Protectorats," Vol. I, 1899; Dubois et Terrier, 1902, *op. cit.*; du Clercq, "Recueil des Traités," Vols. XI–XIV; and L. de Reinach, "Recueil des Traités conclus par la France en Extrême-Orient, 1884–1902" (1902).

Livres Jaunes, "Les Affaires du Chine et du Tonkin, 1884–1885,"—most important.

J. Ferry, "Le Tonkin et la Mère-Patrie" (4th edition, 1890),—an introduction of Ferry containing an important statement of his policy, followed by a collection of documents,—a good source-book.

Accounts of the earliest stages in detail are in—

P. Vial, "Les Premières Années au Tonkin, 1873–1887" (1889) and H. Gautier, "Les Français au Tonkin, 1787–1884" (1884).

For the push to the North, see—

V. de Carné, "Voyage en Indo-Chine et dans l'Empire Chinois" (1869).

de Kergaradec, "Rapport sur la première reconnaissance du fleuve du Tonkin" (1876–1877),—a Consul's report.

J. Dupuis, "Les origines de la question du Tonkin" (1896) and "Le Tonkin et l'Intervention française" (1898),—by the first explorer.

Garnier in "Bulletin de la Société de Géographie," January, 1872, —an important article.

"Excursions et Reconnaissances" (published by Government of Cochinchina, 1879–1887),—for documents.

The above-mentioned are some of the documents on which policy in the early period was determined.

For the actual expedition and the events leading up to it, see—

Debates in Deputies, July and especially December, 1883; October–November, 1884; and the important debate of March 29–31, 1885,—Ferry's fall.

"Procès-verbaux de la Commission parlementaire des crédits du Tonkin," in *Journal Officiel*, July 20, 1886,—a lot of evidence on the Tonkin question.

A. Rivière, "L'Expédition du Tonkin. La chute du Ministère Ferry" (1888).

Bouinais et Paulis, "L'Indo-Chine contemporaine," Vol. II, 1885.

For the Siam episode, see—

Livre Jaune, "Affaires du Siam, 1893–1901" (1901).

Debates in Deputies, *Journal Officiel*, February 25-28, 1896.
 Seauve, "Les Relations de la France avec le Siam, 1880-1897" (1900).

2. OFFICIAL.

The Doumer Reports:—

"Rapport d'Ensemble sur les affaires de l'Indo-Chine," March 22, 1897.

"Rapport sur la Situation de l'Indo-Chine, 1897-1901" (1902).

"L'Indo-Chine française" (1905),—a good account of his work.

All bases for the period of transformation.

Beau's Report, "Situation de l'Indo-Chine de 1902 à 1907" (1908),—2 vols.,—for the period of reconstruction after Doumer.

Governor-General's report to Conseil du Gouvernement, "Situation générale de l'Indo-Chine,"—1 big vol. a year.

Annual budget-reports in French parliament, especially Messimy's, 1909, 1910, and Viollette's, 1911.

Journal Officiel de l'Indo-Chine, 1888 on,—for documents.

"Bulletin Economique de l'Indo-Chine," from 1898.

"Bulletin Officiel de l'Indo-Chine française,"—from 1886, and since 1902 for all the States.

Codifications of the law by de Casanova, 3 vols., 1919, or Petit-Jean for the assimilated Cochinchina, 1917.

A fundamental source for events is "L'Asie Française," 1901,—also reprints the most important documents and debates.

3. GENERAL.

J. Chailley-Bert, "Paul Bert au Tonkin" (1887),—a comprehensive account of a crucial period.

J. L. de Lanessan, "L'Indo-Chine française" (1889),—a good account of policy and conditions.

— "La colonisation française en Indo-Chine" (1895),—an excellent account of early conditions and the author's Governor-Generalship, 1891-1894.

M. de Pourvoirville, "Etudes Coloniales":

Part I. "Le Tonkin actuel, 1888-1889."

Part II. "Deux Années de lutte, 1889-1891."

Part III. "La politique indo-chinoise, 1892-1893."

— "L'Asie Française" (1911). Good analyses by a competent authority.

Important article in "La Quinzaine Coloniale," February 10, 1906, on government.

Mission Pavie,— "L'Indo-Chine" (10 vols., 1898-).

H. F. Dartein, "La Vie et les Travaux de A. Rousseau—Gouverneur Général de l'Indo-Chine" (1902),—for the period of failure.

F. Bernard, "L'Indo-Chine" (1901),—to show the state of the country in 1900,—useful but somewhat flimsy.

C. Lemire, "Les Cinq Pays de l'Indo-Chine française" (1899).

L. Salaun, "L'Indo-Chine" (1903).

Ordonneau, "L'Organisation judiciaire en Indo-Chine" (1909).

Magnabal, "L'Indo-Chine" (1910).

J. Ajalbert, "Les Destinées de l'Indo-Chine" (1909),—by a Minister of the Colonies.

A. Gaisman, "L'Œuvre de la France au Tonkin" (1906),—the best short history, very dependable.

A. Métin, "L'Indo-Chine et l'Opinion" (1916),—account of weaknesses in 1912–1913 by the reporter on the colonial budget for 1913 and the Indo-Chinese loan for 1912. An excellent survey by a first-rate authority.

Special number of "La Vie Technique et Industrielle" (Paris), 1922,—an excellent analysis of both past and present economic conditions, and especially good for railways, the currency-problem, and the country's resources.

Fournier-Vailly, in "L'Asie Française," May–December, 1920,—an authoritative discussion of Indo-China's position.

Caillard, "L'Indo-Chine française" (1922),—especially for the bibliography.

Angoulvant in "Colonies et Marine," August, 1922,—the best summary of Long's work.

Russier et Brenier, "L'Indo-Chine française,"—by two competent authorities.

De Galembert, "Les administrations et les services publics indo-chinois" (1924).

4. THE SEPARATE COLONIES. (See *Occupation, General.*)

COCHIN-CHINA.

"Bulletin officiel de la Cochinchine française," 1865 on.

"Annuaire de la Cochinchine," 1865 on.

Vial (1874) and Cultru (1910), *op. cit.*

ANNAM.

P. T. Silvestre, "L'Empire de l'Annam et le peuple annamite" (1889),—by a diplomat.

Aymenier, "Notes sur l'Annam et le Cambodge."

Luro, "Le Pays d'Annam" (2nd edition), 1897,—the fundamental account.

C. Gosselin, "L'Empire d'Annam" (1904). Compare his "Le Laos," 1900.

CAMBODIA.

"Doudart de Lagrée. Lettres d'un Précurseur" (1885).

L. Aymonier, "Le Cambodge," 3 vols., 1900–1904.

J. Harmand, "Voyage au Cambodge."

Lemire, "Le Laos Annamite" (1894).

L. de Reinach, "Le Laos" (1911); compare E. Ricanon, "Le Laos français."

Froidevaux on origins in "L'Asie Française" (1906).

A. Rousseau, "Le Protectorat français du Cambodge,"—thesis, 1904.

Silvestre, "Le Cambodge administratif" (1923).

TONKIN.

See *General*, page 727.

5. ECONOMIC.

- P. Leroy-Beaulieu, "La Rénovation de l'Asie" (1900).
 Chambre de Commerce de Lyon.—"La Mission lyonnaise en Chine, 1895-1897" (1898),—the heyday of the Yunnan idea. Compare report in *Journal Officiel*, January 28, 1890.
 British Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 324, 1901,—trade report; and annual report in Consular and Diplomatic Reports.
 Krantz Report (railways), in *Journal Officiel*, sess. ext., 1895, p. 1608.
 G. Démorgny, "Les Principales Réformes financières en Indo-Chine de 1897 à 1900."
 J. Grenard, "L'Organisation budgétaire de l'Indo-Chine" (1904),—two theses on the financial reforms of Doumer's time.
 A. Néton, "L'Indo-Chine et son Avenir Economique" (1904),—a short historical account, analysing the position in 1903. Good criticisms.
 J. Devallé, "La Main d'Œuvre en Indo-Chine" (1905).
 Debates in *Journal Officiel*, Deps., April 4-7, 1911; Senate, July 1-2, 1911; Deps., July 4-6, 1912.
 M. Peyrouton, "Les Monopoles en Indo-Chine,"—compare thesis by R. Monier on the same subject.
 H. Brenier, "Essai d'Atlas statistique de l'Indo-Chine française" (1914),—a good economic analysis.
 — "Note sur la colonisation française en Indo-Chine" (supplement to "L'Asie Française," December, 1923).

These two are the only statistical analyses of France's achievements.

- A. Boudillon, "Le Régime de la Propriété Foncière en Indo-Chine" (1915), or Dareste, 1914, for land.

For customs, see R. Ferry, 1912, *op. cit.*, or Sambic Report on Indo-China, in Congrès du Régime Douanier Colonial, 1925 (Marseilles).

For monetary problems, see—

- J. H. Adam, "L'Argent Métail et la Question monétaire en Indo-Chine" (1922),—for the details of the various crises.

Report of Berru Commission in "Bulletin Economique de l'Indo-Chine," July-October, 1921.

- J. M. Detieux, "La Question monétaire en Indo-Chine" (1907).
 Article by Gourdon in "Colonies et Marine," February, 1921,—position in 1920.

- A. Touzet, "L'Emprunt national de 1918 en Indo-Chine" (1919),—for a novel episode in French colonization.

6. THE NATIVE PROBLEM.

Sections in L. Vignon, "Un Programme de Politique Coloniale" (1919),—the best modern account of pre-French organization and the effects of European contact.

Luro, "Le Pays d'Annam," 1897,—the first account of the bases of native society and still very important.

L. de Lajonquière, "Ethnographie du Tonkin septentrional" (1906).

G. Maspéro, "Le Royaume de Champa" (1914),—on the most backward races. Compare d'Ollane, "Les Derniers Barbares," 1911.

Philastre, "Le Code annamite,"—2 vols., 1876; re-issued, 1909.

- G. Garros, "Les usages de Cochinchine" (1905),—customs and relationship to French law. Compare study by Schreiner, 3 vols., 1890-1892.
- Ory, "La Commune annamite au Tonkin" (1894); compare Dareste, 1904.
- Le Myre de Vilers, "Les institutions civiles de la Cochinchine" (1908),—for the position on first contact in 1879-1881.
- G. Dumontier, "Les Débuts de l'Enseignement française au Tonkin" (1887).
- Lafargue, "L'Immigration chinoise en Indo-Chine" (thesis, 1909).

IX. THE ANCIENNES COLONIES. (CHAPTER XII.)

1. OFFICIAL.

- Annual budget-reports in French parliament.
- Annuaire de la Guadeloupe et dépendances (Basse Terre).
- Annuaire de Martinique (Port de France).
- Journal Officiel de la Martinique, 1902 on; and of Guadeloupe, 1882 on.
- Office Coloniale—"Notice sur la Guadeloupe" and "Notice sur la Martinique,"—periodical.

2. GENERAL.

- P. Chemin-Dupontès, "Les Petites Antilles. Etudes sur leur Evolution économique" (1907),—a model thesis by a statistician of the Colonial Ministry. This gives in detail all the information one needs on the development of the sugar-islands.
- "Congrès des Anciennes Colonies," 1909,—a fundamental collection of reports and important conclusions.
- "Revue de la Sucrerie indigène et coloniale" (Paris), for sugar-fluctuations.
- Many papers on the position of assimilation and the Councils in each of the Congresses, earlier quoted. The islands were an experimental ground in this regard.
- H. Mouet, "La Martinique" (1892).
- E. Legier, "La Martinique et la Guadeloupe" (1905),—especially for statistics.
- For the banks, and their especial place in the colonial system, see de Lanessan, "L'Expansion Coloniale de la France" (1886), p. 972 *et seq.*, and "Rapport annuel de la Commission des Banques Coloniales au Président de la République."
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"Journal Officiel des établissements françaises de l'Océanie," 1884 on (analysis by Heimburger, 1915),—for official events and especially reports and other documents.

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G. Scholefield, "The Pacific: its past and future" (1912),—a good account from Parliamentary papers.

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S. H. Roberts, "Population Problems of the Pacific" (1927),—for an analysis of the native-problems of the French groups in detail. Statistics of population-movements in a handy form.

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H. Rivière, "Souvenirs de la Nouvelle Calédonie" (1881),—by "Rivière of Tonkin."

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J. B. Alberti, "Etude sur la Colonisation à la Nouvelle Calédonie" (1909),—thesis,—a lengthy and good analysis of both convict and free settlement.

M. Long, "La Nouvelle Calédonie" (1925),—a good economic analysis.

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C. Depincée, "La Crise néo-calédonienne" (1905),—the slump after Feillet.

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"Rapport sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban," August, 1922, onwards. Reports to the League of Nations,—good accounts, especially from a statistical point of view. The one for 1924 is excellent.

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 N. Mutran, "La Syrie de demain," 1916.
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